This content was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with authority.
The new US president’s top priority for Taiwan will be to communicate clearly and quickly about progress in the partnership to prevent provocations from the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ), as in previous transitions, despite concerns of backsliding.
After Joe Biden won the election four years ago, this author , wrote , that” the Trump and Tsai administrations have repaired the US-Taiwan connection, and the question is whether Biden’s leadership will slow gains in the , solid relationship”.
In my opinion,” there probably wo n’t be a significant rollback of progress returning to weaker engagement.” That positive expectation has frequently been met. However, drawing on his special authority as leader and as a former legislator who had voted for the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, P. L. 96-8, Biden declared constantly that the , US government would support  , to defend Taiwan.
But both present applicants show signs of stepping back, with Kamala , Harris , refusing to “get into suppositions” and Donald , Trump , saying that” Taiwan may compensate us for security”. The winner of their contest should have to support President Biden’s open declaration as one of their top priorities.
Concerns, consistency, and changes
Since 1979, every president has cited the Taiwan Relations Act, which is bipartisan. On Capitol Hill, Congressional oversight of the president centers on the act and its , legislative intent , for creative ambiguity to enable the bilateral, non-diplomatic relationship in spite of the , United States ‘ “one China” policy.
Nonetheless, common approaches also have included the George W Bush and Barrack Obama administrations ‘ , freezes , of congressional notifications of arms sales.
There have been modifications that have altered the approach. For example, Biden’s State Department re-imposed unnecessary restrictions on contacts by itself and the rest of the Executive Branch with Taiwan that then-Secretary of State , Mike Pompeo , had removed completely.
Moreover, the next president could re-ignite a debate about cooperation with the PRC. Instead, it would be prudent to continue the bipartisan, realistic re-assessment of PRC threats. Biden ‘s , National Security Strategy , of 2022 points to the PRC as” the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it” —in line with Trump’s changes. Similarly, Congress has bipartisan re-assessments, particularly that conducted by the , Select Committee , on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.
Further, the strategic environment has worsened in the last four years. Factors include the PRC’s increasing aggressiveness toward Taiwan and the Philippines, Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine since 2022 and Israel’s conflicts since 2023, as well as the Beijing-Moscow strategic axis tightening in cahoots against Washington and its allies.
While not the only reason, arming Ukraine has exacerbated delays in delivering weapons to Taiwan worth$ 18.7 billion, as Sen.  , Josh Hawley , (R-Missouri ) wrote in December 2022 to the Department of State. State has acknowledged the problem, continuing to ask to work with industry to end administrative and production delays, and fix supply chains , at the US-Taiwan , Defense Industry Conference , in September 2024.
Realism, urgency, and cultures
At the same time, Taiwan has been forced to make serious and urgent military reforms for asymmetric defense,  , longer conscription, and more resources as a result of the conflict in Ukraine.
US presidential support needs to remain in alignment with Republic of China ( Taiwan ) President Lai Ching-te’s realism and reforms of Taiwan’s problematic diplomatic and military cultures, especially given , gaps between US and Taiwanese military cultures.
Strategy, security, and stability
Top leadership is needed for a US strategy. Briefly, what are specific priorities no matter who is the president? The president will have to lead US and allied actions to impose costs on the PRC for its , destabilizing , behavior, including the Joint Sword series of military exercises. Expediting , weapons deliveries , is a well-known priority, particularly for , new F-16V fighters , that this author first proposed in 2017.
But major arms acquisitions are not sufficient. Taiwan requires more munitions, training (especially for fighter pilots ), and interoperability with the US. Building on Taiwan’s willingness to acquire asymmetric capabilities, as urged by both the Trump and Biden Administrations, is one of its top priorities.
Advice in modernizing , operational concepts , for joint, decentralized warfighting will build on Taiwan’s defense reforms and training by US Joint Training Teams (JTTs ), military services, and National Guards. The president will support cooperation in unmanned aircraft systems ( UAS ) and counter-UAS capability.
Taiwan will be encouraged by the new president to increase its defense budget so that it can at least meet its 3 % GDP goal. Bilateral talks about cost-effective spending will need to resolve differences about Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Submarine ( IDS ) program, planned to cost almost ,$ 9 billion  , for seven vessels after the first prototype.
A new area of cooperation between allies and partners is the defense industrial resilience. The US under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment presided over the first meeting of the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience ( PIPIR ) in Honolulu in October 2024. Taiwan’s vice minister of defense for armaments,  , General Hsu Yen-Pu, attended, after talking with US officials and industry at the Defense Industry Conference.
Increasing Washington-Taipei cooperation between coast guards is a complementary priority, particularly to counter Beijing’s provocations in “gray zone” coercion.
As Ukraine’s civilian resistance demonstrates to Taiwan, a priority is to strengthen its , whole-of-society resilience , ( as the Atlantic Council recommends, for example ). Lai has broadened defense and resilience beyond Taiwan’s military to the society, a development with US support. His National Security Council ( NSC ) has led coordination for resilience, explaining to this author in June 2024. Taiwan’s new realism is seen in its , Zero Day , drama ( publicized in July ).
Building up this whole-of-society resilience will need to include critical infrastructure protection, defense against cyber attacks, and stockpiles, including phone and internet connections and supplies of energy sources, food, medicines, and water. Without power or phones, Taiwan’s citizens require real-world experiences and exercises.
Moreover, Taiwan’s sensitive subject that would benefit from the US presidential experience is continuity of government amid the PRC’s threats of “decapitation” by targeting the leadership and command centers. Taiwan needs to solve its problem of having only a short bench of publicly named officials for , presidential succession , and thus for the commander-in-chief. Although Taiwan’s president and vice president should not be in the same place, they should still appear together.
Reinforcing priorities
The president will decide on Lai’s” stopover” on the way to visit Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, consistent with established practice. He or she will build on Biden’s leadership in growing multilateral support for Taiwan, such as by the , Group of 7 , and the Global Cooperation and Training Framework ( GCTF ) involving the US, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and Canada.
The president will be compelled to disarm that political conflict by effectively refuting the UN General Assembly’s gaslighting manipulation of Resolution 2758  because the PRC never explicitly stated that Taiwan belongs to the PRC’s jurisdiction.
The president’s leadership will be important for a bilateral agreement to , eliminate double taxation, including for investments in the key semi-conductor sector. Another priority will be agreements in the , US-Taiwan Initiative , on 21st Century Trade.
By sending a Cabinet-ranking official to Taipei, the new president will need to regain credibility and consistency. Since 1992, Biden has failed to permit such visits in accordance with the law.
In sum, such presidential priorities will strategically strengthen , integrated deterrence , across military and non-military domains. Reinforcing that deterrence, the partnership will improve democratic Taiwan’s economic and societal resilience, and international inclusion and legitimacy.
Shirley Kan is a senior adjunct fellow of the Pacific Forum, a founding member of the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Institute ( GTI), a member of the Advisory Council of the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue, and a freelancer with the US Congress at the Congressional Research Service ( CRS ).