This content was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with authority.
Taiwan’s national safety is in danger of being compromised both internally and externally from two different angles.
The People’s Republic of China, of training, poses the greatest and most immediate danger. Beijing’s long-standing location is that Taiwan may not fully socially separate itself from China. The PRC’s red column for military activity has never been completely clear. The presidents of Taiwan ( Chen Shiu-bian, 2000-2008 ) and Lai Ching-te, the current president, have publicly stated that the country is independent, sovereign.
Until recently it was reasonable to believe Beijing may be willing to push the could down the road indefinitely as long as the governments in Taipei did not attempt a movement that would seem to define juridical separation from China, quite as altering the Republic of China law.
However, under Xi Jinping, the country’s most powerful chief, that has gotten questionable. According to Xi, Taiwan’s de facto independence” should not be passed down generation after generation,” despite the lack of progress toward integration.
Beijing indirectly announced in early 2024 that the Chinese government may keep a massive military training later in the year after President Lai’s opening statement expected in May. The People’s Liberation Army continued to play its war games despite the mild remarks made in Lai’s speech and in the rest of his.
If Taipei’s cautious behavior no longer restates potential aggression by China, the situation is much more dangerous.
The PRC armed forces continue not only their rapid buildup and modernization, but also specific preparations for possible military action against Taiwan. Admiral Samuel Paparo, the commander of US forces in the Indo-Pacific region, claims that Chinese military drills near Taiwan are” not exercises, they are rehearsals for war.”
China has reportedly constructed barges that can transport and assemble a bridge to land military vehicles directly onto coastal roads, making it more likely that an amphibious invasion would take place over treacherous beaches.
A Chinese company revealed recently that it is building a million kamikaze drones for the PRC government, with delivery dates anticipated in 2026.
On top of this, of course, China carries out , gray zone , and , subversive , activities and , lawfare , to weaken Taiwan’s ability to stand up for itself against Beijing’s agenda.
Watchers like Russell Hsiao, director of the Global Taiwan Institute, can be awed by what he refers to as” a significant shift in Beijing’s overall strategy from deterring Taiwan’s independence to compelling its unification” with China.
internal division
Internally,  , Taiwan’s two major political parties have fundamentally different views about how to deal with China. China is Taiwan’s mother nation for the Kuomintang ( KMT ), despite the existence of a rival government that currently governs the country. China should have no justification for using military force against Taiwan if Taiwan does not intend to break away from China. Many KMT politicians are therefore lukewarm about increasing the defense budget and about deepening security cooperation with the US.
On the other hand, Taiwanese nationalism is reflected in the Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ). It developed as a result of the KMT government’s unilateral rule over Taiwan that the exiled KMT government imposed from 1945 until the late 1980s. For the DPP, China is an enemy country, Taiwan must prepare to defend its democratic way of life from annihilation, and the US is a crucial bulwark against Chinese aggression.
Taiwan’s deployment of a coherent defense policy is a complication between the politically Blue supporters ( including the KMT ) and the Green supporters ( DPP ).
KMT politicians and other conservative commentators keep repeating CCP talking points. The Taiwan media outlet , China Times, for example, “has morphed from a mainstream publication into what critics call a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist party” , , Financial Times , observes. Tsai Eng-meng, the owner of China Times , who owes his wealth to business in China and has a history of making pro-China statements, is the owner of the snack food company.
One of these common talking points is the idea that Washington’s master plan is to start a war with Taiwan and China, then abandon Taiwan in order to weaken China. It is also known as yimeilun, or skepticism toward America.
During Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election campaign, Foxconn founder Terry Gou, originally a KMT candidate who later opted to run as an independent,  , said , he opposed” buying weapons from the United States” because” If you don’t have a knife or a gun ,]China ] may not specifically attack you”.
Hou You-yi, a KMT candidate, and Ke Wen-je, a Blue-affiliated candidate for the Taiwan People’s Party, both voiced concerns about the US using Taiwan as a” chess piece,” a theme that is prevalent in PRC propaganda. Taiwan should instead start discussions with Beijing about Taiwan’s political status in response to the rumored US unreliability, which supports the idea that a successful military defense of Taiwan against a PLA attack is impossible.
Taiwan’s 2020 Anti-Infiltration Act was controversial. The PRC government and the KMT both opposed the law, which the DPP claimed was necessary to stop PRC influence in Taiwan’s elections. A journalist from Taiwan claimed that the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office was in regular contact with CtiTV, China Times, and other outlets owned by Tsai to help coordinate opposition to the law.
Lai’s government is trying to increase defense spending, but a divided legislature is resisting. Although the DPP is in charge of Taiwan’s executive branch, a Blue Coalition led by the KMT has a small majority in the legislature.
The legislature passed a budget in January that cut funding for other military equipment, including drones, and restricted the remaining funds allocated to Taiwan’s submarine building program. It also trimmed 60 % from the military’s publicity budget, which pays for recruitment campaigns. Legislators from KMT claimed that their goals were to reduce wasteful spending.
A robust civil defense system would help, according to many analysts, stop China from trying to conquer Taiwan. KMT politicians, however, have joined the PRC government in specifically attacking Taiwan’s Kuma Academy, a private company that teaches civil defense skills.
The Trump factor
Taiwan’s long-standing security partner presents a third set of challenges to its security.
The Trump administration wants Taiwan to spend more to build up its armed forces, which would imply buying more weapons from the US, Taiwan’s only major foreign arms supplier. Taiwan should spend 10 % of its GDP on defense, according to both Trump and his nominee for Under Secretary of Defense, Elbridge Colby. Meeting that goal would be impossible for the Taiwanese government, according to the government.
Developed countries typically have government budgets equivalent to 40 or 50 % of GDP. However, Taiwan’s national budget is only 14 % of GDP, which is comparatively small. Even a reduction in the defense budget’s allocation to 5 % of GDP would eat into other forms of investment, including those that are also essential to national security, such as education and infrastructure.
The US has allowed its defense industrial base to wither to the point where it’s uncertain America could prevail in a war against China. China might succeed because of its ability to produce more munitions and platforms than the US, even if many of its weapons systems are qualitatively superior. This means that even with US military intervention, Taiwan might be unable to halt a PLA assault.
Finally, the US’s willingness to act is in dispute. Trump is noticeably less enthusiastic about defending Taiwan than his or her predecessor. He appears to hold a grudge against Taiwan for allegedly” stealing” America’s semiconductor business.
Similar to his criticism of Japan and South Korea, he accuses Taiwan of stifling US protection. He emphasizes and emphasizes that Taiwan is challenging to defend. He , said , publicly he would respond to a Chinese military attack with economic sanctions.
The option to soft surrender
Taiwan can get out of this by making a soft surrender by voluntarily annexing the PRC. This would remove the threat of attack from China, would do away with the need for US protection, and would halt the conflict between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms among Taiwan’s people.
However, in reality, this would benefit both national security and human security.
Using Taiwan’s knowledge that China was watching, illustrates the rapid and vindictive crackdown on civil liberties in Hong Kong since 2019. Previous assurances about how Beijing would treat Taiwan after unification – such as Taiwan retaining retain control of its own military, government, and economic affairs and the PRC not stationing troops or administrative personnel in Taiwan– are excised from the Chinese government’s 2022 , white paper , on Taiwan.
The rough treatment of Taiwan by the Chinese mainland government following its liberation from Japan in 1945 was what caused the uprising on February 28, 1947. KMT bureaucrats and soldiers looted the island and disrespected its citizens, claiming they had been brainwashed by 50 years of Japanese colonial rule.
A chilling echo of this attitude is a , sentiment , common on today’s Chinese social media:” Keep the island, don’t keep the people”.
The opinions expressed in PacNet commentaries and responses are those of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcome and encouraged.
Denny Roy ( royd@eastwestcenter .org )  , is a senior fellow at the East-West Center who specializes in Asia-Pacific international security issues.