South Asia (Page 6)

For the fifth Quad Leaders ‘ Summit, US President Joe Biden hosted for the last moment his peers from Japan, Australia, and India in Manila this year.

The US head focused on institutionalizing participation and the alleged threats posed by China in remarks made by Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his home state of Delaware.

” China continues to behave violently, testing us all across the place, and it’s true in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, South China, South Asia and the Taiwan Straits”, Biden told his brother Quad officials. &nbsp,

” At least from our perspective, we believe Xi Jinping is looking to focus on domestic economic problems and minimize the volatility in China diplomatic ties, and he’s also looking to buy himself some diplomatic place, in my view, to forcefully pursue China’s attention”, Biden said during the high-level meet in a hot-mic time.

Although more measured in their joint statement, the four strong political leaders announced a series of innovative initiatives with a growing emphasis on quality system growth, security, semiconductors and, most crucially, coastal security.

In particular, they announced the launch of mutual coast guard procedures for 2025 regardless of who wins the White House following the November election, and made a promise to improve military logistics cooperation by expanding the previous Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness.

Beijing was quick to criticize and even denounce aspects of the meeting, despite Quad leaders ‘ attempts to portray the event as a more comprehensive and constructive gathering. The grouping was too “loose” and informal to have any impact on the global and regional balance of power, according to the state-backed Global Times.

Chinese experts who claimed the Quad was inciting “bloc confrontation” and adopting a Cold War-style mindset at the expense of regional security in Asia were also featured in the same nationalist newspaper.

In a press conference earlier this year, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian was reported as accusing the four partner nations of “scaremongering, inciting antagonism and confrontation, and holding back other countries’ development”.

China’s growing interest in maritime security and its increasingly harsh criticism of the Asian power’s actions in neighboring waters seem to have been particularly piqued by Quad’s growing focus on maritime security.

The leaders of the US, Japan, Australia, and India” serious concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas,” according to a thinly veiled criticism of Beijing.

The risky “new normal” of constant clashes and near-clashes between Manila and Beijing in the South China Sea in recent months raises concerns for the US and its allies especially.

India has become more active in regional maritime disputes by publicly supporting and arming the Philippines with advanced weapons, including its potent supersonic BrahMos missiles, despite not being a claimant state or a US ally.

Indian officials have occasionally used the phrase” West Philippine Sea” to describe Manila’s claims in the disputed South China Sea waters.

In the East China Sea, Japan is directly involved in maritime disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In addition to expanding its security cooperation with Manila, Tokyo recently signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA ), which places a greater emphasis on emergencies in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

It has close security cooperation with both Japan and the Philippines under a Status of Forces Agreement and is an Australian ally of the US. In recent quadrilateral naval patrols with the Philippines and the US in the South China Sea, both Japan and Australia have participated.

However, Washington, which has a Mutual Defense Treaty ( MDT ) with the Philippines and is concerned about the escalated situation, which many fear could soon put to the test against China.

The US Indo-Pacific Command ( INDOPACOM) provided, in a first, direct assistance in joint resupply missions to hotly disputed features like the Second Thomas Shoal, which is a de facto Philippine military base, following numerous near-clashes and direct collisions between Chinese and Filipino maritime forces in recent months.

The Philippines and China were successful in reducing tensions over the Second Thomas and Sabina shoals following several rounds of bilateral negotiations, including the recently concluded Bilateral Consultation Mechanism high-level meeting in Beijing.

Upon closer examination, however, there is every indication that the South China Sea disputes have entered an unstable and dangerous “new normal”.

Tensions have resumed over the Second Thomas Shoal in recent days following weeks of relative calm and no significant incidents involving Chinese and Philippine maritime forces.

According to Philippine authorities, between September 17-23, China deployed as many as 251 vessels, representing a new milestone in China’s “gray zone” swarming tactics in the disputed maritime area.

” This time, this is the biggest increase we’ve seen”, Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad, the Philippine Navy spokesperson for the South China Sea, told reporters this week.

According to him, “if we notice, the total number of maritime militia vessels in the entire South China Sea could be between 350 and 400.” He also warned of a dangerous increase in China’s presence across disputed waters at the expense of smaller claimant states.

China has largely adhered to its non-lethal gray zone tactics, including frequent ramming and water cannoning of smaller Philippine vessels. Under the mutual defense treaty between the two countries, any “armed attack” against Philippine troops or vessels would automatically lead to American military intervention.

China has, however, successfully used its enormous fleet, which is currently the largest on earth, to determine the speed and coordinates of maritime conflict across the South China Sea.

From Beijing’s perspective, its true rivals are not smaller claimant states such as the Philippines, which has a modernizing yet still limited fleet of warships, but rather the US and the broader Quad.

China believes it is facing nothing less than a Washington-orchestrated” containment” strategy in tandem with a network of regional treaty allies and strategic partners, most notably India.

For Chinese analysts, the Quad is playing a “detrimental role of fomenting confrontation and inciting geopolitical tensions in]the ] Asia-Pacific”.

Ding Duo, deputy director of the Institute of Maritime Law and Policy at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, stated to the Global Times that “targeting China” is done at a strategic level as well as tactical arrangements and specific plans.

According to Li Haidong, a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University, the Quad is” US-led and serves as a strategic tool in its competition with China at both regional and global levels.”

Even senior Chinese officials are starting to criticize the Quad with similarly harsh words, reflecting growing concerns in Beijing over the formation of a new Cold War with the West.

” Quad keeps chanting the slogan of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and all the while, it has been scaremongering, inciting antagonism and confrontation, and holding back other countries’ development”, underscoring Beijing’s threat perceptions towards the quadrilateral grouping.

“]The Quad ] runs counter to the overwhelming trend of pursuing peace, development, cooperation, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and will by no means gain any support”, Chinese spokesperson Lin said at a press conference earlier this year. China “firmly opposes the bloc confrontation they incite in the name of “anti-coercion,” and the enforcing of house rules in the name of maintaining order.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Richeydarian

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The third in-person Triple officials ‘ summit was held in Wilmington, Delaware, the town of US President Joe Biden, on September 21, 2024 amid confusion about the grouping’s potential.

The conference marked the end of a certain time because it was the next meeting to feature retiring US President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

In order to host the summit in his last year as president, Biden and India agreed that the US and India had exchange host years, giving Prime Minister Narendra Modi the opportunity to do so.

Another real reason for holding the Quad in the US was that it gave Kishida one more chance to participate before the governing Liberal Democratic Party’s ( LDP ) presidential election on September 27, 2013.

Kishida, who is not running for re-election, is attending his past political function as prime minister, along with Modi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, at the United Nations General Assembly.

Functional outcomes

The Indo-Pacific Quad’s incarceration efforts and reputation as a service of public goods are further strengthened by the Wilmington Declaration. The charter introduced six new activities:

• The Indo-Pacific country’s cancer death rate is being reduced by the Quad Cancer Moonshot Initiative. The Quad states will expand treatment options and care, improve access to tests, and encourage more HPV vaccines to combat cervical cancer, possibly saving the lives of millions of women. They will do this thanks to innovations developed in Queensland, Australia.

• Increasing training and enhancing existing capacities to ensure that regional partners can continue to strengthen their ability to thwart illegal marine operations through the expansion of the Quad Indo-Pacific Partnership for Marine Domain Awareness ( IPMDA ).

• By bringing together Triple partners to create a joint Triple aircraft power, the Indo-Pacific Logistics Network Pilot aims to increase the performance, performance, and timeliness of humanitarian aid and the response to natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific region.

• In order to improve maritime security and interoperability among Quad coast guard units, the second Quad-at-Sea send spectator goal will be launched in 2025 as part of the Quad Coast Guard Cooperation.

• However, in collaboration with governments in Southeast and South Asia as well as Pacific area states, the Quad will create an Indo-Pacific sea training program – MAITRI, which means “friendship” in Sanskrit. Now, Quad member states provide individual instruction for these nations, including exercises in sea rescue and improper fishing monitoring. The planned initiative aims to increase their performance by synchronizing the exercises to minimize clash. The first MAITRI workshop may be held in India in 2025.

• A quadratic coastal legal dialogue will help to advance the Indo-Pacific’s rules-based sea order.

The Delaware Summit commemorated the Quad’s 20th celebration. The Quad was established in 2004 as an ad hoc system to coordinate disaster reaction in the midst of the storm in the Indian Ocean.

Shinzo Abe, the then-prime minister of Japan, suggested calling the gathering the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007. The file did not succeed, however, because many individuals were concerned about upsetting China.

Abe, yet, always gave up on the Quad. The four original Quad places reaffirmed their commitment to the Quad model in soon 2017, on the eve of the ASEAN Summit in Manila.

The Quad gained momentum despite the release of independent push releases outlining specific local objectives. In 2019, they held their second ministerial-level gathering on the outside of the UN General Assembly.

During the Biden-Kishida time, the Quad more institutionalized itself. In March 2021, the Quad officials held their first digital Leaders ‘ Summit. This introduced a move from merely speaking to speaking. They established working organizations on climate change and crucial systems, and they pledged to provide one billion Covid-19 immunizations to the Indo-Pacific.

Although the future US and Japan elections may result in new leadership interactions, the Quad style will most likely survive. The gathering of the main sea governments is not representative of any one management or set of views, according to Mira Rapp-Hooper, senior producer for East Asia and Oceania at the White House, but rather a set of enduring objectives shared by all four countries.

In Japan, the Quad carries both Abe’s and Kishida’s legacy. The LDP is largely supportive of the Quad Agenda and Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.

In the US, it is likely, if elected president, that Kamala Harris will remain the Biden administration’s method to the Quad. If Donald Trump wins, it is also possible that his administration will continue to support the strategy he supported as chairman in 2017.

Next, in recognition of the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans, his administration changed the name of the US Pacific Command to the US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018. The US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific was eventually released by the Trump presidency in 2018.

Erik Lenhart is a former Deputy Chief of the Mission of the Slovak Republic in Tokyo and graduated from Charles University with an MA in social research.

Michael Tkacik holds a JD from Duke University and a PhD from the University of Maryland. Tkacik’s current research interests include the relevance of China’s fall, China’s actions in the South China Sea, and atomic weapons plan across Asia. He is the head of the School of Honors at Stephen F. Austin State University in Texas and a professor of authorities there.

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The insurgency in Balochistan has intensified, marked by a surge in violent attacks by Baloch insurgents across the region. On August 26, the anniversary of the death of Baloch autonomy leader Nawab Akbar Bugti, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) orchestrated a series of deadly assaults in Lasbella, Makran and Gwadar, resulting in significant casualties.

Notably, in Lasbella, the Frontier Corps’ check post was attacked by a female suicide bomber – Maheel Baloch – leading to the death of several security personnel. Maheel Baloch was the third Baloch female, after Shari Baloch and Sumaiya Qalandrani, who have carried out suicide attacks.

For the first time, BLA militants extended their operations into the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, where they intercepted passenger buses and brutally executed 23 individuals from Punjab province after scrutinizing their identity cards. This attack underscores the increasing ferocity of the insurgency.

Balochistan is now grappling with the most intense phase of its fifth insurgency. The first Baloch uprising erupted in 1948, followed by subsequent rebellions in 1958, 1963, and 1973 during the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The current wave is the fifth in this series, which began in 2004. It gained strength after the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed on August 26th, 2006, in the district of Kohlu.

The response of Pakistan’s military establishment, often referred to simply as “the Establishment,” has been fundamentally flawed from the outset. What began as a political issue has been mishandled and transformed into a purely security matter by both the federal government and the military.

This heavy-handed approach has aggravated the situation, plunging the entire province into a state of perpetual insecurity and chaos. The failure to grasp the complex socio-political underpinnings of the Balochistan conflict has only fueled resentment, deepened grievances and intensified the cycle of violence.

Balochistan is a province of immense strategic significance for Pakistan, both geopolitically and economically. It is home to Gwadar, a deep-sea port that is poised to become an important economic hub, contingent upon proper management and development.

Gwadar’s pivotal location at the mouth of the Persian Gulf offers direct access to the Arabian Sea, making it a vital node for regional and global trade routes. It is a linchpin of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion dollar infrastructure and development project aimed at enhancing connectivity between China and the Arabian Sea, thereby providing China with an alternate route for its energy imports.

The CPEC, a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), passes through Balochistan, making the province crucial for its success. China has invested significantly in Gwadar Port’s development and surrounding infrastructure, with plans for extensive highways, railways and energy projects to integrate the economies of China, Pakistan and other regional players.

The CPEC’s completion and operational success would not only elevate Gwadar to the status of a bustling trade and logistics hub but it would also potentially shift the region’s economic balance, enhancing Pakistan’s economic sovereignty and regional influence.

However, Gwadar’s strategic importance and its potential to enhance Sino-Pakistani economic collaboration have made it a target for regional adversaries. Pakistan’s hostile neighbors, wary of China’s growing presence in South Asia and the Arabian Sea, view a fully functional Gwadar as a threat to their strategic interests.

Consequently, these states may resort to sponsoring militant groups, inciting unrest and fostering instability within Balochistan to undermine the CPEC initiative. The use of non-state actors to perpetuate chaos serves as a primary strategy for these adversarial states to sabotage both China-Pakistan relations and the CPEC master plan.

This geopolitical tug-of-war over Balochistan has manifested in a multi-faceted insurgency that has escalated in recent years. Insurgent groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which have previously expressed grievances against Islamabad, are now increasingly perceived as proxies for foreign powers intent on destabilizing the region.

The province’s vast natural resources, including significant reserves of gas, coal and minerals, further complicate the situation as they represent not only a source of wealth but also a point of contention among various local, national and international actors.

To ensure stability and capitalize on Gwadar’s strategic potential, Pakistan must adopt a comprehensive approach guided by a series of pragmatic policy options that address Balochistan’s political and developmental needs while countering external factors seeking to undermine its progress.

First, the federal government must be genuine in its willingness and commitment to address the crisis in Balochistan. The dismissive attitude exemplified by statements like those of Mohsin Naqvi, the interior minister, who trivialized the Baloch insurgency as merely a task fit for a local police officer (SHO), is not only irresponsible but also counterproductive and condemnable. Such remarks reflect a lack of understanding and empathy for the complex dynamics at play in the region.

Second, meaningful development initiatives are urgently needed in Balochistan to create an environment conducive to dialogue. Long-standing grievances rooted in economic deprivation and underdevelopment must be addressed through targeted investments in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. Economic empowerment is crucial to winning the trust of the local population and laying the groundwork for constructive negotiations.

Third, an empowered committee should be established to initiate dialogue with Baloch insurgents. This committee must be composed of members whose histories show character and credibility from reputable political parties. Including figures perceived as mere puppets of the military would only exacerbate the problem, undermining the legitimacy of the peace process and alienating key stakeholders.

Fourth, reconciliation efforts are essential to appease disgruntled Baloch nationalists and those who have taken up arms. The government should prioritize dialogue and negotiation over force, offering political amnesty and reintegration programs for those willing to abandon violence and work toward peace.

Fifth, human rights violations in Balochistan, which have been rampant and unchecked, must come to a permanent end. Such abuses only serve to reinforce the narrative of the insurgents and fuel the cycle of resentment and conflict.

The government should ensure strict adherence to human rights standards, holding accountable any state actors found guilty of violations. This is crucial for building confidence among the local population and increasing the prospects for a successful peace process.

Finally, political participation in Balochistan must be free from military involvement. The province has long been notorious for electoral manipulations, through which the role of the “Establishment” in determining political outcomes has undermined democratic governance and fueled distrust among the people.

To ensure stability, the military must cease its interference in the political process, allowing for genuinely fair and transparent elections. Only through such a commitment to democratic norms can Islamabad hope to achieve lasting peace and stability in Balochistan.

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India’s commissioning of a second nuclear-powered submarine marks a bold, if not provocative, step in its nuclear deterrence amid rising geostrategic rivalry with China and ever-present tensions with neighboring Pakistan.

The move raises the nuclear stakes on the subcontinent while raising key new questions about the status of India’s long-standing policy of minimum deterrence amid growing strategic ambitions and risks.

Last month, The War Zone reported that India has commissioned the INS Arighat, marking a significant advancement in its strategic nuclear capabilities.

Commissioned in a low-key event attended by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, the submarine is an improved version of its predecessor INS Arihant. Launched in 2017, the INS Arighat has undergone extensive testing and is now fully operational.

It comes equipped with indigenously developed ballistic missiles, including the K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with an approximate range of 750 kilometers. This will enhance India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, a crucial component of its “no first use” nuclear policy.

To be sure, India’s SSBN fleet is still significantly outmatched by China’s in terms of numbers and missile range, The War Zone report notes.

The INS Arighat is part of India’s broader effort to develop a more robust and survivable nuclear triad, with plans for a larger INS Aridhaman and additional SSBNs under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program.

India’s drive to enhance its SSBN capabilities is driven by the looming threat of China, which is seeking to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, and the nuclear threat posed by its longtime rival Pakistan.

India’s  new submarine base in the Bay of Bengal, known as Project Varsha, will enable it to implement a bastion strategy, with the Bay of Bengal’s deep waters providing better cover for India’s SSBNs compared to the Arabian Sea and allowing undetected SLBM launches, Asia Times noted in June 2024.

India’s upcoming third aircraft carrier and escorts will safeguard the Bay of Bengal as part of its SSBN bastion strategy. The strategy will create a secure zone from which India can conceivably launch SLBMs unnoticed toward Chinese and Pakistani targets.

However, India’s undersea nuclear deterrent may be handicapped by the short range of its SLBMs, including the K-15, and will arguably lack credibility vis-à-vis China until it fields SLBMs with intercontinental range.

Until then, India’s SSBNs are limited to striking targets in southern Pakistan and would have to sail through the Malacca Strait to potentially hit targets in mainland China.

Asia Times noted in March 2024 that India’s primary nuclear arsenal deficiency is its limited warhead yields. This limitation would not be overcome by merely increasing the number of low-yield warheads in its inventory.

India’s nuclear capabilities are primarily geared toward power generation rather than nuclear weapons production, which is why its fissile material production is relatively slow despite its substantial nuclear infrastructure.

Yogesh Joshi points out in a March 2020 article for The Nonproliferation Review, a peer-reviewed journal, that the command and control of undersea nuclear weapons present several complex challenges for India, not least consistent communications with the surface.

He says this creates a dilemma where nuclear warheads must be pre-mated with missiles before patrols, effectively making the arsenal ready for use.

He points out that this situation complicates the “always-never” challenge of nuclear command, ensuring that authorized launches always happen while preventing unauthorized ones.

While India has developed procedural controls such as permissive action links (PAL) to mitigate risks, these mechanisms require extensive testing to ensure reliability during a crisis, Joshi says.

He notes that the effectiveness of these systems and the decision on whether to adopt a bastion strategy or continuous patrols remain significant issues as India seeks to secure a credible second-strike capability with its nascent SSBN fleet​.

Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda note in a July 2022 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that aircraft such as the Mirage 2000 and Jaguar serve as India’s primary nuclear delivery platforms as they have been modified to carry nuclear weapons.  

Kristensen and Korda mention that India’s land-based missiles, including the Prithvi and Agni series, are stationed strategically to ensure a credible second-strike capability, covering regional and intercontinental threats.

They say cruise missiles like the Nirbhay are being developed to complement these capabilities, offering a versatile platform India can launch from land, air or sea.

Kristensen and Korda say these platforms enhance India’s nuclear deterrence by ensuring multiple delivery options. They note that India’s multiple nuclear delivery systems complicate adversaries’ strategic calculations and reinforce India’s doctrine of credible minimum deterrence.

However, Zafar Khan argues in a November 2020 article in the peer-reviewed Comparative Strategy journal that India’s commitment to that policy faces challenges as the nation advances its strategic capabilities.

Khan mentions that India’s ambitious pursuit of deterrent force projects, such as the development of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), suggests a shift away from its stated minimalistic nuclear approach.

He says these changes and India’s growing strategic alliance with the US signify a broader transformation in its nuclear strategy, which is aimed at establishing a reliable deterrent against China and Pakistan, securing dominance in the region.

However, Khan notes these advancements create a paradox where India’s evolving nuclear strategy may no longer align with its original minimum deterrence policy.

He argues that India’s efforts to become a major global power could lead to regional instability, fuel an arms race with Pakistan and create new destabilizing complexities in South Asia’s security dynamics while sparking uncertainties about India’s supposed commitment to minimum nuclear deterrence.

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