Bangladesh girls forced to cancel football amid Islamist threats

16 hours before
Anbarasan Ethirajan

BBC News

Supplied A young woman wearing a medal holds up a trophySupplied

Asha Roy, 17, was excited to take part in a children’s sports game, but her hopes were dashed as Islamism forced the organisers to withdraw the suit in northeastern Bangladesh.

The Islami Andolan Bangladesh party announced a protest march against the occurrence in the Rangpur region earlier this month, calling it un-Islamic.

Local authorities intervened in a frightful situation, and the women’s crew members were asked to go home for protection.

” I was upset and disturbed. We had never before encountered quite a circumstance. The lack of playfulness of our return disappointed me, Ms. Roy claimed to the BBC.

Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority nation, is currently undergoing a political transition after widespread protests ousted its authoritarian government last year.

There are worries that Islamist groups, which had been marginalized, have once again been enraged by an interval management in place.

The women’s basketball game was the fourth to be postponed in northeastern Bangladesh in less than two weeks due to the concerns of religious extremists.

In the Dinajpur area, roughly 70km ( 43 miles ) west of Rangpur, Islamists protesting against a game clashed with locals who supported it, leaving four people injured.

Sports and other activities are a source of female empowerment and a way out of poverty for ladies like Asha Roy, who are from rural areas. Those who excel are eligible to play for sponsored teams, and some even go on to signify Bangladesh worldwide.

The success of the national children’s staff, who are regarded as soldiers after winning two consecutive South Asia football tournaments in recent years, has given some girls an inspiration to pursue sport.

Ms Roy’s colleague, Musammat Tara Moni, said she would not quit playing despite the risks.

” It’s my wish to represent our national team. My family supports me, so I am never losing hope”, the 16-year-old said.

For their manager Nurul Islam, the concerns came as a surprise. For the first time in his words,” I have taken the team to several games over the past seven decades.”

Tomal Rahman A team of young women in sports gear pose behind a runner-up poster and a gold cupTomal Rahman

The Islamists claim that the suit they halted was against their religious principles and that they are determined to avoid any more basketball games.

” If ladies want to play sport, they should protect their entire body, and they can play just in front of female fans. Guys can’t watch them play, according to Maulana Ashraf Ali, the Islami Andolan Bangladesh president in Rangpur’s Taraganj.

Mr Ali even insisted that the team “definitely” like hard-line Islamic Sharia law in Bangladesh.

The women’s soccer games were suspended due to a flurry of activity on social media, which led the government to reorganize one of them. They have even launched an investigation into the situations, but they claim that the fear of militancy is exaggerated.

According to Shafiqul Alam, hit secretary to interim head Muhammad Yunus,” there is no truth to the claims that the government is pandering to Islamism.”

Mr. Alam made the point that lots of women’s sports competitions were held without incident as part of a national adolescent event in January.

Some individuals are no reassured. The withdrawal of the women’s soccer games was “definitely alarming,” according to Samina Luthfa, associate professor of sociology at the University of Dhaka.

She said,” The people of Bangladesh does not stop playing sports, going to work, or doing their things,” and that “everyone will fight” efforts to remove people from public places.

Sohel Rana In Dinajpur, men, some holding sticks, throw objects at another group in the distanceSohel Rana

Concerned individuals have also expressed concern about the interval government’s decisions regarding Islamist extremism since it came into power in August.

They include revoking a moratorium on the country’s largest Islamist group, Jamaat-e-Islami, which was introduced in the last weeks of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s state.

Jashimuddin Rahmani, the leader of the banned Islamist militant group Ansarullah Bangladesh ( ABT), also known as Ansar al Islam, was released in August after receiving bail from a court. He was given a five-year prison sentence in connection with the 2013 murder of a liberal blogger, but he had been kept behind cafes because of other pending situations.

According to local media reports, several other people accused of having links with extremist groups have also been given bail in the past few months.

According to Dr. Tawohidul Haque, a murder researcher from the University of Dhaka,” Though security causes say they will observe those released, it will be hard for them to place everyone under monitoring given the limitations.”

Muslim extremism is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh, where most people practice reasonable Islam and liberal values predominate. A decade ago, religious fanatics targeted liberal blogs, skeptics, minorities, foreigners and others in a deluge of attacks- dying dozens and sending others fleeing worldwide.

In one like affair, a group of Islamist militants stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka in 2016, killing 20 people.

Supplied Pori MoniSupplied

Not only women’s football games have been the subject of recent attention, either. Dhaka’s renowned Ekushey Book Fair saw the destruction of a book barn last week by dozens of Islamist students.

The protesters were furious that Taslima Nasrin, a female writer in exile, had displayed a book. In response, Islamist organizations have in the past threatened to kill her.

Muhammad Yunus criticized the affair, claiming that it” shows contempt for both the laws of our country and the rights of Bangladeshis.” The police are investigating.

However, Pori Moni, one of the country’s most well-known celebrities, claims that she was prevented from opening a department store in Tangail after receiving rebuffed requests from religious organizations.

” Now I’m really feeling vulnerable, as well as fragile. I’m required to participate in the beginning of a store or other similar occasion. No one has stopped me all these times”, Ms Moni told the BBC Bengali services.

Similar activities involving two other stars, Apu Biswas and Mehazabien Chowdhury, have also been cancelled following challenges by Islamism.

Majority organizations like the Mystical Muslims claim that there are also more problems on their places of worship. Islamist radicals view Sufism as catholic.

” About a hundred of our shrines]mazars ] and areas have been attacked in the past six times”, Anisur Rahman Jafri, Secretary General of the Sufism Universal Foundation, told the BBC.

” We have not seen this kind of sudden extremist attack on us since the country’s independence in 1971″, he added, warning that the country was at risk of” Talibanisation” if the situation continued.

Only 40 temples were damaged, according to authorities, and there was increased protection around spiritual sites.

The authorities have also been struggling to maintain law and order in the wake of Sheikh Hasina’s departure. Earlier this month, thousands of protesters vandalised homes and buildings connected to Hasina and senior leaders of her Awami League party.

People from various parties and events, including Islamists, joined in various demonstrations in the capital, Dhaka, and across the nation.

The security forces have been defended by the authorities for no intermediate, claiming that doing so would have resulted in fatalities.

Right organizations have voiced their concerns about the security scenario.

” If the authorities fails to work, then Islamists are going to feel emboldened. There will be more self-censorship for women and girls, they will be more frightened participating in public events”, Shireen Huq, a popular children’s rights advocate, told the BBC.

” I am still positive that this phenomenon will no sustain”, she added.

Further monitoring from the Bangladeshi-language BBC Bengali program

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Modi-Trump talks: Five key takeaways

32 hours before
Soutik Biswas and Nikhil Inamdar

BBC News, Delhi

Getty Images Modi and Trump in the White HouseGetty Images

Despite the enthusiasm, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s second visit to Washington under Donald Trump’s subsequent expression was a calm, business-first affair- expected for a working visit, which lacks the pomp of a state visit.

Trump also announced increased oil and gas imports, including F-35 jet, and increased US military sales to India starting in 2025, in order to reduce the trade deficit. A new defense construction will be reached through a business agreement that will be reached by both parties.

He also confirmed the US had approved the extradition of Tahawwur Rana, a Chicago businessman accused of playing a role in the 2008 terror attack in Mumbai.

“That’s a lot of deliverables for an administration less than a month old,” Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center’s South Asia Institute in Washington told the BBC

” General, both sides seem cozy continuing Biden-era cooperation, especially in technology and military, though many will be rebranded under Trump”.

Nevertheless, significant challenges lie away. Here are the essential restaurants:

India: Did it get the mutual tax bullet?

Trump ordered that US trading partners to pay reciprocal tariffs- tit-for-tat transfer taxes to complement similar duties that those nations have now imposed on American exports. Modi’s visit came as a result of Trump’s visit. He directed experts to create broad-based, fresh tariffs for US business partners, warning that they might go into effect by April 1st.

India has a trade deficit with its main trading partner, the US. India cut average tariffs from 13 % to 11 % in its federal budget in a bid to pre-empt Trump’s tariff moves.

The verdict is still out on whether India appears to have escaped price upsets at this point.

Ajay Srivastava, founder of the Delhi-based think tank Global Trade Research Institute ( GTRI), says he doesn’t see any “problems with tariffs”.

The main reason, he says, is that 75 % of the US exports to India attract import taxes of less than 5 %.

” Trump points to extreme outlier tariffs like 150 % on select items, but that’s not the norm. India “has no reason to worry about reciprocal taxes,” according to Mr. Srivastava.

Abhijit Das, former mind of the Centre for WTO Research at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, isn’t convinced.

” The devil lies in the details. Mutual taxes didn’t really resemble India’s buy taxes; they will also take into account other variables, he told the BBC.

Trump’s approach could go beyond import duties, factoring in value added tax (VAT ), non-tariff barriers and trade restrictions. While India’s goods and services tax ( GST ) on imported goods aligns with WTO rules, Trump may still use it to justify higher tariffs.

A US government memo on reciprocal tariffs hints at this strategy, citing costs to American businesses from non-tariff barriers, subsidies and burdensome regulations abroad. It also cites VAT and government procurement restrictions as non-tariff barriers.

AFP - Indian and US soldiers rappel from an Indian Air Force helicopter as they participate in the Yudh Abhyas 2012 military exercise at Mahajan in Rajasthan sector, some 150 kms. from Bikaner, on March 13, 2012.AFP

According to Mr. Das, the US is anticipated to drive for gaining access to India’s federal procurement market, which is already protected by WTO regulations.

” This likely hamper India’s ability to prioritise local suppliers, posing a primary concern to the’ Make in India ‘ action. This is undoubtedly never good news for us.”

Mr. Das suggests that India counteract Trump’s mutual tariff theory, particularly in agriculture, where strict non-tariff restrictions on Indian exports, such as rigorous maximum residue limits, are imposed.

He argues that since the US “heavily subsidises” its land business, India should identify these incentives to push up against American states.

Taxes alone may not be sufficient to bridge the two nations ‘ trade gap. According to experts, energy purchases and defense may contribute to reducing the gap.

Doubling US-India trade to$ 500bn by 2030

The new$ 500bn ( £400bn ) trade goal aims to more than double the$ 190bn trade between the two countries in 2023.

By the end of the 2025 fall semester, Modi and Trump will begin to negotiate the initial phase of a business deal. Deals will concentrate on market exposure, price reductions, and supply chain integration across goods and services.

” The statement that the two parties will negotiate a deal deal gives India the opportunity to engage in trade negotiations for lower taxes on both sides. That would be a gift not only for the US-India marriage, but also for an American business that’s sputtered in recent months”, says Mr Kugelman.

What is unclear is what kind of deal agreement both parties intend to pursue.

” What is this business deal? Is it a fully developed free trade agreement or a “reciprocal tax agreement”? magic Mr Srivastava.

Mr. Das thinks that we’ll have to wait for more information about the business deal.

” It doesn’t always mean a free trade package- if that were the situation, it would have been stated directly. It might just include tariff reductions on a few products with common interest.

Priyanka Kishore, principal analyst at the Singapore-based advisory firm, Asia Decoded, says$ 500bn is a” large specific but there are low hanging fruit we can instantly abuse”.

“For instance the US sanctions on Russian shadow fleet are soon going to kick in, so India can easily pivot to the US for more oil. This will not be too difficult.”

Trump stated at the joint press conference that the US would ideally become India’s number one oil and gas supplier.

Multi-billion dollar US defence deals, including fighter jets

India’s defence trade with the US has surged from near zero to$ 20 billion, making the US its third-largest arms supplier.

While Russia remains India’s top source, its share has dropped from 62 % to 34 % ( 2017-2023 ) as India shifts toward US procurement.

Trump made a significant announcement to strengthen defense ties, saying that the US would increase sales of military equipment to India” by many billions of dollars starting this year,” opening the door for the F-35 stealth warplanes.

But this will be easier said than done, say experts.

” This sounds good, but it may be a case of putting the cart before the horse”, says Mr Kugelman.

He claims that bureaucratic constraints and export controls prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies despite rising US arms sales to India. The new defense framework that was announced at the summit may help address these issues.

Also India isn’t” taking the F-35 offer seriously” due to high maintenance demands, says strategic affairs expert Ajai Shukla.

Shukla points out that US arms deals have challenges because private companies place profits preceding long-term partnerships.

Yet with delays and cost overruns affecting some of India’s arms deals with Russia, Delhi’s defence ties with the US look set to deepen.

Reuters Elon Musk meets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 13, 2025, in this picture obtained from social media.@narendramodi via X/via REUTERS Reuters

Modi meets Musk even as Tesla’s India plans still in limbo

According to the Indian foreign ministry, Modi and Tesla CEO Elon Musk met to talk about AI and emerging technologies.

It’s unclear if they addressed Musk’s stalled plans for Starlink’s India launch or Tesla’s market entry.

Musk has pushed for direct spectrum allocation, clashing with Indian billionaire Mukesh Ambani, who favours auctions. His licence remains under review.

Tesla is also appealing to the Indian government to set up a factory, which will lower automakers ‘ import taxes by$ 500 million and local production by three years. Tesla has not yet made its plans known.

Reuters Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends a press conference with US President Donald Trump (not pictured) at the White House, Washington, DC, USA, 13 February 2025.Reuters

Taking questions- a hardly unusual departure for Modi.

In a rare move, Modi and Trump both addressed two questions at a press conference, one relating to the allegations of bribery against the Adani Group and illegal immigration.

Gautam Adani, an Indian billionaire accused of having ties to Modi, was charged with fraud in the US last November in connection with an alleged$ 250 million bribery scheme.

Modi said he hadn’t discussed the issue with Trump. On immigration, he stated India was ready to take back verified illegal Indian migrants.

This was only Modi’s third direct press Q&amp, A in his almost 11-year tenure as India’s prime minister. He has never held a solo press conference. He answered all the questions in 2019 while sat next to Amit Shah, the party’s president, and in 2023 he only asked Joe Biden two questions.

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Modi-Trump meeting: Tariffs, trade and visas to dominate talks

22 hours ago
Michael Kugelman

Foreign policy scientist

AFP Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi listens to French President's speech during the closing session of the Franco-Indian Economic Forum at the Quai d'Orsay following the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Action Summit in Paris, on February 11, 2025. AFP

There will be warm smiles and laughs when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi travels to Washington for a meeting with President Donald Trump after this week. But that won’t be the end all.

Over the years, Trump and Modi have maintained a close relationship, which has included frequent looks and high-profile sessions.

Their relationship has grown since their first conference in Washington in 2017 through mutual looks at large demonstrations in Houston and Ahmedabad. Their science is the result of their shared worldviews and political views, as well as a mutually corporate desire to combat China, a issue that has also strengthened the wider US-India partnership.

Not surprisingly, Trump has generally criticised India, but he has never criticised Modi.

And so, during Modi’s visit, the two leaders will probably spend time mapping out next steps in the US-India strategic partnership, which is already in a good place.

Modi will presumably join several members of Trump’s case, as well as US company leaders and members of the Indian-American neighborhood.

Elon Musk, the Tesla CEO, and SpaceX may also be in his sights. Modi, eager to level up India’s burgeoning electric cars business, may be glad if Musk opened a Tesla factory in India.

Getty Images India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (R) wearing a white kurta, a black jacket and glasses shakes hands with US President Donald Trump, who is wearing a blue suit with a white shirt and red tie before a meeting at Hyderabad House in New Delhi on February 25, 2020.Getty Images

And yet the Trump-Modi bonhomie and intoxicating talk of strategic agreement may face a disturbing fact: during Modi’s visit, the relationship’s interpersonal side will come into sharp relief with each leader, particularly Trump, armed with an array of demands.

Delhi knows Trump well. Many of Modi’s current cabinet ministers also served during his previous term, which overlapped with part of the first Trump administration. That familiarity has been on display since Trump’s inauguration last month: Delhi has publicly signalled its willingness to lower tariffs, take back undocumented Indian immigrants and buy American oil.

It has already lowered some tariffs and taken back 104 undocumented Indians, with the first plane arriving in India last week. These pre-emptive steps are meant to prevent Trump from making specific demands of India and to reduce the likelihood of tensions with the new Trump administration.

Still, Trump may ask Modi to make additional tariff reductions, to further chip away at a US goods and services trade deficit with India that has approached $46bn (£37.10bn) in recent years. But an obstacle could become an opportunity: Modi may call on Trump to enter into bilateral talks on an economic partnership accord meant to reduce tariffs on both sides.

In recent years, Delhi has shown a growing willingness to pursue trade deals. The Trump administration may prove to be a more willing interlocutor than the Biden administration, which imposed heavy environmental and labour-related conditions on new trade agreements.

Getty Images Supporters of India's prime minister, Narendra Modi cheer during the Howdy Modi event at NRG Stadium day, Sept. 22, 2019, in Houston. Getty Images

Trump may also ask Modi to take back more undocumented Indians. Given that some estimates put the number at more than 700,000 – the third-largest such group in the US – this will be a difficult and delicate issue for Delhi to navigate.

Last week, India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar told parliament that the government was working with the US to ensure Indian citizens were not mistreated while being deported after reports of them being shackled sparked anger.

Trump may also ask Modi to purchase more American oil.

In 2021, India was the top destination for American oil exports, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine brought major changes in global oil markets and prompted Delhi to ramp up imports of cheap oil from close partner Russia. The price point will determine how much oil India is willing to buy from the US.

Modi may also come with his own energy ask: invest in Indian nuclear energy. Delhi is amending its nuclear liability law and has announced a new nuclear energy mission, in an attempt to sharpen international interest in the fuel.

By 2030, India plans to use renewable energy to meet half of its energy needs. A potential happy medium exists when Trump is asked to invest in nuclear fuel because it is cleaner than fossil fuels but very different from solar and wind power, which may not appeal to the Trump administration as an attractive investment.

Technology will likely also be discussed.

This was a fast-growing space for bilateral relations in the Biden era, thanks to the 2022 implementation of the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), which both sides view as a new cornerstone for strategic partnership. iCET is meant to be directly overseen by the two national security advisers – to avoid getting bogged down in bureaucracy – which means they must each be personally invested in it.

Trump and his National Security Advisor Mike Waltz will likely ask for assurances that they will continue to support this. They are likely to do so given Washington’s efforts to combat China by integrating India into more of the global supply chains for technology.

Also on the tech co-operation front, Modi may make a pitch for Trump to maintain the H-1B visa regime. These visas for highly skilled foreign workers, heavily criticised by some influential Trump supporters, have been awarded to large numbers of Indian tech employees in the US.

Getty Images Muthumalla Dhandapani, an Indian immigrant with an H1-B visa and a Comcast employee in Sunnyvale, protests against President Trump's immigration orders in 2017.Getty Images

Other countries may also come up during Modi’s conversations in Washington. Iran might loom particularly large.

Delhi is partnering with Tehran to develop a port in Chabahar city – part of a broader Indian strategy to strengthen connectivity links with Central Asia, via Iran and Afghanistan. But last week, the US administration released a presidential memorandum outlining Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Tehran, which hints at removing sanctions waivers for those conducting commercial activities in Chabahar. Modi may seek clarity on what this means for Delhi.

Trump may also gauge Modi’s position on ending the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, which is a top foreign policy priority.

Delhi is a strong supporter of these waning wars. Trump’s position on the conflict in Ukraine is echoed by Modi’s call for an end to it without praising Putin or Russia.

India’s close ties to Israel and its special relationship with Russia may prompt Trump to consider whether Modi would want to play a third-party mediator as well. Modi would likely be at ease doing so if the parties are open to mediation from outside.

However, both leaders will want to keep a positive tone despite some potentially delicate discussions this week.

In that regard, the Indo-Pacific Quad will be just what the doctor ordered.

Trump supports this group, which includes US, India, Japan, and Australia, with an emphasis on halting Beijing.

The Quad’s annual meetings were elevated to the level of the foreign minister in his first term, while Biden and Trump both moved up to the leadership level.

Modi may invite Trump to Delhi to attend this year’s Quad meeting because India is scheduled to host it.

Trump reportedly is not a big fan of international travel but India is a trip he will probably be keen to make – to deepen his personal relationship with Modi and to advance a multifaceted bilateral partnership that extends well beyond the transactionalism that will carry the day in Washington this week.

The South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington is led by Michael Kugelman.

Follow BBC News India on Instagram, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook.

Getty Images A cargo vessel is seen at Chabahar seaport during an inauguration ceremony for the first export convoy to India via Iran in Chabahar, Iran on February 25, 2019.Getty Images

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Delusion of de-escalation on the China-India border – Asia Times

In late October 2024, India and China began implementing what was touted as a monument alliance to de-escalate conflicts along their disputed Himalayan border, a place known as the Line of Actual Control, or LAC.

The deal, forged ahead of a conference between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, marking the leaders ’ first official talks in five years, included provisions for army pullbacks, dismantlement of temporary facilities and a return to 2020 monitoring trends in contested places such as Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh.

Though touted at the time as the biggest thaw in relations since deadly high-mountain conflicts in the Galwan Valley in 2020, decades later, the partnership is proving more metaphorical than meaningful in addressing rooted issues and ensuring meaningful application.

Beneath the surface of this diplomatic facade lies a glaring contradiction where, on one hand, both sides publicly advocate peace, and on the other hand, their actions reveal a steadfast commitment to military preparedness and geopolitical rivalry.

The stark disconnect between the rhetoric of de-escalation and the realities on the ground underscores the hollow nature of the supposed breakthrough agreement. Aggressive military buildups are still in full effect for both countries along the LAC.

Using its “dual-use” infrastructure strategy, China has been building new villages and military outposts near the contested border. These sites, concealed as civilian infrastructure, boost China ’s capacity to quickly deploy forces and consolidate its control of contested territories.

At the same time, India has expedited its own infrastructure drive, including the construction of the Sela Tunnel, which ensures all-weather access to northeastern border regions. Far from a move toward genuine disengagement, this parallel buildup indicates that both sides are still preparing for the possibility of future confrontations.

Moreover, the so-called restoration of pre-2020 patrols raises doubts. India and China have fundamentally different interpretations of the LAC, and previous agreements to clarify the boundary have failed.

This ambiguity allows both nations to claim compliance while continuing to pursue their strategic objectives. Without a clear and enforceable mechanism to verify troop withdrawals and patrolling rights, the agreement has become an exercise in political theater rather than a genuine step toward resolution.

Similarly, China ’s recently unveiled plan to build the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River presents a strategic threat to India. Located near Arunachal Pradesh, once operational, the dam will enable China to control water flows critical to millions of people in India’s remote northeast, threatening agriculture, water security and hydropower. This leverage will exacerbate India’s vulnerabilities.

While India is monitoring the project and planning countermeasures, the growing geopolitical imbalance highlights China ’s dominance in South Asia’s water politics. India also views China ’s assertiveness in the Global South and Indo-Pacific with growing unease, while China is wary of India’s rising aspirations for global recognition and its deepening ties with the West.

These conflicting interests make a comprehensive Himalayan reconciliation unlikely, leaving the agreement as little more than a tactical pause in an enduring standoff that has badly damaged broad relations, including crucially at the commercial level.

Ultimately, The India-China border agreement is a case of diplomacy without commitment. Both nations continue to prepare for conflict even as they talk of peace, rendering the agreement a contradiction in itself.

It shows clearly that agreements like these cannot be mistaken for strategic resets. Genuine peace requires not just words but actions that address the deep-rooted mistrust and conflicting ambitions that drive the rivalry, dating back to a border war in 1962.

Until then, Asia’s two largest nations will remain locked in a precarious and uneasy coexistence, with agreements serving as temporary bandages rather than lasting solutions to problems with the potential to become major destabilizing flashpoints.

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US sanctions take shine off Pakistan’s UN seat glory – Asia Times

Pakistan’s new election as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council ( UNSC), marking the ninth time it earned the circular classification, should have been cause for political party.

Otherwise, the step arrived under the shadow of new US sanctions targeting Pakistan’s nuclear weapon system. The juxtaposition of these events raises important questions about the world’s future trajectory and the complex and frequently contradicting dynamics of its international relations.

It’s not easy to get a non-permanent chair on the UNSC. It signals that Pakistan’s contributions to global peace, its support for developing countries, and its position as a local power capable of fostering discourse in conflict-ridden regions are recognized internationally.

However, these accomplishments are obscured by the US’s decision to impose restrictions under its MTCR plan. The sanctions, apparently aimed at curbing proliferation risks, problem Pakistan’s storyline as a concerned global companion.

The punishment also show a pervasive problem line between the US and Pakistan. Although the two nations have previously worked together to combat terrorism and provincial balance, Washington has grown to see Pakistan’s strategic partnerships, particularly those with China, as a contrarian of US interests in South Asia.

The sanctions against the weapon system are more about a message to Islamabad: follow Washington’s political objectives or you’ll suffer the consequences.

Pakistan’s reaction to the punishment will become crucial in determining its political trajectory. Its UNSC account provides a system to amplify its speech on global problems, from climate change to cybersecurity, but the punishment underscore the boundaries imposed by great-power elections.

In a South Asian security environment that is extremely tense and disputed, Pakistan must find a balance between its relationship with the US and China and maintaining its proper autonomy.

The UNSC member nation of Pakistan is also at odds with the international platform that the sanctions challenge. By imposing unilateral sanctions, the US runs the risk of undermining the spirit of cooperation required to address shared world issues.

Pakistan, then in a position to control UNSC proceedings, could use its app to argue for a more healthy approach to non-proliferation and dispute resolution.

Pakistan’s enrollment in the UNSC offers an opportunity to reshape its reputation as a country committed to peace and development. The restrictions, however, show how persistently skeptical it is from important international people.

Pakistan has reaffirm its commitment to international standards, increase accountability in its security plans, and use its UNSC seats to foster dialogue on security and creation issues in order to counteract this tale.

Also, Pakistan’s management must realize that its coming as a world player depends on economic endurance and technological development. Beyond martial and proper paradigms, the tech sector’s expansion and weather leadership initiatives serve as the foundation for redefining its global role.

The UNSC election and US sanctions that Pakistan has carried out simultaneously demonstrate the dilemma of its international status as both a crucial companion and a proper problem.

Navigating this dichotomy may require deft politics, strategic vision and a renewed commitment to diplomacy. Pakistan’s authority on the UNSC can both strengthen its reputation as a responsible international actor or only aggravate the conflicts that have long plagued its international relations.

The margins have never been higher for Islamabad.

Iqra Awan is a research fellow at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. She can be reached at [email protected]

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Indian PM opens strategic tunnel to China border zones

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated a strategic Himalayan road tunnel on Monday ( January 13 ), allowing for cross-border disputed high-altitude disputes with rivals China and Pakistan. The Z-Morh or Sonmarg pipe, which extends 6.4 kilometers beneath a dangerous mountain pass that is closed off by frost for fourContinue Reading

Asia’s Best Companies 2025 Poll — open now | FinanceAsia

Welcome to&nbsp, FinanceAsia ‘s&nbsp, annual poll, which celebrates Asia’s best companies across a range of markets and countries. In developing this priceless criterion of the country’s most important companies, their efficiency and corporate behavior in relation to their peers, we value the input of both investors and analysts.

We ask our audience to nominate any publicly traded Asian-based business that is leading in its field. It might be that the firm impresses in terms of new deal execution, inside structure, completed transactions, continued strategy, or possibly ESG credentials.

We want to&nbsp, hear from you! &nbsp, The second 100 voters may get one month free, unlimited access to all of&nbsp, FinanceAsia’s information. &nbsp,

To vote&nbsp, visit below. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

Poll findings will be published via the&nbsp, FinanceAsia&nbsp, site and will provide traders nationally with special insight into Asia’s best-managed companies, both by country / market and by business industry.

Key Dates

Available for Nomination: &nbsp, Tuesday, Janaury 7 2025
Election Deadline: Thursday, March 6&nbsp, 2025 at evening GMT 8

Outcome Announcement: &nbsp,

North Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia: &nbsp, Monday, March 24 2025&nbsp,
Regional: &nbsp, Tuesday March 25, 2025

Recommendations for Election

  • Each individual who submits a nomination may be asked to provide their contact information.
  • Each election type is&nbsp, special to each market/country. To register for more than one market/country, you perhaps click on the link provided at the end of the study to begin a new submission. &nbsp,
  • Please note that you are &nbsp, just required to fill in the areas in which you wish to make a nomination. You may skip and left the fields flat if there are any categories you do not want to nominate in.
  • Please note that&nbsp, you may not voting for your own business. Vote cast by a business for itself will not be counted.

IMPORTANT NOTE: Individual responses will remain confidential – they will only be aggregated to provide overall results.

¬ Capitol Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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How a food crisis in India fed America’s library collections

Getty Images A Sanskrit book in IndiaGetty Images

In 1996, Ananya Vajpeyi, a story graduate student, discovered the famous South Asia collection of books at the University of Chicago’s Regenstein Library.

” I’ve spent day in some of the leading South Asia books of the world, at Oxford and Cambridge, Harvard and Columbia. But nothing has ever matched the eternal riches held at the University of Chicago”, Ms Vajpeyi, then a visiting teacher at India’s Ashoka University, told me.

The 132-year-old University of Chicago homes more than 800, 000 levels related to South Asia, making it one of the world’s top choices for research on the area. But how did a place where there is such a treasure trove of North Eastern writing?

The answer lies in a programme called PL-480, a US initiative launched in 1954 under Public Law 480, also known as the Food for Peace, a hallmark of Cold War diplomacy.

Signed into law by President Dwight D Eisenhower, PL-480 allowed countries like India to get US corn with local money, easing their international exchange problem and reducing US deficits. One of the largest consumers of this meal aid was India, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, when it experienced severe food shortages.

Participating US institutions received the local coin money at no extra cost. These resources were used to purchase native books, periodicals, recorder records, and “other media” in many American languages, enriching collections at over two hundred universities. As a result, universities like the University of Chicago served as academic centers for South Eastern reports. According to Indian ancient laws, manuscripts were kept out.

Getty Images hicago, IL, USA - March 12, 2015: The Joseph Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago in Chicago, IL, USA on March 12, 2015.Getty Images

According to James Nye, chairman of the University of Chicago’s Digital South Asia collection, “PL-480 has had amazing and unexpected implications for the University of Chicago and for more than 30 different US choices.”

Building a compelling collection series from South Asia was not a simple task.

In Delhi, in 1959, a particular team made up of 60 Indians was created. Primarily focused on picking up state papers, the project expanded over five years to encompass books and periodicals. By 1968, 20 US institutions were receiving supplies from the growing set, as noted by Maureen LP Patterson, a leading bibliographer of South Asian research.

In a paper published in 1969, Patterson recounted that in the early days of the PL-480, the team in India faced the challenge of sourcing books from a vast, diverse country with an intricate network of languages.

They needed the knowledge of book dealers with a track record of good judgment and efficiency. Given India’s size and the complexity of its literary landscape, no single dealer could handle the procurement on their own, Patterson, who died in 2012, wrote.

Instead, dealers were selected from various publishing hubs, each focusing on specific languages or groups of languages. This collaboration worked seamlessly, with dealers sending titles they were not certain about for approval. The final selection rested with the Delhi office, Patterson noted.

Photographic Archives at the University of Chicago Joseph Regenstein LibraryPhotographic Archives at the University of Chicago

The program wanted to pick up a comprehensive collection of all-encompassing Indian fiction. Patterson wrote,” The policy netted a large number of detective stories and novels of no lasting value.”

In 1963, the option to buy books was narrowed down to “research level material,” and the intake of fiction in many languages was reduced by half. By 1966, more than 750, 000 books and periodicals were sent to American universities from India, Nepal and Pakistan, with India contributing more than 633, 000 items.

“We’ve sent works like History of India from 1000 to 1770 AD, Handicrafts in India, Hindu Culture and Personality: A Psychoanalytic Study, and more,” a report on a meeting in an US library on the programme in 1967 said.

Todd Michelson-Ambelang, librarian for South Asian studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, wonders if vast collections from the region in US and other Western libraries took away literary resources from the Indian sub-continent.

Founded during Cold War tensions and funded by PL-480, his university’s South Asia centre grew its library to more than 200, 000 titles by the 21st Century.

According to Mr. Michelson-Ambelang, the removal of books from South Asia through programs like PL-480″ creates knowledge gaps,” as researchers there frequently need to travel to the West to access these resources.

If all the books that were then purchased by US universities from India are still available there, it’s not clear whether or not. According to Maya Dodd, of India’s FLAME University, many books now unavailable in India can be found in the University of Chicago’s library collections, all marked with the stamp saying “PL-480”.

” Books that were awarded through the PL-480 program are still popular in South Asia for the most part. However, keeping up with temperature and humidity levels is frequently difficult due to white ants, pests, and poor preservation. In contrast, most materials in the West remain well-preserved thanks to the preservation and conservation efforts in our libraries”, Mr Michelson-Ambelang says.

Ananya Vajpayee Ananya VajpeyiAnanya Vajpayee

Another reason why Mr Michelson-Ambelang calls the Western libraries colonial archives “partly is because they serve academics, often excluding those outside their institutions. While librarians are aware of the barriers to sharing of South Asian materials, copyright laws only narrow these gaps.

So, what happened when the PL-480 programme ended?

Mr Nye says the end of the programme in the 1980s, shifted the financial burden to American libraries. “Libraries in the US have had to pay for the selection, acquisition, collection, and delivery of resources,” he said. For example, the University of Chicago now spends more than $100,000 annually on buying books and periodicals through the Library of Congress field office in Delhi.

Ms Vajpeyi believes the books-for-grain deal had a positive outcome. She studied Sanskrit, but her research in University of Chicago spanned Indian and European languages- French, German, Marathi, and Hindi- and touched on linguistics, literature, philosophy, anthropology, and more. ” At the Regenstein Library, I never failed to find the books I needed or get them quickly if they weren’t already there”, she says.

” The books are safe, valued, accessible and used. Everywhere I’ve been, I’ve visited libraries, archives, and other institutions, and the state of our nation’s economy is generally dismal. They were frequently lost, neglected, or otherwise rendered inaccessible in this case.

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Bangladesh-Pakistan thaw to redraw South Asia’s power map – Asia Times

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif saw an opportunity to revive generally strained relationships just days after Sheikh Hasina’s withdrawal and Muhammad Yunus ‘ appointment as Bangladesh’s time chief executive.

Both officials have met half in the last few weeks, opening the way for a political reset with significant implications for South Asia’s politics, following a rare hot conversation between Islamabad and Dhaka.

Bangladesh has acted to end a specific security area at Dhaka Airport for Pakistani people, waived the need for physical inspection of packages, and welcomed the first strong cargo ship to dock at Chittagong Port from Pakistan.

These actions suggest a major heat trend. Pakistan and Bangladesh were after a single country before they split up following a terrible conflict in 1971. Since therefore, Bangladesh has developed stronger relations with neighboring India, Pakistan’s historic enemy.

Even though Pakistan officially recognized Bangladesh in 1974, the historical repercussions of the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 have long persisted in diplomatic relations, with persistently conflicted political and historical narratives also periodically stoking conflicts.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Hasina’s parents, played a vital role in the isolation of Bangladesh, a tradition that added challenges to diplomatic relations. Sheikh Hasina’s relationship to India may have been influenced by that past.

However, Hasina’s ties with Islamabad were somewhat strained. Pakistan, which saw the tests when politically motivated, drew the ire of its own leaders from the Jamaat-e-Islami Party’s murder on conflict murder charges for events relating to 1971. In 2016, both countries expelled officials, more souring relationships.

On December 19, Sharif and Yunus met on the outside of the D-8 event in Cairo, Egypt, for their next meeting, taking place in New York City since September.

In Cairo, the two leaders expressed” satisfaction]with ] the increasing frequency of high-level contacts”, Sharif’s office said in a statement.

He expressed Pakistan’s “keen wish to increase bilateral cooperation, particularly in the areas of industry, people-to-people connections and social exchanges”.

In particular, Sharif mentioned the option for “new avenues of monetary cooperation” and industry in chemicals, concrete clinkers, medical goods, leather goods and the IT sector.

But, reflecting past scars, Yunus urged Sharif to” live the problems of 1971 to support Dhaka proceed forward with its relationship”, the Bangladesh official news agency reported.

” The issues have kept coming up,” he continued. Let’s settle those issues for us to move forward”, he told Sharif. It would be nice to resolve things “once and for all for the future generations”, Yunus said. &nbsp,

Before Hasina came to power in 1996, Dhaka had never previously requested an apology from Islamabad for the “genocide” committed during its war of independence.

In response, Pakistan only described the events as “regrettable” during former military dictator General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Dhaka in July 2002.

Sharif informed his federal cabinet that his nation was beginning a new chapter of its relationship with Bangladesh upon returning from Egypt after a “positive engagement” in Cairo.

Additionally, he made the announcement that a high-level delegation would travel to Dhaka in February of next year, a ephemeral visit that might alter the dynamics of South Asian alliances.

Regional reset

India appears to be the biggest geopolitical loser as Islamabad and Dhaka get closer as a result of Hasina’s fall, with once-friendly relations experiencing significant decline in recent months.

Hasina maintained a complex relationship with India throughout her tenure. That included a rail connectivity agreement, which would enable India to transport goods to its far-off-the-beaten-path states using Bangladesh’s rail network.

Additionally, Bangladesh approved India’s request to send experts to assess the Teesta River Project, a key bilateral water-sharing initiative.

However, following her ouster amid violent protests, Hasina fled to New Delhi to seek refuge. Since then, Bangladesh has formally requested India’s assistance in extraditing Hasina from court proceedings.

India has acknowledged the request, but it has not provided any additional information, highlighting that Hasina is staying in India for safety reasons.

When protests began against Hasina, she was in China, which has deep and wide ties to Dhaka’s defense establishment, having supplied 72 % of Bangladesh’s military equipment.

The modernization of Bangladesh’s military under the” Forces Goal 2030” has the potential to boost Chinese arms imports further.

As she aimed to strengthen ties with China, Hasina made sure to avoid alienating India while attempting to maintain a strategic balance between the two geopolitical rivals.

However, unlike its relations with India, Bangladesh’s ties with China appear unchanged in the transition from Hasina to Yunus. Yunus was quickly welcomed as the interim leader in Beijing.

On the UNGA in New York in September, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a call to Yunus. That same month, Beijing’s ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen also called on Yunus.

” No matter what changes have taken place in the domestic situation of Bangladesh, China’s commitment to develop China-Bangladesh relations remains unchanged”, Yao said.

In addition to their conversation, Yunus and Sharif discussed reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ( SAARC ), a multilateral body that hasn’t held a summit since 2014.

The last summit took place in Nepal, while the planned 2016 summit in Pakistan was canceled after India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan chose not to participate under Delhi’s influence.

” I am a big fan of the idea of SAARC. I keep harping on the issue. Even if the summit is just for a photo session, Yunus said,” I want a summit of SAARC leaders because it will convey a powerful message.”

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