South Asia (Page 22)

As China expands its presence among Pacific Island countries by building dual-use infrastructure and providing loans, Japan is seeking to counter Beijing’s influence in the region. The Japanese government is engaging Pacific Island countries through infrastructure projects and multilateral forums to mitigate China’s Pacific presence.

Japan has increased its emphasis on an “all Japan” approach toward Pacific Island countries since 2019. At the Ninth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting in July 2021, former Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga announced the Pacific Bond Policy, which aims to strengthen Japan’s ties with Pacific Island countries to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Japan is paying greater attention to Pacific Island countries in its foreign policy to check China’s influence. Former foreign minister Taro Kono visited Papua New Guinea in November 2018, as well as Fiji and three Micronesian countries in August 2019 — the first Japanese foreign minister to visit these countries since January 1987. It has now become common practice for his successors and state ministers to travel to the Pacific Islands.

In April 2021, China and the Solomon Islands signed a secret security agreement. Afterward, Japanese Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kentaro Uesugi, visited the Solomon Islands to directly convey his concerns to Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare.

In January 2023, Japan opened new diplomatic missions in Kiribati and New Caledonia, where the government perceives China’s influence to be growing.

Japan has engaged in several multinational infrastructure development projects in Pacific Island countries with Australia and the United States. Japan also became one of five inaugural members of the Partners in the Blue Pacific, established with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to coordinate assistance for Pacific Island countries in June 2022.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense is also increasing its presence. When it launched the Indo-Pacific Deployment as we know it today in 2017 to provide the Maritime Self-Defense Force with opportunities for joint exercises with other countries, its destinations were confined to Southeast and South Asia.

Since the first Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue was held in September 2021, the Japanese Indo-Pacific Deployment’s geographical area of activity has been expanded to include the Pacific.

In 2022, the Maritime Self-Defense Force conducted exercises with its counterparts in Tonga, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Palau. Japan also dispatched the Self-Defence Forces to work on disaster relief activities in Tonga after the eruption of an undersea volcano in early 2022.

As the May 2023 G7 Summit in Hiroshima approaches, Japan’s diplomacy has become more active, with increased attention on Pacific Island countries. During his visit to India on March 20, 2023, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced “Japan’s New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

The plan refers to the Pacific as a “strategically important region where sea lanes connecting Japan and Australia and sea lanes from the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean intersect.”

On March 19, 2023, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi visited the Solomon Islands as the first Japanese foreign minister to hold face-to-face talks with Prime Minister Sogavare. Hayashi emphasized the importance that Japan places on its relations with the Solomon Islands.

But it is uncertain whether Solomon Islands seriously considered Hayashi’s visit in addition to earlier visits by US National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell.

On March 22, having received a delegation from China, Solomon Islands announced that it had awarded a Chinese state company a contract to upgrade an international port in Honiara. This again raised fears in Japan of China’s ‘dual purpose’ motivations as Solomon Islands could allow Chinese naval vessels to use the port in the future.

Hayashi also visited the Cook Islands — the first such visit by a Japanese foreign minister — and the Polynesian region. Hayashi and the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands Mark Brown had already met in Japan the previous month.

Just before officially taking up the position of Chairman of the Pacific Islands Forum at its Special Leaders Retreat on February 24, 2023, Brown traveled to Japan as the head of the Pacific Islands Forum delegation. At the forum, he discussed the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System-treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station into the sea.

This has been an outstanding issue between Japan and Pacific Island countries, although the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, David Panuelo, expressed his understanding of Japan’s position, and Hayashi protested that China’s remarks to the international community were not based on scientific evidence during his meeting with his Chinese counterpart Qin Gang.

During their meeting on March 21, 2023, Hayashi formally invited Brown to the Outreach Meeting at the G7 Hiroshima Summit along with other world leaders.

Given the strategic importance of Pacific Island countries amid the ongoing climate crisis and China’s growing regional presence, Japan needs to maintain constructive dialogue with Pacific Island countries with a view to hosting a successful milestone 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting in 2024.

It also needs to cooperate with like-minded partners, including Australia, to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Tomohiko Kimura is Specially Appointed Associate Professor, Faculty of Humanities at Seikei University, Japan.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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The rise of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in South Asia, particularly in India, is a growing cause for concern. The group’s use of propaganda and recruitment tactics targeting vulnerable individuals leads to the radicalization of youth and the perpetration of violent acts.

ISKP’s belated acknowledgment of responsibility for the Coimbatore and Mangalore blasts last October and November, even though the attacks failed to cause the intended harm, may represent an attempt by the group to demonstrate its expanding presence and operational capabilities in India.

This is consistent with the group’s propaganda and recruitment efforts, portraying ISKP as a powerful and effective organization capable of carrying out attacks in multiple countries.

Indian security agencies should take this threat seriously and work proactively to prevent further attacks by ISKP and other extremist groups – and seek help from Delhi’s partners in addressing these threats.

This may include measures such as improving intelligence-gathering capabilities, strengthening border security and enhancing cooperation with international partners in countering terrorism.

Addressing the underlying grievances and socio-economic factors contributing to the radicalization of individuals also matters in preventing the spread of extremist ideologies.

ISKP in South Asia

Founded eight years ago, the ISKP goal was to establish an Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan. The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in 2021 created a complex security situation in the region, emboldening groups like ISKP to push their agenda and attract recruits.

The Taliban and ISKP have different ideologies and objectives, and their competing interests could lead to violent clashes in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.

ISKP’s extension of its “Khorasan Province” into other parts of Central and South Asia beyond Afghanistan demonstrates its aspirations to expand its reach and establish a broader caliphate.

One of the ways ISKP has succeeded in recruiting members is by taking advantage of minorities’ plights and sectarianism across the region. By portraying itself as a defender of minority rights and a champion of the oppressed, ISKP has succeeded in attracting individuals who feel marginalized or disenfranchised by their governments.

Propaganda tactics carried out by the ISKP have also succeeded in garnering widespread sympathy for its cause: overthrowing governments in the region.

The organization has capitalized on public dissatisfaction with corruption, inequality, and violence among Central and South Asian countries by portraying itself as a more extreme, uncompromising alternative to these other parties.

ISKP’s use of online propaganda and targeted messaging has helped it recruit members and build support for its agenda. In particular, the objective of ISKP’s propaganda campaign in India is to condemn the emergence of Hindu nationalism and defend dissatisfied Muslim minorities.

The ISKP has also issued a book in Malayalam, the indigenous language of southwest India, detailing how to engage in jihad. The organization has, furthermore, produced books with comparable content in Hindi and Urdu. These publications are intended to radicalize susceptible individuals and persuade them to join the group’s cause.

The vast majority of Muslims in India reject the extremist ideology and violent tactics of ISKP, and the Indian government has taken steps to counter the group’s propaganda and recruitment efforts. Nonetheless, efforts to counter such propaganda must continue.

A comprehensive response

ISKP has demonstrated its resiliency by adapting to the ever-changing situations in Central and South Asia and shifting its focus to more and more countries.

Its rise requires a comprehensive and coordinated response by all stakeholders, including international partners such as the United States and East Asian countries, which can play an important role in countering the ISKP threat.

For starters, the United States has a strong interest in countering this threat given the group’s links to the broader ISIS network and its potential to destabilize the region. The United States can provide significant support in intelligence-sharing, capacity-building, and diplomatic engagement, as well as in countering terrorist financing and extremist ideology.

Partners such as Japan and South Korea can also play a role, including through financial assistance and technical support. As part of broader efforts to promote regional stability and security, these countries can work with Indian authorities and other stakeholders to build a comprehensive and coordinated response.

Additionally, cooperation and coordination among South Asian countries and their international partners is essential. Included could be sharing of best practices, joint military exercises and joint operations against the group. A united front against ISKP would send a strong message that the group’s violent extremist activities will not be tolerated.

South Asian countries should also work together to address the underlying issues contributing to the growth of extremist groups, such as poverty, inequality, and political instability. By addressing root causes, South Asian countries can create a more stable and secure environment for their citizens and reduce the appeal of violent extremism.

Crucial to effectively addressing ISKP’s threat is a multi-faceted approach that involves improved intelligence gathering, counter-radicalization efforts, and international support, as well as cooperation and coordination among South Asian countries;

Neeraj Singh Manhas ([email protected]) is the director of research in the Indo-Pacific Consortium at Raisina House, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal.

This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

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Iran and Saudi Arabia’s agreement to resume diplomatic relations after years of clashes caught many by surprise – especially due to the Chinese role in mediating between the parties, leaving the United States on the sidelines.

The deal was described by some as a ground-breaking achievement that will change the entire geopolitical architecture in the Middle East, with ramifications for the United States’ posture in the region.

In fact, the agreement did not turn Iran and Saudi Arabia from foes to friends, nor did it change the multifaceted approach of Middle East countries.

Moreover, China’s active diplomacy should not have come as a surprise; rather, it signaled another step away from “wolf warrior” to more constructive diplomacy, not only regarding the Middle East but globally.

To be realistic, China is not trying to replace the United States as a global peace broker but it is very capable of identifying global opportunities to extend its influence and enjoy the fruits of work done by others.

In addition, any promotion of stability is crucial to the Chinese economy – and equally important is to improve its global image.

For example, recently China presented a “peace plan” to end the war in Ukraine. Although that was mostly a smoke screen to legitimize Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, it is worth paying attention to China’s efforts to present itself as a balanced and responsible power.

Another example is the Chinese proposal to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians, recycling old principles that other countries already tried with zero success.

Beijing’s renewed diplomatic activism is aimed at shaping a new diplomatic narrative of China’s global role, primarily focused on the Global South.

Early signs of this diplomatic activism could be found at the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress last October. The changes made to the party and its organs were meant to create a clearer separation between the defense apparatus and the diplomatic circle.

The appointments made in March this year to China’s diplomatic cadre showed Xi’s focus on relations with the US and economic development.

Qin Gang, the new minister for foreign affairs and former ambassador to the US, was promoted to the rank of state councilor. Both Qin and his immediate predecessor Wang Yi, also a state councilor, have extensive experience in American affairs and both hold more power within the party than Wang’s predecessors.

In contrast, Zhao Lijian, who as Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman had personified more confrontational wolf warrior diplomacy, was demoted in January to a position overseeing ocean affairs.

Since March, the two senior diplomats have been pushing harder to realize an updated diplomatic vision advanced by President Xi in three core documents: Global Civilization Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Development Initiative.

All three emphasize the importance of worldwide cooperation and development while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.

Although the three initiatives align with United Nations’ sustainable development goals, many Western countries remain skeptical about China’s real intentions or its ability to realize them. In the Global South, however, countries that are not willing to choose sides in the great power competition but need financial support are much more receptive.

Although Global South countries are aware of the complexity of engaging China, they are concerned more about solving their immediate economic challenges. China can offer them solutions without preconditions – capital for infrastructure projects and investments in manufacturing and services sectors.

In the Middle East, the symbolic mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a sign of China’s growing influence in the region over the last decade. Last month, it was reported that China has resumed construction on a military base in the United Arabs Emirates. Earlier this year, China sealed several deals and agreements with Saudi Arabia, including US$50 billion worth of investments.

This trend is very evident in South Asia as well, with China already deeply invested in Sri Lanka and Pakistan while also extending its reach to Nepal and Bangladesh.

In the case of Bangladesh, China acknowledges the geostrategic importance and bright prospects the growing economy can offer but faces strong competition from India and Japan. The prime minister of Bangladesh is wisely balancing between these powers to promote win-win cooperation.

What we see in these two regions is playing out across the entire Global South and demonstrating that China’s new active diplomacy focused on cooperation rather than division is proving quite attractive.

In this context, public disagreements between the US and Global South countries (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, to name a few) are used effectively by China to expand its influence.

If the United States wishes to counter this trend, it should adopt a more constructive approach and manage disagreements behind closed doors. Otherwise, the US will find itself caught unaware in future developments as well.

Joseph Rozen served for a decade in the Israeli National Security Council as the director for Asia-Pacific affairs. There he was a driving force behind the Israeli foreign investments-screening mechanism and the development of Israel’s bilateral relations with Asian powers. 

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