Navigating Bangladesh’s economic trajectory – Asia Times

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Bangladesh, since its liberation in 1971, has undergone a profound economic transformation, evolving from one of the world’s most impoverished nations to one of the fastest-growing economies.

Despite significant progress in indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), recent external shocks, particularly from the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, have brought attention to the vulnerabilities in the nation’s economic landscape.

Also read: Why Bangladesh can’t get enough of Hasina

In the face of adversity, Bangladesh showcased resilience by achieving GDP growth of 3.4% in 2020, outperforming many developing nations and earning accolades for its government’s adept management.

However, the subsequent move to seek a US$4.5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), alongside Sri Lanka and Pakistan, in late 2022 suggests underlying economic challenges that extend beyond immediate global uncertainties.

Annual GDP growth rates of BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) nations (Percentage, 2010-2021). Source: Author’s own, data from the World Bank

Awami League re-elected

As Bangladesh concluded its 12th parliamentary election on January 7, with the Awami League securing victory for a fourth consecutive term under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, the implications for the country’s economic future are significant.

A critical concern that emerges is the over-reliance on the textile and ready-made garments (RMG) sector, contributing more than 84% to total export earnings in the fiscal year 2019-20. This concentration exposes the economy to risks associated with global demand fluctuations and the labor-intensive nature of production methods.

While the service sector offers short-term support, the imperative for long-term diversification strategies becomes evident.

Turning attention to the tax landscape, Bangladesh currently maintains a tax-to-GDP ratio of 8%, ranking as the second-lowest in South Asia. Institutional corruption poses a substantial hindrance to revenue mobilization, negatively correlating with the tax-to-GDP ratio and impacting taxpayer compliance.

Urgent anti-corruption measures, coupled with progressive tax systems and expenditure rationalization, are indispensable for ensuring fiscal stability, addressing inequality, and fostering sustainable economic development.

The balance of payments presents another challenge, with a significant import-export mismatch exacerbating issues in both the current account and the overall balance of payments.

Fiscal deficits, partially attributed to reduced exports and increased import bills, add strain to the economic scenario.

A decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) further contributes to the fall in the capital-account balance. Strategies such as export promotion, reducing dependency on imported inputs, and improving the business climate are necessary to rectify these macroeconomic imbalances.

Because of global events, the diminishing foreign-exchange reserves and weakening Bangladeshi taka necessitate urgent government action to protect the country’s business environment.

Such measures as halting non-essential imports and limiting the supply of US dollars to commercial banks aim to safeguard reserves but simultaneously pose challenges, including uncertainty in timely payments to foreign suppliers.

Government intervention, complemented by social-security measures, is crucial to stabilizing the domestic economy and protecting vulnerable sections.

In the energy sector, despite a significant increase in electricity generation capacity, the plant load factor (PLF) reached an all-time low in 2022. Addressing the demand-supply gap through technological upgrades and a swift transition to renewable sources becomes imperative for sustaining economic growth.

Inflationary pressures, primarily driven by escalating food and fuel prices, intensify economic challenges and intersect with a banking sector in upheaval. Issues such as loan fraud, capital flight, cronyism, and bureaucratic corruption underscore the intricate ties between economic challenges and the dynamics of patronage politics in Bangladesh.

Environmental concerns

Furthermore, Bangladesh grapples with the dual challenges of addressing inequality and managing the economic risks associated with rapid climate change. Efforts to reduce inequality through increased social expenditures, stimulating savings and investments, and ensuring inclusive growth are crucial.

Simultaneously, the country contends with the threat of climate change, marked by rising sea levels, urbanization, and deforestation, jeopardizing livelihoods and ecosystem services. Effective mitigation strategies, supported by international grants and technology transfer, are crucial to combat environmental degradation and safeguard economic productivity.

In a broader context, the political business-cycle lens sheds light on the fluctuation of economic activities in response to external interventions by political actors aiming to boost the incumbent government’s re-election prospects.

Bangladesh’s historical trends reflect a departure in 2014 and 2018, where GDP growth increased during election years, possibly due to reduced uncertainty about power transfer. If the newly elected government successfully addresses ongoing challenges, the economy may rebound in the latter half of this fiscal year, leading to another period of growth in the next election year.

Finally, as Bangladesh stands at the crossroads of its economic trajectory, strategic interventions and a departure from historical trends are crucial. The intricate interplay of economic challenges, political dynamics, and global uncertainties necessitates a holistic and proactive approach.

By addressing these multifaceted issues, Bangladesh can not only weather the current storms but also position itself as a resilient and thriving player on the global economic stage.

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India-Myanmar: Why Delhi wants to fence the ‘troubled’ border

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A picture made available on 11 March 2017 shows an Indian vendor bringing goods from Myanmar through Indo-Myanmar friendship gate in Moreh in the Tengnoupal district of Manipur state, India, 10 March 2017EPA

Soutik Biswas

By Soutik Biswas
India correspondent

Just over a week ago, India’s federal home minister Amit Shah announced a plan to fence the open border with neighbouring Myanmar.

He said India would secure the rugged 1,643km (1,020-mile) boundary the same way in which “we have fenced the country’s border with Bangladesh”, which is more than twice as long.

Mr Shah said the government would also consider scrapping a six-year-old free movement agreement, allowing border residents from India and Myanmar to travel 16km into each other’s territory without a visa. He gave few details of how the fence would be built, or over what timeframe.

But the move would be fraught with challenges – some experts say the mountainous terrain makes a fence all but impossible. And India’s plans could destabilise the equilibrium that has existed for decades between peoples in the border area, as well as stirring up tensions with its neighbours.

The move to fence the border – involving the four north-eastern Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram – appears to have come against the backdrop of two major developments.

First, the escalation of the conflict in Myanmar since the military coup in February 2021 posed a mounting risk to Indian interests. Some two million people have been displaced in the fighting, according to the UN. In recent weeks, ethnic rebels claimed to have taken over the crucial town of Paletwa in Chin state, disrupting a key route from Myanmar to India.

A policeman fires tear gas to the protesters as they demand restoration of peace in India's north-eastern state of Manipur after ethnic violence, in Imphal on September 21, 2023

AFP

Second, ethnic violence sparked by an affirmative action row erupted last year in Manipur, which shares a near-400km border with Myanmar. Clashes between members of the majority Meitei and tribal Kuki minority have claimed more than 170 lives and displaced tens of thousands of people.

The government in Manipur, led by Indian PM Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has spoken about a “large number of illegal migrants” and said the “violence was fuelled by influential illegal poppy cultivators and drug lords from Myanmar settling in Manipur”.

Last July, India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar informed his counterpart Than Swe from Myanmar’s military-led government that India’s border areas “were seriously disturbed“. He said that “any actions that aggravate the [border] situation should be avoided”, and raised concerns about “human and drug trafficking”.

Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center, an American think-tank, believes the move to fence the border is “driven by India’s perception of a growing two-pronged security threat on its eastern border”.

“It wants to limit the spill-over effects of a deepening conflict in Myanmar, and to reduce the risk of refugees entering an increasingly volatile Manipur from Myanmar,” Mr Kugelman told the BBC.

A view of Myanmar's Khawmawi village on the India-Myanmar border across the Tiau river as seen from Zokhawthar village in Champhai district of India's northeastern state of Mizoram, India, November 14, 2023

Reuters

Some question the validity of this reason. While Manipur’s government has attributed the conflict there to an influx of Kuki refugees from Myanmar, its own panel had identified only 2,187 immigrants from Myanmar in the state by the end of April last year.

“This narrative of massive illegal immigration from Myanmar is false. This is being done to support the narrative that Kukis are ‘foreigners’ and illegal migrants, that they don’t belong to Manipur, and lately, that their resistance is getting support from Myanmar,” said Gautam Mukhopadhaya, a former ambassador of India to Myanmar.

“The logic and evidence for this is very thin. Kukis have inhabited Manipur for ages. The free movement regime has been working well for all communities including Meiteis who have benefitted from it commercially.”

A senior retired army officer, with experience in the region and preferring to remain unnamed, said the necessity for border fencing was not due to civilian migration but because several Indian rebel groups from the north-east had established camps in Myanmar’s border villages and towns.

This picture taken on September 24, 2021 shows shelters for refugees at Pang village in India's eastern state of Mizoram near the Myanmar border, after people fled across the border following attacks by Myanmar's military on villages in western Chin state.

Reuters

For decades India’s north-east has been roiled by separatist insurgencies. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), a law granting security forces search-and-seizure powers and protecting soldiers involved in civilian casualties during operations, has proven to be controversial. Indian rebels hiding in Myanmar can easily cross the border and “do their extortion and violent activities”, the officer said.

However, the move to fence the border is likely to meet resistance.

India and Myanmar have historic religious, linguistic and ethnic ties – some two million people of Indian origin live in Myanmar, which seeks greater economic integration through India’s Look East policy.

Under this policy, India has provided more than $2bn in development assistance – roads, higher education, restoration of damaged pagodas – to Myanmar, most of it in the form of grants.

More importantly, the border splits people with shared ethnicity and culture. Mizos in Mizoram and Chins in Myanmar are ethnic cousins, with cross-border connections, especially as the predominantly Christian Chin State borders Mizoram. There are Nagas on both sides of the border, with many from Myanmar pursuing higher education in India. Hunters from Walong in Arunachal Pradesh have come and gone across the border for centuries.

Not surprisingly, Mizoram, defying federal government directives, has sheltered more than 40,000 refugees who have fled the civil war in Myanmar. Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio, an ally of the BJP, said recently: “We have to work out a formula on how to solve the issue for the people and prevent infiltration as well, because Nagaland is bordered by Myanmar, and on both sides there are Nagas.”

this aerial photo taken on October 29, 2021 show smokes and fires from Thantlang, in Chin State, where more than 160 buildings have been destroyed caused by shelling from Junta military troops, according to local media.

AFP

Also, experts believe that fencing the mountainous and densely forested border will pose significant challenges.

“To fence off the entire border would be impossible given all the mountains along the border and the remoteness of the terrain. It won’t be like building a fence along the border with Bangladesh,” Bertil Linter, a well-known Myanmar expert, told me.

“A fence is impractical, would take years to build and even if is was built at some places, local people would find ways around it.”.

Then there’s the delicate diplomatic question. Constructing a border fence could be a provocative move at a time when Delhi needs to exercise caution in its interactions with Myanmar, according to Mr Kugelman. “India seeks junta support for border security and infrastructure development, among other priorities. Erecting the fence in consultation with Myanmar as opposed to pursing the project unilaterally would lessen the risk of tensions,” he said.

Ultimately, the move underscores India’s border security challenges – the country endures border tensions with arch-rival Pakistan and China – stemming from political tensions, territorial disputes, war, terrorism, or a combination of these factors. India is also pushing back against China in South Asia – and China has stronger economic connections with Myanmar compared to India.

“With India working to strengthen ties with its regional neighbours, and looking to fend off challenges from an increasingly present Beijing in its broader backyard, border challenges are an unwelcome intrusion. But they can’t simply be wished away,” said Mr Kugelman.

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It’s a dream come true to work in Urdu with Zayn Malik, say band

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A picture of the Aur bandmatesAgent HAQ
By Noor Nanji
Culture correspondent

Working with Zayn Malik on a single in Urdu was “a dream come true,” the Pakistani band Aur have told the BBC.

“Previously we only had a Pakistani audience, now we have people from the UK, Brazil, China… so it feels very good,” said bandmate Raffey Anwar.

A remake of Aur’s breakout hit Tu Hai Kahan features the ex-One Direction singer with vocals in Urdu.

The original song has more than 100m views, but the remake is fast catching up, with more than eight million views.

The collaboration came about following discussions between Malik’s and Aur’s management, the band said.

The three bandmates, from Karachi, said none of their friends or family could believe it, when they found out they were collaborating with him.

Many fans were psyched that Malik, who was born in Bradford, is fluent in Urdu.

Zayn Malik

Getty Images

Malik said at the time he was “incredibly humbled” when Aur reached out to him.

“I love the song and have brought some of myself to it. I hope people love what we’ve done,” he said.

Aur’s music blends R&B and hip hop elements. Band members Usama Ali, 21, Ahad Khan, 20, and Anwar, 18, were already popular in South Asia.

But to work with Malik and get global audiences is “all about dreams coming true”, Ali said.

Closer to home, the three bandmates are also getting a lot of attention.

Khan said their friends and family went “crazy” when they heard about the partnership.

“No one was believing it,” added Anwar.

“When we go out somewhere, people instantly recognise us,” said Ali.

“The reaction has been very good, not just friends, the whole of Pakistan has given us a great reaction.”

‘So humble’

Malik, 31, was born in the UK and his father is a Pakistani immigrant.

His music career began in 2010 as part of One Direction, the boy band formed on TV music competition, The X Factor. The other band members are Harry Styles. Niall Horan, Louis Tomlinson and Liam Payne.

Malik released his debut album, Mind of Mine, in 2016. A song in his 2021 album, Nobody is Listening, also included Urdu lyrics.

The Tu Hai Kahan remake was quick to gain fans online among many Urdu-speaking fans, with one calling it a “gift for his fellow Pakistanis”.

Aur were full of praise for Malik, saying: “He is so down to earth, so humble. He sang in Urdu, what can be bigger than that?”

As for who they want to partner with next, the three bandmates are not holding back.

“21 Savage, and Drake, and The Weeknd,” Khan said.

“We will do it with anyone,” laughed Ali.

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Commentary: As South Asia prepares to head to the polls, brace for a possibly violent election year

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PAKISTAN

In Pakistan, elections are scheduled for Feb 8 but risk being postponed amid political uncertainties and the military’s meddling in the elections.

Pakistan’s former prime minister Imran Khan, who is currently in jail on various charges after being ousted from power in April 2022, has said the upcoming election could be a “farce”. Khan, widely seen as the country’s most popular leader, has accused the military of fixing the election by barring him from contesting.

Although Pakistan elects its civilian governments, the military has always wielded power and influence over the election process and elected governments. The army and Khan were on cordial terms before the 2018 general elections that brought him to power but the relationship soon soured.

After Khan’s ouster following his fallout with the military, Pakistan became embroiled in political uncertainty and chaos made even worse by a crippling economic crisis.

The tide has changed in 2024 and according to observers, the military is determined to prevent Khan and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), from forming the government. The exclusion of Khan from the election could increase the sympathy of those who consider him unfairly treated and worsen the popular discontent against the country’s powerful military.

More worryingly, Pakistan’s severe political problems in 2024 come amid militant attacks on the Pakistani military and police, having risen considerably in the previous year. The Islamabad-based Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) reported that 2023 was the “deadliest year” or the country’s “police and military forces in a decade”, with more than 500 security personnel killed.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, is the biggest culprit, responsible for several high-casualty attacks. TPP is a close ally of, but is separate from, the Afghan Taliban, which returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021.

Pakistan officials have blamed the Afghan Taliban government for not doing enough to stop the TTP’s cross-border attacks. Still, the attacks are set to continue and possibly accelerate as TTP and other militant groups try to take advantage of Pakistan’s chaotic election.

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Could war in Gaza ignite direct US-Iran confrontation?  – Asia Times

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Increasingly, there have been signs of Israel’s current military operations expanding violence beyond Gaza. Such prognoses became compelling after last week’s military strikes by the US and its allies on more than 60 locations under Houthi command and launch centers across Yemen, followed by Iranian strikes on Iraq, Syria and Pakistan.

The US has since re-designated the Houthis as global terrorists. This drift away from the hyperactive US shuttle diplomacy to contain this conflict has dangerous implications beyond this energy-rich but volatile region.

The US no longer has to worry only about the Houthis’ missile strikes on merchant vessels in the Red Sea that connects the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, accounting for 15% of global shipping and one-third of global container trade. 

What the West calls Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” – which includes the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and similar groups in Syria and Iraq – have been carrying out attacks on Israel and its allies to express solidarity with Palestine. The Houthis have been attacking merchant ships in the Red Sea since November to pressure Israel to allow the free flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza and for an early end of hostilities.

Of course, the Houthis’ promise to attack only Israel-linked shipping has not been possible, as it is never easy to identify a merchant ship with one nation even when it is legally identified by the flag of that country.

This crisis has caused severe disruptions, with shipping companies’ re-routing resulting in delays, uncertainties and fee increases. But what the United States has to worry about now is Iran’s direct military strikes, which have raised the specter of a possible direct US-Iran confrontation long in the making. At the least this new phantom threatens to derail diplomatic efforts to contain the conflict within Gaza.

Specter of military strikes

Weary of continued Houthi strikes in the Red Sea, several nations, including India, have taken measures to provide escorts, intelligence and rescues for merchant shipping in this theater. In December the United States constituted a nine-nation task force named Operation Prosperity Guardian. This has enormously increased the presence of warships in these waters, and yet the problems have not subsided.

Now, last week’s barrage of retaliation from the US and its allies has been followed by Iranian inland military strikes, first on Iraq and Syria and then inside Pakistan.

It appears that after bomb explosions in Kerman in southern Iran this month, Tehran is no longer relying only on its so-called proxies alone. President Ebrahim Raisi’s political deputy Mohammad Jamshaidi was quick to blame Israel and the US for the Kerman bombings, though Islamic State (ISIS) soon claimed responsibility for the attacks, which killed more than 100 people.

But can the United States, in the midst of a presidential election season and in the face of wars in Ukraine and Israel, afford a direct confrontation with Tehran and its allies? Especially so, when the Israeli war in Gaza has killed more than 24,000 Palestinians, galvanizing intransigence if not open pan-Arab support for Palestine? 

Not that the US has discarded diplomacy as its first choice, yet these expanding military strikes surely betray fatigue among its partners, thus complicating its diplomacy.

The US-led nine-nation Operation Prosperity Guardian, for example, has not been joined by several of its close Indo-Pacific allies. These include Australia, Japan and several of its Arab allies, including Saudi Arabia, which has been fighting the Houthis for decades.

The world’s largest trading nation, China, has not joined it either. Meanwhile, Iran launching direct strikes does not mean that Hezbollah and the Houthis have stopped shooting missiles, incrementally intensifying regional tensions. If anything, they remain keen on spreading it wider as well.

Expanding confrontation 

The Houthis, for example, have now taken it all the way from Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.  Also, more than Israel, last week’s US-led attacks were followed by the Houthis this week launching fresh attacks on US commercial vessels as well.

Together, these military attacks have reportedly impacted more than 50 countries’ shipping, disrupting global supply chains and igniting doomsday speculations.

Iran’s direct military strikes have triggered scenarios of a wider confrontation involving other nations. This Monday saw Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launch ballistic missiles at what it calls Israeli “spy headquarters” in Iraq’s Kurdish region and hit targets linked to ISIS in northern Syria.

Tuesday saw the IRGC using drones and missiles to hit at Salafi-Sunni insurgents of Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) inside Pakistan, thereby involving a nuclear-armed state of South Asia.

The Pakistan Navy has also deployed its warships in the Arabian Sea, and last Sunday claimed to have rescued 21 crew members from a merchant vessel after a hijacking distress call.

Pakistan, which has been a close ally of the United States but also a close friend of China and Iran and a major stakeholder in the Middle East, has so far steered clear of the Gaza conflict, focusing on its own merchant ships and even clarifying that its naval deployments are not meant to counter the Houthis. 

But Iranian strikes in Balochistan have pulled Pakistan into this expanding confrontation.  A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman responded by saying, “This violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty is completely unacceptable and can have serious consequences.”

It has forbidden the Iranian ambassador, on a visit to Tehran, to return to Islamabad. On Thursday, after the Iranian attacks in Balochistan, an IRGC colonel was shot dead in Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan region, with no clarity on who was behind the murder.

In December a senior IRGC adviser was killed by Israeli air strikes outside Damascus. Tensions could deepen further.

Iran-Pakistan tensions 

Jaish al-Adl, with sanctuaries in Pakistan, has been launching attacks against Iranian border guards since it was set up in 2012 and has previously claimed bombings and kidnappings of Iranian border police.

The leader of this Salafi-Sunni movement in southeastern Iran, Salahudin Farooqui, has been a vocal opponent of Iran’s support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. They are also known for being closely linked to the Kurdish freedom movement, which could potentially bring in Turkey as well.

On Tuesday, Iran’s IRGC launched an assault on two of Jaish al-Adl’s military bases inside Pakistan’s Balochistan province. This involved the use of missiles and drones targeting the two bases but also killed two innocent children and injuring three other girls. However, both the US and China – closest of friends of Pakistan – have advised restraint and dialogue.

Given Pakistan’s current politico-economic situation and its track record of non-action against India’s air strikes on Balakot in 2019 or the American operation against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011, Islamabad is not expected to retaliate against Iran. Pakistan has troubles on its borders with Afghanistan and India as well.

Plus, as two Islamic republics, Iran and Pakistan have had an enduring history of working together on their shared challenge from these insurgencies on both sides of their 1,000-kilometer-long border.

Iran was the first country on August 14, 1947, to recognize the Pakistani state. Both have continued to make efforts to fight insurgencies and the drug trade jointly on their shared border regions.

Diplomacy on crutches 

So as war and diplomacy in West Asia race against each other, diplomacy surely seems to be in need of crutches if not yet on a ventilator. As the United States overstretches itself to address challenges at home and abroad, it needs to balance its military and diplomatic strategies to contain the war in Gaza.

On the positive side, it seems close to an early interim cessation of hostilities at least between Israel and Hezbollah by offering an economic aid package for Lebanon. But the Houthi violence now being joined by Iran’s adds to America’s troubles, though both the US and Iran can ill afford a direct confrontation.

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India to remain world’s fastest growing economy in 2024, driven by public spending, services sector

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Financial experts also remain bullish on the outlook for India’s economic growth.

“I’m pretty confident. My guess is that we’ll be anywhere around 7 per cent, or even slightly higher if everything goes well globally as well. So I think it will surprise the consensus, which is much lower,” Mr Amar Ambani, executive director of Yes Securities, told CNA.

“There are many factors that are driving (the growth) and primarily the robustness is getting built … because there are so many cylinders firing.”

These efforts include India’s digitisation efforts and capital expenditure by the government, he said.

However, they could still be hampered by a weak global environment, with factors such as extreme weather and economic pressures unleashed by the war in the Middle East and continuing conflict in Ukraine.

IMPACT OF UPCOMING ELECTION

Another risk factor that could impact the economy is India’s next general election, to be held from April to May this year.

Recent state elections, however, suggested that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) remains popular across the country.

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ISIS-K set on sowing transnational terror mayhem

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Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the terror group Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISIS-K, has sought to internationalize its operational and recruitment campaign.

Utilizing a sweeping propaganda campaign to appeal to audiences across South and Central Asia, the group has tried to position itself as the dominant regional challenger to what it perceives to be repressive regimes.

On January 3, 2024, ISIS-K demonstrated just how far it had progressed toward these goals. In a brutal demonstration of its capability to align actions with extreme rhetoric, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in Kerman, Iran, which resulted in the deaths of over 100 people.

The blast, which was reportedly carried out by two Tajik ISIS-K members, occurred during a memorial service for Qassem Soleimani, a Lieutenant General in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was killed in a US drone strike in 2020.

ISIS-K claimed the attack as an act of revenge against Soleimani, who spearheaded Iran’s fight against the Islamic State group and its affiliates prior to his death.

As experts in ISIS-K and Iran, we believe the attack highlights the success of ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies and its growing ability to strike declared enemies and undermine regional stability.

The attack in Iran was not completely unexpected to those monitoring ISIS-K. A paper one of us co-wrote in 2023 noted that despite setbacks, including the loss of key personnel, ISIS-K was expanding and intensifying its regional influence. It was achieving this by leveraging its ethnically and nationally diverse membership base and ties to other militant groups.

The Kerman blast follows two other recent attacks on the Shahcheragh shrine in Shiraz, Iran, in October 2022 and August 2023 – both purportedly involving Tajik perpetrators.

The involvement of Tajik nationals in the Kerman attack underscores Iran’s long-standing concerns over ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies, which have seen the group swell its members by reaching out to discontented Muslim populations across South and Central Asian countries and consolidating diverse grievances into a single narrative.

Strategic diversity

This strategy of “internationalizing” ISIS-K’s agenda – its aim is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Central and South Asia – has been pursued with renewed vigor since 2021. This is in part due to a more permissive environment following the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan government.

This process of internationalizing ISIS-K’s agenda involves the group targeting regional countries directly, or their presence within Afghanistan. To date, this has seen interests from Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Russia targeted by terrorist attacks.

Meanwhile, strikes against Iran have long been foreshadowed in ISIS-K propaganda.

Islamic State-Khorasan fighters at the Sheikh Jalaluddin training camp in Afghanistan in a file photo. Photo: Facebook

In parallel, the group’s multilingual propaganda campaign interwove a tapestry of local, regional and global grievances to recruit and mobilize supporters from a vast demographic spectrum, and potentially inspire supporters from afar.

In other instances, this has seen the terror group partnering with anti-government and sectarian militant networks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, collaborating with groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

But moreover, ISIS-K is attempting to capture the South and Central Asian militant market for itself. By utilizing fighters representative of regional religious and ethnic populations and publicizing their attacks, ISIS-K is signaling its commitment to a comprehensive jihadist agenda.

The Tajik connection

The involvement of Tajik recruits in the Kerman attack can be understood within this broader context of ISIS-K’s intentional strategic diversification.

Concerns around Tajik nationals’ recruitment into ISIS-K have existed for a while, with the Taliban’s draconian treatment of Afghanistan’s minorities, including Tajiks, likely creating an unwitting recruitment boon for the terror group.

Several Tajik nationals were arrested in relation to a plot against US and NATO targets in Germany in April 2020. More Tajik ISIS-K members were arrested by German and Dutch authorities in July 2023 as part of an operation to disrupt a plot and ISIS-K fundraising.

The attack in Iran represents a continuation of this process of internationalizing ISIS-K’s violent campaign.

But the bombing is significant for another reason: It takes ISIS-K’s fight directly to a symbol of Shia leadership.

A deadly attack against Iran, a formidable Shia state, lends ideological credence to ISIS-K’s words in the eyes of its followers. It also potentially facilitates the recruitment of individuals who are proponents of anti-Shia ideologies in the Muslim world.

More than any other Islamic State affiliate, ISIS-K is uniquely positioned to exploit the vestiges of the deeply embedded, decades-old Sunni-Shia divide in the region.

Iran’s proxies and the Taliban

This isn’t to say that the attack on Iran was purely opportunistic. ISIS-K has deep-rooted antipathy toward Iran due to Tehran’s religious, social and political involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iran’s involvement has been multifold, from supporting political and militant groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban to recruiting fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan for operations against Sunni militants.

Additionally, during the two decades of war in Afghanistan, several Taliban factions reportedly received weapons and funding through Iran’s Quds Force, which carries out missions outside Iran as an arm of the paramilitary security institution Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. By 2018, leaders in Tehran viewed the Taliban as a buffer against ISIS-K.

A man in fatigues stands on rubble, broken walls are behind him.
A Taliban fighter checks a destroyed ISIS-K safehouse on Feb. 14, 2023. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Ebrahim Noroozi

Iran’s strategic interest in Afghanistan is also reflected in the career trajectories of the Quds Force’s top brass. Soleimani was the chief architect behind Iran’s network of proxies, some of which were leveraged against ISIS.

His successor, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, spent part of his career managing proxies in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Iran’s recruitment and encouragement of Shia proxies has exacerbated tensions with ISIS-K.

During the Syrian civil war, the Quds Force recruited, trained and deployed the Fatemiyoun and Zeinabiyoun brigades, composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters, respectively. There were concerns among international observers that the Fatemiyoun Brigade may be deployed to Afghanistan after the US’s withdrawal.

Thus far, Iran appears to leverage the two brigades to stabilize its partners in areas outside of Iran’s immediate vicinity. Nevertheless, the Fatemiyoun Brigade retains the potential to be mobilized as a mobile force within Afghanistan, contingent upon Iran’s evolving strategic calculus.

The perfect storm?

The attack in Iran raises two critical issues with grave security implications: the growing regional reputation and capability of ISIS-K, and the extent to which Iran’s use of militant proxies in Afghanistan may encourage a regional backlash among Sunni extremists.

Improving relations between the Taliban and Tehran suggests that a collaborative stance against ISIS-K may be possible, driven by a mutual desire for stability.

But intervention in Afghanistan, or Iranian deployment of proxy militant forces in the region, could have widespread security repercussions, the type of which we have seen play out in the Iranian attack.

For Pakistan, too, it may fester a renewed cycle of sectarian violence, creating opportunities for militant groups active in the country like ISIS-K, Tehrik-e-Taliban and fighters involved in the Baloch insurgency.

For the US, Iran’s increased involvement in Afghanistan and the violent attack by ISIS-K likewise poses a strategic concern. It risks destabilizing the region and undermining efforts to constrain transnational terrorism.

Amira Jadoon is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson University and Nakissa Jahanbani is Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West Point

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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China fueling Pakistan-India stealth fighter race

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Pakistan is poised to take delivery of China’s Shenyang FC-31 Gyrfalcon fifth-generation fighter jets, a potentially pivotal moment in South Asia’s bristling arms race pitting India and Pakistan with China in the middle.

This month, Defense News quoted Pakistan Air Force (PAF) chief Zaheer Baber Sidhu saying that the Chinese-made fighters, also known as F-60s or J-21 Snowy Owls, are expected to enter service shortly, without indicating an exact timeframe.

Sidhu was speaking at an induction ceremony for new military equipment that included Chinese-made K-10C Firebird fighters, the Defense News report said. The PAF chief did not indicate how many FC-31s Pakistan would acquire.

China’s FC-31/J-35 lower-cost fifth-generation fighter program seeks to compete with the US-made F-35 and fourth-generation-plus European fighters in international markets.

But unanswered questions about the FC-31’s level of stealth achievable in practice, the sensors and sensor fusion in the aircraft when operational and the time taken for delivery will all determine how effective Pakistan’s acquisition will be in counterbalancing India’s evolving capabilities, the Defense News report said.  

The report also suggested that Pakistan’s JF-17, J-10 and F-16s are adequate for air superiority operations vis-à-vis India, raising questions about the need to procure FC-31s at a time Pakistan is particularly cash-strapped with the economy in a shambles.

Pakistan is a notable purchaser of Chinese fighter jets, one of a small group of countries along with Bangladesh, Myanmar, North Korea and a few African countries that have opted to procure Chinese military aircraft.

In March 2022, The Warzone reported that Pakistan had received its first Chinese-made J-10 multirole fighter jets, an acquisition that aims to enhance the PAF’s capabilities following the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) airstrike on an alleged terrorist training camp in Balakot, Pakistan, in February 2019.

The Warzone report said the PAF’s J-10 acquisition was also a response to India’s procurement of France’s Dassault Rafale multirole fighters. The J-10, equipped with advanced active-radar-guided PL-15 air-to-air missiles and active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, will fill at least some of the strategic gap with India.

Previously, Pakistan and China co-developed the JF-17 light fighter, a strategic tie-up that could eventually lift China’s fortunes in global fighter jet markets.

A China-made JF-17 Pakistani fighter. Image: Facebook

In a November 2022 article for Business Insider, Benjamin Brimelow notes that the JF-17, which first flew in 2003, is in service with only Pakistan, Myanmar and Nigeria with 145 airframes as of October 2021.

Brimelow notes that the number will increase to 185 airframes by the decade’s end, making the JF-17 the most used Chinese fighter jet worldwide.

He writes that while early JF-17s were made exclusively in China, Pakistan now hosts most of the production, with 58% of the aircraft made in Pakistan and 42% in China.

Brimelow mentions that the JF-17’s US$15 to $25 million price tag makes it cheaper than any fourth-generation fighter on the market, making it an attractive option for cash-strapped air forces in the developing world that cannot afford Western aircraft.

However, Brimelow notes that the JF-17 is not designed to compete head-on with fifth-generation fighters such as the US-made F-22 and F-35 but rather is better equipped for low-intensity conflicts such as insurgencies or basic air defense against similarly equipped adversaries.

China’s fighter jet sales to Pakistan are a bright spot in its otherwise dismal performance on world markets.

Asia Times noted in January 2022 that China’s scant fighter jet sales to date owe to Beijing’s hesitance to enter cost-sharing agreements, lack of major strategic partners and the reluctance of potential partners to enter strategic tie-ups with China via fighter jet purchases.

However, China may now be consolidating Pakistan into its military logistics supply chain through sales of sophisticated weapons.

Following the US’ example, China could use Pakistan as a model for marketing its weapons on the premise that buyers join a Chinese-dominated logistics train for technical support, better pricing and access to even more advanced weapons.

Pakistan’s long-running conflict with India has made it increasingly dependent on China for relatively cheap advanced weapons, a situation that some suggest could subjugate its foreign and defense policies to Chinese interests.

As such, Pakistan is diversifying its fighter jet sources. In February 2022, Asia Times reported that Pakistan and Turkey are collaborating to develop a fifth-generation stealth fighter to replace its aging US-made F-16 fleets.

The Turkish Fighter Experimental (TF-X) project is a twin-engine multi-role aircraft with air-to-air capabilities and air-to-surface roles. In November 2022, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) released video footage of the TF-X in an early stage of construction. It’s unclear how the FC-31 acquisition will impact the collaboration, if at all.

A full-size TF-X mockup. Photo: TRT World

Pakistan’s China-powered air force modernization is ringing alarms in India, driving New Delhi to step up its indigenous fighter program.   

In an Eurasian Times article this month, Anil Chopra says that India’s Light Combat Aircraft Mark 1A (LCA Mk1A) is on course for induction this year while the companion LCA Mk2 will make its first flight around 2025.

Meanwhile, India’s first indigenously-made fifth-generation fighter, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), is scheduled for induction around 2028-29. Chopra notes that the AMCA has two variants, the partial stealth AMCA Mk1 and stealth AMCA Mk2, with the former set to fly by 2028-29 and the latter by 2032.

Chopra suggests that India may acquire around two squadrons of F-35s as an interim measure, join the Russian Su-57 or Su-75 programs, or join Japanese or European fifth-generation programs. He asserts India’s best option is to accelerate the AMCA program and acquire around 36 F-35 units.

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