The shopping website Daraz has reported a spike in searches for air purifiers and face masks since last October, especially in Punjab. Pulmonologist Dr Khawar Abbas Chaudhry laments the deterioration of Lahore, which he describes as a “once beautiful” city. The hospital where he works is part of the BillContinue Reading
In Pakistan, elections are scheduled for Feb 8 but risk being postponed amid political uncertainties and the military’s meddling in the elections.
Pakistan’s former prime minister Imran Khan, who is currently in jail on various charges after being ousted from power in April 2022, has said the upcoming election could be a “farce”. Khan, widely seen as the country’s most popular leader, has accused the military of fixing the election by barring him from contesting.
Although Pakistan elects its civilian governments, the military has always wielded power and influence over the election process and elected governments. The army and Khan were on cordial terms before the 2018 general elections that brought him to power but the relationship soon soured.
After Khan’s ouster following his fallout with the military, Pakistan became embroiled in political uncertainty and chaos made even worse by a crippling economic crisis.
The tide has changed in 2024 and according to observers, the military is determined to prevent Khan and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), from forming the government. The exclusion of Khan from the election could increase the sympathy of those who consider him unfairly treated and worsen the popular discontent against the country’s powerful military.
More worryingly, Pakistan’s severe political problems in 2024 come amid militant attacks on the Pakistani military and police, having risen considerably in the previous year. The Islamabad-based Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) reported that 2023 was the “deadliest year” or the country’s “police and military forces in a decade”, with more than 500 security personnel killed.
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, is the biggest culprit, responsible for several high-casualty attacks. TPP is a close ally of, but is separate from, the Afghan Taliban, which returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021.
Pakistan officials have blamed the Afghan Taliban government for not doing enough to stop the TTP’s cross-border attacks. Still, the attacks are set to continue and possibly accelerate as TTP and other militant groups try to take advantage of Pakistan’s chaotic election.
Increasingly, there have been signs of Israel’s current military operations expanding violence beyond Gaza. Such prognoses became compelling after last week’s military strikes by the US and its allies on more than 60 locations under Houthi command and launch centers across Yemen, followed by Iranian strikes on Iraq, Syria and Pakistan.
The US has since re-designated the Houthis as global terrorists. This drift away from the hyperactive US shuttle diplomacy to contain this conflict has dangerous implications beyond this energy-rich but volatile region.
The US no longer has to worry only about the Houthis’ missile strikes on merchant vessels in the Red Sea that connects the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, accounting for 15% of global shipping and one-third of global container trade.
What the West calls Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” – which includes the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and similar groups in Syria and Iraq – have been carrying out attacks on Israel and its allies to express solidarity with Palestine. The Houthis have been attacking merchant ships in the Red Sea since November to pressure Israel to allow the free flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza and for an early end of hostilities.
Of course, the Houthis’ promise to attack only Israel-linked shipping has not been possible, as it is never easy to identify a merchant ship with one nation even when it is legally identified by the flag of that country.
This crisis has caused severe disruptions, with shipping companies’ re-routing resulting in delays, uncertainties and fee increases. But what the United States has to worry about now is Iran’s direct military strikes, which have raised the specter of a possible direct US-Iran confrontation long in the making. At the least this new phantom threatens to derail diplomatic efforts to contain the conflict within Gaza.
Weary of continued Houthi strikes in the Red Sea, several nations, including India, have taken measures to provide escorts, intelligence and rescues for merchant shipping in this theater. In December the United States constituted a nine-nation task force named Operation Prosperity Guardian. This has enormously increased the presence of warships in these waters, and yet the problems have not subsided.
Now, last week’s barrage of retaliation from the US and its allies has been followed by Iranian inland military strikes, first on Iraq and Syria and then inside Pakistan.
It appears that after bomb explosions in Kerman in southern Iran this month, Tehran is no longer relying only on its so-called proxies alone. President Ebrahim Raisi’s political deputy Mohammad Jamshaidi was quick to blame Israel and the US for the Kerman bombings, though Islamic State (ISIS) soon claimed responsibility for the attacks, which killed more than 100 people.
But can the United States, in the midst of a presidential election season and in the face of wars in Ukraine and Israel, afford a direct confrontation with Tehran and its allies? Especially so, when the Israeli war in Gaza has killed more than 24,000 Palestinians, galvanizing intransigence if not open pan-Arab support for Palestine?
Not that the US has discarded diplomacy as its first choice, yet these expanding military strikes surely betray fatigue among its partners, thus complicating its diplomacy.
The US-led nine-nation Operation Prosperity Guardian, for example, has not been joined by several of its close Indo-Pacific allies. These include Australia, Japan and several of its Arab allies, including Saudi Arabia, which has been fighting the Houthis for decades.
The world’s largest trading nation, China, has not joined it either. Meanwhile, Iran launching direct strikes does not mean that Hezbollah and the Houthis have stopped shooting missiles, incrementally intensifying regional tensions. If anything, they remain keen on spreading it wider as well.
The Houthis, for example, have now taken it all the way from Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Also, more than Israel, last week’s US-led attacks were followed by the Houthis this week launching fresh attacks on US commercial vessels as well.
Together, these military attacks have reportedly impacted more than 50 countries’ shipping, disrupting global supply chains and igniting doomsday speculations.
Iran’s direct military strikes have triggered scenarios of a wider confrontation involving other nations. This Monday saw Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launch ballistic missiles at what it calls Israeli “spy headquarters” in Iraq’s Kurdish region and hit targets linked to ISIS in northern Syria.
Tuesday saw the IRGC using drones and missiles to hit at Salafi-Sunni insurgents of Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) inside Pakistan, thereby involving a nuclear-armed state of South Asia.
The Pakistan Navy has also deployed its warships in the Arabian Sea, and last Sunday claimed to have rescued 21 crew members from a merchant vessel after a hijacking distress call.
Pakistan, which has been a close ally of the United States but also a close friend of China and Iran and a major stakeholder in the Middle East, has so far steered clear of the Gaza conflict, focusing on its own merchant ships and even clarifying that its naval deployments are not meant to counter the Houthis.
But Iranian strikes in Balochistan have pulled Pakistan into this expanding confrontation. A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman responded by saying, “This violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty is completely unacceptable and can have serious consequences.”
It has forbidden the Iranian ambassador, on a visit to Tehran, to return to Islamabad. On Thursday, after the Iranian attacks in Balochistan, an IRGC colonel was shot dead in Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan region, with no clarity on who was behind the murder.
In December a senior IRGC adviser was killed by Israeli air strikes outside Damascus. Tensions could deepen further.
Jaish al-Adl, with sanctuaries in Pakistan, has been launching attacks against Iranian border guards since it was set up in 2012 and has previously claimed bombings and kidnappings of Iranian border police.
The leader of this Salafi-Sunni movement in southeastern Iran, Salahudin Farooqui, has been a vocal opponent of Iran’s support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. They are also known for being closely linked to the Kurdish freedom movement, which could potentially bring in Turkey as well.
On Tuesday, Iran’s IRGC launched an assault on two of Jaish al-Adl’s military bases inside Pakistan’s Balochistan province. This involved the use of missiles and drones targeting the two bases but also killed two innocent children and injuring three other girls. However, both the US and China – closest of friends of Pakistan – have advised restraint and dialogue.
Given Pakistan’s current politico-economic situation and its track record of non-action against India’s air strikes on Balakot in 2019 or the American operation against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011, Islamabad is not expected to retaliate against Iran. Pakistan has troubles on its borders with Afghanistan and India as well.
Plus, as two Islamic republics, Iran and Pakistan have had an enduring history of working together on their shared challenge from these insurgencies on both sides of their 1,000-kilometer-long border.
Iran was the first country on August 14, 1947, to recognize the Pakistani state. Both have continued to make efforts to fight insurgencies and the drug trade jointly on their shared border regions.
So as war and diplomacy in West Asia race against each other, diplomacy surely seems to be in need of crutches if not yet on a ventilator. As the United States overstretches itself to address challenges at home and abroad, it needs to balance its military and diplomatic strategies to contain the war in Gaza.
On the positive side, it seems close to an early interim cessation of hostilities at least between Israel and Hezbollah by offering an economic aid package for Lebanon. But the Houthi violence now being joined by Iran’s adds to America’s troubles, though both the US and Iran can ill afford a direct confrontation.
Domestic demand to remain a key growth driver with RM expected to outperform
Core inflation to remain benign, Bank Negara to maintain Overnight Policy Rate at 3.0%
Standard Chartered expects Malaysia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth to pick up to 4.8% in 2024 from 4.3% in 2023, with domestic demand likely to be…Continue Reading
Financial experts also remain bullish on the outlook for India’s economic growth.
“I’m pretty confident. My guess is that we’ll be anywhere around 7 per cent, or even slightly higher if everything goes well globally as well. So I think it will surprise the consensus, which is much lower,” Mr Amar Ambani, executive director of Yes Securities, told CNA.
“There are many factors that are driving (the growth) and primarily the robustness is getting built … because there are so many cylinders firing.”
These efforts include India’s digitisation efforts and capital expenditure by the government, he said.
However, they could still be hampered by a weak global environment, with factors such as extreme weather and economic pressures unleashed by the war in the Middle East and continuing conflict in Ukraine.
Another risk factor that could impact the economy is India’s next general election, to be held from April to May this year.
Recent state elections, however, suggested that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) remains popular across the country.
Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the terror group Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISIS-K, has sought to internationalize its operational and recruitment campaign.
Utilizing a sweeping propaganda campaign to appeal to audiences across South and Central Asia, the group has tried to position itself as the dominant regional challenger to what it perceives to be repressive regimes.
On January 3, 2024, ISIS-K demonstrated just how far it had progressed toward these goals. In a brutal demonstration of its capability to align actions with extreme rhetoric, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in Kerman, Iran, which resulted in the deaths of over 100 people.
The blast, which was reportedly carried out by two Tajik ISIS-K members, occurred during a memorial service for Qassem Soleimani, a Lieutenant General in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was killed in a US drone strike in 2020.
ISIS-K claimed the attack as an act of revenge against Soleimani, who spearheaded Iran’s fight against the Islamic State group and its affiliates prior to his death.
As experts in ISIS-K and Iran, we believe the attack highlights the success of ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies and its growing ability to strike declared enemies and undermine regional stability.
The attack in Iran was not completely unexpected to those monitoring ISIS-K. A paper one of us co-wrote in 2023 noted that despite setbacks, including the loss of key personnel, ISIS-K was expanding and intensifying its regional influence. It was achieving this by leveraging its ethnically and nationally diverse membership base and ties to other militant groups.
The Kerman blast follows two other recent attacks on the Shahcheragh shrine in Shiraz, Iran, in October 2022 and August 2023 – both purportedly involving Tajik perpetrators.
The involvement of Tajik nationals in the Kerman attack underscores Iran’s long-standing concerns over ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies, which have seen the group swell its members by reaching out to discontented Muslim populations across South and Central Asian countries and consolidating diverse grievances into a single narrative.
This strategy of “internationalizing” ISIS-K’s agenda – its aim is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Central and South Asia – has been pursued with renewed vigor since 2021. This is in part due to a more permissive environment following the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan government.
This process of internationalizing ISIS-K’s agenda involves the group targeting regional countries directly, or their presence within Afghanistan. To date, this has seen interests from Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Russia targeted by terrorist attacks.
Meanwhile, strikes against Iran have long been foreshadowed in ISIS-K propaganda.
In parallel, the group’s multilingual propaganda campaign interwove a tapestry of local, regional and global grievances to recruit and mobilize supporters from a vast demographic spectrum, and potentially inspire supporters from afar.
In other instances, this has seen the terror group partnering with anti-government and sectarian militant networks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, collaborating with groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
But moreover, ISIS-K is attempting to capture the South and Central Asian militant market for itself. By utilizing fighters representative of regional religious and ethnic populations and publicizing their attacks, ISIS-K is signaling its commitment to a comprehensive jihadist agenda.
The involvement of Tajik recruits in the Kerman attack can be understood within this broader context of ISIS-K’s intentional strategic diversification.
Concerns around Tajik nationals’ recruitment into ISIS-K have existed for a while, with the Taliban’s draconian treatment of Afghanistan’s minorities, including Tajiks, likely creating an unwitting recruitment boon for the terror group.
Several Tajik nationals were arrested in relation to a plot against US and NATO targets in Germany in April 2020. More Tajik ISIS-K members were arrested by German and Dutch authorities in July 2023 as part of an operation to disrupt a plot and ISIS-K fundraising.
The attack in Iran represents a continuation of this process of internationalizing ISIS-K’s violent campaign.
But the bombing is significant for another reason: It takes ISIS-K’s fight directly to a symbol of Shia leadership.
A deadly attack against Iran, a formidable Shia state, lends ideological credence to ISIS-K’s words in the eyes of its followers. It also potentially facilitates the recruitment of individuals who are proponents of anti-Shia ideologies in the Muslim world.
More than any other Islamic State affiliate, ISIS-K is uniquely positioned to exploit the vestiges of the deeply embedded, decades-old Sunni-Shia divide in the region.
This isn’t to say that the attack on Iran was purely opportunistic. ISIS-K has deep-rooted antipathy toward Iran due to Tehran’s religious, social and political involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Iran’s involvement has been multifold, from supporting political and militant groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban to recruiting fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan for operations against Sunni militants.
Additionally, during the two decades of war in Afghanistan, several Taliban factions reportedly received weapons and funding through Iran’s Quds Force, which carries out missions outside Iran as an arm of the paramilitary security institution Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. By 2018, leaders in Tehran viewed the Taliban as a buffer against ISIS-K.
Iran’s strategic interest in Afghanistan is also reflected in the career trajectories of the Quds Force’s top brass. Soleimani was the chief architect behind Iran’s network of proxies, some of which were leveraged against ISIS.
His successor, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, spent part of his career managing proxies in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Iran’s recruitment and encouragement of Shia proxies has exacerbated tensions with ISIS-K.
During the Syrian civil war, the Quds Force recruited, trained and deployed the Fatemiyoun and Zeinabiyoun brigades, composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters, respectively. There were concerns among international observers that the Fatemiyoun Brigade may be deployed to Afghanistan after the US’s withdrawal.
Thus far, Iran appears to leverage the two brigades to stabilize its partners in areas outside of Iran’s immediate vicinity. Nevertheless, the Fatemiyoun Brigade retains the potential to be mobilized as a mobile force within Afghanistan, contingent upon Iran’s evolving strategic calculus.
The attack in Iran raises two critical issues with grave security implications: the growing regional reputation and capability of ISIS-K, and the extent to which Iran’s use of militant proxies in Afghanistan may encourage a regional backlash among Sunni extremists.
Improving relations between the Taliban and Tehran suggests that a collaborative stance against ISIS-K may be possible, driven by a mutual desire for stability.
But intervention in Afghanistan, or Iranian deployment of proxy militant forces in the region, could have widespread security repercussions, the type of which we have seen play out in the Iranian attack.
For Pakistan, too, it may fester a renewed cycle of sectarian violence, creating opportunities for militant groups active in the country like ISIS-K, Tehrik-e-Taliban and fighters involved in the Baloch insurgency.
For the US, Iran’s increased involvement in Afghanistan and the violent attack by ISIS-K likewise poses a strategic concern. It risks destabilizing the region and undermining efforts to constrain transnational terrorism.
Amira Jadoon is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson University and Nakissa Jahanbani is Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West Point
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Pakistan is poised to take delivery of China’s Shenyang FC-31 Gyrfalcon fifth-generation fighter jets, a potentially pivotal moment in South Asia’s bristling arms race pitting India and Pakistan with China in the middle.
This month, Defense News quoted Pakistan Air Force (PAF) chief Zaheer Baber Sidhu saying that the Chinese-made fighters, also known as F-60s or J-21 Snowy Owls, are expected to enter service shortly, without indicating an exact timeframe.
Sidhu was speaking at an induction ceremony for new military equipment that included Chinese-made K-10C Firebird fighters, the Defense News report said. The PAF chief did not indicate how many FC-31s Pakistan would acquire.
China’s FC-31/J-35 lower-cost fifth-generation fighter program seeks to compete with the US-made F-35 and fourth-generation-plus European fighters in international markets.
But unanswered questions about the FC-31’s level of stealth achievable in practice, the sensors and sensor fusion in the aircraft when operational and the time taken for delivery will all determine how effective Pakistan’s acquisition will be in counterbalancing India’s evolving capabilities, the Defense News report said.
The report also suggested that Pakistan’s JF-17, J-10 and F-16s are adequate for air superiority operations vis-à-vis India, raising questions about the need to procure FC-31s at a time Pakistan is particularly cash-strapped with the economy in a shambles.
Pakistan is a notable purchaser of Chinese fighter jets, one of a small group of countries along with Bangladesh, Myanmar, North Korea and a few African countries that have opted to procure Chinese military aircraft.
In March 2022, The Warzone reported that Pakistan had received its first Chinese-made J-10 multirole fighter jets, an acquisition that aims to enhance the PAF’s capabilities following the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) airstrike on an alleged terrorist training camp in Balakot, Pakistan, in February 2019.
The Warzone report said the PAF’s J-10 acquisition was also a response to India’s procurement of France’s Dassault Rafale multirole fighters. The J-10, equipped with advanced active-radar-guided PL-15 air-to-air missiles and active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, will fill at least some of the strategic gap with India.
Previously, Pakistan and China co-developed the JF-17 light fighter, a strategic tie-up that could eventually lift China’s fortunes in global fighter jet markets.
In a November 2022 article for Business Insider, Benjamin Brimelow notes that the JF-17, which first flew in 2003, is in service with only Pakistan, Myanmar and Nigeria with 145 airframes as of October 2021.
Brimelow notes that the number will increase to 185 airframes by the decade’s end, making the JF-17 the most used Chinese fighter jet worldwide.
He writes that while early JF-17s were made exclusively in China, Pakistan now hosts most of the production, with 58% of the aircraft made in Pakistan and 42% in China.
Brimelow mentions that the JF-17’s US$15 to $25 million price tag makes it cheaper than any fourth-generation fighter on the market, making it an attractive option for cash-strapped air forces in the developing world that cannot afford Western aircraft.
However, Brimelow notes that the JF-17 is not designed to compete head-on with fifth-generation fighters such as the US-made F-22 and F-35 but rather is better equipped for low-intensity conflicts such as insurgencies or basic air defense against similarly equipped adversaries.
China’s fighter jet sales to Pakistan are a bright spot in its otherwise dismal performance on world markets.
Asia Times noted in January 2022 that China’s scant fighter jet sales to date owe to Beijing’s hesitance to enter cost-sharing agreements, lack of major strategic partners and the reluctance of potential partners to enter strategic tie-ups with China via fighter jet purchases.
However, China may now be consolidating Pakistan into its military logistics supply chain through sales of sophisticated weapons.
Following the US’ example, China could use Pakistan as a model for marketing its weapons on the premise that buyers join a Chinese-dominated logistics train for technical support, better pricing and access to even more advanced weapons.
Pakistan’s long-running conflict with India has made it increasingly dependent on China for relatively cheap advanced weapons, a situation that some suggest could subjugate its foreign and defense policies to Chinese interests.
As such, Pakistan is diversifying its fighter jet sources. In February 2022, Asia Times reported that Pakistan and Turkey are collaborating to develop a fifth-generation stealth fighter to replace its aging US-made F-16 fleets.
The Turkish Fighter Experimental (TF-X) project is a twin-engine multi-role aircraft with air-to-air capabilities and air-to-surface roles. In November 2022, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) released video footage of the TF-X in an early stage of construction. It’s unclear how the FC-31 acquisition will impact the collaboration, if at all.
Pakistan’s China-powered air force modernization is ringing alarms in India, driving New Delhi to step up its indigenous fighter program.
In an Eurasian Times article this month, Anil Chopra says that India’s Light Combat Aircraft Mark 1A (LCA Mk1A) is on course for induction this year while the companion LCA Mk2 will make its first flight around 2025.
Meanwhile, India’s first indigenously-made fifth-generation fighter, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), is scheduled for induction around 2028-29. Chopra notes that the AMCA has two variants, the partial stealth AMCA Mk1 and stealth AMCA Mk2, with the former set to fly by 2028-29 and the latter by 2032.
Chopra suggests that India may acquire around two squadrons of F-35s as an interim measure, join the Russian Su-57 or Su-75 programs, or join Japanese or European fifth-generation programs. He asserts India’s best option is to accelerate the AMCA program and acquire around 36 F-35 units.
family, lady, and lady. She requested that we refrain from using her brand.
She wants to share a tale, but she’s hesitant to do so in front of others. We travel along railroad tracks in search of a peaceful area where we can have private conversations.
We head to an abandoned creating after leaving a crammed market. We are positioned on a program three planes above the city. In the distance, there is a call to prayer. She describes her father to me.
He was a well-known employee of Bangladesh Nationalist Party ( BNP ), the nation’s primary political opposition. He was a big-hearted man who gladly indulged his wife and children. He loved to sing, especially romantic songs. He was at a local drink shop when authorities detained him late last month. Only 26 weeks afterwards, his boy received a call. His parents had passed away in custody.
My brother had just seen his father three days prior, and he was in good health, she said. When my son inquired about his death, they replied,” We do n’t know.” Simply taking him to the graveyard.
The woman claimed that her father had marks all over his brain, hands, and mouth when she first saw him. She was informed by officials that he passed away naturally. She thinks he was tortured, though.
My daughter ca n’t hear her father’s voice, and my son can no longer call his father. The like a father does provide cannot be replaced by me. Who will appreciate the father? I then want my father to receive justice.
According to human rights organizations, under the leadership of Prime Minister Hasina Sheikh, there has been an increase in politically motivated prosecutions, extrajudicial murders of people, and other violations of their rights.
The “violent autocratic crackdown” by Bangladeshi authorities, according to a recent report by Human Rights Watch ( HRW), was unmistakably an effort to crush the opposition before the elections. According to Meenakshi Ganguly, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch, Asia Division,” This all seems like there is no room for opposition or criticism that is so essential to a functioning democracy.”
The BNP declared it would abstain from voting on Sunday in light of the assault on opposition. Prime Minister Hasina Sheikh and her Awami League group are almost certain to win a fifth straight term in office because there is no genuine opposition running against her.
The government asserts that it is committed to holding completely, fair, and interactive elections on Sunday and refutes claims that critics have been silenced. Ainsul Haq, the Minister for Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs, said,” Let me make one thing clear: we are not gagging anyone.” ” Everyone has the right to speak up, and we would be happy to have anyone do so.”
BNP protesters find it difficult to buy. More than 10,000 of their backers and group officials are incarcerated, according to HRW.
Nasrul Islam, a mature BNP head, said,” Yes, you may speak freely, but no one will be held accountable for the results.” He claimed that those who spoke openly were detained, subjected to beatings and torture, and some of them even died in prison. Yet he takes precautions, refraining from spending the night in his home because” that’s when officials come and arrest people.”
The married lady claims that she is concerned for the safety of her family and herself due to her late husband’s political activities.
There are many Awami League followers in the area, so we are afraid. My brother and I will be harassed, she said.
She also thinks her father did the right thing for his land despite her fear. She claims there is an excessive use of force and does not believe in the legality of these primaries.
” He passed away and left us. For this reason, I wo n’t cast a ballot.
Andrew Clarance provided further reporting
Noor Bashar only earns 500 Bangladeshi taka ($ 4.50,$ 3.55 ) per day, or half of what he requires to support his nine-person family.
That amount might decrease even more as Bangladesh’s prices rate rises.
The 43-year-old day laborer who lives in Cox’s Bazaar, 400 km ( 250 miles ) south of the capital Dhaka, says,” People are really suffering.”
” I cannot get spices if I buy bass.” If I purchase spices, I am unable to purchase corn.
A cost-of-living issue is plaguing Bangladesh, a nation of 170 million people. The once-promising development curve of the nation has dipped, and greater difficulties now loom in the low-lying delta that is susceptible to climate change.
Disgruntled citizens, however, have no faith that Sunday’s vote, which they claim is a foregone conclusion, will make their lives better.
My family’s needs are my top priority. Politics are not something I care about because it wo n’t support my family. I’m constantly considering how I may pay back the money I took out from people, said Mr. Bashar.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party ( BNP ), the main opposition, has boycotted this election, and the ruling Awami League, led by Hasina,Sheikh, appears poised to tighten its authoritarian hold on it.
Many voters believe that the Awami League has already won because there is n’t a strong opposition candidate. Some worry that Ms. Hasina’s third direct term will make the economic situation worse and increase their desperation.
” The elections do n’t interest me in the least. Why if I give a damn? Gias Uddin, a security guard in the port town of Chittagong, said that the goal, whatever it may be, will never alter my fate.
The 57-year-old claims that his family’s finances are so small that they can only manage two meals per day. Fish and meat are no longer purchased by him because they are too costly, and he frequently gathers other people’s crumbs to prepare meals for his nine kids.
The home gets by on donations and friend money.
” I have so far borrowed 200, 000 baht. How I may pay back the money is a mystery to me. Simply God knows, according to Mr. Uddin.
” This is a really challenging situation. I occasionally feel like I may pass away.
According to some experts, Bangladesh’s descent into monarchy was one of the greatest threats to the country, which was hailed as an “economic wonder” just a few years ago.
According to scholar Debapriya Bhattacharya of the Centre for Policy Dialogue think tank in Dhaka, the next government may face a problem in regaining trust in the economy.
However, it would be very challenging because the state lacks the political clout to carry out the stability-related plans.
Bangladesh had experienced rapid economic growth in recent years.
Despite its difficult working conditions, its garment industry has helped millions of people escape poverty and now makes up about 80 % of the nation’s exports, making it the second-largest garment producer in the world after China.
The International Monetary Fund approved a$ 4.7 billion borrowing in 2023 to strengthen Bangladesh’s weak economy after once predicting that its gross domestic product could exceed that of developed markets like Singapore and Hong Kong.
However, researchers have cautioned that Bangladesh’s issues cannot be solved but quickly. Although outside factors played a role, some believe that politicians did not address them or carry out necessary changes.
Corruption is another scourge that has gone unchallenged. Bangladesh was ranked as the 12th most dishonest nation in the world by Transparency International.
” The ruling party has no reason to crack down on fraud severely.” And following this election, people and organizations connected to them will continue to have influence, according to Dr. Bhattacharya.
According to Ali Riaz, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, the folks at bottom of the social ladder did continue to bear the burden of its troubled economy as the national debt grows heavier.
” In any one-party state, there are no checks and balances.” According to Prof. Riaz, no one holds the government accountable for its financial decisions.
There have been claims of extensive vote-rigging in the past, which the Awami League refuted.
Additionally, there is worry that Bangladesh’s democracy and human rights situation may result in economic sanctions from important buying lovers like the US and the EU. Washington started enforcing immigration restrictions on Bangladeshi authorities past September after concluding that they were responsible for undermining the nation’s democratic election process.
Another significant and urgent issue is weather change. Bangladesh is located less than 5 meters above sea level in about two-thirds of the country. A 30 to 45 inches rise in sea level could force more than 35 million people—roughly 25 % of the nation’s population—out of southern areas, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
In the south-western region of Satkhira, where vegetables simply grow during specific seasons or in corn sacks stuffed with compost due to the increasing acidity of the soil, tidal surges and cyclones are a growing threat.
The biggest issue in our region is the lack of clean drinking water. We are surrounded by salt water, according to local native Shampa Goswami.
She added that many people who live in rural areas are not well-informed about culture issues and that weather has not been a top priority in the poll plan.
This, in Prof. Riaz’s opinion, highlights the absence of a political approach. You wo n’t be able to address a crisis like this that calls for engagement with the common people unless you have an accountable system, he said.
Since the end of military rule in 1991, the Awami League and the BNP have alternated as the nation’s leaders, and some people claim that both parties have made a mockery of politics.
” Generally, whoever is in power will act in the same way.” It is very challenging to determine which of two evils is the lesser of the two. According to AKM Mohsin, managing director of the Bangladesh Centre in Singapore, “democracy in Bangladesh is defined in the government’s officials ‘ words.”
They cling to their authority when they have it. But rather than removing opportunities for the populace through poor governance of the nation, Bangladesh definitely needs officials who work to create them.
JAKARTA: More than 140 Rohingya have arrived in Indonesia’s North Sumatra province over the weekend, state news agency Antara reported on Monday (Jan 1), adding to a surge of arrivals of members of the Myanmar Muslim minority to Indonesia. The group, consisting mostly of women and children, arrived by boatContinue Reading