WASHINGTON: At a time of escalating geopolitical tension, the United States called on China on Saturday( Apr 29 ) to stop harassing Philippine ships in the South China Sea. The US State Department stated in a speech,” We call upon Beijing to refrain from its controversial and dangerous run.” FollowingContinue Reading
Someone asked me a few questions about Japan’s national defense the other day. As expected, I gave my take on each one. Meanwhile, others might be just as curious about the current status of Japan’s preparedness.
If so, then this is what you need to know:
The People’s Republic of China. Xi Jinping has succeeded in getting Japan to take its national defense seriously. That’s something the Americans never had much success at.
Some Japanese were concerned with PRC military threat in the early 2000s, if not before. And then-prime minister Shinzo Abe‘s efforts in 2006-2007 to establish the Quad between the major democracies: Japan, Australia, the United States, and India owed to concerns of Chinese expansionism.
Japan had been quietly building up its defense all the while. By the late 2000s, for example, Japan’s “anti-submarine helicopter carriers” — aircraft carriers with a little modification — were already on hand, and the next generation was already under construction. Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) plans to “fortify” the Nansei Shoto were developed around this time too.
The US Army’s high-mobility rocket artillery system “HIMARS” (left) which was first deployed to the Nansei Islands, and the Ground Self-Defense Force’s “Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile.” August 31, 2022 GSDF Camp Amami. Image: Sankei by Toyohiro Ichioka
China’s fishing fleet, along with the China Coast Guard and Chinese Navy muscling in on Japan’s Senkaku Islands around 2012 is what really got Tokyo’s attention. It spurred a faster, if measured, defense buildup.
The buildup was probably too measured. The Chinese have not let up around Japan’s southern islands, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard are overstretched down south. That’s not surprising given that from 2016-2020 the People’s Liberation Army Navy launched about as many ships as were in the entire Japanese naval fleet.
In recent years, Japan’s moves to strengthen defense have seemed more pronounced. People’s attention was caught, especially, by Kishida‘s announced doubling of defense spending. The Japanese are now moving faster. And Japanese defense guidelines no longer beat around the bush. They now describe China as the problem that needs to be addressed.
Japan by and large recognizes that there’s no deal to be cut with the PRC. And Japan is being forced to protect itself.
I doubt it. That would have been mostly a matter of beefing up missile defenses, and maybe acquiring some long-range missiles — the so-called “counterstrike weapons” to hit targets in North Korea.
Japan’s move to strengthen its defense is also partly motivated by fears that the United States may not defend Japan if it doesn’t do enough. Indeed, Tokyo has always fretted about “Japan passing.” In other words, the Americans losing interest in Japan and even reaching an accommodation with China that leaves Japan on its own.
A Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel navigates alongside a Chinese Coast Guard ship to prevent it from approaching a research vessel. January 30, off the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture. Image: Sankei by Hiroshi Kawase
Not really. Japanese pacifism has always been a strange thing and in part is just moral preening. The JSDF, for all its shortcomings, has always been a real military. Even more, pacifist Japan has always insisted that the Americans exterminate anyone threatening Japan. That’s some pacifism. With China breathing fire, nobody much talks about pacifism these days.
Maybe, maybe not. Tokyo should have started moving faster at least a decade ago. But this is always the case when free nations wake up and realize they are at risk from aggressive, dictatorial regimes. It’s always later than it should be.
Japan isn’t starting from scratch, however. It has the makings of a force that can deliver some punch. But owing to restraints placed on JSDF development — mostly self-imposed — it’s a somewhat misshapen and undersized force.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), for example, ought to be twice its size in order to handle current missions. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is not well integrated with the other services and seems to prefer flying around at 30,000 feet (9 kilometers) looking for a dogfight. It’s also smaller than it should be.
GSDF has made some good progress in the last decade in becoming a more mobile force. This is evidenced by the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade. And it’s even able to work with MSDF more than one imagines. But GSDF has to overcome decades of being focused on defending Hokkaido from a Russian invasion — that never came.
Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade getting off from amphibious vehicle AAV7 in the Ground Self-Defense Force “Fuji Firepower Exercise” on May 28, Higashifuji Exercise Area in Gotemba City, Shizuoka Prefecture. Image: Sankei by Haruna Naka
JSDF needs to figure out joint (or combined) operations, so the three JSDF services can operate together. Otherwise, it’s not even the sum of its parts. There’s a move afoot to get this capability in place, but it will be a few years. And even then, mastering joint/combined ops takes time and practice
Recruitment is another problem. JSDF has been missing its targets by 20% for years. This isn’t because of the shrinking population. It’s more because service in the JSDF has never been a respected profession — owing to governments and media and academia doing their best to humiliate and handcuff the JSDF for decades.
Also, service in the JSDF is poorly compensated, living conditions are almost slum-like, and has nothing like the benefits of serving in the US forces.
Announcing that Japan will double defense spending was the easy part. Spending it on the right things is the hard part. Japan really doesn’t know what it needs — either capability or hardware-wise to fight a war.
Hopefully, the US side will quietly dispatch some good war planners to Japan, link them with the right people, and have them lay out what is needed (and what the US needs from Japan as well.) It would save a lot of time and wasted effort and money.
Some other shortcomings that need addressing, and fast, are the practical issues of logistics, war stocks, casualty handling and replacements, mobilization processes, civil defense, and the like. It’s hard to fight a war if these aren’t in place, and in Japan’s case, they are not ready.
The ability to operate with US forces also needs much work. The two navies are pretty good at operating together, but beyond that things need work. You’d have no idea the Americans and the Japanese have had a defense relationship for 60+ years, given how lacking the two militaries are in this respect.
Until you see a joint operational headquarters in Japan where US and Japanese forces are conducting peacetime and wartime activities necessary to defend Japan, you should be skeptical of officials saying the military alliance is in fighting trim.
Jointly training: JASDF F15 fighter (three in the foreground) and US military F16 fighter on June 7, 2022. Image: Joint Staff Office of the Ministry of Defense
It had better. If Japan doesn’t pitch in, the US-Japan alliance will collapse in short order. Ironically, but not surprisingly, I heard a Japanese scholar say not long ago that if the US did not fight to defend Taiwan the Japanese would leave the alliance.
No mention of Japan doing its part in the fighting. Indeed, he pointed out how it would be hard from a legal perspective, and would also upset Japan’s economic ties with the PRC. Fortunately, most Japanese are more tuned in than this fellow.
Japan is well aware that “Taiwan’s defense is Japan’s defense.” JSDF officers were saying this years ago, but now it’s widely understood. Japan will look to see what the Americans are going to do and then figure out what Japan will do. That’s not unusual.
I expect that Japan will deploy the JSDF — particularly the Navy and Air Force — and will back up the Americans, and will do some “shooting.” The Ground Self Defense Force will be active down in Nansei Shoto with surveillance and long-range weaponry, and maybe even operating with US Marines.
Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear that Japan is doing the necessary planning for a Taiwan contingency. And it is unclear if the Japanese and the Americans have a joint plan either. Perhaps the idea is to “wing it” if something happens. That’s a good way to lose.
Stepping back and taking stock, Japan has made a lot of progress. If you knew about Japan’s defense situation several decades ago, it is almost unrecognizable today. But there’s much to do and little time to do it.
This article was first published by JapanForward. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.
After more than a year of no direct communication, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had a phone conversation on April 26, 2023.
According to the Chinese record of the call, “the two sides exchanged views on China-Ukraine relations and the Ukraine crisis”, but globally it was seen as an attempt by Beijing to step in as peacemaker.
Meanwhile, Zelensky tweeted that he “had a long and meaningful phone call” with Xi, and later expanded on his Telegram channel saying that particular attention was “paid to the ways of possible cooperation to establish a just and sustainable peace for Ukraine”.
The most concrete outcome of the call is Xi’s confirmation that China will appoint a special representative on Eurasian affairs to Ukraine “to have in-depth communication with all parties on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis.”
If nothing else, this signals that China is getting serious with its mediation efforts and judges the time to be right for this, not least because of increasing tensions in the Western alliance and doubts about the success of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
China’s move is another indication of a changing international order that Beijing is keen, and increasingly able, to shape. What is immediately at stake for China is its relationship with the EU. For the EU’s member states, the war in Ukraine, including a possible further escalation, is of much more acute security concern than it is for China.
European officials have repeatedly urged Beijing to use its influence over Moscow to “bring Russia to its senses”, as French President Emmanuel Macron put it on his recent visit to China.
Other senior EU officials, from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to European Council President Charles Michel and the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs Josep Borrell have similarly left no doubt that China’s stance on the war in Ukraine will shape the future of EU-China relations. Given how important the EU and China are for each other economically, both sides have an interest in a stable and constructive relationship.
China-EU relations are, of course, part of a bigger picture of relations between China and the West. Yet even here, there are some signs of a possible opening. US treasury secretary Jane Yellen acknowledged that “negotiating the contours of engagement between great powers is difficult” but also noted that Beijing and Washington “can find a way forward if China is also willing to play its part.”
The Xi-Zelensky phone call fits into a careful and fragile choreography of moves that might gradually see a more effective management of the war in Ukraine that would, initially, prevent further escalation and eventually pave the way toward a settlement.
While it would not resolve all of the contentious issues in China-West relations, it would remove one particularly problematic issue from the list of immediate concerns.
At the same time, China needs Russia as leverage in its great power competition with the West, and Xi is unlikely to abandon his partnership with Putin. But China also needs a Russia that is more controllable, and this means China needs an end to the war in Ukraine, which still has the potential to escalate further.
By reining in Russia over Ukraine, Xi can firmly establish China as an indispensable guarantor of sustainable security and stability in Europe.
If the Chinese initiative is given the benefit of the doubt in Brussels and Washington and gains traction in Kyiv and Moscow, it gives Beijing a major opportunity to begin shaping a new Eurasian security order. While the West may be able and willing to contain the Kremlin militarily and isolate Russia economically, Xi will have a major role to play in managing Putin politically.
In other words, Beijing’s calculation may well be that for Europe to regain a measure of stability and security, China’s cooperation will be essential. This does not diminish the importance of the transatlantic security relationship embodied by NATO, but it would mean an acknowledgment of the fundamentally changed dynamics of the European order and the far more critical role of China within it.
Bringing about a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine may take some time and require more than just Beijing’s mediation. But even an end to the fighting in Ukraine in the form of a stable ceasefire could benefit China. Such an intermediate outcome would make it more likely, for example, that the Black Sea deal, which allows Ukraine to export its grain, would be extended again, easing the global food crisis.
This would consolidate China’s influence and leadership in the developing world, further cementing its status as an important power broker in the new bipolar order sketched out in a 2019 white paper China and the World in the New Era.
While China’s more open engagement in mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine could significantly advance Beijing’s vision of a new international order, it is not without risks for Xi.
As Zelensky noted in his call with Xi, the “territorial integrity of Ukraine must be restored within the 1991 borders.” Russia’s predictable reaction, delivered by foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, was to accuse Ukraine of linking its willingness to negotiate “with ultimatums containing … unrealistic demands.”
Ultimately, the question for Beijing, which has consistently affirmed its support for the international norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, becomes whether it can find a way to square the circle between Moscow’s internationally isolated insistence that its illegal war and land grab in Ukraine be recognized and Kiev’s demand that its borders not be subject to change by force.
This is a fundamental question for European and global order, and since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act the inviolability of borders was the foundational principle of European security.
Whatever the fate of China’s mediation efforts in the war are, they will be a major test of the skill and leverage that Chinese diplomats have and they will be an indication of how China intends to play its future role in a re-imagined Eurasia.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko is Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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In the South China Sea, where Beijing’s sweeping cases have alarmed the US and its supporters, a Chinese Coast Guard deliver nearly collided with the Spanish police ship.
Last Sunday, the BBC saw the uncomfortable encounter near Second Thomas Shoal in the isolated Spratly archipelago, which Manila claims is a move straight out of Beijing’s handbook. And it took place the day after President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines met with Taiwanese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Manila and expressed support for clear channels of communication regarding the South China Sea dispute.
News cameras captured how Chinese ships would follow the Filipinos on cue and in specific locations throughout their 1, 670 km( 1, 038-mile ) journey over the course of six days, sending them radio warnings to leave or face” consequences.” According to the Philippine Coast Guard, it had invited journalists to participate in their daily guard in the contentious waters for the first time so they could see China’s actions firsthand.
The Spratly Islands, which the Philippines already partially claim, are included in China’s claim to nearly the entire South China Sea. There are also competing statements made by Taiwan, Brunei, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
As a result, the South China Sea has become one of the major outposts in history, particularly as US-China tensions have risen. For starters, defending Taiwan at a time when China’s claims to the autonomous peninsula have grown stronger depends on having access to these lakes. Second, there is concern that Beijing’s expanding footprint may limit trade because the waterways also handle$ 5 trillion(£ 4 trillion ) of global trade annually.
However, China has disregarded the decision of an international arbitration court that its claim to nearly the entire South China Sea is unjustified. Alternatively, it has increased patrols, erected man-made islands over reef areas, and, more recently, blocked the view of Spanish ships by shining lasers at them.
The Philippines, on the other hand, has relied on its steadfast ally, the US, which views China’s actions as violating the” freedom of navigation” of other nations.
The US and the Philippines were finishing up their biggest warfare games ever when the stand-off occurred. The US gained access to important Spanish military home, many of which face Taiwan, shortly after this.
According to the Philippines foreign ministry, China conducted” really scary manoeuvres” at Second Thomas Shoal and Filipino leaders were well within their power to regularly guard the region. On the other hand, Beijing charged that the Philippines had entered Foreign territory.
According to Commodore Jay Tarriela, a spokesman for the Philippine Coast Guard,” China has long used techniques like shadowing, but now, thanks to the media, the entire world gets to see it.”
The Chinese ship that had been following their ship Malapascua increased velocity, as evidenced by the dense gray smoke coming from its fuel, the Filipino crew noticed at dawn on April 23. A single Spanish ship, the Malabrigo, was about a kilometer away when the BBC saw the huge seas chase taking place on quite calm turquoise waters.
It eventually became apparent that the Spanish vessel could not outmanoeuvre a vessel larger than twice its shape when the Chinese fleet caught up to it. The Malapascua was forced to shut off its locomotive in order to avoid a hit because the Chinese ship blocked the path and wouldn’t move.
Due to the” sudden and really very dangerous manoeuvre ,” the Chinese ship was able to approach the Malapascua’s bow up to 45 meters( 146 feet ), according to Rodel Hernandez, the commander of the Philippine ship. His ship, which was also involved in a light motion with the Chinese in February, came the closest to colliding, he claimed.
After a 30-minute standoff, the Spanish boats turned away and were unable to police the Second Thomas Shoal, one of Manila’s some disputed outcrops and islands, which was occupied by the Sierra Madre and other run-down Navy ships.
The way brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 involved China’s daily obstruction of Filipino inspections and provide operations to the Second Thomas Shoal. The Filipino name Ayungin, which means” rich fishing ground,” is derived from a small local fish.
Editors who joined the police already saw firsthand how the Philippine Coast Guard has fared in the midst of the ongoing South China Sea dispute.
The two police boats’ crew members are prepared with code to alert or respond to Chinese submarines. The television instructions from the Chinese are delivered in English and Chinese and could arrive at any time of day, especially in the dead of night.
Some Chinese boats have reportedly adopted a new strategy in prior days by refusing to heed warnings from Filipinos. In order to appear undetectable on radar, some Chinese militia ships have already disabled a tracking system.
In the Spratlys’ coastal area, close to V-shaped Whitsun Reef, the coastguard mission also discovered about 100 militia ships.
It claimed to have given information about China’s subsequent actions to a government body tasked with handling the South China Sea dispute.
The coastguard pledged to” diligently and hard work to protect the Philippines’ official sovereign rights” along with other Philippine security forces.
On board the Philippine Coast Guard ship conducting a week-long guard in the South China Sea, editors including the BBC’s Virma Simonette were present.
BEIJING: China is bracing for a record-high travel rush over the Labour Day holiday, with popular sightseeing spots selling out of tickets and some cities warning would-be visitors away as domestic tourism rebounds after Beijing ended COVID-19 curbs. Authorities are expecting 19 million trips to be made across China’s vastContinue Reading
TOKYO – Judging by the dearth of volatility in yen trading, investors aren’t expecting fireworks from the Bank of Japan tomorrow (April 28).
Surprises do happen at BOJ headquarters, of course. But this being Kazuo Ueda’s first policy meeting as governor, the odds are low that Tokyo is about to shock global markets with an about-face in its 20-plus-year experiment with quantitative easing.
That would be wise considering the worrisome mix of troubles bubbling up under the surface of the world’s third-biggest economy. Those include worries about a Silicon Valley Bank-like blowup among Japan’s 100-plus regional lenders.
Another: the high likelihood of political blowback in Tokyo if Ueda made radical monetary policy moves right out of the gate.
This latter point is often underappreciated in analyses of the BOJ’s latitude to take risky steps. Though “independent,” the BOJ in reality is on a shorter leash than many observers like to admit. Case in point: Haruhiko Kuroda leaving the BOJ governorship earlier this month with zero effort to wind down QE.
Granted, the BOJ had already been deep in the QE matrix for 13 years by the time Kuroda arrived in 2013. But he turned Japan’s QE era up to 11 and then some. And with limited success, clearly, as wages flatlined amid record corporate profits compliments of a plunging yen.
Still, the big gains in Nikkei stocks and relative macroeconomic stability earned Kuroda considerable political capital at home. Capital he could’ve spent on his way out the door plotting ways to reduce the BOJ’s US$5 trillion balance sheet.
Kuroda didn’t, leaving Ueda with what’s arguably the worst job in global economics. As Ueda presides over his first policy deliberation as governor, memories of December 20, 2022 loom large.
On that day, all hell broke loose in markets after Team Kuroda announced the slightest of tweaks to its “yield curve control” policy. The move to let 10-year bond yields rise as high as 0.5% was meant to limit the gap between US and Japanese interest rates. That, Kuroda figured, would reduce pressure on the BOJ to intervene in markets day after day.
The Kuroda BOJ spent the next two weeks cleaning up the move’s mess by making countless unscheduled asset purchases to reassure global investors that QE is here to stay.
Then came the Silicon Valley Bank crisis in the US. Next, UBS having to save Credit Suisse, which served to spike global paranoia levels to the next level.
Now, comes news this week that San Francisco-based First Republic Bank’s troubles are far from over. And, it follows, concerns about new US bank failures are intensifying by the day.
This is the limited option environment into which Ueda steps. Reports from Bloomberg that US regulators may downgrade First Republic’s prospects are making headlines just as Ueda sits down to mull BOJ policy. It’s worth noting, too, that Japan’s economic performance thus far in 2023 has not been stellar.
“Although the recent decline in government bond yields might seem to open the door for tweaks to yield-curve control, such a step could backfire,” says economist Stefan Angrick at Moody’s Analytics. “Economic data of late haven’t been good. Disappointing GDP growth means the economy is still smaller than before the pandemic. Employment conditions are showing signs of softening, and wage growth is trailing inflation.”
Complicating matters, recent “shunto” wage negotiations yielded the biggest wage gains since 1993 – an average 3.8%. Trouble is, coming amidst the highest inflation in 40 years, the timing of the pay bump could fan overheating risks. Here, China’s rebound adds to the risk of global inflation getting a second wind.
As Angrick notes, “notwithstanding a strong shunto spring wage round, it is unclear that this year’s gains will be repeated next year. Recent financial market disruptions abroad have only added risk. Given the BoJ’s history of premature policy tightening, the bungled yield curve control tweak in December, and the cold water poured on the idea of a change at the first press conference with the BOJ’s new leadership, it is unlikely the BOJ will move soon.”
The reference here to wage uncertainties for next year deepens the plot for Ueda. On the one hand, the new governor doesn’t want to let inflation become even hotter. On the other, Tokyo’s political establishment would pounce if BOJ “tapering” spooked CEOs into closing their wallets anew.
As Naoko Tochibayashi, a World Economic Forum analyst in Tokyo, notes, even now “it remains to be seen if similar wage rises can be seen in small and medium-size enterprises, which make up 70% of employers and are key to Japan’s economic revival.”
This dramatizes the precarious balancing act Ueda faces. So does the fragile state of Japan’s regional bank network. Many of these lenders service rapidly aging communities in already sparsely populated areas of the country. That squeezed profits well before the banking shocks of the last 15 years, including fallout from the 2008 “Lehman shock.”
That episode, graying customer bases and an accelerating exodus of companies to Tokyo had regional banks hoarding government and corporate bonds instead of lending BOJ liquidity. It was a similar practice that blew up SVB and New York-based Signature Bank.
As of the end of December, SMBC Nikko Securities estimated that regional lenders were sitting on about $10.5 billion of unrealized losses on foreign bonds and other securities. Such figures raise a difficult question Ueda now has to answer: how big might losses get on domestic debt if Japanese government bond yields rose above, say, 1% or more?
The good news is that many Japanese banks tend to prioritize bonds that can be sold rather than holding to maturity SVB-style. As such, SMBC Nikko analyst Masahiko Sato reckons the threat to capital ratios, on average, is only about 2%. Therefore, Sato does “not think potential losses are on a scale with systemic implications.”
BOJ tapering or even a rate hike or two could change this calculus, and fast. If regional banks face profit pressures with rates at zero – and the BOJ is still in 24/7 ATM mode – just imagine the valuation losses if Ueda were to hit the monetary brakes.
Yet Ueda’s pedigree suggests he could be more of an out-of-the-box thinker than currency strategists grasp.
During his time as a BOJ board member in 2000, Ueda dissented on a move to end the zero-rate strategy. His background as a Massachusetts Institute of Technology-trained economist, meanwhile, could be its own wildcard.
At MIT, Ueda was a pupil of Stanley Fischer, a former senior official at the Fed, the Bank of Israel and the International Monetary Fund. Fisher also taught former Fed chief Ben Bernanke, former European Central Bank head Mario Draghi and former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers.
Other members of the MIT monetary club: Reserve Bank of Australia Governor Philip Lowe and former Bank of England governor Mervyn King.
In February, Summers called Ueda “Japan’s Ben Bernanke.” Ueda and Bernanke, it’s worth noting, made their economic reputations exploring the lessons from the Great Depression, including Japan’s late-1920s to mid-1930s policies.
For Ueda, that entailed a keen focus on the 1930s policies of Korekiyo Takahashi, who’s often called the John Maynard Keynes of Japan.
Takahashi served as finance minister, BOJ governor and even prime minister in the 1920s and 1930s. His super-aggressive monetary easing, fiscal expansion and “debt monetization” efforts were as pioneering as economic policy gets.
There’s also reason to think Ueda could be a rather conventional central banker. He’s said so far, for example, that there’s no urgency to alter the BOJ-government framework that mandates the central bank target 2% inflation.
“If needed, Ueda likely will request the government to revise the joint statement so that the BOJ can respond flexibly, without sticking with the continuation of monetary easing,” says JPMorgan Chase & Co economist Benjamin Shatil. “We continue to see an exit from yield-curve control in coming months.”
Yet odds are decidedly low that Ueda would choose tomorrow (April 27) to toss financial explosives into jittery markets. And that seems wise for now.
Follow William Pesek on Twitter at @WilliamPesek
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is in Washington this week, and his trip comes at a time when the US, South Korea and North Korea are stuck in a vortex of escalation, counter-escalation. The security dilemma is alive and well on the Korean Peninsula. Is there a way out?
Daniel DePetris, writing for Pacific Forum, says that “The most dramatic shift would be recognition among the United States and its allies that denuclearization is infeasible.” Asia Times is republishing the piece below.
Relatedly, Biden and Yoon were expected to issue a separate statement on the US extended deterrence commitment to South Korea, which obviously occurs on the heels of a renewed debate about whether the ROK should have a nuclear deterrent of its own.
The Wall Street Journal Reports: “The US has agreed to give Seoul a greater voice in consultations on a potential American nuclear response to a North Korean attack in return for swearing off developing its own nuclear weapons, U.S. officials said.”
Here is the DePetris article:
North Korea conducted another intercontinental ballistic missile test on April 13, the second in less than a month. Unlike the case with previous launches, however, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un presided over what Pyongyang claimed was an ICBM powered by a solid-fueled engine.
This would represent another milestone in Pyongyang’s decades-long effort to field an operational missile capability despite being the subject of one of the most stringent UN Security Council sanctions regimes in existence.
A reliable North Korean solid-fueled ICBM would be of particular concern to the United States during a war-time contingency—solid-fueled missiles can be assembled rapidly, are easier to conceal compared to liquid-fueled variants, and can be prepared on-site, giving the United States far less time to locate and neutralize them before launch.
As expected, the United States, South Korea, and Japan condemned the latest test. Tokyo, which issued an emergency alert to residents on the island of Hokkaido, requested an emergency UN Security Council meeting.
The next day, Washington authorized two separate bilateral military drills with South Korea and Japan, including B-52 bombers and F-35 fighters. The drills were designed to send a message: more missile tests, particularly those with the capacity to reach targets on the continental United States, will result in more defensive measures by Washington and its East Asian allies in response.
None of these moves is especially surprising. The Biden administration is spending significant effort this year bolstering the credibility of US extended deterrence to its South Korean and Japanese allies.
In January, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and South Korean Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup engaged in a series of meetings in Seoul, during which Washington pledged to “enhance the implementation of US extended deterrence” through increased deployment of US strategic assets on and near the Korean Peninsula.
This came roughly two weeks after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol suggested it may be time for South Korea to build its own nuclear weapons, or at least request the return of US tactical nuclear warheads on South Korean soil. Yoon’s comments got the attention of US defense officials; in the ensuing months, a variety of US strategic combat systems have been rotated to the area.
In February, US and South Korean officials participated in tabletop exercises at the Pentagon with a specific focus on responding to a number of scenarios involving North Korean nuclear use. US B-1B Lancers joined exercises with South Korean forces at least four times this year. The USS Nimitz, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, docked in the South Korean port city of Busan in late March. In April, Washington and Seoul executed the largest military field exercises in five years.
Separate exercises occur as well, including trilateral anti-submarine warfare drills between US, South Korean, and Japanese naval forces. Similar exercises are now ongoing, with Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo regularizing them in the future to improve naval force inter-operability.
This has predictably elicited strong countermeasures from the North Koreans. The “security dilemma” – where “defensive” exercises are perceived by the adversary as a belligerent action – is very much alive on the Korean Peninsula. What Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo view as entirely justifiable, Pyongyang views as aggressive and thus deserving of retaliation.
It is hard to see this cycle ending anytime soon. Ordinarily, such situations would be contained through diplomatic engagement, either between the parties themselves (oftentimes discreetly) or through a trusted intermediary. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any diplomatic channel on the horizon.
The Biden administration has reached out to the Kim regime multiple times to jumpstart a new negotiation after talks failed during the Trump era. But Kim Jong Un rejected the overtures and is unlikely to green-light any serious negotiating effort as long as US policy centers on North Korea’s total and irreversible denuclearization.
South Korea, which acted as a facilitator of direct US-North Korea diplomacy during Moon Jae-in’s presidency, is no longer seen by the North Koreans as a credible interlocutor due to President Yoon’s hardline approach toward Pyongyang. (North Korea has even ignored daily military-to-military phone calls from the South for nearly two weeks.)
In an ideal world, China would exploit its considerable financial and political leverage over North Korea to aid Washington in bringing the Kim regime to the negotiating table. Yet, given the terrible state of US-China relations, Beijing has little incentive to help Washington on a foreign policy dispute that has confounded multiple US administrations for decades.
Additional economic pressure is unlikely to bring Kim to the table either. The UN Security Council has been deadlocked on the North Korean nuclear issue since 2017, with the United States and China arguing over who is at fault. Permanent members Russia and China use their veto power to block individual sanctions designations, and the prospect of a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution passing is too low to even theorize about.
Beijing and Moscow increasingly see sanctions as worsening the internal food and economic crisis in North Korea and should therefore be loosened or removed. The United States found out the hard way when it tabled a draft resolution in May 2022, only to walk away from the council chamber disappointed after the Russian and Chinese delegations cast a double veto.
Even if the North Koreans conducted another nuclear test, there is no guarantee the Security Council could conjure up the unanimity required to issue a statement condemning it.
With the UN paralyzed, the Biden administration has relied on unilateral sanctions designations ever since to penalize North Korea for everything from illicit financial practices and fuel smuggling to the development of weapons of mass destruction and human rights abuses. Even so, the North Koreans have proven by necessity to be highly meticulous sanctions evaders.
Washington, therefore, is left with a short list of options. Continuing to strengthen the sanctions regime is the most likely course of action, if only out of bureaucratic habit, yet by definition it is highly reactive to North Korean behavior and holds low probability of success.
Maintaining the current pace of US military deployments in East Asia will be welcomed by Seoul and Tokyo but also risks prompting more North Korean missile tests and military exercises—up to and including a seventh underground nuclear test.
Fostering a detente between the two Koreas is probably a dead-end as long as the Yoon administration’s hard line continues.
The North Korean nuclear issue is a low priority for the Biden administration. The United States is currently content with treading water and waiting for the Kim regime to accept its overtures.
Assuming Washington wants to solve or at least contain the problem, the time has come for a major policy shift. The most dramatic shift would be recognition among the United States and its allies that denuclearization is infeasible when North Korea already possesses dozens of nuclear warheads, will likely construct more, and is in the process of diversifying its delivery systems.
Avoiding a war through a mixture of deterrence, engagement, and practical diplomacy should now be the paramount US national security objective on the Korean Peninsula, not transforming North Korea into a non-nuclear state.
If the United States intends to maintain a consistently high pace of military exercises with South Korea, Washington should establish protocols to minimize confusion and mixed signaling with North Korea.
This will likely require direct communication between US and North Korean military officers and perhaps advanced, mutual notifications about the timing and location of various military and missile exercises to decrease misperceptions.
In addition, the United States, in coordination with China, should be willing to exchange basic information on nuclear safety and maintenance with North Korea. That the United States is highly unlikely to recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-armed state does not obviate the need to ensure Pyongyang’s nuclear practices are up to standard.
The United States should also stop predicating US-North Korea engagement on the nuclear issue alone. Maintaining a cold peace on the Korean Peninsula involves discussions beyond the nuclear component, including, but not limited to, the disposition of conventional forces on both sides of the 150-mile Demilitarized Zone, de-escalation mechanisms between the two Koreas, and common rules of engagement along disputed boundaries like the Northern Limit Line.
Only when realistic, achievable goals are set can an effective strategy be formulated.
Daniel R. DePetris ([email protected]) is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, DC., a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune and a foreign policy writer for Newsweek. Follow him on Twitter @DanDePetris.
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.
Export controls on semiconductor technology have been expanded after the conclusion of US bilateral negotiations with Japan and the Netherlands in March 2023. This is only the beginning as the United States is set to further tighten export controls, as recommended in the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s final report.
The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security issued new regulations on October 7, 2022, which were expected to bring about protests from semiconductor equipment makers and foundries.
While Washington insists that the measures are designed to protect US intellectual property and defend national security, they reflect the heavy competition in the global semiconductor equipment business.
According to 2019 figures, the United States had a 17% share of overall semiconductor manufacturing equipment exports, trailing behind Japan (28%) and closely followed by the Netherlands (17%), Singapore (10%) and South Korea (10%).
The United States is dominant in the upstream integrated circuit design process but it faces competition from the Netherlands and Japan in the midstream integrated circuit manufacturing process. It also does not have a substantial market share in the downstream integrated circuit packaging and testing process.
The competitive nature of the global semiconductor industry is particularly salient in lithography equipment (dubbed scanners or steppers). The Dutch company ASML Holding NV dominates this market, which was valued at US$11.8 billion in 2022 and is expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 10%, reaching $18 billion by 2025.
The current moves to deter the Netherlands and Japan from exporting semiconductor equipment to China aim to undercut China’s access to high-end chip manufacturing equipment. But these efforts might also lead to a shift in market share depending on how export controls are implemented.
After months of deliberation amid negotiations with the United States, ASML announced it would prevent the sales of specific models of semiconductor equipment to an unnamed country.
The affected models were the TWINSCAN NXT:2000i, the NXT:2050i and the NXT:2100i, which are immersion-deep ultraviolet machinery used for lithographic processes in the most advanced logic and memory chips.
ASML has announced that the added measures will not affect its revenue, as it is currently operating at capacity. But given that the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security has already prohibited the sale of extreme ultraviolet machinery to China, ASML must plan its next steps wisely and diversify into other jurisdictions.
The additional measures are pending implementation until the Netherlands enacts new laws and ASML is bound by any existing contracts to deliver machines until that time.
Japan has expressed its intent to participate in export controls, announcing its own export control mechanisms in March 2023. But Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi subsequently paid a visit to his counterpart in Beijing, Qin Gang, given the possible backlash from China.
As expected, China has contemplated placing export controls on rare earth materials in retaliation. There is speculation on which Japanese companies would be subject to the ban on semiconductor equipment sales to China, with the most likely being Tokyo Electron.
Depending on how Japan implements the export curbs, Japanese companies Canon and Nikon may seek to revive their lithography businesses, a market in which they once flourished but in which they have lost market share as they have instead focussed on camera lenses.
The Bureau of Industry and Security measures announced on October 7, 2022, have led to a plunge in semiconductor equipment sales to China, demonstrating the immediate impact of the measures on US companies such as Applied Materials, KLA and Lam Research.
The implementation of US export controls on semiconductor equipment may reset the competition for market share and create uncertainty for major players. Other countries such as Singapore, Germany and South Korea are likely to be subject to additional measures in the near future.
As access to the Chinese market shrinks under US export controls, it is bound to spur heightened competition and geo-economic conflict between the United States and China.
June Park is a political economist and an inaugural Asia Fellow of the International Strategy Forum at Schmidt Futures.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a a Creative Commons license.
TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE COLLECTIVESingapore is set to hang a man for trafficking cannabis, in the city-state’s latest controversial execution.
Activists say Tangaraju Suppiah was convicted on weak evidence. Authorities say he received due process, and have scheduled his execution for Wednesday.
It follows a high-profile execution last year of a mentally disabled man over a drugs charge.
Singapore has some of the world’s toughest anti-drug laws, which it says are necessary to protect society.
In recent days his family members and activists delivered letters to Singapore’s president Halimah Yacob in a last-minute plea for clemency, while British billionaire Sir Richard Branson has called for a halt of the execution and a review of the case.
“I know that my brother has not done anything wrong. I urge the court to look at his case from the beginning,” Tangaraju’s sister, Leela Suppiah, told reporters at a news conference.
Tangaraju, 46, was convicted of “abetting by engaging in a conspiracy to traffic” over a delivery of 1kg (35oz) of cannabis from Malaysia to Singapore in 2013.
Though he was not caught during the delivery, prosecutors said he was responsible for coordinating it, and traced two phone numbers used by a deliveryman back to Tangaraju.
Tangaraju claimed he was not the person communicating with others connected to the case. He said he had lost one of the phones and denied owning the second one.
Singapore law mandates the death penalty for drug trafficking and has lesser penalties for couriers. In Tangaraju’s last appeal, the judge agreed with the prosecution that Tangaraju was responsible for coordinating the delivery, which made him ineligible for a more lenient sentence.
Activists have also raised concerns that Tangaraju was not given adequate access to an interpreter and had to argue his last appeal on his own since his family was unable to secure a lawyer.
Singapore authorities say Tangaraju requested for an interpreter only during the trial, and not earlier. They added that he had access to legal counsel throughout the process.
Sir Richard, who previously criticised the 2022 execution of mentally disabled Nagaenthran Dharmalingam, said Tangaraju’s case was “shocking on multiple levels”.
In a blog post, he said Singapore “may be about to kill an innocent man” on the back of “more than dubious circumstances”.
“The death penalty is already a dark stain on the country’s reputation. An execution following such an unsafe conviction would only make things worse,” he said.
Rebutting his allegations, Singapore’s Home Affairs Ministry said his claims were untrue and accused him of “disrespect for Singapore’s judges and our criminal justice system”.
It said the death penalty was “an essential component” in a multi-pronged approach that has been “effective in keeping Singapore safe and secure”.
Kirsten Han, a spokesperson for Singaporean anti-death penalty advocacy group the Transformative Justice Collective (TJC), said the government did not want to appear to buckle under pressure.
But, she added, “of all the things that Singapore punches above its weight for on the international stage and at the UN, defending its right to murder people in the name of its citizens is not something we should be proud of for being outstanding on the international stage”.
Singapore’s strict rules stand in contrast to some of its neighbours’ recent moves. Thailand has legalised the trade of cannabis while Malaysia has ended the mandatory death penalty for serious crimes.
Speaking to reporters on Sunday, Tangaraju’s family members said they were able to meet him from behind a glass partition at Changi Prison after his notice of execution was released last week.
“He puts up a brave front for my mother because he does not want her to break down,” his niece Subhashini Ilango said. “He has mentally prepared for this day to come. He does feel there’s a great injustice and he’ll be executed for something he did not do.”
His family said they would continue to press for reforms in Singapore’s legal system even if Tangaraju ends up executed.
“If such an injustice happens to my brother, I wouldn’t want it to happen to anybody else so I will continue to fight,” said his sister Leela.
More than 4 million foreign visitors have cleared immigration through the automated lanes to date, the authority said.
Eligible foreign visitors can submit their SG Arrival Card through the MyICA mobile app or on ICA’s website within three days prior to arrival in Singapore. Submission is free.
They will be directed to the automated lanes, where their biometrics – iris, facial and fingerprint images – are automatically enrolled during the clearance process.
Information on their enrolment is included in the electronic visit pass, which will be sent via email after immigration clearance.
Foreign visitors who are enrolled will then be able to use the automated lanes during departure and on future visits to Singapore.
“ACI is a critical component of ICA’s New Clearance Concept, which aims to make automated immigration clearance the norm at the checkpoints,” said ICA, adding that automated lanes leverage multi-modal biometric scanning technology to provide travellers with a “more secure, efficient, and seamless immigration clearance experience”.
The authority added that it expects 95 per cent of all arrivals at Changi Airport to be cleared through the automated lanes by the first quarter of 2024.
With the automated lanes taking up less physical space and requiring less manpower, ICA will be able to increase its clearance volume and meet the growing traveller volume, which is expected to reach 300 million travellers per year by 2025.
“Correspondingly, the job roles of ICA officers will be enhanced, as ICA moves away from manual clearance,” it added.
“Prior to the ACI, most foreign visitors would have to queue at the manual counters upon arrival for immigration clearance. With the ACI, those eligible can now proceed directly to the automated lanes for immigration clearance, even if it is their first time visiting Singapore,” said ICA’s Assistant Commissioner Phua Chiew Hua, who is deputy director for operations.
“We have made the enrolment process as seamless as possible, so that travellers can perform self-enrolment at the automated lanes while clearing immigration. If required, our officers deployed at the automated lanes will assist them.”
