Turkey’s Erdogan in a realpolitik flip-flop on Gaza

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pulled his ambassador from Israel on November 4, 2023. Less than a month earlier, he was offering diplomatic assistance to calm the situation in the Middle East.

That diplomatic shift is indicative of how in just a few short weeks, Turkey has recalibrated its stance on the escalating violence in Israel and the Gaza Strip.

Erdogan’s initial reaction following the October 7 Hamas-led massacre in Israel was a carefully balanced one, calling for restraint and an end to “aggressive acts.” But amid an escalating death toll in Gaza, he quickly tilted toward a pro-Hamas and seemingly anti-Israel position.

By October 25, the Turkish leader was accusing Israel of “one of the bloodiest and most savage attacks in history,” while defending Hamas as a “liberation group.”

As an expert on Turkish politics and international affairs, I believe Erdogan’s evolving rhetoric cannot be understood without considering the domestic and international constraints surrounding Turkey’s leader.

In responding to the crisis in the Middle East, Erdogan faces a significant dilemma: He needs to appease his political base at home – which has Islamist, strong pro-Palestinian sympathies – while not totally alienating Israel, with whom Turkey has significant geopolitical and economic ties and, until now, warming relations.

At the same time, Erdogan is eyeing an opportunity to project himself as a key regional player in Middle East politics – and a potential mediator in the current crisis. And to understand how he intends to do all this, you need to look beyond rhetoric and diplomatic gestures alone.

Politics vs realpolitik

Erdogan’s reaction to the conflict reflects an attempt to strike a balance between two forces: domestic politics and realpolitik on the international stage.

Since the renewal of conflict in Gaza, Erdogan has faced pressure from various quarters in Turkey. His initial response drew extensive ire among the country’s Islamist circles, who have long shared deep sympathy for Hamas – leading members of whom Turkey has been offering a safe harbor.

Ahmet Davutoglu, formerly a prime minister and a minister of foreign affairs under Erdogan, condemned the Turkish president for hesitance and called on him to align with his Islamist base. Leaders of other Islamist parties and Erdogan coalition partner Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party, likewise called on the government for a stronger anti-Israeli positioning.

Growing anti-Israeli sentiment in the international arena also encouraged Erdogan to take an openly pro-Hamas stance. On October 26, 120 countries in the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution calling for an “immediate, durable, and sustained humanitarian truce.”

Meanwhile, protests on the streets of Western capitals have put further pressure on governments there to soften support for Israel. They have also facilitated Erdogan’s repositioning.

Erdogan is aware that his criticism can’t go too far and risk a complete severing of ties with Tel Aviv. Israel is an important partner for Turkey. The two countries have seen growing trade relations, with Turkish exports to Israel doubling from 2017 to 2022.

This includes extensive arms trade, with Israeli and Turkish arms producers seeing the highest growth in weapons sales worldwide in 2021.

Two men in suits and red ties sit at a table.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meet in New York on September 19, 2023 – days before the Hamas attack. Photo: Anadolu Agency via Getty Images / Handout / Murat Cetinmuhurdar / The Conversation

Meanwhile, regional geopolitical dynamics have shifted to put Israel and Turkey in greater alignments. Recently, the Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh conflict has drawn Ankara and Tel-Aviv closer – with both backing the Azerbaijani government with weapons.

And in its own fight against Kurdish separatists, Turkey deployed Israeli surveillance drones in the late 1990s and 2000s before developing its own drones.

Erdogan as peacemaker?

There is another critical factor at play as Erdogan’s stance has developed. From the beginning of the crisis, Erdogan has sought to assert himself as a mediator.

To that end, he has held talks with regional leaders in which he signaled an intention to act as a peace broker. Senior Turkish officials have also revealed negotiation attempts over hostages being held in Gaza by Hamas.

This approach echoes Erdogan’s strategy in Ukraine, where he likewise put himself forward as a potential mediator.

In some ways, the challenges of balancing these domestic and regional concerns is what makes Erdogan uniquely suited as a potential mediator: He has maintained ties with Hamas while also recently deepening a relationship with Israel.

But for Erdogan to pull off the role of mediator, he will need to manage those links well. Initial proposals for Turkish mediation over the crisis were reportedly turned down by Hamas.

If Erdogan’s harsher rhetoric on Israel was aimed at alluring Hamas to a negotiation table, then there is a case to be made that he went too far. Calling Hamas a freedom-fighting group and accusing Israel of war crimes in Gaza has harmed relations with Israel. It may be the case that Erdogan may have already squandered the opportunity for an arbitrator role.

But go beyond the words and you see something else at play. While talking tough on Israel, Erdogan has taken concrete steps to prevent a complete souring of strained relations with the West and Israel.

On October 23, he signed Sweden’s NATO accession protocol, increasing the hopes for an end to an at-times tense standoff between Turkey and its NATO allies. On the same day, Turkish law enforcement arrested 33 ISIS members in Ankara, potentially to preempt Western criticism for Erdogan’s support of radical Islamist networks.

Meanwhile, Turkish media circulated reports of Hamas leadership leaving Turkey around the same time.

Notable too is what Turkey hasn’t done. It hasn’t tried to stop shipments of Azeri oil through Turkey to Israel, and continues to allows the US to use its Incirlik Air Base in Turkey despite increasing public pressure. Police had to disperse pro-Palestine crowds intending to storm the base on November 5.

Becoming unbalanced?

This may explain the relatively muted reaction by Washington and Tel Aviv thus far to Erdogan’s statements. The US Department of Treasury was content with sanctioning a few Turkish entities for trade links to Hamas.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Ankara as part of his recent Middle East trip, and US administration officials have been at pains to stress Turkey’s value as an ally despite disagreements over Erdogan’s comments on Hamas.

Israel responded to those remarks by pulling its diplomatic mission back to Tel Aviv, prompting reciprocal moves from Turkey.

But there are reports that the tit-for-tat was more for appearances and that Israeli diplomats had already been recalled out of concern for their safety.

In fact, there are reasons to suggest that Erdogan’s strategy is working – despite the shift in tone, Ankara has kept its communication channels open with both Israel and Hamas throughout the crisis.

But balancing domestic support for Hamas and geopolitical reliance on Israel means walking a very fine line for Erdogan – and some of his most recent statements suggest he is beginning to teeter.

Ozgur Ozkan is Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher School’s Russia and Eurasia Program, Tufts University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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What do Pacific people really think of China?

China has been steadily increasing its footprint in the Pacific in recent years as it attempts to deepen its influence and challenge the traditionally strong relationships many countries have with the US and Australia.

But what do people in the Pacific think of China’s expanding interest and engagement in the region?

To find out, we conducted surveys with local residents in two countries where China has focused its outreach in recent years – Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. Both countries have embraced a foreign policy professing to be a “friend to all and enemy to none.”

PNG is China’s principal diplomatic and trading partner in the region. Prime Minister James Marape just concluded a visit to Beijing where he and Chinese leaders discussed deepening their economic and security ties, including possibly establishing a common currency trading arrangement.

Solomon Islands’ relationship with China, meanwhile, has boomed since it abandoned its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in September 2019. China has made huge efforts to promote cooperation with Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s government on aid, trade, agriculture, health, fisheries and policing cooperation.

Beijing intends to develop this partnership to serve as a role model for other Pacific Island nations that still recognize Taiwan.

While the PNG and Solomon Islands governments welcome China’s growing engagement with their countries, however, our research found this wasn’t always the case with the local populations.

Environmental pollution concerns

Our first survey sought to gauge the corporate social responsibilities of the China-owned Ramu NiCo project in Papua New Guinea through the eyes of those who are currently living or have lived in Madang Province, where it’s located.

We collected 100 responses in total, mainly from current and former Divine Word University students and staff.

In 2019, the nickel mine operator had to apologize for accidentally spilling some 200,000 liters of toxic slurry into a bay in the province. The vast majority (98%) of our respondents said they were concerned about environmental pollution, while nearly 60% thought the mine project has not benefited PNG.

In response to the question, “Looking back, do you support the [previous] government’s approval of the China-owned Ramu NiCo project”, nearly 70% said “no.”

However, those living in the area of the mining lease tended to have a more positive view of the venture because of the direct financial benefit they receive in the form of royalties or ancillary businesses.

And 72% of our participants said they support the PNG government developing a closer relationship with China.

The second survey (conducted by Denghua Zhang and Jeffers Teargun Heptol) asked 78 PNG students who had received Chinese government scholarships for their perceptions on the program and Chinese soft power, more generally.

A large majority of respondents (87%) said they would recommend the program to their friends. Studying in China also appeared to change their impressions of the country itself.

Before these students went to China, they were asked to score the Chinese political system on a scale of one to five (from a very low impression to very high), as compared to political systems in Western countries.

The students gave China’s system an average score of 3.45 out of five before their study abroad. After they started the program and lived in China for some time, this average score increased to 4.01.

The scholarship program also changed their views about China’s environmental sustainability from an average score of 3.17 before they went to China to 3.73 after they arrived. Similarly, the students’ average score for China’s foreign policy was boosted from 3.47 to 3.80.

‘Very helpful in building our roads’

For the third survey (conducted by Denghua Zhang and Lincy Pendeverana), we canvassed 93 students from Solomon Islands National University on their views of China and more traditional Pacific partners like the US and Australia.

Two-thirds of our respondents were supportive of a closer bilateral relationship between China and Solomon Islands, but support for a closer relationship with the US was even higher (76%).

Nearly four-fifths of these students also supported China’s Belt and Road projects in Solomon Islands. One participant wrote, “they are very helpful in building and upgrading our roads.”

The other fifth, however, had a more negative view. For example, one student said, “their purpose is to create a debt risk for our government and that leads the Chinese to control the whole of our resources”.

Another student commented, “for a country like Solomon Islands with a weak economy, this Belt and Road project will be a debt trap.”

While some of the students we surveyed in PNG and the Solomon Islands think positively of China, the views of non-governmental organizations in the Pacific can be less rosy.

For example, another survey of 57 NGOs in PNG, Fiji and Tonga conducted in 2021 by Denghua Zhang (one of the authors) found that a majority in each country disapproved of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Their concerns included human rights violations, bad governance, debt risks, environmental pollution and an influx of small Chinese businesses and low-quality goods into their countries. For example, one Fijian NGO representative said, “feels that Fiji can go down the same path as Sri Lanka with their port example.”

Our new surveys paint a more mixed picture of local feelings in the Pacific about China. Our participants did not simply “love China” or “hate China”, but had far more complicated, nuanced perceptions of the country.

This is often not represented in media reports on China’s influence in the region, but is important for policymakers in the US and Australia to understand as they seek to counter moves by China to deepen its relationships here.

Denghua Zhang is research fellow, Australian National University and Bernard Yegiora, Lecturer, Divine Word University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Police bring birthday cake to drug bust

Unusual gesture moves suspect to tears in Nakhon Si Thammarat

Police bring birthday cake to drug bust
Police give a birthday cake to drug suspect Ratchanon Phongsawat, 37, who was arrested on her birthday in Nakhon Si Thammarat. (Photo: Nujaree Rakrun)

NAKHON SI THAMMARAT: Police who arrested a woman after finding nearly a million speed pills in her home brought more than handcuffs when they took her into custody. When they learned it was her birthday, they brought a cake.

Ratchanon Phongsawat, 37, burst into tears at the gesture and promised to turn over a new leaf after being released from jail.

Her arrest was one of two made in the southern province, in which more than 1.4 million methamphetamine pills were seized.

Police had been keeping a close watch on Ms Ratchanon, who also owns a spa in Phrommakhiri district, as they suspected she was linked to drug dealers.

On Thursday they followed her car and managed to intercept it on a road leading to Nakhon Si Thammarat airport.

They subsequently brought her to her rented home in Muang district, where they found 944,000 speed pills, police said at a media briefing on Friday.

During questioning, Ms Ratchanon admitted she was about to fly to Bangkok to stay with her mother after learning that other members of a drug network in Phuket, Surat Thani and Nakhon Si Thammarat had been arrested.

The suspect admitted she had kept the drugs at the rented house pending delivery to other dealers, police said.

In Khanom district, meanwhile, police arrested Prachak Suksarn after 536,000 speed pills were found inside his house on the same day.

Police display more than 1.4 million speed pills seized in two separate cases in Nakhon Si Thammarat. (Photo: Nujaree Rakrun)

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Another petition seeks to axe Move Forward

The Bhumjaithai registration queries whether the criticism party’s “expulsion” of the deputy speaker was in accordance with the law.

Another petition seeks to axe Move Forward
Following his expulsion from the Move Forward Party, Padipat Suntiphada (centre ) joins the Fair Party. At parliament on October 10, Fair Party leader Pitipong Temcharoen ( left ) and secretary-general Kannavee Suebsang flank him. ( Photo: Chatpattarasil Pattarpong )

The Bhumjaithai Party, which leads the opposition in the House of Representatives while a former party member continues to serve as deputy speaker, has petitioned the Election Commission (EC ) to dissolve the Move Forward Party ( MFP).

Supachai Jaisamut, the Bhumjaithai registration, announced on Wednesday that he had forwarded his petition to the EC’s political party secretary. It requested that the election watchdog investigate Move Forward’s actions and those of its original member, Phitsanulok MP Padipat Suntiphada.

Mr. Supachai questioned whether Move Forward had complied with the law by bringing administrative action against Dr. Padipat and expelling himbefore&nbsp. If no, he continued to be a group member.

Two additional MPs have recently been expelled by the main opposition party for sexual abuse, but those actions were the result of administrative hearings in accordance with party rules.

After winning the May 14 general election, Move Forward won the most seats, and Mr. Padipat was appointed deputy House listener. However, the group was later kicked out of the partnership state and rose to prominence as the main opposition party. Bhumjaithai, a coalition part, finished second in the vote.

The law mandates that the head of the largest opposition party be the criticism leader, but it also forbids any party member from holding positions such as cabinet minister, House speaker, or deputy speaker.

Pita Limjaroenrat, who was barred from political responsibility pending a court decision regarding his eligibility and was unable to lead the opposition, was succeeded by Chaithawat Tulathon&nbsp on September 23.

The MFP kicked Mr. Padipat out on September 28. The opposition president and deputy speaker functions of the party were thought to be preserved as a result of this action.

According to Mr. Supachai,” I have asked the social party registrar at the Office of the Election Commission to see if the Move Forward Party took punitive action against Mr.” Padipat in accordance with its rules and the law.

Mr. Padipat would remain a group member and be unable to meet another social group if Move Forward did not go through this process, according to the Bhumjaithai registration.

Mr. Padipat’s reputation as an MP immediately expired if he resigned and was not expelled for a severe disciplinary violation, according to Mr Supachai.

Mr. Padipat is currently a part of the Fair Party, an opposition group with two members.

Mr. Supachai questioned whether Move Forward may be viewed as working with Dr. Padipat to maintain control of the deputy speaker and opposition leader positions. If so, it might be considered a plot to overthrow the democratic king.

He asserted that the EC registration may request the dissolution of the MFP from the Constitutional Court if it discovers irregularities.

Walk Forward’s proposal to amend Part 112 of the Criminal Code, the lesser-majest laws, is still being considered by the Constitutional Court, and it could result in the breakdown of that case. It is expected to hear testimony on November 15.

Theerayut Suwannakaysorn, an environmentalist attorney, filed the complaint. He is best known for standing in for the friar Phra Buddha Isara, a key organizer of the Bangkok Shutdown demonstrations that resulted in the military takeover in 2014. Eventually, he was defrocked and is now referred to as Suwit Thongprasert. &nbsp,

Move Forward MP Padipat Suntiphada was expelled, but Supachai Jaisamut, the secretary of the alliance part Bhumjaithai Party, has questioned whether this was done tactically to keep him in his position as House deputy speaker.

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Taiwan’s land squeeze pits advanced chips against ancestral temples

“FIVE SHORTAGES” The chip industry has long complained about Taiwan’s “five shortages”: Land, water, energy, labour, and talent. The sector’s rapid growth in recent years, which has sent prices of industrial land soaring, is further testing the island’s ability to support its prized chipmakers. After protests, including one outside Taiwan’sContinue Reading

Kishida Philippines trip’s focus was Japan defense

For years, Chinese officers have proclaimed that” Japan is Japan’s security.” Additionally, they would inform you that” The Philippines’ protection is Japan’s protection.” And it’s accurate.

chain of islands. Map: ResearchGate

Corporate terrain includes the Philippines, which is a part of the so-called” first island chain” that extends from Japan to Taiwan and then continues through them to Malaysia. In the event of a conflict, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, or nbsp, PLA, is surrounded by this chain of islands. and during times of peace as well. & nbsp,

The Philippines also plays a crucial part in Taiwan’s protection, primarily defending its southern side. China & nbsp will have to deal with the Philippines if it moves on Taiwan.

Fumio Kishida‘s recent trip to Manila, according to Prime Minister & nbsp, should be seen in the context of Japanese concerns over its own defense against a hostile China.

Two nations collaborating and nbsp,

Kishida and Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the president of the Philippines, agreed to begin talks on the a & nbsp, Reciprocal Access Agreement, ( RAA ), which is similar to what Japan has with the governments of Japan, Australia, and Great Britain. Such a treaty makes military connections between nations simpler to carry out. & nbsp,

In reality, there is already a military-to-military relationship between Japan and the Philippines, despite the fact that Japan rarely acknowledges it and is frequently overshadowed by the more extensive Philippine-American protection efforts. & nbsp,

The Japan Coast Guard send Akitsushima( PLH – 32 ), which docked at Manila’s South Harbor on June 1, 2023, is shown in the image. Jeoffrey Maitem / BenarNews image

For a while now, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ( MSDF) and the Philippines have been engaged in combat, including drills in the South China Sea( nbsp ), where the Chinese have harassed the Filipinos.

Multilateral exercises and bilateral engagements in and with the Philippines have been joined by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force( GSDF ). F-15 soldiers from the Chinese Air Self-Defense Force made their first-ever presence in the Philippines in 2022. In addition, & nbsp,

Japan has also given the Philippines underwater and marine patrol aircraft. Radar systems for air security are also being developed.

What else is Japan capable of?

In actuality, Prime Minister Kishida is enhancing the economic and security help Japan is now giving the Philippines. Additionally, he is indicating that more of this help is on the method. In addition, & nbsp,

On the defensive before, Japan is capable of much more. Typical joint patrols with Spanish and nbsp navies are part of this strategy to protect Philippine territory. Japan may even deliver more than token-sized units to take part in the international exercises being led by the US and the Philippines. And Japan needs to take action when the day comes to fight Chinese intimidation immediately.

But for the time being, Japan is showing the Philippines its assistance. Additionally, it enhances the much more extensive US government role in the nation following Duterte.

One hopes that the Japanese and Americans are working together.

On November 4, 2023, in Manila, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida addresses the Philippine Congress as a tourist. Kyodo in pictures

Looking past the armed forces

A concerted effort by Japan to further aid the Philippines in the areas of infrastructure, economic growth, and growth can have a significant impact. Japan has the resources, the expertise, and the know-how. Such initiatives have been carried out in a number of nations outside of the primary earth. & nbsp,

Of course, Japan now has development initiatives in the Philippines. However, it’s crucial that Japan intervene and establishes itself as a viable alternative to Chinese investment, which it is, especially now that the Philippines is freeing itself from several Chinese Belt and Road & nbsp projects that former President Roderigo Duterte agreed to. In addition, & nbsp,

On this network and nbsp development effort, it would be beneficial if the Americans joined the Japanese. However, this is a field in which Japan may and ought to be in the result. In addition, & nbsp,

The political in this situation is the economic & nbsp. Additionally, there is a distinct military andnbsp usefulness when it comes to infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and yet roads. That may apply to the Philippine Armed Forces, the US government, and possibly other groups as well, such as the Japan Self Defense Force.

Don’t forget about the Filipinos.

One should take into account that President Marcos and a few other loyal Filipinos have freed the nation from the PRC’s connection that former President Duterte established. Andnbsp, Marcos made a daring decision to return the country’s fundamental position to the US and the completely world. It requires assistance, and Marcos must demonstrate domestic effects. & nbsp,

Chinese political support is extremely important, not only military support. For Filipinos, it is physiologically crucial to recognize the support of two significant nations. and one hopes that will go on for quite some time. In addition, & nbsp,

In fact, a” democratic” bloc of smaller Asian countries is beginning to rely on the Philippines. Perhaps more successfully than Washington, Manila has criticized and exposed China’s activities in the grey area. If this bravery is rewarded, several people in the area will take notice and may be inspired to make an effort to escape Beijing’s tightening hand. & nbsp,

When you take on China, you want some powerful, trustworthy allies.

I appreciate it, Beijing

The Chinese may be praised by Tokyo and Washington for upsetting and degrading the Philippines. They’ve taken it so far that the Philippines has a sizable electorate that opposes the PRC. In addition, & nbsp,

It is now up to the Japanese( and Americans) to show that they have a significantly better option. They also don’t want to rule the Philippines and take its place and tools, unlike the Chinese.

Japan is signing defence agreements with other countries, which is a good thing. The Philippines is a piece of the puzzle, and Japan is trying to defend itself.

Additionally, Japan’s efforts to develop its facilities are directly related to its defence. They make a significant commitment to the advancement of the free world.

However, looking upwards and maintaining cordial relations, including those of defense, with other countries is not a substitute for Japan’s specific, carefully thought-out efforts to correctly restructure its own defense. & nbsp,

Additionally, having a solid strategy for defending Taiwan alongside US forces is crucial. & nbsp,

In truth, Japan ought to treat Taiwan similarly to how it treats the Philippines. All of their futures are intertwined, and any poor website puts the entire network at risk.

Former US minister and retired US Marine official Grant Newsham. When China Attacks: A Caution To America was written by him.

This content has been republished with JAPAN Forward’s consent.

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How does US rank crises in Taiwan, Israel, Ukraine?

I once received some wise counsel from a foreign writer,” Look where everyone else isn’t looking ,” again when the phrase had meaning. Similar wise counsel was given by a Chinese general:” Look at the full map.” When observing current affairs and unrest in the & nbsp, Middle East, it is important to keep these in mind. & nbsp,

The & nbsp, IsraelHamas, and the war, which could easily intensify, are the current focus. Ukraine & nbsp is no longer the center of attention, but it still exists. Yet the United States, a superpower, can solve these two fights, even though it hasn’t already instantly participated in the preventing. & nbsp,

However, trouble can easily flare up elsewhere on short notice, with the & nbsp, Indo-Pacific, being the front-runner.

Unsurprisingly, China pays attention to the entire image in an effort to advance its pursuits. Beijing may see an option in its immediate area, with Taiwan in certain, given the Americans’ involvement in the Middle East and Ukraine. & nbsp,

Overstretched US Military

The US military‘s The & nbsp has not forgotten about the Indo-Pacific and is currently on the scene. However, it can only manage a certain number of wars at once. & nbsp,

In fact, it hasn’t been able to fight two big wars simultaneously( as is required by law ) for a number of decades.

Ukraine currently caused too much trouble and depleted assets. & nbsp, Now include a conflict between Israel and Hamas that could involve Iran and Hezbollah. This depletes the limited US government and nbsp resources and interest, both of which are already extremely overextended. & nbsp,

Since the Obama administration announced the” Asia Pivot” in 2011, there has been a lot of discussion about bolstering military troops in the Asia-Pacific region. However, this has never actually occurred, or at least not on the required or imagined range.

However, there is something about Europe, the Middle East, or pretty much anywhere that isn’t the Indo-Pacific that draws attention and diverts US military leaders and policymakers.

Therefore, it will be much more difficult to support US troops in the Asia-Pacific now that the Middle East has heated up once more( on top of Ukraine ). Additionally, the Indo-Pacific theatre will receive even less consideration in terms of hardware, manpower, and yet brainpower if US forces engage in direct combat in the Middle East.

However, doesn’t allies like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the NBPsp make up the difference? Yes, theoretically. Not even close in reality.

& nbsp, The People’s Republic of China can” do the math.”

The Political Perspective

There is a social component to all of this as well. Taiwan may be given a lower priority than the Biden administration( or any administration ) because they can only concentrate on so many issues. & nbsp,

Information Regarding Israel’s Security Image

For starters, Israel receives more overt and covert aid in the United States than Taiwan does. Taiwan doesn’t have as many social supporters, nbsp. ( Consider votes and funding. ) & nbsp,

And at least a lot more Americans are aware of Israel and recognize its significance. This is true despite the emergence of a ferocious anti-Jewish electorate in Congress and the United States.

Some Americans have a thorough understanding of Taiwan. For an administration to sell the idea of risking nuclear war for” Taiwan ,” it takes a lot of work and political will.

If Team Biden is stranded in Ukraine and the Middle East, will it still make the effort? That’s whoever can imagine.

China Observes

China is probably assessing the US’s reaction to the Israel-Hamas conflict in order to predict how good it will be to respond to an attack or significant pressure on Taiwan.

However, the verdict is still out. The Biden presidency is currently primarily in favor of Israel. There are signs that it wants Israel to lift its punches, though. And now that Israeli troops have entered Gaza, hold off for a few days. If Team Biden informs the Israelis that they have” defended themselves sufficiently” and that a ceasefire or other so-called humanitarian pauses are necessary to allow Hamas to get its breath, we’ll watch to view.

If so, Xi Jinping may make a note of it.

However, Xi will also recall the initial response of the Biden administration to the October 7 Hamas murders. It was unclear and appeared to hold Israel and Hamas extremely accountable.

When compared to a Taiwanese situation, one might picture the State Department tweeting hours after the People’s Liberation Army has pounded Taiwan: & nbsp,

” Taiwan, couldn’t say anything.” Everything is resolved by murder.

Well, that’ll be fine if Beijing believes that an attack on Taiwan will lead to some tut – tutting and faux outrage and then a move to double down on diplomacy. And it won’t matter if it has to delay a few weeks while Washington pretends to be trying to help Taiwan before releasing it.

Why Did We Place Iran There?

Beijing must also be thinking about what transpired prior to the Hamas problems. & nbsp,

I’m especially referring to the interactions between the Biden administration and Iran‘s nbsp. loosing the restrictions and giving the US$ 6 billion. Overall, President Obama’s efforts to satisfy, if not improve, the Iranian regime are really continuing. & nbsp,

After what the Iranians have done to you and your objectives for years, China may reasonably conclude that” the sky is the restriction in what you’ll do for us after we take Taiwan.”

Team Biden was eager to see nothing and continues to be adamant that Iran has no direct involvement in Hamas’ problems. Despite having an annual budget of$ 80 billion and Hamas publicly thanking Iran for its assistance, the US intelligence community appears to be in the bag as well. They are unable to come to a conclusion on Iran and Hamas.

There is even more cause to question American resolve when you consider the Biden administration’s sluggish, if not frightened, response to Persian proxies’ continuing attacks on US forces in Syria, Iraq, and Beijing.

What are the repercussions for Chinese help of Iran in the form of fuel purchases and overt social support? Nothing. In fact, the Pentagon and the Biden administration are sacrificing themselves to work with the PRC and” steady” relationships.

Concerning Taiwan

Additionally, there are other locations on the map where China’s allies simply need to launch menacing actions that will thin out the Americans even more and intensify their focus on Taiwan.

Consider the Baltic States, the Persian Gulf, Cuba, and Venezuela, as well as the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, some” DC-sniper” fifth-columnist activities across the US will succeed.

The idea that the United States do not experience a serious foe again and the” peace dividend” and” the end of history” are now being paid for by the country.

And the other complimentary countries made a mistake by relying on Americans to handle everything. & nbsp,

I’m speaking to you about every nation in Europe, including Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington. & nbsp,

How terrible are points really? & nbsp,

I recently learned from an experienced man who has been involved in US federal security concerns since the 1960s:

When Beijing views the situation objectively, they must see us in nearly complete chaos with the” Taiwans” dozing off. Tokyo continues to dither as usual. The ROKs [ South Koreans ] are awake, but in the grand scheme of things, they would die valiantly but still die. The Phils [ the Filipinos ], of all people, seem to be agitated against them [ China ]. Given the situation, I find it difficult to believe that the” If not now, when”? Accents aren’t getting louder over there in Beijing.

Former US minister and retired US Marine officer Grant Newsham. When China Attacks: A Warning To America is the book & nbsp by him. This post, which was first released by JAPAN Forward, is being reprinted with authorization.

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Commentary: How China can reassure nervous foreign investors before it’s too late

HONG KONG: Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, the presidents of China and the US, appear set to meet in San Francisco later this month. They will undoubtedly concentrate on the Taiwan issue, which poses the biggest threat to a stable US-China relationship, but managing the” securitization” of the two countries’ economic ties should also be their top priority.

Since the Trump administration started the trade conflict in 2018, Beijing has accused Washington of exaggerating worries about the safety implications of their financial relations. It has been turned into a device conflict by Biden’s administration in an effort to impede Chinese advancement in cutting-edge technology.

In the name of regional security, Washington seems to” securitize” virtually every aspect of economic ties, from industry and technologies to purchase. Due to its Chinese ownership, TikTok, a platform for sharing little videos, is being scrutinized more closely. Security concerns have even been raised regarding Chinese-made energy buses operating in US cities.

Beijing portrays itself as the hurt party and insists that the US is solely to blame for the relationship’s problems.

Beijing’s assertion, however, is false, to put it mildly.

In response to Washington’s actions, Beijing is also active” securitizing” US-related trade and investment issues. This is consistent with Beijing’s significant transition away from growth and toward security. The most recent instances include unexpected and poorly explained raids and arrests involving Foxconn, a Taiwanese Apple provider, as well as some American agencies and other businesses.

Such behavior run counter to its stated objective of allowing more foreign investment and trade, which scares away US and international investors.

In other words, while US actions merely target and influence Chinese trade and assets, China’s actions are alarming traders all over the world. The Taiwanese government needs to review its safeguards urgently in order to revitalize an economy that has been severely impacted by three years of zero-COVID settings.

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