A Rita Ora performance of a man performing the” worm” has gone viral.
Australian lawyer Ian Smith made the decision to demonstrate his dance moves while Ms. Ora was singing” Praising You” at a Prince’s Trust ceremony in New York.
Natasha Stott Despoja, the 57-year-old’s and and former senator from Australia, watched as her many quarter was filmed by famous actors like Kate Beckinsale.
EPAAfter defeating Russia’s Ian Nepomniachtchi, Ding Liren has won the title of the first world games wizard for China.
After 14 first-stage matches at the World Chess Championship in Kazakhstan, Ding, 30, won a rapid-play playoff.
Magnus Carlsen, a five-time champion from Norway who claimed he was” not motivated” to defend his title, is succeeded by him.
In a dispute that rocked the game world last year, Carlsen accused he had cheated on his US opposite. He continues to be at the top of the list.
Ding’s triumph makes him the 17th world games champion, while Nepomniachtchi, who had hitherto advanced to the great last, failed there a single time.
According to remarks made by FIDE, the International Chess Federation, Ding stated that he was” as thrilled” after his victory.
” It was a very emotional moment when Ian left the game.” I was unable to control my emotions. I am aware that I may cry and start crying. For me, it was a difficult championship.
Game enthusiasts and republicans in China, a burgeoning chess power, celebrated his victory.
Following Ding’s victory, other grandmaster Anish Giri remarked,” One ding to act em all.”
A warm note of congratulations was already posted by China’s General Administration of Sport, praising Ding for” winning splendor for the country and its men.”
Ding, a native of Wenzhou, China’s” game place,” triumphed in serious cases in Astana, the capital of Kazakh.
Over the course of three days, the first 14 games were played. With eight gets, Ding and Nepomniachtchi each received three victories.
Each player had 25 minutes to make their swings, plus an additional 10 seconds for each transfer they made, for the playoff. Ding won the fifth quick-fire game, clinching the victory.
The prize money for the 2 million euro($ 1.8 million,$ 2.2 million ) will be divided between the two players 55 to 45.
Due to Carlsen’s abstinence, Ding was able to contend against Nepomniachtchi. At the Candidates Tournament, which competitors must earn to compete against the world champion, Ding had placed further.
He won the national game championship for China’s youngest player in 2009.
Within 12 year, he had moved up to second place in the world ranking as the highest-ranked Chinese person.
From August 2017 to November 2018, Ding played 100 adventures of traditional game without losing. Before Carlsen broke it in 2019, this was the longest unbroken streak in top-tier game account.
His victory is a reflection of China’s development in the international games world.
Since the 1990s, when Xie Jun became the first Chinese player to win a world championship in the children’s tournament, China has dominated chess games.
The World Chess Championship, which is open to both men and women, had never before been won by a Taiwanese person.
The Pheu Thai Party has adjusted its strategy, calling on voters to vote Pheu Thai to keep the other lot out, much to the displeasure of the Move Forward Party (MFP) whose campaign appears to be gaining traction.
In asking voters to “vote strategically”, it is telling supporters to cast ballots for the party which has the best chance of defeating the 250-member Senate in its vote for prime minister in parliament. At the moment, that’s Pheu Thai, the frontrunner in many polls.
It hopes to prevent the return of Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the top prime ministerial candidate of the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party, to power.
Pheu Thai is aiming for 310 seats in a landslide victory. Without it, there is no guarantee that Pheu Thai can muster enough support to secure the premiership for one of its three candidates and put together a coalition government, even if it finishes first in the May 14 polls.
Following the 2019 general election, the coup-appointed Senate overwhelmingly voted for Gen Prayut, nominated by the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) to be prime minister, clearing the way for the PPRP-led bloc to form a coalition.
If Pheu Thai’s candidate is to be voted in as prime minister without the need for the Senate’s support, a bare minimum of 376 seats, more than half of the combined 750 members of both chambers, is needed.
But Pheu Thai’s calls for tactical voting is upsetting MFP, its ally in the self-proclaimed democracy camp.
According to recent Nida poll findings, the gap between the two parties which are competing for support from the same voter base is narrowing, and Pheu Thai’s “vote strategically” campaign will be at the MFP’s expense.
According to Suan Dusit Poll findings on Saturday, Pheu Thai Party leads all other parties, followed by the Move Forward Party.
The poll was conducted on April 10-20 among 162,454 people aged 18 and over. Asked which party is gaining popularity among Thais before the election, 41.37% said the Pheu Thai Party and 19.32% the Move Forward Party.
‘The only solution’
Strategic voting has been put on the table because it is the only way to keep Gen Prayut from returning to power, said Pheu Thai deputy leader Phumtham Wechayachai.
There is no guarantee the winner will lead the next government unless the party secures at least 250 seats, and even better 300 seats, to control the 500-member House of Representatives, he said.
The UTN is widely believed to have the senators in its pocket, so the party needs only 25 seats — the minimum number required for a party to be able to nominate a prime minister — to get the ball rolling, he said.
Mr Phumtham admitted the MFP’s campaign is gaining momentum, but it is not enough for the party to emerge victorious. He is also doubtful the MFP’s popularity on social media is genuine and equals votes.
Even without the party’s calls for strategic voting, MFP will not capture enough seats to be a core party in forming the government, said the Pheu Thai heavyweight.
“It is an election strategy. We’re not being selfish but we have the best chance. If voters don’t vote this way, we’ll see a repeat of what happened in previous polls. That’s why tactical voting is important,” he said.
Mr Phumtham said it was unlikely the MFP would win 100 seats and help the Pheu Thai-MFP alliance secure a majority, saying both parties share the same support base and the numbers do not add up.
“How can the MFP get 100 seats and we get more than 200 seats when we are competing for the same base?” he said.
Phumtham: Plot to stop Prayut’s return
Tactical voting will also prevent formation of a minority government being floated by some political analysts, said the Pheu Thai deputy leader, who believes the other bloc will proceed to set up a minority government and consolidate its coalition by luring political “cobras” (those who change parties at a whim).
The “vote strategically” campaign also comes at a time when the MFP’s approval rating is on the rise especially among urban communities.
Based on the second Nida Poll [April 3-7], the contest between Pheu Thai and the MFP, even though Pheu Thai is leading the survey, is tightening.
Pheu Thai remains the frontrunner with 47.2% support in the constituency system and 47% in the party-list system, but that is down from 49.75% and 49.85% respectively compared with the first survey in March. The popularity of the MFP has increased to 21.2% in the constituency system and 21.85% in the party-list system from 17.4% and 17.15% in the March survey.
Paetongtarn Shinawatra, one of Pheu Thai’s prime ministerial candidates, has seen her popularity drop to 35.7%, from 38.2% in the first poll. MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat is more popular than he was previously with 20.25%, up from 15.75%.
‘Don’t give in to fears’
Rangsiman Rome, spokesman of the MFP, is sceptical about strategic voting, saying voters should not be scared into switching party allegiances because the election outcome is far from certain.
The findings of polls are often inaccurate and if this line of thinking is pursued, Bangkok voters should cast ballots for the MFP because it is the most popular, he argued.
Pheu Thai is not the only party that has adopted a stance against the Senate’s power to co-elect the prime minister and the Gen Prayut-led camp appears to be weakening because they also share the same support base, he said.
“People should vote for their desired party and candidate. They shouldn’t be seduced or scared into abandoning their support.
“In the end the candidates they pick out of strategic voting may not represent their values,” he said.
Mr Rangsiman is confident the party can win as many as 100 seats from both the constituency and party-list system and insisted the party’s popularity on social media platforms can be turned into votes.
The MFP politician shrugged off fears about the UTN-led camp forming a minority government, saying while there is a likelihood of that happening, he would still bet against it.
“Forming a minority government is the wrong move to make. The Senate’s five-year term is coming to an end and it is quite a risk for the senators to challenge the people’s voice. How could they face the public?” he said.
Mr Rangsiman said he is not certain that being part of a minority government is a risk worth taking by other parties because it is close to cheating the people and they will face a public backlash, which could ultimately mean a loss of support.
The opposition camp can still topple the government on the first day by forcing a censure debate, not to mention a budget bill debate that is expected to take place in July, he said, adding he can’t see how a minority government can lure away political cobras in such a short period and push for the bill’s passage.
“If a minority government is formed, political unrest is likely. People won’t stand it and they may hit the streets,” he said.
If that scenario materialises, the party will put up a fight in parliament to stop any attempts to rob people of their power.
Rangsiman: Don’t believe fearmongers
A painful dilemma
Stithorn Thananithichot, an analyst at King Prajadhipok’s Institute, said Pheu Thai is caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to forming a political alliance with the MFP.
On one hand, it is reluctant to form a pact with the MFP out of fear of losing support and failing to score a landslide victory. On the other, if it does not form partnership and does not win big enough, its chances of putting together a coalition will slip away.
He said the MFP is going from strength to strength but it is difficult to determine if the MFP’s popularity is genuine because of its clear and straightforward election strategy, or fabricated to stop Pheu Thai from clinching a landslide victory. According to Mr Stithorn, Pheu Thai should not alienate the MFP but keep the door open for both parties forming a coalition government after the May 14 polls. However, the analyst said the opinion polls put the MFP behind Pheu Thai, Bhumjaithai and the PPRP.
Stithorn: Pheu Thai Party in a quandry
Nida Poll director Suvicha Pou-aree said the MFP is pulling votes away from every party in the party-list system and the most affected is Pheu Thai.
However, in the constituency contest, the party is lagging behind others because its candidates do not have organised support. The MFP is projected to capture no more than 40 House seats under both systems combined, he said.
Suvicha: MFP will scoop list votes
The Pheu Thai Party has adjusted its strategy, calling on voters to vote Pheu Thai to keep the other lot out, much to the displeasure of the Move Forward Party (MFP) whose campaign appears to be gaining traction.
In asking voters to “vote strategically”, it is telling supporters to cast ballots for the party which has the best chance of defeating the 250-member Senate in its vote for prime minister in parliament. At the moment, that’s Pheu Thai, the frontrunner in many polls.
It hopes to prevent the return of Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the top prime ministerial candidate of the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party, to power.
Pheu Thai is aiming for 310 seats in a landslide victory. Without it, there is no guarantee that Pheu Thai can muster enough support to secure the premiership for one of its three candidates and put together a coalition government, even if it finishes first in the May 14 polls.
Following the 2019 general election, the coup-appointed Senate overwhelmingly voted for Gen Prayut, nominated by the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) to be prime minister, clearing the way for the PPRP-led bloc to form a coalition.
If Pheu Thai’s candidate is to be voted in as prime minister without the need for the Senate’s support, a bare minimum of 376 seats, more than half of the combined 750 members of both chambers, is needed.
But Pheu Thai’s calls for tactical voting is upsetting MFP, its ally in the self-proclaimed democracy camp.
According to recent Nida poll findings, the gap between the two parties which are competing for support from the same voter base is narrowing, and Pheu Thai’s “vote strategically” campaign will be at the MFP’s expense.
According to Suan Dusit Poll findings on Saturday, Pheu Thai Party leads all other parties, followed by the Move Forward Party.
The poll was conducted on April 10-20 among 162,454 people aged 18 and over. Asked which party is gaining popularity among Thais before the election, 41.37% said the Pheu Thai Party and 19.32% the Move Forward Party.
Strategic voting has been put on the table because it is the only way to keep Gen Prayut from returning to power, said Pheu Thai deputy leader Phumtham Wechayachai.
There is no guarantee the winner will lead the next government unless the party secures at least 250 seats, and even better 300 seats, to control the 500-member House of Representatives, he said.
The UTN is widely believed to have the senators in its pocket, so the party needs only 25 seats — the minimum number required for a party to be able to nominate a prime minister — to get the ball rolling, he said.
Mr Phumtham admitted the MFP’s campaign is gaining momentum, but it is not enough for the party to emerge victorious. He is also doubtful the MFP’s popularity on social media is genuine and equals votes.
Even without the party’s calls for strategic voting, MFP will not capture enough seats to be a core party in forming the government, said the Pheu Thai heavyweight.
“It is an election strategy. We’re not being selfish but we have the best chance. If voters don’t vote this way, we’ll see a repeat of what happened in previous polls. That’s why tactical voting is important,” he said.
Mr Phumtham said it was unlikely the MFP would win 100 seats and help the Pheu Thai-MFP alliance secure a majority, saying both parties share the same support base and the numbers do not add up.
“How can the MFP get 100 seats and we get more than 200 seats when we are competing for the same base?” he said.
Phumtham: Plot to stop Prayut’s return
Tactical voting will also prevent formation of a minority government being floated by some political analysts, said the Pheu Thai deputy leader, who believes the other bloc will proceed to set up a minority government and consolidate its coalition by luring political “cobras” (those who change parties at a whim).
The “vote strategically” campaign also comes at a time when the MFP’s approval rating is on the rise especially among urban communities.
Based on the second Nida Poll [April 3-7], the contest between Pheu Thai and the MFP, even though Pheu Thai is leading the survey, is tightening.
Pheu Thai remains the frontrunner with 47.2% support in the constituency system and 47% in the party-list system, but that is down from 49.75% and 49.85% respectively compared with the first survey in March. The popularity of the MFP has increased to 21.2% in the constituency system and 21.85% in the party-list system from 17.4% and 17.15% in the March survey.
Paetongtarn Shinawatra, one of Pheu Thai’s prime ministerial candidates, has seen her popularity drop to 35.7%, from 38.2% in the first poll. MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat is more popular than he was previously with 20.25%, up from 15.75%.
Rangsiman Rome, spokesman of the MFP, is sceptical about strategic voting, saying voters should not be scared into switching party allegiances because the election outcome is far from certain.
The findings of polls are often inaccurate and if this line of thinking is pursued, Bangkok voters should cast ballots for the MFP because it is the most popular, he argued.
Pheu Thai is not the only party that has adopted a stance against the Senate’s power to co-elect the prime minister and the Gen Prayut-led camp appears to be weakening because they also share the same support base, he said.
“People should vote for their desired party and candidate. They shouldn’t be seduced or scared into abandoning their support.
“In the end the candidates they pick out of strategic voting may not represent their values,” he said.
Mr Rangsiman is confident the party can win as many as 100 seats from both the constituency and party-list system and insisted the party’s popularity on social media platforms can be turned into votes.
The MFP politician shrugged off fears about the UTN-led camp forming a minority government, saying while there is a likelihood of that happening, he would still bet against it.
“Forming a minority government is the wrong move to make. The Senate’s five-year term is coming to an end and it is quite a risk for the senators to challenge the people’s voice. How could they face the public?” he said.
Mr Rangsiman said he is not certain that being part of a minority government is a risk worth taking by other parties because it is close to cheating the people and they will face a public backlash, which could ultimately mean a loss of support.
The opposition camp can still topple the government on the first day by forcing a censure debate, not to mention a budget bill debate that is expected to take place in July, he said, adding he can’t see how a minority government can lure away political cobras in such a short period and push for the bill’s passage.
“If a minority government is formed, political unrest is likely. People won’t stand it and they may hit the streets,” he said.
If that scenario materialises, the party will put up a fight in parliament to stop any attempts to rob people of their power.
Rangsiman: Don’t believe fearmongers
Stithorn Thananithichot, an analyst at King Prajadhipok’s Institute, said Pheu Thai is caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to forming a political alliance with the MFP.
On one hand, it is reluctant to form a pact with the MFP out of fear of losing support and failing to score a landslide victory. On the other, if it does not form partnership and does not win big enough, its chances of putting together a coalition will slip away.
He said the MFP is going from strength to strength but it is difficult to determine if the MFP’s popularity is genuine because of its clear and straightforward election strategy, or fabricated to stop Pheu Thai from clinching a landslide victory. According to Mr Stithorn, Pheu Thai should not alienate the MFP but keep the door open for both parties forming a coalition government after the May 14 polls. However, the analyst said the opinion polls put the MFP behind Pheu Thai, Bhumjaithai and the PPRP.
Stithorn: Pheu Thai Party in a quandry
Nida Poll director Suvicha Pou-aree said the MFP is pulling votes away from every party in the party-list system and the most affected is Pheu Thai.
However, in the constituency contest, the party is lagging behind others because its candidates do not have organised support. The MFP is projected to capture no more than 40 House seats under both systems combined, he said.
Suvicha: MFP will scoop list votes
Getty ImagesA new symbol has appeared in the kaleidoscopic jumble of neon signs that light up Sukhumvit Road, Bangkok’s most international street. The sudden ubiquity of the five-pointed marijuana leaf, in lurid green, announces the spectacular boom there has been in weed-related businesses in Thailand since cannabis was decriminalised last June.
Walk two kilometres east of the BBC office in Bangkok, and you pass more than 40 dispensaries, selling potent marijuana flower buds and all the paraphernalia needed to smoke them.
Travel in the opposite direction, to the famous backpacker hangout of Khao San Road, and there is an entire marijuana-themed shopping mall, Plantopia, its shops half-hidden behind the haze of smoke created by customers trying out the product. The website Weed in Thailand lists more than 4,000 businesses across the country selling cannabis and its derivatives.
And this is Thailand, where until last June you could be jailed for five years just for possessing marijuana, up to 15 years for producing it; where other drug offences get the death penalty. The pace of change has been breathtaking.
“It is messy, but then this is Thailand, and without this sudden liberalisation I don’t think it would have happened at all,” says Kitty Chopaka, founder of Elevated Estate, a company that offers advice on the marijuana industry, and has been a part of the parliamentary committee trying to get the new regulations passed.
But this is not the kind of liberalisation long-term campaigners like her dreamed of.
“We need regulation. Spelling out what you can and cannot do,” Ms Chopaka says. “It is causing a lot of confusion, a lot of people not knowing what they can do, what they can put money behind.”
There are some rules in this apparent free-for-all, but they are being enforced haphazardly, if at all. Not all dispensaries have a licence, which they are required to have, and they are supposed to record the provenance of all their cannabis flowers and the personal details of every customer.
No products aside from the unprocessed flower are supposed to have more than 0.2 percent THC, the psychotropic chemical in cannabis, nor can they be sold online. Yet you can find suppliers offering potent weed brownies and gummies with high THC content online, with delivery to your door within an hour. Cannabis cannot be sold to anyone under 20 years old, but who is to know if the product is simply delivered by a motorbike courier?
There are restaurants serving marijuana-laced dishes, you can get marijuana tea, and marijuana ice-cream. Convenience stores are even selling weed-tinged drinking water. The police have admitted that they are so unsure of what is and is not legal they are enforcing very few rules around marijuana.
The new cannabis regime is a bit of a political accident. Anutin Charnvirakul, head of one of Thailand’s larger political parties, made decriminalisation part of his manifesto for the 2019 election. It proved a vote-winner, mostly on the as-yet untested notion that cannabis could be a profitable alternative cash crop for poor farmers. As health minister in the new government, Mr Anutin prioritised getting it taken off the banned narcotics list as soon as possible to fulfil his election pledge.
But Thailand’s parliament, a cauldron of competing interest groups, moves slowly. Cannabis was decriminalised before anyone had been able to write regulations to control the new business. And the planned new laws got bogged down by inter-party bickering. With another general election taking place in May, there is little chance of the law getting through the parliament before the end of the year. Already rival parties are warning of the dangers of unregulated weed, and threatening to re-criminalise it if they take power.
The future of this free-wheeling new industry is uncertain.
Tukta, a 21-year-old university student, jumped on the marijuana bandwagon last year, sinking more than one million baht ($30,000; £23,500) into a dispensary and coffee shop called The Herb Club in Bangkok’s Klong Toei district. She sells 16 different grades of the cured flower, ranging from $10 to $80 a gram, but she worries about possible changes in the law. With so much competition from the many other dispensaries nearby, she says business is neither bad nor good.
“The price is falling because there’s a glut of marijuana,” Ms Chopaka says.
“There are a lot of illegal imports. We are growing strains from overseas, which need air-conditioning and lighting. We should look into developing strains that work for our climate to lower costs.
“We really need to go back to our old heritage, our old cultures. Because cannabis and Thais, Thailand, are very interwoven with each other.”
For many Thais, who have grown up in a country which viewed all narcotics as a dangerous social evil, the dramatic flowering of the weed business since last year is bewildering. Yet the unforgiving official view of drugs is a relatively recent development.
Up until the late 1970s marijuana was widely cultivated by the hill tribes in northern Thailand, in the border area known as the Golden Triangle, which also used to be the source of much of the world’s opium. Marijuana had also been used extensively as a herb and cooking ingredient in north-eastern Thailand.
When US soldiers arrived in the 1960s on “rest and recreation” breaks from fighting in the Vietnam War they discovered Thai stick, locally made from cured marijuana buds wrapped in leaves around a bamboo stick, like a fat cigar. The soldiers began shipping Thai marijuana back home in large quantities; along with Golden Triangle heroin it made up much of the narcotics flow going into the United States.
As the Vietnam War wound down, the US put pressure on Thailand to curb drug production. In 1979 Thailand passed a sweeping Narcotics Act, mandating harsh penalties for using and selling drugs, including the death sentence.
This coincided with a conservative backlash across South East Asia against permissive 1960s attitudes to drugs and sex, a reaction to the ganja-smoking backpackers travelling east along the “hippie trail”. Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia all instructed their immigration officers to look out for hippies and bar them entry. At Singapore airport those with long hair were given a choice of a trip to the barber or being turned around. In Malaysia anyone with sufficiently suspect attributes would have the letters SHIT – suspected hippie in transit – stamped in their passports before being deported.
The Thai government was especially wary of alternative youth culture after it crushed a leftist student movement, killing dozens at Bangkok’s Thammasat University in October 1976. Conservatives feared they might support a communist takeover in Thailand, as had just happened in neighbouring Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.
Meanwhile a series of royally-sponsored crop substitution projects persuaded most hill tribes to stop cultivating opium and marijuana, and try coffee or macadamia nuts instead.
Since the 1990s cheap methamphetamines have poured into Thailand from war-torn areas of Myanmar. The ruinous social impact of meth addiction turned the Thai public even more firmly against drugs, and led to a brutal anti-drug campaign in 2003, in which at least 1,400 suspected users and dealers were gunned down.
It was the dire overcrowding in Thailand’s prisons – three-quarters of them in for drug offences, many quite minor – that finally persuaded Thai officials to rethink their hardline approach, along with the realisation that marijuana’s medicinal and therapeutic applications might be a valuable complement to the country’s successful medical tourism industry. It was not much of a leap from that to see the potential in recreational marijuana too.
“Welcome to Amsterdam on steroids,” booms Tom Kruesopon, the Thai entrepreneur known here as “Mr Weed” for his role in getting the drug laws liberalised, to a group of German tourists just off the plane, who cannot quite believe what they are seeing. Mr Kruesopon has opened a branch of the US cannabis store Cookies in Bangkok, and runs through the different strains of locally-grown marijuana, each in its own illuminated jar. Weed-themed underwear, slippers and t-shirts are on the shelves.
Perhaps it’s the familiar tales of hapless Westerners locked up for decades in the Bangkok Hilton that make the visitors seem a bit hesitant. But Mr Kruesopon assures them they can no longer be arrested for buying and consuming any part of the marijuana plant in Thailand, though he does not allow smoking in his shop. He believes the business will continue to grow. “You’re going to have a few billion-dollar companies here – I guarantee it.” But he also accepts that better regulation is essential “otherwise you’re going to kill the golden goose”.
Outside of parliament public debate about cannabis is surprisingly muted.
“It’s not ok. It’s still like narcotics to me… Only the youngsters are using it more and those who have used it before are using it again,” says a 32-year-old street vendor. But an older motorcycle taxi driver says legalising marijuana has neither helped nor harmed him: “We’re not paying attention because we haven’t been smoking pot. It doesn’t matter to us anyway.”
Some doctors have warned of the dangers of cannabis addiction, but for most Thais it pales beside the long-standing methamphetamine crisis. Dispensaries in central Bangkok say most of their customers are foreign tourists, not Thais. The most enthusiastic supporters of the new regime are the not insignificant numbers of people in Thailand who were already using marijuana regularly.
Self-styled “stoner” Amanda is one of them. She is happy to be able to cultivate the kinds of strains she likes at home, without fearing a knock on the door from the police. She has turned her small apartment into something like a shrine to the wonder-weed, filling her little bedroom balcony with reflective tents and powerful lights where she carefully tends seven plants. Her cat is no longer allowed in the bedroom.
“It was difficult at first. I had a lot to learn. I didn’t get the temperature right at first, and using air-conditioning 24 hours a day, I need a humidifier. But it is so awesome this happened in Thailand. There are thousands of farms and dispensaries now, so many interesting people in the business.”
For all the talk in Thai political parties of re-criminalising marijuana, or trying to restrict it to medical, rather than recreational use – a distinction those in the business say is almost impossible to make – it seems unlikely that after the last, crazy nine months the cork can be put back in the bottle. But where Thailand’s free-wheeling marijuana industry goes from here is anybody’s guess.
WASHINGTON: At a time of escalating geopolitical tension, the United States called on China on Saturday( Apr 29 ) to stop harassing Philippine ships in the South China Sea. The US State Department stated in a speech,” We call upon Beijing to refrain from its controversial and dangerous run.” FollowingContinue Reading
Someone asked me a few questions about Japan’s national defense the other day. As expected, I gave my take on each one. Meanwhile, others might be just as curious about the current status of Japan’s preparedness.
If so, then this is what you need to know:
The People’s Republic of China. Xi Jinping has succeeded in getting Japan to take its national defense seriously. That’s something the Americans never had much success at.
Some Japanese were concerned with PRC military threat in the early 2000s, if not before. And then-prime minister Shinzo Abe‘s efforts in 2006-2007 to establish the Quad between the major democracies: Japan, Australia, the United States, and India owed to concerns of Chinese expansionism.
Japan had been quietly building up its defense all the while. By the late 2000s, for example, Japan’s “anti-submarine helicopter carriers” — aircraft carriers with a little modification — were already on hand, and the next generation was already under construction. Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) plans to “fortify” the Nansei Shoto were developed around this time too.
The US Army’s high-mobility rocket artillery system “HIMARS” (left) which was first deployed to the Nansei Islands, and the Ground Self-Defense Force’s “Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile.” August 31, 2022 GSDF Camp Amami. Image: Sankei by Toyohiro Ichioka
China’s fishing fleet, along with the China Coast Guard and Chinese Navy muscling in on Japan’s Senkaku Islands around 2012 is what really got Tokyo’s attention. It spurred a faster, if measured, defense buildup.
The buildup was probably too measured. The Chinese have not let up around Japan’s southern islands, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard are overstretched down south. That’s not surprising given that from 2016-2020 the People’s Liberation Army Navy launched about as many ships as were in the entire Japanese naval fleet.
In recent years, Japan’s moves to strengthen defense have seemed more pronounced. People’s attention was caught, especially, by Kishida‘s announced doubling of defense spending. The Japanese are now moving faster. And Japanese defense guidelines no longer beat around the bush. They now describe China as the problem that needs to be addressed.
Japan by and large recognizes that there’s no deal to be cut with the PRC. And Japan is being forced to protect itself.
I doubt it. That would have been mostly a matter of beefing up missile defenses, and maybe acquiring some long-range missiles — the so-called “counterstrike weapons” to hit targets in North Korea.
Japan’s move to strengthen its defense is also partly motivated by fears that the United States may not defend Japan if it doesn’t do enough. Indeed, Tokyo has always fretted about “Japan passing.” In other words, the Americans losing interest in Japan and even reaching an accommodation with China that leaves Japan on its own.
A Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel navigates alongside a Chinese Coast Guard ship to prevent it from approaching a research vessel. January 30, off the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture. Image: Sankei by Hiroshi Kawase
Not really. Japanese pacifism has always been a strange thing and in part is just moral preening. The JSDF, for all its shortcomings, has always been a real military. Even more, pacifist Japan has always insisted that the Americans exterminate anyone threatening Japan. That’s some pacifism. With China breathing fire, nobody much talks about pacifism these days.
Maybe, maybe not. Tokyo should have started moving faster at least a decade ago. But this is always the case when free nations wake up and realize they are at risk from aggressive, dictatorial regimes. It’s always later than it should be.
Japan isn’t starting from scratch, however. It has the makings of a force that can deliver some punch. But owing to restraints placed on JSDF development — mostly self-imposed — it’s a somewhat misshapen and undersized force.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), for example, ought to be twice its size in order to handle current missions. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is not well integrated with the other services and seems to prefer flying around at 30,000 feet (9 kilometers) looking for a dogfight. It’s also smaller than it should be.
GSDF has made some good progress in the last decade in becoming a more mobile force. This is evidenced by the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade. And it’s even able to work with MSDF more than one imagines. But GSDF has to overcome decades of being focused on defending Hokkaido from a Russian invasion — that never came.
Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade getting off from amphibious vehicle AAV7 in the Ground Self-Defense Force “Fuji Firepower Exercise” on May 28, Higashifuji Exercise Area in Gotemba City, Shizuoka Prefecture. Image: Sankei by Haruna Naka
JSDF needs to figure out joint (or combined) operations, so the three JSDF services can operate together. Otherwise, it’s not even the sum of its parts. There’s a move afoot to get this capability in place, but it will be a few years. And even then, mastering joint/combined ops takes time and practice
Recruitment is another problem. JSDF has been missing its targets by 20% for years. This isn’t because of the shrinking population. It’s more because service in the JSDF has never been a respected profession — owing to governments and media and academia doing their best to humiliate and handcuff the JSDF for decades.
Also, service in the JSDF is poorly compensated, living conditions are almost slum-like, and has nothing like the benefits of serving in the US forces.
Announcing that Japan will double defense spending was the easy part. Spending it on the right things is the hard part. Japan really doesn’t know what it needs — either capability or hardware-wise to fight a war.
Hopefully, the US side will quietly dispatch some good war planners to Japan, link them with the right people, and have them lay out what is needed (and what the US needs from Japan as well.) It would save a lot of time and wasted effort and money.
Some other shortcomings that need addressing, and fast, are the practical issues of logistics, war stocks, casualty handling and replacements, mobilization processes, civil defense, and the like. It’s hard to fight a war if these aren’t in place, and in Japan’s case, they are not ready.
The ability to operate with US forces also needs much work. The two navies are pretty good at operating together, but beyond that things need work. You’d have no idea the Americans and the Japanese have had a defense relationship for 60+ years, given how lacking the two militaries are in this respect.
Until you see a joint operational headquarters in Japan where US and Japanese forces are conducting peacetime and wartime activities necessary to defend Japan, you should be skeptical of officials saying the military alliance is in fighting trim.
Jointly training: JASDF F15 fighter (three in the foreground) and US military F16 fighter on June 7, 2022. Image: Joint Staff Office of the Ministry of Defense
It had better. If Japan doesn’t pitch in, the US-Japan alliance will collapse in short order. Ironically, but not surprisingly, I heard a Japanese scholar say not long ago that if the US did not fight to defend Taiwan the Japanese would leave the alliance.
No mention of Japan doing its part in the fighting. Indeed, he pointed out how it would be hard from a legal perspective, and would also upset Japan’s economic ties with the PRC. Fortunately, most Japanese are more tuned in than this fellow.
Japan is well aware that “Taiwan’s defense is Japan’s defense.” JSDF officers were saying this years ago, but now it’s widely understood. Japan will look to see what the Americans are going to do and then figure out what Japan will do. That’s not unusual.
I expect that Japan will deploy the JSDF — particularly the Navy and Air Force — and will back up the Americans, and will do some “shooting.” The Ground Self Defense Force will be active down in Nansei Shoto with surveillance and long-range weaponry, and maybe even operating with US Marines.
Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear that Japan is doing the necessary planning for a Taiwan contingency. And it is unclear if the Japanese and the Americans have a joint plan either. Perhaps the idea is to “wing it” if something happens. That’s a good way to lose.
Stepping back and taking stock, Japan has made a lot of progress. If you knew about Japan’s defense situation several decades ago, it is almost unrecognizable today. But there’s much to do and little time to do it.
This article was first published by JapanForward. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.
After more than a year of no direct communication, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had a phone conversation on April 26, 2023.
According to the Chinese record of the call, “the two sides exchanged views on China-Ukraine relations and the Ukraine crisis”, but globally it was seen as an attempt by Beijing to step in as peacemaker.
Meanwhile, Zelensky tweeted that he “had a long and meaningful phone call” with Xi, and later expanded on his Telegram channel saying that particular attention was “paid to the ways of possible cooperation to establish a just and sustainable peace for Ukraine”.
The most concrete outcome of the call is Xi’s confirmation that China will appoint a special representative on Eurasian affairs to Ukraine “to have in-depth communication with all parties on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis.”
If nothing else, this signals that China is getting serious with its mediation efforts and judges the time to be right for this, not least because of increasing tensions in the Western alliance and doubts about the success of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
China’s move is another indication of a changing international order that Beijing is keen, and increasingly able, to shape. What is immediately at stake for China is its relationship with the EU. For the EU’s member states, the war in Ukraine, including a possible further escalation, is of much more acute security concern than it is for China.
European officials have repeatedly urged Beijing to use its influence over Moscow to “bring Russia to its senses”, as French President Emmanuel Macron put it on his recent visit to China.
Other senior EU officials, from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to European Council President Charles Michel and the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs Josep Borrell have similarly left no doubt that China’s stance on the war in Ukraine will shape the future of EU-China relations. Given how important the EU and China are for each other economically, both sides have an interest in a stable and constructive relationship.
China-EU relations are, of course, part of a bigger picture of relations between China and the West. Yet even here, there are some signs of a possible opening. US treasury secretary Jane Yellen acknowledged that “negotiating the contours of engagement between great powers is difficult” but also noted that Beijing and Washington “can find a way forward if China is also willing to play its part.”
The Xi-Zelensky phone call fits into a careful and fragile choreography of moves that might gradually see a more effective management of the war in Ukraine that would, initially, prevent further escalation and eventually pave the way toward a settlement.
While it would not resolve all of the contentious issues in China-West relations, it would remove one particularly problematic issue from the list of immediate concerns.
At the same time, China needs Russia as leverage in its great power competition with the West, and Xi is unlikely to abandon his partnership with Putin. But China also needs a Russia that is more controllable, and this means China needs an end to the war in Ukraine, which still has the potential to escalate further.
By reining in Russia over Ukraine, Xi can firmly establish China as an indispensable guarantor of sustainable security and stability in Europe.
If the Chinese initiative is given the benefit of the doubt in Brussels and Washington and gains traction in Kyiv and Moscow, it gives Beijing a major opportunity to begin shaping a new Eurasian security order. While the West may be able and willing to contain the Kremlin militarily and isolate Russia economically, Xi will have a major role to play in managing Putin politically.
In other words, Beijing’s calculation may well be that for Europe to regain a measure of stability and security, China’s cooperation will be essential. This does not diminish the importance of the transatlantic security relationship embodied by NATO, but it would mean an acknowledgment of the fundamentally changed dynamics of the European order and the far more critical role of China within it.
Bringing about a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine may take some time and require more than just Beijing’s mediation. But even an end to the fighting in Ukraine in the form of a stable ceasefire could benefit China. Such an intermediate outcome would make it more likely, for example, that the Black Sea deal, which allows Ukraine to export its grain, would be extended again, easing the global food crisis.
This would consolidate China’s influence and leadership in the developing world, further cementing its status as an important power broker in the new bipolar order sketched out in a 2019 white paper China and the World in the New Era.
While China’s more open engagement in mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine could significantly advance Beijing’s vision of a new international order, it is not without risks for Xi.
As Zelensky noted in his call with Xi, the “territorial integrity of Ukraine must be restored within the 1991 borders.” Russia’s predictable reaction, delivered by foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, was to accuse Ukraine of linking its willingness to negotiate “with ultimatums containing … unrealistic demands.”
Ultimately, the question for Beijing, which has consistently affirmed its support for the international norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, becomes whether it can find a way to square the circle between Moscow’s internationally isolated insistence that its illegal war and land grab in Ukraine be recognized and Kiev’s demand that its borders not be subject to change by force.
This is a fundamental question for European and global order, and since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act the inviolability of borders was the foundational principle of European security.
Whatever the fate of China’s mediation efforts in the war are, they will be a major test of the skill and leverage that Chinese diplomats have and they will be an indication of how China intends to play its future role in a re-imagined Eurasia.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko is Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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In the South China Sea, where Beijing’s sweeping cases have alarmed the US and its supporters, a Chinese Coast Guard deliver nearly collided with the Spanish police ship.
Last Sunday, the BBC saw the uncomfortable encounter near Second Thomas Shoal in the isolated Spratly archipelago, which Manila claims is a move straight out of Beijing’s handbook. And it took place the day after President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines met with Taiwanese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Manila and expressed support for clear channels of communication regarding the South China Sea dispute.
News cameras captured how Chinese ships would follow the Filipinos on cue and in specific locations throughout their 1, 670 km( 1, 038-mile ) journey over the course of six days, sending them radio warnings to leave or face” consequences.” According to the Philippine Coast Guard, it had invited journalists to participate in their daily guard in the contentious waters for the first time so they could see China’s actions firsthand.
The Spratly Islands, which the Philippines already partially claim, are included in China’s claim to nearly the entire South China Sea. There are also competing statements made by Taiwan, Brunei, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
As a result, the South China Sea has become one of the major outposts in history, particularly as US-China tensions have risen. For starters, defending Taiwan at a time when China’s claims to the autonomous peninsula have grown stronger depends on having access to these lakes. Second, there is concern that Beijing’s expanding footprint may limit trade because the waterways also handle$ 5 trillion(£ 4 trillion ) of global trade annually.
However, China has disregarded the decision of an international arbitration court that its claim to nearly the entire South China Sea is unjustified. Alternatively, it has increased patrols, erected man-made islands over reef areas, and, more recently, blocked the view of Spanish ships by shining lasers at them.
The Philippines, on the other hand, has relied on its steadfast ally, the US, which views China’s actions as violating the” freedom of navigation” of other nations.
The US and the Philippines were finishing up their biggest warfare games ever when the stand-off occurred. The US gained access to important Spanish military home, many of which face Taiwan, shortly after this.
According to the Philippines foreign ministry, China conducted” really scary manoeuvres” at Second Thomas Shoal and Filipino leaders were well within their power to regularly guard the region. On the other hand, Beijing charged that the Philippines had entered Foreign territory.
According to Commodore Jay Tarriela, a spokesman for the Philippine Coast Guard,” China has long used techniques like shadowing, but now, thanks to the media, the entire world gets to see it.”
The Chinese ship that had been following their ship Malapascua increased velocity, as evidenced by the dense gray smoke coming from its fuel, the Filipino crew noticed at dawn on April 23. A single Spanish ship, the Malabrigo, was about a kilometer away when the BBC saw the huge seas chase taking place on quite calm turquoise waters.
It eventually became apparent that the Spanish vessel could not outmanoeuvre a vessel larger than twice its shape when the Chinese fleet caught up to it. The Malapascua was forced to shut off its locomotive in order to avoid a hit because the Chinese ship blocked the path and wouldn’t move.
Due to the” sudden and really very dangerous manoeuvre ,” the Chinese ship was able to approach the Malapascua’s bow up to 45 meters( 146 feet ), according to Rodel Hernandez, the commander of the Philippine ship. His ship, which was also involved in a light motion with the Chinese in February, came the closest to colliding, he claimed.
After a 30-minute standoff, the Spanish boats turned away and were unable to police the Second Thomas Shoal, one of Manila’s some disputed outcrops and islands, which was occupied by the Sierra Madre and other run-down Navy ships.
The way brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 involved China’s daily obstruction of Filipino inspections and provide operations to the Second Thomas Shoal. The Filipino name Ayungin, which means” rich fishing ground,” is derived from a small local fish.
Editors who joined the police already saw firsthand how the Philippine Coast Guard has fared in the midst of the ongoing South China Sea dispute.
The two police boats’ crew members are prepared with code to alert or respond to Chinese submarines. The television instructions from the Chinese are delivered in English and Chinese and could arrive at any time of day, especially in the dead of night.
Some Chinese boats have reportedly adopted a new strategy in prior days by refusing to heed warnings from Filipinos. In order to appear undetectable on radar, some Chinese militia ships have already disabled a tracking system.
In the Spratlys’ coastal area, close to V-shaped Whitsun Reef, the coastguard mission also discovered about 100 militia ships.
It claimed to have given information about China’s subsequent actions to a government body tasked with handling the South China Sea dispute.
The coastguard pledged to” diligently and hard work to protect the Philippines’ official sovereign rights” along with other Philippine security forces.
On board the Philippine Coast Guard ship conducting a week-long guard in the South China Sea, editors including the BBC’s Virma Simonette were present.
BEIJING: China is bracing for a record-high travel rush over the Labour Day holiday, with popular sightseeing spots selling out of tickets and some cities warning would-be visitors away as domestic tourism rebounds after Beijing ended COVID-19 curbs. Authorities are expecting 19 million trips to be made across China’s vastContinue Reading
