Healthcare professionals to get AI training as Singapore continues push towards preventive care

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SINGAPORE: As Singapore moves towards preventive care for its people, artificial intelligence (AI) is set to help.

The country can harness AI to focus on delivering better diagnosis and treatment, early detection, prevention and prediction of diseases and faster drug development, said Dr Janil Puthucheary, Senior Minister of State for Health at the AI Health Summit on Thursday (Nov 23).

“The application of AI may take some more time to mature, and we are looking at how AI can help in the shorter term to enhance clinical decision support, increase productivity of our healthcare teams, and support individuals,” he said.

“Patients will be better and healthier residents in their Healthier SG journey for preventive population care.”

Ultimately, the impact of AI is felt through the healthcare professionals in delivering their work, he noted, adding that this means that they need to be equipped to make the best use of the new technology.

“They need to understand not only AI’s potential, but also its limitations and ethical implications of using these technologies,” he said.

To that end, under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between AI Singapore — the national programme to boost AI capability — and SingHealth at the summit, healthcare professionals will receive AI training and qualification catered for their industry.

There will be support for joint research and innovation projects. The education programmes will start in June next year, and include a 10-part e-learning video, as well as physical classes and workshops. Topics include AI ethics.

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China: WHO seeks data on ‘pneumonia clusters’ in children

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Schoolchildren wearing masks walking up stairsMayur Kakade
By Phelan Chatterjee & Fergus Walsh
BBC News

The World Health Organization (WHO) has asked China for more information on “clusters of undiagnosed pneumonia” reportedly spreading among children in the north of the country.

Non-state media reports say paediatric hospitals in parts of the country are overwhelmed with sick children.

Chinese authorities have attributed a spike in flu-like illnesses this winter to the lifting of Covid measures.

The WHO is urging people in China to take measures to reduce transmission.

In a statement, the UN health agency says it wants more information on reports in the media and from ProMed – a global outbreak surveillance system – of “clusters of undiagnosed pneumonia in children in northern China”.

After the WHO statement was released, state-run Xinhua news agency published an article on Thursday which quoted officials of the National Health Commission as saying they were paying close attention to the diagnosis and care of children with respiratory illnesses.

While mentions of China and a wave of infection can get people jittery as it brings memories of the coronavirus pandemic, it’s good practice for the WHO to ask for clarity. But until Beijing responds, there is no way of knowing why this spike of infections has come.

Since October, northern China has reported an “increase in influenza-like illness” compared to the same period over the past three years, the WHO adds.

Last week, China’s National Health Commission said there had been a rise in several respiratory diseases across the country – in particular influenza, Covid, mycoplasma pneumoniae – a common bacterial infection affecting younger children – and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV).

Officials attributed the rise to the lifting of Covid restrictions.

Other countries, including the UK and the US, saw similar surges in flu-like illnesses once pandemic restrictions were lifted.

“China is likely experiencing a major wave of childhood respiratory infections now as this is the first winter after their lengthy lockdown, which must have drastically reduced the circulation of respiratory bugs, and hence decreased immunity to endemic bugs,” said Prof Francois Balloux of the University College of London Genetics Institute.

The WHO says it is unclear if the reported pneumonia outbreak and overall increase in respiratory infections reported by Beijing are linked – and has made an official request for more detailed information.

It has urged people in China to take basic precautions like getting vaccinated, wearing masks and hand-washing.

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North Korea spy satellite: South partially suspends military deal after launch

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A rocket supposedly carrying a North Korean satellite is launchedReuters
By Jean Mackenzie
Seoul correspondent

South Korea has suspended parts of its 2018 agreement with the North aimed at lowering military tensions.

This comes after Pyongyang claimed to have successfully launched a spy satellite into space.

Prime Minister Han Duck-soo said the launch threatened South Korea’s security.

Seoul said it would resume surveillance flights along its border with North Korea, breaching a no-fly zone established under the military deal.

Some analysts have said these developments could escalate tensions further.

Pyongyang fired a rocket, said to contain its Malligyong-1 spy satellite, late on Tuesday and hailed the launch as a “success”.

The United States and South Korea said they could not yet assess whether the launch had been successful, or if the spy satellite was operational, but both “strongly condemned” it.

US National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said the move risked “destabilising the security situation in the region and beyond.”

Developing a functioning spy satellite is a major part of North Korea’s five-year military plan, set out by its leader Kim Jong Un in January 2021.

The technology could in theory enable Pyongyang to monitor the movement of US and South Korean troops and weapons on the Korean Peninsula, allowing it to spot incoming threats. It would also allow the North to plot its nuclear attacks with more precision.

Kim Jong Un looks on as a rocket is launched in the distance

Reuters

North Korea’s space agency, the National Aerospace Technology Administration, said the launch was an attempt to bolster the country’s self-defence capabilities, in the face of “dangerous military moves” by its enemies. Pyongyang added that it planned to launch several more spy satellites “in a short space of time”.

Some analysts are sceptical as to whether the satellite is advanced enough to be effective. Jang Young-geun, who runs the Missile Centre at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy, predicted that given past attempts, the resolution of the satellite’s camera is “probably not at a level to allow for detailed military reconnaissance.”

Nonetheless, he said, a low resolution is “better than nothing”, as an attack – regardless of the target – will need information to make it more effective.

Ankit Panda, a nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, also reckoned that while the satellite could enhance the effectiveness of North Korea’s armed forces, it could conversely have a “stabilising effect” on the Peninsula.

“It could make Pyongyang act less skittishly in crises,” he said. “For instance, it could use its satellites to verify that the US and South Korea were, in fact, not surging their forces to prepare for a major attack.”

North claims success after two failed launches

This is the North’s third attempt this year to put a spy satellite into orbit, after two previous attempts in May and August failed. South Korean officials said they believed Pyongyang had received technical support from Moscow, which allowed it to overcome the hurdles that had led to its previous failures.

When Kim Jong Un met Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny space centre in Russia’s far east in September, the Russian leader hinted he would help Mr Kim build satellites. The US and South Korea believe the North is sending Russia arms to use in Ukraine, and that Moscow may have agreed to share its military expertise in return.

But Mr Panda said there was no evidence that Pyongyang had received Russia’s technical assistance and implemented it. “This was North Korea’s third launch attempt and they’ve been carrying out their own research and development on space systems for a while now,” Mr Panda noted.

Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin

Reuters

Jo Bee Yun, an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defence Analysis (KIDA) added that the time was too limited for Russia to have provided “game-changing” technology, but that “significant transfers” could be expected in the future.

Mr Kim and then South Korean President Moon Jae-in signed the Comprehensive Military Agreement in 2018, in an attempt to de-escalate tensions between their two countries and prevent a conflict erupting. It limited military movements by both sides near the border, removed guard posts, banned live-fire drills, and created a no fly-zone.

But the South Korean government had recently argued that the deal left it vulnerable to an attack, by prohibiting it from flying surveillance aircraft and reconnaissance drones along the border.

Members of South Korea’s National Security Council met in the early hours of Wednesday morning, followed by its defence chiefs and cabinet. All agreed the country should restart surveillance operations along the border with immediate effect and with the President’s backing.

This increased surveillance will allow the South to monitor North Korean outposts and long-range artillery, previously hidden behind its mountain slopes. Seoul currently relies on US spy satellites to monitor the North, but is planning to launch its first home-built model into space at the end of November.

Some analysts warn that the suspension of the military pact could escalate tensions and make cross-border skirmishes more likely.

Hong Min, from the Korea Institute for National Unification, pointed out that the deal had significantly reduced the number of cross-border incidents and had been successful in deterring the North. He said Seoul risked providing it with “the justification to carry out further provocations.”

However Jo Bee Yun of KIDA, does not believe the suspension would increase tensions, noting that Pyongyang has been regularly launching missiles since 2022. “The cycle of provocations has already resumed. South Korea had to respond sometime or another.”

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Risking NATO’s future for its expansion to Ukraine

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Barring some unforeseen contingency there will not be a war in Europe, beyond Ukraine, for some time to come.

That prediction, however, is based on NATO’s ability to deter a future Russian attack. NATO’s deterrent capability, in light of the Ukraine war, is open to increasing doubt.

If NATO is unable to restore confidence in its defenses, the organization will have to make deals with the Russians that will change Europe’s strategic map.

NATO’s ultra modern HQ in Brussels

As things stand now, NATO is an expansionist alliance and not a defensive alliance as originally conceived.

The organization’s changed posture came about after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Policymakers decided to extend NATO coverage to the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, vastly expanding the NATO’security zone.

It was a gutsy decision, based on a greatly weakened and mostly impoverished Russia. Over nearly a decade, post-Soviet Russia stopped producing weapons and ammunition, its military leadership ossified and its plans for new weapons were put to the side because there wasn’t money to finance them.

One of Vladimir Putin’s accomplishments in his 17 years in power was to reverse the decline in Russia’s military. That has not been easy. Russia’s industry was far from modernized. However good they were at their main job, military leaders in the core group were not up to the task of managing factories run by the state.

The Russians were very slow to adapt. By the time of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, it was clear that Russian-supplied hardware and tactics were inadequate and failed. The Armenians, who used mainly Russian equipment, saw their forces torn apart by Azerbaijan.

A key factor in the war was the introduction of armed and loitering drones that were used to destroy Armenian air defenses, command posts, and heavy equipment.

Harop Loitering Munition (Israel)

By the start of 2022, the Russias had not yet learned the lessons of 2020. Nor had they adapted their tactics on how to deal with smart weapons including anti tank missiles and MANPADs air defenses.

Russian drones first seen in the Ukraine War were primitive and poorly made. Russian armor was picked apart by Ukrainian soldiers, who ambushed hundreds of them as they traveled down roadways. Ukraine, with lots of Western support in the form of smart weapons and real-time intelligence, pushed the Russians back and inflicted serious defeats on them.

Bleeding Ukraine (and NATO)

But all that changed in late 2022 and early 2023 as the Russians adapted. Spurning World War II-style shock armor advances that were costly in equipment and manpower, Russia turned to an active defense system designed primarily by Russian general Sergei Surovikin.

Russia then turned to a new generation of attack drones, concentrated artillery, and aerial dropped mines to stop Ukraine’s army. Russia adopted the strategy of bleeding Ukraine, something Ukraine’s American and European advisors did not correctly calculate when they trained nine Ukrainian brigades to attack Russia’s defenses in the Zaphorize area.

Sergei Surovikin

Bleeding Ukraine has, at least so far, demonstrated that NATO’s military ideas are defective and out of date. Seen objectively, the huge losses of equipment and manpower by the Ukrainians are not sustainable in a NATO context. NATO lacks the trained armed forces and satisfactory equipment to withstand a modernized Russian army on the offensive.

One of the keys to the dilemma is artillery. NATO planners did not anticipate the level of ammunition needed in the new warfare paradigm seen in Ukraine. To support the fighting, Europe and the United States have supplied long-range artillery howitzer rounds, mainly 155mm, to Ukraine.  These supplies are far below what is needed.  

Both the Russians and NATO are experiencing shortages, but the NATO shortages are far more significant than Russia’s. Today even after shell supply has been ramped up, NATO won’t be able to produce more than 163,000 shells a month – while the Russians probably have the potential to manufacture over 350,000 monthly.

The US raided its stockpile of 155mm shells in Korea and Israel, both very dangerous moves.  It left the US with nothing to defend South Korea if Kim Jong-un starts a conventional war on the peninsula.  North Korea has loads of artillery and plenty of shells.  South Korea does not have enough.  

The decision to take 300,000 155 mm shells stockpiled in Israel and send them on to Ukraine likewise was a bad one as it left Israel with little more than its own war stocks. With the fighting in Gaza and in the north against Hezbollah, Israel urgently needed 155mm shells from the United States and that need significantly impacted supplies that had been set to go to Ukraine. 

The Russians also felt some pinch and they turned to their friends in North Korea and Iran.  Both manufacture 152mm (actually 152.4 mm) shells for Russian towed and self-propelled howitzers. The actual numbers being supplied are hard to come by. One report has it that North Korea already sent 500,000 and could end up sending up to two million shells to Russia.

There are reports that shells from North Korea and Iran are being stockpiled, either as a contingency or for a big offensive in Ukraine – or possibly even both.

2S19 Msta-S Russian 152mm Self-Propelled Howitzer

The Europeans are saying that they need to keep back ammunition from Ukraine because they have little or nothing left for their own defense. While some European companies, such as Rheinmetall, have stepped up production, it will take them years to produce the numbers needed. Rheinmetall has a new factory in Spain.

In the United States there are six ammunition plants, but the two most important are in Iowa and Pennsylvania.

These factories are getting billions from the US government to increase production. It is, however, hard to push them much harder because they use out-of-date manufacturing methods and find it hard to attract workers due to rough working conditions.

These US factories are over 80 years old. It takes about three days to produce one completed shell (not counting the time it takes to produce the propellant charges and fuses, which are manufactured elsewhere).

Iowa Ammunition Plant

The Iowa Army Ammunition Plant in Middletown, near Burlington, is the largest 155mm shell producer. The facility covers more than 19,000 acres ― nearly 30 square miles. It has more than 400 buildings and a total storage capacity of 1.6 million square feet. It is owned by the Army but operated by a private company called American Ordnance LLC. Today it employs 830 civilians and around 25 military (mainly supervisory).  In the 1960s the same plant employed 13,000 workers.

A worker at the Iowa factory. Photo: DVIDS

The plant is not automated.  However, it does use some robots to carry out some of the most dangerous tasks such as moving around red hot shell billets. Otherwise the factory is much the same as it was years ago.

Scranton Ammunition Plant

The other big factory is in Scranton, Pennsylvania. That factory – built for the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad just after 1900 – has produced large-caliber ammunition for the military going back to the Korean War. It has received $120 million to expand production, but won’t reach that goal until 2025 at the earliest. It is a government-owned-contractor-operated (GOCO) operation, like the Iowa plant.

The Scranton Ammunition Plant (SCAAP) was established in 1953 and was operated by the US Hoffman Machinery Corporation until 1963, when Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation became the operating contractor. General Dynamics – Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GD-OTS) assumed operation of the facility from Chamberlain in 2006, and is the current operating contractor.

Like the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, most of the production machinery is old.  

While the Army has invested a great deal in ginning up the production of shells, it has not undertaken any real effort to update the manufacturing technology. Even DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) has not been receptive to introducing new technology to these installations.

US and NATO ammunition goal not enough for deterrence

The US Defense Department wants to ramp up 155mm shell production to 80,000 per month by 2028.  European plans are less clear: the hope is to build between 20,000 to 55,000 per month “in future.”  

The NATO production goal is based on the Ukraine war numbers.  But in case of wider warfare in Europe, or fighting elsewhere (Korean peninsula, China, Taiwan, Israel), those numbers go out the window. 

One of the amazing features of the US and its NATO allies supplying millions of tons of ammunition and hardware to Ukraine is that the allies paid almost no attention to contingencies and freely raided stockpiles that were put there for US and NATO national security defense needs.

What is true of 155mm ammunition is even more true of precision weapons whose supplies have been depleted.  If it takes 3 days to manufacture a basic 155 mm shell; it takes two years or more to produce smart weapons. 

The idea of expanding NATO to Ukraine may well have propelled the NATO partners into a far riskier future. Surely it has undermined NATO’s deterrence, something the Russians and Chinese clearly grasp.

Stephen Bryen, who served as staff director of the Near East Subcommittee of the
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a deputy undersecretary of defense
for policy, currently is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute.

This article was originally published on his Weapons and Security Substack. It is republished with kind permission.

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Lower-income families to get more help, including cash and debt clearance

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As these families have less disposable income and savings, they are more susceptible to falling into debt or arrears when faced with unexpected events like retrenchment or health issues.

Even a relatively small debt can have a severe impact on lower-income families financially, psychologically and emotionally, the ministry said.

To help these families, MSF will work with donors to fully fund a progress package that matches families’ repayments to their creditors, up to S$5,000 in debt.

This package, which can only be used once, applies to “verifiable debt”. This is debt owed to licensed companies and organisations that can be verified and for which repayments can be tracked, MSF said. Examples include utility bill arrears, hospital bills or credit card debt.

Informal debts, such as those owed to family and friends, and to unlicensed moneylenders, are not covered.

ComLink+ families will also get help to save up for a home. A progress package jointly funded by a donor and the government will match S$2 for every S$1 families contribute voluntarily to their CPF.

“This will help families save up more quickly for their flat purchase and give them a better chance of fulfilling this aspiration,” said MSF.

For this and the employment package, payouts will be limited to S$30,000 in total across the two support schemes.

With these new moves, families can receive parenting support and send their children to quality preschools in their early years, said Mr Masagos. 

Individuals who are motivated to secure a job are also supported by an ecosystem to acquire the skills they need, be matched to a suitable job and benefit from wage support, he added. 

“These moves demonstrate our community’s commitment to invest in long-term outcomes. Rather than quick fixes, we want to enable families to build resilience and secure sustained stability and self-reliance, and ultimately social mobility,” said the Social and Family Development Minister. 

“It may take a generation or more, but we know that by reinforcing families’ ability to provide their children with a good start in life today, we give them a better chance for a brighter tomorrow.” 

FAMILY COACHES, COMMUNITY PARTNERS

While there are ComLink officers who work closely with the families now, their roles will expand as family coaches.

The coaches will work with each family to develop action plans tailored to each family’s needs. They will also coach and motivate the families to achieve their goals, and act as a single point of contact to help them better navigate social support services, said MSF.

“When families feel understood and supported, they are more likely to actively participate in the decision-making process and take steps towards their goals,” said Mr Masagos. 

With support from family coaches, families have told MSF that they feel more optimistic about their future, he added. 

The ministry emphasised that the programme will be implemented with community partners. About 170 organisations and individuals are partnering Social Service Offices to support ComLink+ families.

DBS, for instance, is a package sponsor who will contribute to the CDA and CPF top-ups for the progress packages on children’s education and savings.

Another ComLink partner, Singapore Pools, will help fund part of the progress package on debt clearance. This is projected to support up to 240 families, said Mr Masagos. 

Other ComLink+ partners include companies, charity and voluntary organisations, business associations and schools.

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Russia breakup would be a China nightmare for the West

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Do names on a map matter? When they are in border territories, the answer is probably “yes.”

Earlier in 2023, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources ordered that new maps must use the former Chinese names of its lost territories in what is now Russia’s Far East. Vladivostok, home to Russia’s Pacific fleet headquarters, became Haishenwai; Sakhalin Island became Kuyedao. Then in late August, the ministry released a map that showed the disputed Russian territory of Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island within China’s borders.

These map moves come amid growing chatter and even calls in Western foreign policy circles for the disintegration of the Russian Federation into a multitude of smaller states. The thinking is, being split into smaller states would blunt Russia’s challenge to the West and its ability to carry on a war in Ukraine.

As a scholar of Russian regional identity and history, I believe the prospect of a broken-up Russia is unlikely, to say the least. But talk of Russia’s disintegration and the change in map names taps into themes worth exploring: Is there much appetite for independence in the far regions of the Russian state? And if there were to be breakaway regions in the Far East, would that be to the benefit of the West – or to China?

Rise of the ‘breakup boosters’

Those calling for, or predicting, the disintegration of the Russian Federation have grown in numbers since the start of the Ukraine war.

In the book “Failed State: A guide to Russia’s Rupture,” political scientist Janusz Bugajski argues that the territories of the Russian Federation will in time declare independence – like during the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This, he and others argue, would be good for everyone outside Russia. A rump Russian state would have “reduced capabilities to attack neighbors,” Bugajski argues.

The Washington Post’s David Ignatius has a gloomier view of Russian disintegration, writing in August that it would provide “a devil’s playground” that could pose a danger to the West.

Either way, a growing number of analysts are of a mind that, in the words of Russia scholar Alexander J Motyl, it is “time to start taking the potential disintegration of Russia seriously.”

Having worked on the history of Russian regionalism for two decades, I see serious obstacles to territories declaring independence. It is certainly true that centralized authority has been to the detriment – both economically and culturally – to some of the Russian Federation’s 83 regions.

But there is a lack of mass public support for autonomy – that is, the ability to decide local and regional matters within a larger state – let alone full-blown independence.

Not all regions in Russia are the same. In some, such as Tatarstan and Dagestan, autonomy has a genuine mass appeal.

But most Russian regions that favor greater autonomy are in locations that would make it difficult for them to declare independence outright because they would still be surrounded by the Russian Federation.

Those locations more suited to independence – say, those that have borders with neighboring countries – often face other difficulties, such as being close to China.

An industrial city is seen in the background behind a fence with Chinese writing on it.
A view of Russia, from China. Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

In Russia’s Far East, there is concern among would-be breakaways that independence could lead to the possibility of an interventionist China either taking over or at least exerting its influence.

Problems of geography

“Breakup boosters” – the term I use to describe those advocating for Russia’s disintegration – assume that regions in the Russian Federation all have aspirations for independence.

But an analysis of Russian regions by Adam Lenton of Wake Forest University found a highly variable level of support for autonomy across Russian regions.

The data shows that in many of the regions that have exiled independence leaders and are talked about as being potential breakaways, the public doesn’t support that goal.

The data shows support for autonomy rather than independence. Autonomy would make the Russian Federation a real federation.

The region with by far the most support for autonomy is Tatarstan, a subnational republic led by Turkic-speaking Tatar people 447 miles south of Moscow. But arguing that this should lead to independence makes little sense – it would be completely surrounded by a hostile Russian Federation. An independent foreign and defense policy in such circumstances would be almost impossible.

Some Tatars have themselves argued against independence on this ground.

The regions of the North Caucasus have some of the highest scores, plus a foreign border with Georgia making it potentially a better candidate for independence. But the region has a bitter experience with attempts to break away. Chechnya’s attempt at independence failed after a long and bloody war.

In Siberia, the region of Tuva has high levels of support for autonomy. But it is in China’s backyard – and this would make it geographically vulnerable.

Russia’s Far East, China’s backyard

Russia’s Far East includes the Amur region along the border with China and Vladivostok. These were taken from China by Russia during the mid-19th century when Russian general Nikolai Murav’ev-Amurskii used Russia’s greater firepower and more modern army to defeat China.

But the status of territories in the region remained contentious. In 1969, China and the Soviet Union fought a seven-month undeclared war over border issues.

After 1991, China and Russia went through several rounds of talks and treaties to ensure that the border between them was ratified by both parties, with the last treaty taking place in 2004. Even so, not all groups within China accept the results.

Textbooks in China still mention the loss of 1.5 million square kilometers to Russia and note that Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, said he would “present the bill,” meaning that Russia would have to pay what Mao perceived as the theft of territory.

The fear among some Russians – and those in the West – is that China could turn Russia’s Far East into its satellite, using it as a source of raw materials such as diamonds and gold, as well as oil and gas. And with economic hegemony comes political influence.

China faces challenges that make increasing its influence in Russia’s Far East particularly attractive now, including what experts see as a structural economic crisis and a rural education gap. Territorial expansion could provide economic growth while serving as a distraction from domestic issues.

But the breakup of the Russian Federation could also pose a security threat to China. The experience of Xinjiang serves as a warning. The region, which has been the focus of China’s persecution of the Muslim Uighur people, had twice been a breakaway region under the protection of former Soviet leader Josef Stalin.

Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party will be fearful that any unrest in areas of the Russian Federation that are close to Xinjiang might spill over.

Given all this, the argument from breakup boosters that no one, other than President Vladimir Putin, would lose if the Russian Federation disintegrated is, I believe, simply not sustainable.

RussiaFAREAST
Map: Facebook Screengrab

And rather than hastening the disintegration of the Russian Federation, polls suggest that the war in Ukraine is having a unifying effect. Many Russians who were originally against the war have become reluctant supporters of it – in part because of propaganda that has emphasized the threat from the West to Russia’s territorial integrity.

Since 2021, Russia’s military doctrine has highlighted this threat, stating that one of the main issues facing the nation was groups “aimed at violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.”

The calls in the West for the breakup of the Russian Federation might suggest to the Russian public that Putin’s territorial fears could become a reality. Moreover, dreams of a broken Russian Federation might distract those in the West from the very real problem of helping Ukraine protect its own territorial integrity.

Susan Smith-Peter is Professor of Russian history , City University of New York

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Commentary: Foxconn founder Terry Gou’s presidential candidacy may shift Taiwan’s political landscape

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THE FUTURE OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

For a sizeable segment of the Taiwanese electorate, the 2024 election significantly influences the nation’s future stance on cross-strait relations. While the election holds personal significance for Gou, his initial endorsement of the Kuomintang candidate, followed by his independent bid, accentuates the volatile nature of political allegiances and underscores the elevated significance of this presidential contest.

Despite the limited prospect of a Gou-led presidency, the potential significance of his political influence cannot be brushed aside. Securing substantial support before the election might not get him the presidency but could position him as a kingmaker. Such a position might prove instrumental in resolving any deadlock within the opposition, ensuring that Gou’s candidate clinches the presidency.

Gou’s recent campaign efforts display a shrewdness in communication strategies. It involves a play on the phonetic qualities of his Chinese name, implying the English expression of “good timing”. This manoeuvre subtly invites support, suggesting that now is the opportune moment to rally to his cause.

If this envisioned change in governance remains unfulfilled, questions arise about whether Gou’s strategic moves serve the greater good of Taiwan. Given the current state of Taiwan’s political climate, this may be the only time Gou can establish a favourable political position.

Should he drop out of the race and join the opposition party, Gou may secure a place in the new government and a strong position to pursue future political ambitions.

Aligning with opposition parties could lead to a broad coalition achieving victory in January 2024, potentially enabling a peaceful transition into a new Taiwanese administration focused on improving cross-strait relations. Amid heightened tensions with China, reopening proper dialogue channels will contribute to securing a safer climate for continued de facto Taiwanese sovereignty.

Big elections are often won on small margins. Even if Gou only commands 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the vote, this could push a coalition partner to victory. It will all come down to whether Gou can settle for being the kingmaker, or if he truly believes he can become the king.

Dennis LC Weng is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sam Houston State University and Founding Chief Executive Officer of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Institute. Jared Jeter is a master’s student at National Chengchi University and Research Associate at the Asia Pacific Peace Research Institute. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Turkey’s Erdogan in a realpolitik flip-flop on Gaza

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pulled his ambassador from Israel on November 4, 2023. Less than a month earlier, he was offering diplomatic assistance to calm the situation in the Middle East.

That diplomatic shift is indicative of how in just a few short weeks, Turkey has recalibrated its stance on the escalating violence in Israel and the Gaza Strip.

Erdogan’s initial reaction following the October 7 Hamas-led massacre in Israel was a carefully balanced one, calling for restraint and an end to “aggressive acts.” But amid an escalating death toll in Gaza, he quickly tilted toward a pro-Hamas and seemingly anti-Israel position.

By October 25, the Turkish leader was accusing Israel of “one of the bloodiest and most savage attacks in history,” while defending Hamas as a “liberation group.”

As an expert on Turkish politics and international affairs, I believe Erdogan’s evolving rhetoric cannot be understood without considering the domestic and international constraints surrounding Turkey’s leader.

In responding to the crisis in the Middle East, Erdogan faces a significant dilemma: He needs to appease his political base at home – which has Islamist, strong pro-Palestinian sympathies – while not totally alienating Israel, with whom Turkey has significant geopolitical and economic ties and, until now, warming relations.

At the same time, Erdogan is eyeing an opportunity to project himself as a key regional player in Middle East politics – and a potential mediator in the current crisis. And to understand how he intends to do all this, you need to look beyond rhetoric and diplomatic gestures alone.

Politics vs realpolitik

Erdogan’s reaction to the conflict reflects an attempt to strike a balance between two forces: domestic politics and realpolitik on the international stage.

Since the renewal of conflict in Gaza, Erdogan has faced pressure from various quarters in Turkey. His initial response drew extensive ire among the country’s Islamist circles, who have long shared deep sympathy for Hamas – leading members of whom Turkey has been offering a safe harbor.

Ahmet Davutoglu, formerly a prime minister and a minister of foreign affairs under Erdogan, condemned the Turkish president for hesitance and called on him to align with his Islamist base. Leaders of other Islamist parties and Erdogan coalition partner Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party, likewise called on the government for a stronger anti-Israeli positioning.

Growing anti-Israeli sentiment in the international arena also encouraged Erdogan to take an openly pro-Hamas stance. On October 26, 120 countries in the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution calling for an “immediate, durable, and sustained humanitarian truce.”

Meanwhile, protests on the streets of Western capitals have put further pressure on governments there to soften support for Israel. They have also facilitated Erdogan’s repositioning.

Erdogan is aware that his criticism can’t go too far and risk a complete severing of ties with Tel Aviv. Israel is an important partner for Turkey. The two countries have seen growing trade relations, with Turkish exports to Israel doubling from 2017 to 2022.

This includes extensive arms trade, with Israeli and Turkish arms producers seeing the highest growth in weapons sales worldwide in 2021.

Two men in suits and red ties sit at a table.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meet in New York on September 19, 2023 – days before the Hamas attack. Photo: Anadolu Agency via Getty Images / Handout / Murat Cetinmuhurdar / The Conversation

Meanwhile, regional geopolitical dynamics have shifted to put Israel and Turkey in greater alignments. Recently, the Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh conflict has drawn Ankara and Tel-Aviv closer – with both backing the Azerbaijani government with weapons.

And in its own fight against Kurdish separatists, Turkey deployed Israeli surveillance drones in the late 1990s and 2000s before developing its own drones.

Erdogan as peacemaker?

There is another critical factor at play as Erdogan’s stance has developed. From the beginning of the crisis, Erdogan has sought to assert himself as a mediator.

To that end, he has held talks with regional leaders in which he signaled an intention to act as a peace broker. Senior Turkish officials have also revealed negotiation attempts over hostages being held in Gaza by Hamas.

This approach echoes Erdogan’s strategy in Ukraine, where he likewise put himself forward as a potential mediator.

In some ways, the challenges of balancing these domestic and regional concerns is what makes Erdogan uniquely suited as a potential mediator: He has maintained ties with Hamas while also recently deepening a relationship with Israel.

But for Erdogan to pull off the role of mediator, he will need to manage those links well. Initial proposals for Turkish mediation over the crisis were reportedly turned down by Hamas.

If Erdogan’s harsher rhetoric on Israel was aimed at alluring Hamas to a negotiation table, then there is a case to be made that he went too far. Calling Hamas a freedom-fighting group and accusing Israel of war crimes in Gaza has harmed relations with Israel. It may be the case that Erdogan may have already squandered the opportunity for an arbitrator role.

But go beyond the words and you see something else at play. While talking tough on Israel, Erdogan has taken concrete steps to prevent a complete souring of strained relations with the West and Israel.

On October 23, he signed Sweden’s NATO accession protocol, increasing the hopes for an end to an at-times tense standoff between Turkey and its NATO allies. On the same day, Turkish law enforcement arrested 33 ISIS members in Ankara, potentially to preempt Western criticism for Erdogan’s support of radical Islamist networks.

Meanwhile, Turkish media circulated reports of Hamas leadership leaving Turkey around the same time.

Notable too is what Turkey hasn’t done. It hasn’t tried to stop shipments of Azeri oil through Turkey to Israel, and continues to allows the US to use its Incirlik Air Base in Turkey despite increasing public pressure. Police had to disperse pro-Palestine crowds intending to storm the base on November 5.

Becoming unbalanced?

This may explain the relatively muted reaction by Washington and Tel Aviv thus far to Erdogan’s statements. The US Department of Treasury was content with sanctioning a few Turkish entities for trade links to Hamas.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Ankara as part of his recent Middle East trip, and US administration officials have been at pains to stress Turkey’s value as an ally despite disagreements over Erdogan’s comments on Hamas.

Israel responded to those remarks by pulling its diplomatic mission back to Tel Aviv, prompting reciprocal moves from Turkey.

But there are reports that the tit-for-tat was more for appearances and that Israeli diplomats had already been recalled out of concern for their safety.

In fact, there are reasons to suggest that Erdogan’s strategy is working – despite the shift in tone, Ankara has kept its communication channels open with both Israel and Hamas throughout the crisis.

But balancing domestic support for Hamas and geopolitical reliance on Israel means walking a very fine line for Erdogan – and some of his most recent statements suggest he is beginning to teeter.

Ozgur Ozkan is Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher School’s Russia and Eurasia Program, Tufts University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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