China holds more trade war cards than Trump thinks – Asia Times
There was one notable exceptions to Donald Trump’s pivotal decision to impose eye-watering levies on trading partners around the world.
While the rest of the world may be given a 90-day relief on more responsibilities beyond the new 10 % taxes on all US business associates, China would think the squash even more. Trump increased the Chinese goods price to 12 % on April 9, 2025.
According to Trump, the decision was motivated by Beijing’s “lack of regard for international markets.” But the US senator may well have been smarting from Beijing’s apparent determination to fight US tariffs head-on.
Beijing took a different tack than some nations, choosing to favor negotiation and dialogue over Trump’s now-delayed mutual tariff increases. It immediately and steadfastly reacted.
On April 11, China dismissed Trump’s moves as a” joke” and raised its own tariff against the US to 125 %. Trump after raised his tariffs on China to 145 % in reprisal before granting an exemption for some devices.
The two markets are currently tangled up in a massive, high-intensity industry conflict. And China is showing no signs of backing over.
And I wouldn’t expect China to, as an analyst on US-China relationships. China now has much more leverage than the first US-China business war during Trump’s first word, when Beijing eagerly sought a deal with the US.
However, Beijing believes it can wreak at least as much harm on the US as evil opposite, while at the same time expanding its international location.
A modified mathematics for China
There is no denying that China’s export-focused companies, particularly those in coastal regions, are subject to severe tariff consequences for American consumers.

However, a number of actual financial factors have considerably altered Beijing’s math since Trump initially increased tariffs on China in 2018.
Critically, the importance of the US business to China’s export-driven market has declined considerably. US-bound export made up 19.8 % of China’s full imports in 2018, the first trade war started.
That percentage had dropped to 12.8 % in 2023. The tariffs perhaps more enable China to expand its “domestic need development” strategy, unleashing the spending power of its consumers and strengthening its local economy.
China entered the 2018 trade war during a period of robust economic growth, but the current situation is completely different. The Chinese economy is experiencing a persistent slowdown due to the slowness of the real estate markets, capital flight, and Western “decoupling.”
Perhaps counterintuitively, this prolonged downturn may have made the Chinese economy more resilient to shocks. Even prior to the impact of Trump’s tariffs, it has pushed businesses and policymakers to take into account the already harsh economic realities.
Trump’s tariffs on China may also give Beijing a useful external scapegoat, allowing it to spread the blame for US aggression and win over public opinion.
China also understands that the US cannot easily replace its dependency on Chinese goods, particularly through its supply chains. Although China’s direct US imports have decreased, many products now coming from third countries still rely on Chinese-made components or raw materials.
By 2022, China was almost four times as dependent on China as of the same time, compared to the same period in which China was almost four times as dependent.
There’s a related public opinion calculation: Rising tariffs are expected to drive up prices, something that could stir discontent among American consumers, particularly blue-collar voters. Beijing, in fact, thinks that Trump’s tariffs could cause the country’s otherwise robust economy to recede.

Potent tools for reprisal
China also has a number of strategic tools to use retaliation against the US in addition to the altered economic environments. It dominates the global rare earth supply chain – critical to military and high-tech industries – supplying roughly 72 % of US rare earth imports, by some estimates.
On April 9, China added 12 American companies to its list of countries that are subject to export control on March 4. Many US high-tech companies or US defense contractors rely on rare earth elements in their products.
China also retains the ability to target key US agricultural export sectors such as poultry and soybeans – industries heavily dependent on Chinese demand and concentrated in Republican-leaning states.
About 5 % of US exports of poultry and soybeans are made up of China. Beijing revoked import authorizations for three significant U.S. soybean exporters on March 4.
And on the tech side, many US companies – such as Apple and Tesla – remain deeply tied to Chinese manufacturing. Tariffs threaten to significantly lower their profit margins, which Beijing believes can be used as a leverage against the Trump administration. Beijing is reportedly planning to retaliate by imposing regulations on US businesses operating in China.
Meanwhile, the fact that Elon Musk, a senior Trump insider who has clashed with US trade adviser Peter Navarro against tariffs, has major business interests in China is a particularly strong wedge that Beijing could yet exploit in an attempt to divide the Trump administration.

A strategic opening for China?
Beijing believes it can withstand Trump’s significant tariffs on a bilateral basis, but it also believes that the US broadside against its own trading partners has given rise to a generational strategic opportunity to replace American hegemony.
This shift may have a significant impact on East Asia’s geopolitical landscape. Already on March 30 – after Trump had first raised tariffs on Beijing – China, Japan and South Korea hosted their first economic dialogue in five years and pledged to advance a trilateral free trade agreement.
Given how diligently the US worked under the Biden administration to combat regional influence from China, the move was especially remarkable. Trump’s actions, in Beijing’s opinion, give the US a chance to directly erode its influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Similar to how Trump’s severe tariffs on Southeast Asian nations, which were a significant strategic regional priority during the Biden administration, may aggravate those nations ‘ relationship with China.
Chinese state media announced on April 11 that President Xi Jinping will pay state visits to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia from April 14-18, aiming to deepen “all-round cooperation” with neighboring countries.
Notably, the Trump administration targeted all three Southeast Asian countries with their now-paused reciprocal tariffs, which included 49 % on Cambodian goods, 46 % on Vietnamese exports, and 24 % on Malaysian products.
Farther away from China lies an even more promising strategic opportunity. Trump’s tariff plan has already prompted China and European Union officials to consider strengthening their own, previously strained trade ties, which might sour the transatlantic alliance that had been trying to break up with China.
On April 8, the European Commission president spoke with China’s premier to discuss trade protectionionism in which both sides jointly condemned US trade protectionism and supported free and open trade.
Coincidentally, on April 9, the day China raised tariffs on US goods to 84 %, the EU also announced its first wave of retaliatory measures – imposing a 25 % tariff on selected US imports worth over 20 billion euros– but delayed implementation following Trump’s 90-day pause.
Officials from the EU and China are currently negotiating with each other over the current trade barriers and considering holding a full-fledged summit in China in July.
China also believes that Trump’s tariffs could potentially affect the US dollar’s reputation abroad. Widespread tariffs imposed on multiple countries have shaken investor confidence in the US economy, contributing to a decline in the dollar’s value.
The dollar and US Treasury bonds have traditionally been viewed as haven assets, but recent market turmoil has questioned that status. Soaring tariffs have also undermined investor confidence in both the US economy and US Treasurys, raising questions about the viability of the country’s economy and the sustainability of its debt.
While Trump’s tariffs will inevitably hurt parts of the Chinese economy, Beijing appears to have far more cards to play this time around. It has the means to seriously harm US interests, and Trump’s comprehensive tariff war offers China a rare and unexploited strategic opportunity.
Auburn University’s PhD candidate in political science is Linggong Kong.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.