Resolution 68: real reform or elite buffer in Vietnam? – Asia Times

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Some Asian businesspeople have praised the Vietnamese Communist Party’s statement of Resolution 68 as a significant step toward ensuring good competition, ensuring good competition, and codifying lawful precepts.

Crucially, those constitutional changes include a ban on voluntary law enforcement, a preference for legal remedies over criminal penalties, and the presumption of innocence. All of these are essential to the operation of a current market supported by the rule of law.

But beneath that business enthusiasm lies a crucial question: Is this a headless, pretended-to-be-real liberation for all secret business, or is it merely a headless, Marxist Party-connected, and wealthy?

Resolution 68, which was announced earlier this month, did not emerge in a womb. The” Views on Promoting Development and Growth of the Private Economy” were released by the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council in July 2023.

That statement was made at a gentle time when China’s financial engines were slipping under the weight. After massive reprisals on large, privately held tech firms like Alibaba, firm confidence had deteriorated.

The Taiwanese government changed its position, highlighting the significance of the private sector to the region’s push for development, after acknowledging that a stifling regulatory burden and social uncertainty were stifling private-sector dynamism.

China’s record from 2023 aimed to rekindle confidence and stability, but it also signaled that the Communist Party was attempting to maintain a strong hold on the market.

By 2025, Vietnam’s monetary flood had also changed. Nguyen Phu Trong’s dying in 2024 and To Lam To Party’s arrival marked a significant shift in Vietnam’s management structure and outlook.

However, Vietnam’s private sector expanded rapidly but faced long-standing challenges, including limited resources, legal uncertainty, and fragile business confidence, partly as a result of the government’s crackdown on supposedly corrupt politicians and businesses.

Foreign literature

Resolution 68 draws heavily from China’s handbook, praises the importance of the private sector, and offers a more business-friendly culture. However, Vietnam’s version goes yet further, promising a stronger legitimate weapon than China’s.

Article 11 of China’s 2023 report makes explicit recommendations for preventing inside corruption and makes acts like misappropriation and bribery illegal. Additionally, it highlights efforts to improve Party operations in private companies and confirms the premise that all companies must operate in accordance with Party principles.

In addition, Vietnam’s Resolution 68 urges private firms to uphold business ethics, morality, and social responsibility. However, in Vietnam, corruption is seen as a two-way road, and it is imperative that people officials stop extorting and destroying private companies.

In this double messaging, the state is both an enforcer and a partner, aiming to promote both a private-led growth and a regulatory framework. The main issue between the two guidelines, however, is how they handle legal challenges.

China’s record promises to stop unnecessary interference with business during legal proceedings. It emphasizes “protecting the property rights and interests of private companies and businesses in accordance with the law” and vows to stop overreach through broad property freezes or arbitrary protection.

However, it falls short of removing the possibility of legal trial. Owing process and proportionality are important, but legal liability persists when determined.

The Vietnami Resolution 68 is more ambitious. Part 2.3 states:

  • Civil, financial, and managerial measures should be used to address both civil and economic violations.
  • Legal actions should be totally avoided where the law permits both legal and non-criminal management.
  • Remediation should be prioritized and seriously weighed in lawful decisions, even when prosecution is required.
  • It is against the law to engage in voluntary business injury.
  • And the idea of ignorance is vehemently promoted.

This is not a gentle shifting. Vietnam’s record not only tries to minimize legitimate disturbance, but it also makes criminal sanctions a last resort even in situations where legal results are uncertain.

Transformation for whom?

These principles appear to be in line with international standards for consistency and proportion. A good legal method emphasizes civil rights and the protection of the presumption of innocence.

However, Vietnam’s political-business climate muddies the lakes. In an atmosphere also fueled by wealthy record and favoritism, these legal protections may still offer concern and better protection to effective state or state-linked conglomerates. Even if these reforms lead to a more level playing field for small and medium enterprises.

The new constitutional shield may eventually remain out of reach for many businesses unless you are one of the key players with political connections.

Moreover, overprotecting big businesses presents systemic risks. Protecting these businesses from total legal scrutiny creates moral hazard, or worse. If these megacorporations fail, the condition could be forced to participate in cheap bailouts, destabilizing the entire economic system in a” also big to fail” scenario.

Vietnam, one of the top” China 1″ destinations for global manufacturers, is already attracting international investors ‘ attention for its commitment to stability and predictability.

Resolution 68’s pro-business claims may lessen worries for home businesses, but international investors, especially those who are conscious of China’s decades-long trend, may remain closely monitoring how it’s carried out. Even if the outlook for short-term mood improves, any overt defence of aristocracy interests may undermine confidence in Vietnam’s long-term legal standing.

By any standard, Resolution 68 is a brave decision. It promises to reduce bureaucracy, guard home rights, and modify the legal system in ways that are more suitable for contemporary Vietnam.

However, Vietnam’s solid pro-business stance raises an obvious question: Is this the start of real legitimate reform or is it just a cunning way to protect the connected while appearing present and pro-business to the outside world?

Vietnam’s entrepreneurs and foreign observers should tread carefully when predicting whether this most recent wave of reforms actually level the playing field or just strengthen the system’s existing ones and hierarchies.

Leo Tran writes about global strategy, trade, and international affairs. His writing has appeared in The Diplomat, Kyiv Post, and Modern Diplomacy. He also writes for Vietnam Decoded.

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Third World needs to ditch the ‘Diplomacy of Non’ – Asia Times

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The first half of the Cold War period marked the emergence of an alternative diplomatic paradigm, one defined not by explicit ideological allegiance but by strategic detachment from the bipolar power struggle.

The principles of non-interference, non-intervention and non-alignment became the hallmarks of what could be termed the “Diplomacy of Non.” However, this agenda was not a construct in itself but rather a counter-construct against Western hegemony and, more broadly, against any external imposition on newly independent states.

The roots of this approach were not solely based on anti-imperialist fears; they also reflected the sheer diversity of post-colonial nations, many of whom found it impossible to reach a consensus on political and economic models. Thereby, it received mutual recognition from democratic India to Communist China and many countries in between.

Despite the inherent differences among post-colonial states, this approach secured widespread acceptance. It provided a framework for newly established nations to navigate international affairs without being drawn into the Cold War binary.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 was a defining moment, where countries from Asia and Africa consolidated their commitment to non-alignment, reinforcing sovereignty as the bedrock of their international engagement. This consensus allowed weaker states to resist coercion, at least rhetorically, and to assert their right to self-determination in an era of geopolitical turbulence.

Yet, the most vocal champions of this vision, India and China, often contradicted their own advocacy. India, while positioning itself as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), engaged in interventions within its neighborhood, such as in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971 and Sri Lanka in the 1980s.

China, too, pursued interventionist policies, most notably in the Korean War and Vietnam. The contradiction lay in the fact that while both nations rhetorically upheld non-interference, they strategically wielded power in their respective regions.

The claims about neutrality could not survive their contradiction with realpolitik. Therefore, New Delhi itself aligned with the Soviet Union, while Beijing shifted towards Washington after a split with Moscow in the early 1970s.

By the second half of the Cold War, the general orientation of the post-colonial states that concealed their sympathy for the anti-Western Soviet Union by the rhetoric of non-alignment looked West. Suharto’s Indonesia and Sadat’s Egypt are clear examples.

These divisions undermined the “third world” consensus, reaching a Western-dominated unipolar moment where most of the world embraced neo-liberal globalization, albeit with muted resentment.

Liberal exhaustion and resurgence of “Non”

On the other side, the victorious West exhausted its liberal rhetoric and took this acceptance as an unlimited mandate. The disillusionment with liberal interventionism grew in the aftermath of military invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Plus, the failure of the Arab uprisings and the strategic exposure faced later by successful democratic movements in Ukraine, Armenia, and lately Sudan revealed the vulnerabilities of any political transition.

Adding to that, the war in Gaza and the unshakable support from Biden’s administration, along with the morally oriented European Union, eroded the credibility of liberal internationalism.

Eventually, the liberal consensus lost its relevance to realpolitik and its inherent contradictions, not to some authoritarian conspiracy, as Biden once claimed.

Even within the United States, segments of the political right lament the removal of figures like Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi with a growing appreciation for stability over chaos caused by elusive democratization.

Prominent MAGA figures today feel ideologically closer to Putin than the American liberal establishment. With Donald Trump openly dismissing democracy promotion and human rights as core tenets of US foreign policy, the moral justification for interference has faded.

His administration’s rhetoric frequently ridicules concerns over women’s rights in Afghanistan, political prisoners and other liberal values that once served as a cornerstone of Western diplomacy. This shift signals that the US is no longer willing to expend political or military capital on interventions cloaked in democratic ideals.

However, this does not imply that the US has adopted full military passivism. The ongoing military escalation in Yemen, along with provocative statements about taking over Canada and Greenland, suggests a turn towards a more overt realpolitik.

Rather than interventions framed in liberal discourse, future US military actions are likely to be driven by stark strategic calculations, untethered from normative justifications.

The US version of the “Diplomacy of Non” will refrain from intervening, not generally but only in its global peers’ sphere of influence. This can pave the way to better coexistence among great powers in a multipolar world, but it will not result in a “global order.”

Emerging powers and rule-making initiative

As global power dynamics shift, the “Diplomacy of Non” cannot be sustainable. India has gradually positioned itself as a middle power, engaging in strategic partnerships and military alliances, while China has emerged as a global power with expanding economic and security footprints.

The very tenets of non-alignment that once shielded these nations from entanglement now appear less viable as they assume more proactive roles in global governance and regional security.

In this evolving environment, the old order has unraveled, dismantling both its fair and unfair rules. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity for emerging powers. The passive nature of the “Diplomacy of Non”, while historically useful, is no longer sufficient in an era of uncertainty.

A constructive agenda is needed, one that moves beyond mere resistance to Western dominance and towards proactive rule-making. This is now more urgent than ever since the West has lost its ideological consensus, which has been contorted enough that it is unlikely to come back soon.

If emerging powers wish to shape the new world order rather than merely react to it, they must lay down new rules that reflect contemporary geopolitical realities and push towards stability and development.

Islam Alhalawany is a Beijing-based international affairs researcher and policy consultant. He is a Chevening Scholar with a master’s degree in development and international business from Queen Mary University of London.

Islam previously served as an assistant professor of practice and assistant dean for international collaborations at Jindal Global University in India. He worked as a senior research analyst at Standard & Poor’s (S&P) in London and for the Egyptian government through research posts in Cabinet-affiliated think tanks.

His work has been published by renowned think tanks, including the Atlantic Council, The National Interest, the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore and IDSC.

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Trump’s speech at Tokyo press club 32 years ago proved prophetic – Asia Times

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Donald Trump, the US president, announced a plan of reciprocal taxes in April, claiming that Americans had been taken advantage of by” fakers” and “pillaged” by foreigners. Since then, property markets around the world have plummeted, and worry has spread that Trump’s techniques will cause a slowdown that risks bringing down the structure of business that has been in place since the end of World War II.

The Financial Times and the&nbsp soon caused a strong reaction, with the&nbsp calling Trump’s actions “utter insanity” and” an act of war against the entire world.” Trump is now regarded as one of the world’s most overbearing and uncertain officials.

The library of the Foreign Correspondents ‘ Club of Japan contains a beautiful lighthouse that puts lighting on Trump’s unexpected behavior. This is an audio recording of Trump, who traveled to Japan 32 centuries ago as a business but not as a politician.

Trump attended a media luncheon at the FCCJ on August 18, 1993, while visiting Tokyo, which was the Yurakucho Denki Building at the time. He was in the method of discussing different business enterprises such as real property and games, but instantly changed the subject to the business disparity between Japan and the United States. In his opinion, “morons” had been used to represent America during past US-Japan business negotiations. He stated:

I think the Chinese diplomats have done one of the wonderful tap-tap-taps always. That’s kicking off the conversation, giving absolutely nothing, and making the American idiots say,” Thank you.”

The US was demanding the beginning of industries like cars, electronics, and supercomputers because the country had a significant trade imbalance with Japan at the time. Dissatisfied with the gradual development of the conversations, Trump singled out Carla Hills, &nbsp, the US deal agent under President George HW Bush, for condemnation:

Carla Hills said that we must realize that it takes time, but it really doesn’t take time when I look at the job that she did. It doesn’t take much time at all. Free business doesn’t get day. You can’t relax for four or eight years without experiencing free deal.

He continued:

The Chinese friends I’ve seen over the last few times– and they’re really great friends – they themselves grin at the foolishness of my state. They laugh because they all recognize what I ‘m&nbsp, right? They claim I’m correct, but they’re correct.

There was a portentousness to Trump’s notes. &nbsp,

On September 2, 1987, Trump had published an open letter in big American publications, including the New York Times&nbsp, and the Washington Post, six years prior to his press conference in Tokyo. The email sharply criticized Japan and other countries for taking advantage of the US over the previous years:

As we defend the Persian Gulf, an area of only marginal value for the United States ‘ crude materials but on which Japan and other countries are almost entirely dependent, the story continues unabated. Why don’t these countries compensate the United States for the billions of dollars we are losing to protect their and their passions?

The earth is laughing at America’s officials as we protect boats we don’t possess, carrying petrol we don’t want, destined for allies who didn’t help.

From this viewpoint, we can see that Trump’s view was developed in the late 1980s or early 1990s, and that the speech he uses currently has no significantly altered. In other words, he is also residing in the world of 1993. &nbsp,

Trump’s rage toward the US government for no quickly resolving Japan’s enormous trade deficit with the US, at a time when Japan was the second-largest economy in the world, can be attributed to his position. And Trump’s intention was to use the mutual tariffs to combat the business imbalance, which he announced last month. &nbsp,

The impact of 1993 is what is crucial here.

The Berlin Wall fell only four years prior, tearing down the Iron Curtain that had divided Europe since World War II. In December 1991, the Soviet Union had collapsed. After being defeated, communism was suddenly over, and it could be anticipated that Western-style democracy and capitalism would soon become practiced everywhere. Americans had a sense of hope and awe among others.

Unfortunately, Trump was confronting several challenges to his organizations at the time.

Trump had expanded his business empire into hotels, games, and an airport in the 1980s, but he ended up with enormous bills. One of those businesses, Trump Shuttle, operated a flight that connected Boston to New York, Washington, DC, and Washington, DC. But, after Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, gas prices surged and customer need dropped, while expenses of running an aircraft soared. Trump later sold it to a rival.

He told investigators at the FCCJ,” This is what I’m doing.

I was unhappy in going into a really horrible company, something called the flight business. Have any of you worked for an flight? I’ll show you that this is the worst company ever.

President Bush marshaled the US-led foreign troops, attacking Iraq and effectively free Kuwait. Trump, however, referred to the first Gulf War as a” shame”:

Nothing is aware of the true cost that the United States incurred during this conflict. Anyone knows. And we received no fair compensation for it. And we were dumb.

Ironically, Trump has agreed on a package with Ukraine for its material assets, which he described as payment for military support the&nbsp, US&nbsp, had provided to Kyiv since Russia launched its full-scale war in February 2022. Given the trauma and significant harm the Gulf War had caused to Trump’s organization, it may seem like a crazy idea at first glance. However, it is natural.

Another crucial factor in knowing Trump was fidelity, which was revealed at the FCCJ press event. He looked up on the day when his company struggled in the 1990s, and compared it to battle:

When you engage in a battle, you learn stuff about who is dedicated and who is not. You discover who your friends are, but the truth is that you can’t really tell. I wish I may say that anyone with golden locks or black hair or black skin or mild skin was devoted. But that’s just how it works. People I would have bet the ranch on ruined my life, please excuse me for the phrase.

He added:

I say that I’d like to be in trouble at some point in my life so that I can determine who will be loyal and who will not be. You do learn a lot about loyalty, I suppose. And I think it’s a very important word.

Trump has kept his word and appointed people to cabinet positions based on their loyalty. Additionally, he demands that anyone who wants to work for the government be given loyalty checks. To Trump, loyalty is everything.

Loyalty may be the answer to everything, but irony was in his circumstances. Investors in Hong Kong and Japan were the people who fervently backed Trump when he was trying to get out of a difficult business situation. At the FCCJ, he said this about his supporters:

Both Japan and Hong Kong make up our largest customer base. And I just want to thank so many of them for sticking with me. They did buy my&nbsp, products. They did visit my casino and, perhaps most importantly, negotiate deals with me on casino bonds.

Yet Trump made the announcement to impose reciprocal tariffs on Japan, one of his main supporters, last month. Unfortunately, it appears that those who were loyal to Trump were not treated with reciprocation.

We have a lot of insight from Trump’s Tokyo press conference 32 years ago, as well as the principles that govern his behavior. In terms of foreign affairs, defense, the economy, and personnel, those remarks remain completely consistent with his current actions and policies. They might even be said to have been prophetic. In that regard, Trump’s words and actions have always been consistent. &nbsp,

His speech contained only one remark that could be regarded as contradictory. If Trump had continued to follow his words with the same conviction, he might have altered both the history of the United States and the world as well.

He stated to his Tokyo audience,” I’m not running for office. &nbsp, Who cares if I’m politically correct”?

Writer Eiichiro Tokumoto was born and raised in Tokyo.

The FCCJ’s Number 1 Shimbun published this article at the beginning. It is republished with permission, updated to reflect the fact that the Ukraine minerals deal has been agreed upon.

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Trump’s broken and flawed trade war algorithm – Asia Times

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There was a time when US politics was conducted across mahogany furniture, national security disputes were spelled out in full sentences, and political decisions were filtered through experienced institutions.

With the next coming of Donald J. Trump, who no longer serves as a head of state but instead functions as a market-reactive process, that period is over. The US president has so evolved into a contentious, screen-driven experiment in governance on impulse.

The global business serves as a guarantee, never policymaking.

The engine is Trump, and the engine that is Trump has been broken. According to what they are supposed to be, systems are meant to be precise sets of rules that produce predictable results. Trump, nevertheless, has absorbed the variety and expanded the function. &nbsp,

His presidency also usually acts as a faulty trading bot, unable to have the balance or reasoning of an AI model but sensitive to Dow, Nasdaq, VIX, and Treasury yield fluctuations.

His affected taxes vanish when the Nasdaq drops. Trade war risks are dialed up when bond provides soar. A spike in the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX ) signals a change in foreign policy rather than market instability. This is not management; rather, it is a nervous, jerky-response machine.

Trump’s sudden 90-day tax reprieve for some Chinese tech exports vividly illustrated this new reality. The choice wasn’t the result of any high-level discussion with Beijing or a resuscitation of multilateralism.

Instead, it was a Nasdaq-driven stress reaction to rising equity prices for US tech companies. The industry did not rule the markets, but the industry did.

This new computational uncertainty has paralyzed regional planning in Southeast Asia. As if US policy then follows a straight path, officials and technocrats in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Manila are also putting together actions to Trump’s statement of” Liberation Day” taxes. &nbsp,

However, Trump’s administration no more adheres to timelines or philosophy. It moves using mood figures and uncertainty ticks. And this novel disconnect has the potential to be fatal for commerce and industry in the area.

A Trump tariff on Chinese goods from today might unintentionally hurt Indonesian middle exporters tomorrow. If those manufacturers pivot, they might discover that the price has been eliminated the following month, leaving them vulnerable and cash-strapped.

A week later in Trump World, Thai companies who have their supply chains modified to favour US customers may find their opportunities reversed.

Trump’s flawed algorithm has so stalled investments, stifled planning, and weakened confidence. No creative destruction has emerged, but strategic paralysis has spread far and wide.

China is adapting to this jumbled, disorganized new fact, and it is demonstrating that it no longer desires coherence from Washington. China is instead constructing firewalls by strengthening its tech ecosystem, expanding bilateral yuan settlements, and enhancing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP ). Beijing is hedging against US vacuity as well as US punishment.

That’s because the Trump 2.0 management plays a volatile role rather than a proper one. And volatility players don’t bargain; they react. They don’t act, they say.

This is real-time trading, no diplomacy. The engine tightens its hold with each uneven move. &nbsp,

Without readjusting their objectives, ASEAN people may find themselves reacting both late and incorrectly. Because friends and foes are lumped and axed up, Trump’s trade policy is a simplistic crossbow without a specific goal. &nbsp,

It has evolved into a form of” hammer diplomacy,” which is brutal, conservative, and destructive. Taxes are outbursts, not calibrated tools. And the harm they cause is system-wide confusion and chaos, not just precise discomfort.

Even when exceptions are granted, they arrive too late because the damage to confidence and supply chain integrity has already been done. Not as a buying partner has America lost its credibility, but rather because of instability.

Unfortunately, Trump is now under the control of the world’s economic rulers, who railed against them. Every tax tilt is dictated by the bond business. His administration is now being scripted in real-time using the same methods he sought to stop.

One needs to start reading market indicators instead of communiqués in order to predict the upcoming Trump decision. Is the offer on 10-year Bank increasing? Prepare for tax suspensions.

Does the Nasdaq increase as a result of device property rebounding? Believe sanctions for Chinese technology. Is the VI on the rise? Watch out for fresh, unpredictable White House communications, most likely via Truth Social.

These measures no longer serve as financial sidebars. They are US international policy. What Trump has created is more than just another charade: it is a brand-new governing system, an aggressive, wacky, and extremely unbound by legislation or strategy.

It moves at the frequency of sentiment, and a slow-moving disaster will result in the same kind of political fallout. But despite its length, it wields a lot of power—not through reason, but rather by emotion. Not through politics, but through momentum.

The most effective note on White House letterhead doesn’t appear on letterhead in this modern era; it appears on trading screens instead. That is the computational presidency’s rule. It doesn’t need to consider. It simply needs to keep reacting while making the world sigh in disbelief.

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US foreign student purge an exercise in economic self-destruction – Asia Times

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The Trump administration terminated the emigration positions of thousands of foreign individuals listed in a government database in early April 2025, resulting in their no more having legal authority to study in the nation. Some individuals choose to self-deport rather than face deportation.

After authorities across the country determined they did not have significance, the US Department of Homeland Security just announced that it would change the pregnancies.

The White House is attempting to improve monitoring and assessing of all foreign citizens as a result of these actions. In March, the State Department made the announcement that it would review foreign individuals ‘ social media accounts using artificial intelligence.

I am aware that international individuals in the US have long been subject to a higher standard of testing, monitoring, and assessing as an administrator and researcher with a focus on international higher education.

Addition of government to present procedures may make the US a less desirable study location. In the end, I think this would ultimately prevent the Trump administration from achieving its” America Initially” objectives in terms of business, systems, and national security.

US learners from abroad

The US has much been the top destination for foreign students abroad. However, as other nations, such as Germany and South Korea, implement strategies for attracting foreign training, competition for these individuals is growing.

According to the Institute of International Education, the US is home to 16 % of students who study abroad, down from 22 % in 2014 and 28 % in 2001. In the US, there were more than 1 million foreign students studying in the academic year of 2023-2024, of which only 4 % were from China and India.

Most foreign students pursue graduate degrees in STEM disciplines like science, technology, architecture, and mathematics. Additionally, the National Science Foundation estimates that international students account for a sizable percentage of admission at the master’s and doctoral amounts.

How are foreign individuals evaluated?

US learners from abroad are already subjected to intense screening and continuous monitoring. These measures include:

• observing the child’s academic institution. International students may be admitted to a university that is approved by the Department of Homeland Security before they can apply for a student visa.

• Visiting the official for security. International individuals are subject to federal safety reviews conducted by various intelligence and law enforcement organizations as part of the card application process. More screenings take place in some situations, such as when a US judicial official in their home country decides that more information is needed from outside sources to establish visa eligibility. That is accomplished through a procedure known as operational control.

• Opening security checked. International students are rescreened by a US Customs and Border Protection agent when they arrive in the country. The student is transported to extra observation, a safe meeting area where the student waits while the officers perfect more assessment, if the officer is unable to confirm any information. The scholar is therefore both denied entry to the US or forced to leave.

• Continued monitoring while students are resident of the US If allowed to enter, students may participate full-time, achieve high academic standing, and notify their school within ten days of significant changes in their circumstances.

For instance, they might change their target, key, or financial sponsor. Additionally, college administrators are required to submit this information to the National Security Investigations Division of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Student and Exchange Visitor Program.

Students who take part in temporary, postgraduate training may continue to follow reporting standards. Additionally, some STEM alumni and their companies are subject to additional demands. They include monthly evaluations, site visits, and certification of coaching plans.

Current research indicates that the majority of foreign individuals prefer to study in the US. However, as other nations adopt nicer immigration policies, such as more versatile post-study job opportunities and lower visa costs, they are willing to alter their preferences.

It is unclear how additional steps would increase benefit given the current level of testing and monitoring that are currently being implemented in the US on foreign students.

crucial to the” America First” plan

The” America First” plan of President Donald Trump aims to expand the US market. Additionally, it intends to strengthen US authority in science and technology and strengthen security.

The importance of recruiting leading international expertise has been highlighted by Trump administration leaders. Additionally, Trump has stated that a green card may be presented with a degree to international students who have attended US universities.

International students contributed$ 43.8 billion to the US market through tuition and living expenses during the academic year 2023-2024, which is expected to support 378, 175 US work.

According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, their achievements don’t stop after graduation. Some entrepreneurs then build productive businesses at a rate that is eight to nine days higher than their local competitors. In fact, a former foreign student founded 25 % of the US’s multibillion-dollar businesses.

Airbnb, Grammarly, Moderna, OpenAI, Robinhood, and SpaceX are just a few examples of these businesses.

International students even aid in the US’s continued authority in STEM fields. Consider that 45 % of STEM professionals in the US who hold a doctoral degree were born outside of the country.

A 2024 report warns that the US is failing to develop regional STEM skills at all levels of the educational system. On average, just 3.2 % of high school graduates in the US work in the STEM field.

Additionally, immigration restrictions and increased global competition are reducing the nation’s ability to recruit and maintain international STEM skills.

Lastly, foreign students are crucial to building international networks and encouraging soft power politics. This is demonstrated by the US graduating more earth leaders than any other country.

In the end, talent will be directed to other countries, allies, and adversaries if the ability of foreign students is more restricted.

University of Maryland, Baltimore County, David L. Di Maria serves as vice provost for international relationship.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Learn the article’s introduction.

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A spanner in the works?

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Paetongtarn: Casino bill woes
Paetongtarn: Issues with the game costs

A screwdriver in the runs?

After hearing Bhumjaithai Party secretary-general Chaichanok Chidchob claim that the alliance government is surviving on borrowed time in parliament, some people made ominous predictions.

The Pheu Thai Party, the party’s main coalition partner, and Bhumjaithai can’t cover their tense marriage, which has occasionally manifested itself. The latest case was heard loud and clear in life lessons on various radio channels.

Mr. Chaichanok, who caught his fellow MPs off guard, broke the common calm at a recent House meeting to discuss essential agendas.

He took to the ground and pleaded with the House to make a movement on a comprehensive national plan to stop natural tragedies in the midst of the earthquake in Myanmar that erupted in Bangkok, as well as develop an immediate plan to lessen the impact of Washington’s price increases.

Mr Chaichanok credited Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra with demonstrating unusual leadership and commitment to public health reasons. The Buri Ram MP made a pledge to support the top without fail. Except for a piercing bend toward the end of his speech, which threatens to have a profound social impact on the state, his words were music to the perfect leader’s ears.

” I declare before parliament that I, Chaichanok Chidchob, the eldest son of Newin and Karuna Chidchob, and in my capacity as Bhumjaithai Party secretary-general, does not consent to the casino-entertainment complex act, or any related charges in the future, perhaps those which may be presented by Bhumjaithai, in the government’s involvement.

I will not give my expected thought consideration. According to what I have reviewed, there are still unsolved problems that are much more serious and warrant our attention,” Mr. Chaichanok said.

His charter, although eventually dismissed as his personal position by Bhumjathai head Anutin Charnvirakul, was seen as an assault on alliance unity that is already weak.

Pheu Thai stalwarts demanded that the party renounce its rule over Bhumjaithai and refused to let him off the hook.

An observer claimed the irony was that these ruling party leaders vented their anger despite knowing that Bhumjaithai’s departure would cost the coalition 70 seats and put it on thin ice.

The figures may have had enough of watching Bhumjaithai turn against their party again and again.

Phumtham Wechayachai, the deputy prime minister and minister of defense, questioned Bhumjaithai’s hierarchy of command under Mr. Anutin, who also serves as the interior minister.

Is the party headed by Mr. Anutin or Mr. Chaichanok? ” the senior Pheu Thai figure asked.

” Mr. Anutin and the coalition leaders have already discussed the direction,” he said. So who should I trust right now, then? Mr Chaichanok or Mr Anutin?”

Adisorn Piengkes, a member of the Pheu Thai list, criticized Mr. Chaichanok for talking “nonsense” for more than 30 minutes while ignoring the issue of US tariffs on Thai exports.

” If Bhumjaithai cannot align with the coalition’s direction, then they might as well step down.” It’s simple. Don’t stay in the government just to thwart progress, advised Mr. Adisorn.

He also criticized Mr. Chaichanok for using his lineage to advance his position, being the son of Newin Chidchob, the spiritual leader of Bhumjaithai.

The observer noted it was the first time Mr Phumtham and Mr Adisorn, both veteran and well-respected figures in Pheu Thai, had confronted Bhumjaithai verbally.

One compelling reason they were seeing red is that Mr. Chaichanok is Bhumjaithai’s secretary-general. The leader is the party’s top executive, who can address the secretary-general in its name.

At the same time, both the Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai leaders have tried to patch things up.

Anutin and Paetongtarn, the Pheu Thai leader, held a joint press conference to reassure the public that their partnership was not about to collapse, as was widely speculated.

He claimed that Mr. Chaichanok’s statements were his own opinions and not the party’s official position, and that he had sincere apologised to Ms. Paetongtarn for the statement, which may have caused a misunderstanding.

When asked if Bhumjaithai would give its MPs a free vote on the bill, Mr Anutin said”, No. We will back the government.

He further stated that Mr. Chaichanok will have to cast a ballot alongside the group.

Mr Anutin said Mr Chaichanok was suffering from stress and should be given a few days ‘ rest following his controversial speech.

Ms. Paetongtarn suggested that she and her party maintain a close relationship with Mr. Chaichanok and that they do not disagree with his statement. The premier claimed that Mr. Chaichanok’s confusion may have been his cause of his disapproval.

The observer said Mr Anutin may be premature in saying Mr Chaichanok’s casino remarks were a personal view. Other Bhumjaithai heavyweights may share this sentiment.

Chada Thaiset, a Uthai Thani MP, claimed that the draft bill for the casino-entertainment complex was being rushed and poorly thought through even though he has a penchant for gambling and does not oppose legalizing casinos.

The problem stemming from young people and youths freely accessing online gambling represents a myriad of problems that must be dealt with to illustrate the sanctity of the law can be preserved before casinos are made legal, he said.

He also demanded a vote to make a decision on such a contentious and contentious subject.

It’s not as though one can open casinos on a whim. It doesn’t work that way. It requires thorough research and analysis.

Solid groundwork is in order. We’re taking this way too fast”, he said.

After former premier Thaksin Shinawatra reportedly reportedly made a veiled threat that coalition partners may be dumped if they disagreed with the casino-entertainment complex bill, Somsak Prissanantakul, the father of deputy House speaker Paradorn Prissanantakul and Bhumjaithai executive Korrawee Prissanantakul, appealed to coalition party leaders to pull out of the government.

Shuffling the middle of the pack

A cabinet reshuffle is being widely predicted to take place this month, although changes will likely be limited to the ruling Pheu Thai Party.

Thaksin: Under legal repression

Thaksin: Under legal repression

The strongest signal to date came from former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the party’s alleged de facto leader, despite repeated denials from senior government figures.

Thaksin was quoted as saying last weekend that if any cabinet changes were to be made, it would involve shuffling positions rather than altering the line-up of coalition parties.

His remarks came in response to persistent rumors about a reshuffle amid growing tensions between the ruling party and its coalition partner, Bhumjaithai.

According to some experts, a small reshuffle in the works was sparked by public dissatisfaction with some underperforming ministers, as revealed in a recent Nida Poll survey. Many respondents expected the commerce minister and the agriculture and cooperatives minister to be replaced.

Commerce Minister Pichai Naripthaphan, Deputy Interior Minister Theerarat Samrejvanich, and Deputy Finance Minister Paopoom Rojanasakul are among the Pheu Thai ministers who are expected to lose their jobs.

Phumtham Wechayachai’s appointment as the deputy prime minister will likely be replaced by his position as defense minister. However, he will likely take over at the Commerce Ministry– the post he held in the Srettha Thavisin administration.

List MP Anusorn Iamsa-ard is likely to succeed Prime Minister’s Office Minister Jiraporn Sindhuprai, who may succeed Mr. Paopoom, while Sutin Klungsang is rumored to make a return to the Defence Ministry.

Wisut Chainaroon, a member of the Pheu Thai list, is expected to take the place of Ms. Theerarat, and there are also rumors that tourism and sports minister Sorawong Thienthong may be dropped from the new lineup.

According to observers, Bhumjaithai, the second-largest party in the government, is off-limits in the much-anticipated reshuffle due to Pheu Thai’s concerns over the passage of key pieces of legislation, including the casino-entertainment complex bill, where coalition support is required.

According to Olarn Thinbangtieo, a lecturer in political science at Burapha University, there is uncertainty over whether Bhumjaithai might “betray” Pheu Thai or undermine its efforts to advance the casino policy.

The two parties have been roiling over each other.

The ruling party is believed to be pulling strings in the Department of Special Investigation ( DSI) probe against dozens of senators with close ties to Bhumjaithai over alleged vote fixing in last year’s Senate election.

The DSI has made a decision to look into many of them for alleged money laundering.

Anutin Charnvirakul, the leader of Bhumjaithai, is regarded as sending a clear message that his party supports the conservative camp, according to Mr. Olarn, despite his full support for Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s leadership and his respect for her father, Thaksin.

Several economic problems remain unresolved, with a growing public perception that the government has not adequately addressed people’s hardship, said Mr Olarn.

Even if it doesn’t help the government very much, the reshuffle is necessary. At least Pheu Thai can demonstrate to the people that the government is responsive by removing ministers who have performed poorly, he said, without providing a better explanation.

According to Mr Olarn, Thaksin is under legal pressure from the lese majeste case he is facing, which has reportedly restricted his political moves. He feels compelled to show that he is the only person capable of handling the “orange” camp, which is a reference to the People’s Party ( PP ), which conservatives view as a challenge.

The attorney-general indicted Thaksin on charges of lee majeste and computer crime in connection with an interview conducted on February 21, 2015 in Seoul, South Korea, on May 29 last year.

Thaksin was alleged to have defamed the monarchy while speaking with South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo when he claimed privy councillors supported the 2014 coup that ousted the government of his younger sister, fugitive former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

Thaksin’s involvement in the computer crime charge stemmed from him entering information into a computer system that he felt threatened the security of the country.

Some analysts saw the conservative establishment’s insistence that the former prime minister had to honor a political agreement with the old power groups when they indict Thaksin.

Thaksin returned from self-imposed exile in August 2023 to face jail time on the day Pheu Thai candidate Mr Srettha was endorsed as prime minister. The two most significant political developments were thought to be the result of prior political agreements between Thaksin and the old power groups.

Mr. Olarn stated that Thaksin is aware that the conservative camp views his own “red” Pheu Thai Party as a greater threat and that no one can fend off that threat without him.

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ABOUT POLITICS: A spanner in the works?

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Paetongtarn: Casino bill woes
Paetongtarn: Issues with the game costs

Some have made an ominous projection after hearing Bhumjaithai Party secretary-general Chaichanok Chidchob say in parliament that the coalition government is living on borrowed time.

The Pheu Thai Party, the party’s main coalition partner, and Bhumjaithai can’t cover their tense connection, which has occasionally manifested itself. In life sessions on different television platforms, the most recent example was audible and audible.

In a recent House conference to debate serious goals, the general quiet was broken by Mr Chaichanok, who took his brother Members off guard.

He took to the ground and pleaded with the House to make a movement on a comprehensive national plan to stop natural tragedies in the midst of the Bangkok earthquake and to develop an immediate plan to stem the effects of Washington’s price increases.

Mr. Chaichanok attributed Paetongtarn Shinawatra to having shown incredible leadership and commitment to issues relating to public health. The Buri Ram MP pledged to do everything in his strength to march behind the elite. His words, aside from a piercing bend toward the end of his speech, which threatens to have a profound social impact on the state, had been tunes to the perfect leader’s ears.

I declare before the legislature that I, Chaichanok Chidchob, the eldest child of Newin and Karuna Chidchob, does not support the casino-entertainment complex act, or any other similar costs that may be introduced by Bhumjaithai, in the interests of the nation.

” I will not grant my due consideration. There are excellent problems that are a lot more serious than what I have reviewed, according to Mr. Chaichanok, who deserves our attention.

His declaration was seen as an assault on the already fragile coalition unity, even though Bhumjathai leader Anutin Charnvirakul after labeled it as his private stance.

Pheu Thai greats refused to allow Bhumjaithai off the hook and called on the group to retreat from the government.

An observer claimed the irony was that these ruling party leaders vented their anger despite knowing that Bhumjaithai’s departure had cost the alliance 70 chairs and put it on thin ice.

The numbers may have had enough of Bhumjaithai’s constant move against their group.

Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai, questioned Bhumjaithai’s chain of command under Mr Anutin, who also serves as the internal secretary.

Is the group headed by Mr. Anutin or Mr. Chaichanok? ” the older Pheu Thai find inquired.

” We’ve now had discussions between partnership officials, with Mr Anutin agreeing on the course. So who should I trust right then, then? Mr. Anutin or Mr. Chaichanok?

Pheu Thai record MP Adisorn Piengkes slammed Mr Chaichanok for talking” crap” for over 30 days, ignoring the issue at hands– the US levies on Thai imports.

” Maybe they should step down if Bhumjaithai cannot coincide with the government’s way. It’s straightforward. Don’t be in the authorities merely to hinder improvement,” said Mr Adisorn.

He even criticized Mr. Chaichanok for using his genealogy as a way to advance his place, being the son of Bhumjaithai’s religious leader Newin Chidchob.

The observer noted that this was the first time that Mr. Phumtham and Mr. Adisorn, both well-known and former Pheu Thai figures, had orally fought with Bhumjaithai.

One powerful reason they were seeing dark has to do with Mr Chaichanok being Bhumjaithai’s secretary-general. The secretary-general is the party’s leading professional, after the president, who has the authority to address matters on behalf of the party.

Both the rulers of Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai have made an effort to mend things at the same time.

Mr Anutin and Ms Paetongtarn, who leads Pheu Thai, held a joint press conference to convince the public their empire was not about to collapse, as frequently speculated.

He added that he had apologized to Ms. Paetongtarn for the speech, which may have caused a mistake, and that Mr. Chaichanok’s notes were his own personal opinions and not the group’s established position.

When asked if Bhumjaithai would allow its MPs to cast a completely ballot on the act, Mr. Anutin responded,” No. We did support the government.”

He added that Mr. Chaichanok will have to cast a ballot alongside the group.

Following his controversial statement, Mr. Anutin claimed that Mr. Chaichanok should be given a few days ‘ sleep because he was under pressure.

Ms Paetongtarn suggested she and her party would not see Mr Chaichanok’s speech as an matter, saying she retains a close connection with him. The top claimed that Mr. Chaichanok’s confusion may have been his cause of his disapproval.

The observer claimed that Mr. Anutin may become excessive in claiming that Mr. Chaichanok’s comments about casinos were his own opinion. This attitude could also be shared by different Bhumjaithai superstars.

Chada Thaiset, a Uthai Thani MP, claimed the draft bill for the casino-entertainment advanced was being rushed and poorly thought through despite his propensity for betting and his objections to legalizing casinos.

The issue that young people and young people have with online gambling is a myriad of issues that need to be resolved before games are made legal, he said.

He furthermore called for a vote to decide on for a deeply divisive and controversial issue.

It’s not as though one you play casino games randomly. That is not how it works. It needs considerable reports and analyses to get conducted.

” Good foundations is required.” He claimed that we are moving too quickly.

Before Mr Chada spoke his head, Somsak Prissananantakul, the father of assistant House speaker Paradorn Prissananantakul and Bhumjaithai executive Korrawee Prissananantakul, appealed to coalition party leaders to move out of the government after former premier Thaksin Shinawatra apparently issued a veiled threat that coalition partners may be dumped if they disagreed with the casino-entertainment difficult bill.

Shuffling the middle of the pack

A cabinet reshuffle is anticipated to occur this month, although changes will likely be limited to the ruling Pheu Thai Party.

Thaksin: Under legal pressure

Thaksin: Under legal pressure

The party’s alleged de facto leader, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, sent the strongest signal yet despite repeated denials from senior government officials.

According to Thaksin, who was quoted last weekend, any cabinet changes would involve shifting positions rather than altering the coalition party lineup.

His comments were in response to persistent speculation about a reshuffle amid signs of growing tension between the ruling party and its coalition partner, Bhumjaithai.

According to some experts, a small reshuffle in the works was sparked by public dissatisfaction with some underperforming ministers, as revealed in a recent Nida Poll survey. Many people expected the replacements of the agriculture and cooperatives minister and the commerce minister.

Among the Pheu Thai ministers predicted to lose their jobs are Commerce Minister Pichai Naripthaphan, Deputy Interior Minister Theerarat Samrejvanich and Deputy Finance Minister Paopoom Rojanasakul.

Phumtham Wechayachai’s appointment as the deputy prime minister will likely be replaced by his position as defense minister. He will likely take over the position he previously held in the Srettha Thavisin administration at the Commerce Ministry.

Sutin Klungsang is speculated to make a return to the Defence Ministry, while list MP Anusorn Iamsa-ard is likely to replace Prime Minister’s Office Minister Jiraporn Sindhuprai, who could replace Mr Paopoom.

Wisut Chainaroon, a member of the Pheu Thai list, is expected to take the place of Ms. Theerarat, and rumors also point to the resignation of Sorawong Thienthong, the minister of tourism and sports, from the new lineup.

Pheu Thai’s concerns over the passage of crucial pieces of legislation, including the casino-entertainment complex bill, require coalition support, according to observers, making Bhumjaithai, the second-largest party in the government, off-limits in the much-anticipated reshuffle.

While it is believed there have been some negotiations between Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai, there is uncertainty over whether Bhumjaithai might “betray” Pheu Thai or undermine its efforts to push ahead with the casino policy, according to Olarn Thinbangtieo, a political science lecturer at Burapha University.

The two parties have been roiling over each other.

In the Department of Special Investigation ( DSI) investigation into dozens of senators with close ties to Bhumjaithai over alleged vote fixing in the Senate election of last year, the ruling party is alleged to be pulling strings.

The DSI has decided to investigate many of them for alleged money laundering.

Anutin Charnvirakul, the leader of Bhumjaithai, is regarded as having sent a clear message that his party supports the conservative camp, Mr. Olarn said, while Bhumjaithai leader Anutin Charnvirakul shows full support for Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s leadership and respect for her father, Thaksin.

According to Mr. Olarn, there are still many unresolved economic issues and a growing public perception that the government has not adequately addressed the hardship of its citizens.

” The reshuffle is necessary even if it doesn’t help]the government ] much. At least Pheu Thai can demonstrate to the people that the government is responsive to them by removing ministers who have performed poorly, he said, without a better explanation.

The lese majeste case, which reportedly slowed Thaksin’s political choices, is reportedly putting pressure on him. He is compelled to demonstrate that he is the only one who can deal with the “orange” camp, a reference to the People’s Party ( PP ), seen as a challenge to the conservatives.

The attorney-general indicted Thaksin on charges of lee majeste and computer crime in connection with an interview conducted on February 21, 2015 in Seoul, South Korea, on May 29 last year.

When he claimed that secret councillors supported the coup that overthrew the government of his younger sister, fugitive former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin allegedly defamed the monarchy while speaking with South Korean television station Chosun Ilbo.

The computer crime charge was due to Thaksin putting information into a computer system that was deemed a threat to national security.

Some analysts saw the conservative establishment’s insistence that the former prime minister had to honor a political agreement with the old power groups when they indict Thaksin.

On the day Mr. Srettha was chosen as prime minister, Thaksin faced jail time after leaving self-imposed exile in August 2023. The two major political developments were seen as the result of prior political deals struck between Thaksin and the old power groups.

Mr. Olarn stated that Thaksin is aware that the conservative camp views his own “red” Pheu Thai Party as a greater threat and that no one can fend off that threat without him.

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50 years on, Vietnam War’s ecocide still not healed – Asia Times

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When the Vietnam War came to an end on April 30, 1975, it left behind a surroundings ruined by economic damage. Great stretches of coastal trees, when housing rich companies of fish and birds, lay in ruins. Trees that had lots of species on display were reduced to dried-out fragments and overgrown with aggressive grasses.

In the late 1960s, the term “ecocide” was coined to describe the US government’s use of pesticides like Agent Orange and burning weaponry like napalm to combat insurgent forces that used jungles and marshes as hiding places.

Fifty years later, Vietnam’s degraded communities and dioxin-contaminated grounds and waters also reflect the long-term natural outcomes of the battle. There have been little effort to repair these damaged landscapes or even examine the long-term effects.

As an ecological scientist and archaeologist who has been in Vietnam since the 1990s, I find the lack of attention and delayed healing work to be deeply disturbing. Although the battle spurred new international agreements aimed at protecting the environment during war, these attempts failed to convince post-war recovery for Vietnam.

These laws and treaties are also ineffective, despite the current conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Daisy scissors and Agent Orange

The US second sent floor troops to Vietnam in March 1965 to help South Vietnam against revolution troops and North Vietnamese army, but the battle had been going on for years before then. The U.S. government turned to climate adaptation technologies to combat an obscure foe that was operating covertly at night and from hideouts strong in swamps and jungles.

Operation Ranch Hand, the most well-known of these, sprayed at least 19 million gallons ( 75 million liters ) of herbicides over South Vietnam’s 6.64 million acres ( 2.66 million hectares ).

The chemicals fell on forests, and also on rivers, rice paddies and villages, exposing civilians and troops. More than half of that spraying involved the Agent Orange, a defoliant, that was contaminated with dioxin.

A plane flies over jungle, with streams of defoliant flowing out behind it.
A C-123 of the United States Air Force flies low along a South Vietnamese highway to remove dense jungle vegetation near ambush locations during the Vietnam War. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Department of Defense

Herbicides were used to remove leaf cover from forests, improve visibility along transportation routes, and obliterate crops suspected of providing guerrilla forces.

Scientists contacted President Lyndon Johnson about the campaign’s environmental effects and demanded a review of whether the US was using chemical weapons on purpose as soon as news of the damage from these tactics returned to the US. American military leaders ‘ position was that herbicides did not constitute chemical weapons under the Geneva Protocol, which the US had yet to ratify.

During the war, scientific organizations conducted research in Vietnam that discovered widespread destruction of mangroves, the loss of rubber and timber plantations, and the harm to lakes and waterways.

A photo in a museum shows a broad area of destroyed mangroves with no leaves
The damage to the Cen Gi mangrove forest can be seen in a photo taken at the Vietnam Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, which is historically known as Saigon. The mangrove forest was destroyed by herbicides, bombs and plows. Gary Todd / Flickr via The Conversation

Due to the presence of TCDD, a particularly harmful dioxin, in Agent Orange, 2, 4, 5, and 5, one study in 1969 established a link between the chemicals. That led to a ban on domestic use and suspension of Agent Orange use by the military in April 1970, with the last mission flown in early 1971.

Rich ecosystems in Vietnam were also ravaged by incurable weapons and the clearing of forests.

By igniting barrels of fuel oil that were dropped from aircraft, the US Forest Service tested large-scale incineration of jungles. Particularly feared by civilians was the use of napalm bombs, with more than 400, 000 tons of the thickened petroleum used during the war. Invasive grasses frequently took over in hardened, infertile soils following these infernos.

A tank and soldier pass by a burning area of forest.
Several stretches of forest were cleared by fires from napalm and other incendiary weapons, some of which were scorching the soil so much that nothing would grow back. Photo: AP via The Conversation

1, 000 acres of land could be cleared each day using” Rome Plows,” massive bulldozers with an armor-fortified cutting blade. Enormous concussive bombs, known as “daisy cutters,” flatten forests and erupt shock waves that kill everything within a 3, 000-foot (900-meter ) radius, right down to earthworms in the soil.

The US also engaged in weather modification through Project Popeye, a secret program from 1967 to 1972 that seeded clouds with silver iodide to prolong the monsoon season in an attempt to cut the flow of fighters and supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam.

In 1973, Congress finally passed a bipartisan resolution urging an international treaty to outlaw the use of weather modification as a means of war. That agreement became effective in 1978.

The US military contended that all these tactics were operationally successful as a trade of trees for American lives.

Despite the concerns of Congress, little was done to examine the effects of US military operations and technologies on the environment. There was no regular environmental monitoring, and research sites were difficult to access.

Recovery efforts have been slow

The US imposed a trade and economic embargo on all of Vietnam after Saigon was overthrown by North Vietnamese troops on April 30, 1975, leaving the nation both war-damaged and cash-strapped.

Vietnamese researchers described how they assembled small-scale studies. One found a dramatic drop in bird and mammal diversity in forests. By the early 1980s, 80 % of the forests in the A Li valley in central Vietnam had not recovered from herbicide exposure. In those areas, biologists discovered only 24 bird and five mammal species, which is significantly below what is expected for unsprayed forests.

Only a handful of ecosystem restoration projects were attempted, hampered by shoestring budgets. The most notable project started in 1978 when foresters began hand-planting mangroves near the Saigon River in Cn Gi forest, which had been completely destroyed.

Tall mangroves line a river bank.
In the Cen Gi Biosphere Reserve near Ho Chi Minh City, mangroves have been replanted, but their restoration required years of effort. Photo: Tho Nau / Flickr, CC BY

In inland areas, widespread tree-planting initiatives in the late 1980s and 1990s finally took root, but they focused on planting exotic trees like acacia, which did not restore the original diversity of the natural forests.

Chemical cleanup is still being done.

For years, the US also denied responsibility for Agent Orange cleanup, despite the recognition of dioxin-associated illnesses among US veterans and testing that revealed continuing dioxin exposure among potentially tens of thousands of Vietnamese.

After persistent advocacy by veterans, scientists, and nongovernmental organizations led Congress to authorize US$ 3 million for the restoration of the Da Nang airport, the first remediation agreement between the two nations only came into existence in 2006.

The 150 000 cubic meters of dioxin-laden soil was treated in that project, which was finished in 2018, for an estimated cost of more than$ 115 million, mostly funded by the US Agency for International Development, or USAID. The cleanup required lakes to be drained and contaminated soil, which had seeped more than 9 feet ( 3 meters ) deeper than expected, to be piled and heated to break down the dioxin molecules.

A pit with sandbags and tarps and buildings in the background.
During the war, large amounts of Agent Orange were stored in the Da Nang airport, which left dioxin in the soil. 2018 saw the completion of the cleanup project, which included heating contaminated soil to high temperatures. Photo: Richard Nyberg / USAID via The Conversation

Another significant hotspot is the contaminated Biên Hoà airbase, where local residents continue to consume high levels of dioxin through fish, chicken, and ducks.

Agent Orange barrels were kept at the base, which caused significant contamination to the soil and water as it moved up the food chain. It still accumulated in animal tissue as it continues to contaminate animal tissue.

Remediation began in 2019, however, further work is at risk with the Trump administration’s near elimination of USAID, leaving it unclear if there will be any American experts in Vietnam in charge of administering this complex project.

The laws preventing a future “ecocide” are complex.

While Agent Orange’s health effects have understandably drawn scrutiny, its long-term ecological consequences have not been well studied.

In addition to satellite imagery, which is being used in Ukraine to identify fires, flooding, and pollution, there are far more options available to scientists today than they did fifty years ago. These tools, however, cannot replace ground monitoring, which is frequently restricted or dangerous during conflicts.

The legal situation is similarly complex.

The Geneva Conventions for conduct during wartime were revised in 1977 to make it illegal to “widespread, long term, and severe damage to the natural environment.” Incendiary weapons were restricted by a 1980 protocol.

Yet oil fires set by Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991, and recent environmental damage in the Gaza Strip, Ukraine and Syria indicate the limits of relying on treaties when there are no strong mechanisms to ensure compliance.

Large equipment move piles of contaminated dirt.
When USAID’s staff was dismantled in 2025, restoration work to remove dioxin contamination was only just beginning at the former Biên Hoà Air Base in Vietnam. Photo: USAID Vietnam, CC BY-NC / The Conversation

An international campaign currently underway calls for an amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to add ecocide as a fifth prosecutable crime alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression.

Some nations have adopted their own ecocide laws. Vietnam was the first country to legally state in its penal code that “ecocide, destroying the natural environment, whether committed in time of peace or war, constitutes a crime against humanity.” Yet the law has resulted in no prosecutions, despite several large pollution cases.

Both Russia and Ukraine have ecocide laws, but neither have they prevented harm or held anyone accountable for harm during the ongoing conflict.

The Vietnam War serves as a reminder that failing to take into account environmental effects, both during and after the war, will have long-term effects. What remains in short supply is the political will to ensure that these impacts are neither ignored nor repeated.

Rutgers University professor of human ecology, Pamela McElwee

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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With Trump’s push, China changing its relations with the world – Asia Times

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China has spent the majority of the past two decades spluttering up friends both domestically and abroad. At the end of March, two rounds of ministerial meetings with local foes Japan and South Korea took place in Tokyo and Seoul.

And earlier in April, the red carpet was draped around the Spanish president, Pedro Sanchez, for his next trip to Beijing in less than seven times. This occurred just before the Taiwanese president, Xi Jinping, made his first overseas vacation of the year in 2025, conducting a charm offensive against Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia.

Donald Trump, who has returned to the White House has undoubtedly skewed the restrictions between friend and foe, is at the heart of these political maneuvers.

China, Japan, and South Korea have all previously used caution when interacting with one another. This is the result of royal anger, conflicted territorial issues, and conflicting safety positions with the US.

However, the volatility of the Trump administration, which has most recently been demonstrated by the implementation of severe business taxes, appears to be bringing the three nations closer up.

Their respective governments agreed to increase the Secretary-General and DSL Secretaries ‘ terms of office from two to three at the ministerial meeting in Tokyo in March. In an effort to encourage cooperation between the three countries, this also largely unknown foreign organization was established in 2011.

The decision represents a growing increasing mutual confidence between these countries, despite what appears to be a minor administrative adjustment. Wang Yi, the country’s foreign minister, has made it clear that the extension represents a complete support for the organization’s function. China has then requested that Japan respond to US taxes in a planned manner.

China sought to strengthen corporate ties and argue its leadership as a result of this renewed interest in local assistance.

China put together a sophisticated political plan for Xi’s visit to Vietnam. It sought to reaffirm” comrades and brothers” ‘ ideological ties and counteract Hanoi’s new deepening relationships with Washington.

To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, stated after speaking with Xi that his nation has always viewed developing relations with China as” a proper decision and top goal.”

Malaysia, on the other hand, is one of the first countries to support Xi’s name Belt and Road Initiative. It became a “partner state” in the BRICS team of emerging markets in 2025 and is now the chairman of the ASEAN team of South Asian states. In order to coordinate China’s relationships with the alliance, Malaysia now has a key role.

Anwar Ibrahim, the Malay prime minister, made the connection between the two nations apparent during Xi’s visit. In response to US risks, he claimed that Malaysia” stands with China.” One of China’s major trading lovers is Malaysia.

Cambodia is even regarded as one of Beijing’s most steadfast allies in Southeast Asia. In honor of China’s contribution to Cambodia’s advancement, it perhaps gave the name” Xi Jinping Avenue” as a name for a road in the funds, Phnom Penh, in May 2024.

For Xi’s most recent attend, the government made all the stops. Norodom Sihamoni, the king of Cambodia, individually welcomed Xi at the airport in a never-before-seen split from protocol. Additionally, the two nations increased their ties to an “all-weather” agreement, which suggests that their relationship is adaptable to physical changes.

Relations with Europe

Sanchez’s April attend to Beijing, on the other hand, marked a crucial turning point for bilateral relations between China and the EU. Following the US tariff increase, Xi demanded that the EU and China” simultaneously resist unilateral bullying.” This seems to have had a positive impact in Madrid.

The Spanish committee emphasized that Washington’s tariff increases were “neither good nor only” and had hurt the EU economy. Additionally, it stated that Europe may” strengthen unity and cooperation to protect its own pursuits.”

Some leaders have expressed an interest in stabilizing relations with Beijing, and this message appears to be reaching out to wider European lines. For instance, Union von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, has had” creative” conversations with Taiwanese Premier Li Qiang to discuss potential business problems brought on by US taxes.

However, the EU is faced with an apparent choice: whether to engage China as a substitute financial partner or rebel against a possible rise in redirected Foreign exports that would threaten European industries and worsen already-existing political tensions.

Spain, for its part, makes its own proper decisions. Madrid’s desire to become the world’s leader in alternative energy is highlighted by Sanchez’s return to China, where Foreign investment is anticipated to be key.

This helps clarify why Sanchez remarked that” Europe needs to evaluate this choice when asked about the EU’s tax legislation on China during a media briefing in September 2024. Spain finally decided to withdraw from the EU’s decision to impose levies on China’s electric vehicle industry.

China’s message to the world is obvious. It supports free trade and has a steady partner. In the face of growing political uncertainty, whether China can inspire the world to trust its leadership is a question that remains open.

Ming Gao is a study professor at Lund University studying East Asia.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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