Why China’s port play has Trump so up in arms – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Colombian President Dina Boluarte met to actually inaugurate a new US$ 3.6 billion deepwater mega-port in Peru, called Chancay, on their way to the G20 conference in Rio de Janeiro in November.

China’s state-owned Cosco shipping giant had purchased a 60 % stake in the port for$ 1.6 billion, which gave the company exclusive use of the port for 60 years. Weeks later, the first fleet departed for Shanghai loaded with strawberries, bananas and materials.

China’s plan for a maritime Silk Road in the 21st century that may better join its manufacturing hubs with its global trading partners includes Chancay. The West is concerned about China’s growing influence over global transport routes because of the high investments in ships in many nations.

Donald Trump, the just re-elected US president, made clear these issues when he claimed that China was “operating” the Panama Canal and that the US intended to retake it. China does not run the river, nevertheless. Instead, a Hong Kong organization runs two ships on either side.

Port growth growth

The maritime Silk Road has a remarkable scope and scale. China has invested in 129 ships in lots of countries through its state-owned companies, mostly in the Global South. Seventeen of these ships have majority-Chinese rights.

According to one estimate, Taiwanese firms invested$ 11 billion in international port advancement from 2010–19. Leading Chinese companies today own direct stakes in stations where more than 27 % of the world’s container industry is currently conducted.

China has entered Latin America violently, becoming the country’s leading trading partner. Its interface approach has evidently signaled a long-term aim to get the exports important to its food and energy security: soybeans, corn, beef, iron ore, copper and battery-grade lithium.

Last season, for instance, Portos do Paraná, the Portuguese state-owned organization that functions as the port authority in the state of Paraná, signed a letter of intent with China Merchants Port Holdings to develop Paranaguá Container Terminal, the second-largest switch in South America. Due to the 22 stations scheduled to be auctioned before the close of 2025, China may participate in even more Portuguese ships.

In Africa, Chinese purchase grew from two ships in 2000 to 61 infrastructure in 30 countries by 2022. Additionally, the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe is led by Chinese companies that own two significant ports in Belgium and Greece, which are the so-called “dragon’s brain” of the program.

Hard-driving interface strategy

Xi’s goal of having a global economic hegemony is largely driven by its rise as a sea and delivery power.

For one, China requires steady access to important trading routes in order to continue meeting both the exports Beijing needs to keep its market strong and the need for Chinese exports abroad.

China can establish economic zones in other nations that grant terminal owners and operators unrestricted access to goods and products by controlling ports as well. Some feared that this might cause China to stifle the supply of some goods or even have an impact on the political or economic policies of various nations.

The metal and minerals needed to power China’s rise as a technology superpower are another important component of this technique. Beijing has focused its interface investments in those areas with the most important resources.

For example, China is the world’s largest supplier of copper ore, primarily from Chile, Peru and Mexico. It is also one of the country’s major lithium hydroxide manufacturers, primarily from Chile and Argentina. Additionally, its terminal agreements in Africa give it access to unique rocks and other nutrients.

Latin America’s expansion also helps to resolve China’s recent industry disputes with Europe. Additionally, it eliminates worries about potential US taxes Trump might impose on Chinese products.

Military problems

Washington is concerned about these actions because it makes sense that China is challenging US effect in its own neighborhood.

China maintains that its port geopolitics is market-oriented. However, it has established a naval base in Djibouti, a country in Africa that is carefully placed. Additionally, it is alleged that Equatorial Guinea is developing a new naval foundation.

According to a recent review by the Asia Society Policy Institute, plan experts believe China is seeking to “weaponize” the Belt and Road Initiative. One way it does this is by requiring that the business ships it invests in be able to serve as naval foundations as well.

Foreign businesses own a 23.5 % play in the west African port of Djibouti. &nbsp, Photo: Elias Messeret / AP

14 of the 17 ports where it holds a majority of the stakes have the potential to be used for marine purposes so much. These ports may then fulfill a dual purpose: they support the Taiwanese military’s logistic network and help Chinese naval vessels to travel farther away from home.

US officials worry that China might use its influence on private companies to stifle business during a time of conflict.

American response

While China’s assets are raising concerns, the West’s determination to invest in ships at this level is limited. The US International Development Finance Corporation, for example, has a little slower, comprehensive approach for its investments, which usually leads to better outcomes for both investors and host nations.

However, some Western companies are acquiring stakes in established and newly built ports in other countries, albeit not to the extent of Chinese enterprises.

The French shipping and logistics company CMA CGM’s global port development strategy, for example, includes investments in 60 terminals worldwide. In 2024, it acquired control over South America’s largest container terminal in the Port of Santos, Brazil.

Trump has threatened to impose tariffs as a means of limiting China’s position on the world stage. A member of his transition team’s advisor has suggested a 60 % tariff on any product passing through Peru’s Chancay port or any other Chinese-owned or controlled port in South America.

Rather than making nations reluctant to sign port deals with Beijing, however, this kind of action just erodes Washington’s regional influence. Additionally, China is likely to take retaliatory measures, such as outlawing the US’s export of crucial minerals.

Host nations like Peru and Brazil, meanwhile, are using the competition for port investment to their advantage. They are increasingly asserting their autonomy and adopting a strategy of using ports to “play everywhere” on the global stage, drawing attention from both the West and China.

Claudio Bozzi is lecturer in law, Deakin University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Muzinich & Co appoints director in Asia | FinanceAsia

By:
On:
In: Asia, Finance, South-East Asia

Private credit specialist Muzinich & Co. has appointed of Pam Hsieh as director – marketing & client relations.

Hsieh (pictured), based in Singapore, will focus on developing the firm’s relationships with financial intermediaries and wealth managers across Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, according to a January 6 media release.

In her new role, Hsieh will report to Sashi Nambiar, head of financial intermediaries and wealth, Asia. She has over a decade of experience in asset management and wealth management, having held senior positions at Fidelity and BlackRock in Taiwan, most recently as vice president, wealth at BlackRock.

Nambiar said in the media release: “We welcome Pam to Muzinich at a time of growing interest in both public and private credit solutions among Asian investors. Her deep understanding of the wealth market and strong track record of building relationships with financial intermediaries will be invaluable as we continue to expand our presence in the region.”

Andrew Tan, chief executive officer, Asia Pacific (Apac), Muzinich & Co., added: “Pam’s appointment demonstrates our commitment to building a strong presence across both institutional and wealth management segments in Apac.”

Tan continued: “As Asian investors increasingly seek to diversify their portfolios through credit solutions, we are strategically expanding our team to better serve their evolving needs while maintaining our focus on delivering excellence in credit investing.”

The appointment follows a partnership with First Bank to bring its “parallel” lending strategy, MLoan, to the Taiwanese market.

And In September, Muzinich announced a partnership with Hong Kong’s Orion3 to launch an up to $1 billion infrastructure and real assets private debt strategy targeting several key markets in Apac. 

For more FinanceAsia people moves click here.  

 


¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

Continue Reading

Trump’s Stargate a bold reach for AI’s next frontier – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, Technology

In one of his first moves as the 47th President of the United States, Donald Trump announced a new US$ 500 billion project called Stargate to accelerate the development of artificial intelligence ( AI ) in the US.

The job is a collaboration between three big tech companies – OpenAI, SoftBank and Oracle. Trump called it “the largest AI infrastructure project by far in history” and said it would help keep “the future of technology ” in the US.

Tech businessman Elon Musk, however, had a different take, claiming without evidence on his system X that the project’s donors “don’t really have the money. ” X, which is not included in Stargate, is even working on developing AI and Musk is a foe to OpenAI CEO Sam Altman.

Alongside announcing Stargate, Trump even revoked an executive order signed by his father Joe Biden that was aimed at addressing and controlling AI challenges.

Seen together, these two techniques embody a culture prevalent in software development that can best be summed up by the word: “move fast and break things. ”

What is Stargate?

The US is now the world’s pioneer when it comes to AI advancement. The Stargate task will considerably extend this guide over different nations.

It will see a system of data centres built across the US. These centres will building massive computer machines required for running AI applications such as ChatGPT. These machines will operate 24/7 and may require significant amounts of electricity and water to work.

According to a speech by OpenAI, construction of new data locations as part of Stargate is currently underway in the US state of Texas:

[ W]e are evaluating potential sites across the country for more campuses as we finalise definitive agreements.

US President Donald Trump speaking at the White House alongside Softbank CEO Masayoshi Son, Oracle chief technology officer Larry Ellison and OpenAI CEO Sam Altman.   Photo: Julia Demaree Nikhinson

An inadequate – but encouraging – order

The increased funding into AI growth by Trump is encouraging. It may help improve the many possible benefits of AI. For instance, AI may increase cancer patients ’ prognosis by quickly analyzing clinical information and detecting early signs of illness.

But Trump’s continuous renewal of Biden’s professional get on the “safe, safe and reliable development and use of AI” is deeply concerning. It could mean that any potential gains of Stargate are immediately trumped by its potential to exacerbate the existing affects of AI systems.

Yes, Biden’s get lacked critical technical details. But it was a tempting start towards developing safer and more responsible AI techniques. One big problem it was meant to address was tech firms collecting personal information for AI education without second obtaining acceptance.

AI techniques collect information from all over the internet. Even if data are readily available on the internet for individual use, it does not imply AI systems may use them for training. Moreover, when a picture or word is fed into an AI unit, it cannot be removed. There have been many instances of  artists suing Artificial craft generators  for  the unauthorised use  of their labor.

Another problem Biden’s get aimed to address was the risk of harm – especially to people from minority areas.

Most Artificial devices aim to increase accuracy for the majority. Without proper pattern, they can make really dangerous choices for a few.

For instance, in 2015, an image-recognition algorithm developed by Google immediately tagged pics of black individuals as “gorillas. ” This equal concern was later found in AI techniques of other organizations such as Yahoo and Apple, and remains unanswered a century later because these methods are so often incomprehensible actually to their creators.

This opacity makes it crucial to design AI systems correctly from the start. Problems can be deeply embedded in the AI system itself, worsening over time and becoming nearly impossible to fix.

As AI tools increasingly make important decisions, such as résumé screening, minorities are being even more disproportionately affected. For example, AI-powered face recognition software more commonly misidentifies black people and other people of color, which has led to false arrests and imprisonment.

YouTube video

[embedded content]

Faster, more powerful AI systems

Trump’s twin AI announcements in the first days of his second term as US president show his main focus in terms of AI – and that of the biggest tech companies in the world – is on developing ever faster, more powerful AI systems.

If we compare an AI system with a car, this is like developing the fastest car possible while ignoring crucial safety features like seat belts or airbags in order to keep it lighter and thus faster.

For both cars and AI, this approach could mean putting very dangerous machines into the hands of billions of people around the world.

Armin Chitizadeh is lecturer, School of Computer Science, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading

Trump’s China trade war plan keeps markets guessing – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Your shift, President Xi. This may be the important information from Donald Trump’s amazing reversal on large “day one ” tariffs on China.

The reprieve Trump appears to have granted  Asia’s biggest economy  is one Xi Jinping’s Communist Party certainly did n’t see coming. For weeks now, Trump and the gang of anti-China advisers he’s named to his new administration promised immediate 60 % tariffs as the centerpiece of a “shock-and-awe ” trade war.

No so quickly, it turns out. Taxes on Chinese goods are somewhat excluded from the storm of first-week executive orders. When pressed, Trump actually lowered his places. Whereas Canada and Mexico face 25 % levies by February 1, China might suffer a mere 10 %.

Chances are, this is Trump’s means of cajoling Xi to the dealing stand for a large Group of Two  business deal. To be sure, slow-walking China levies are aimed primarily at the share market.

Though Trump was n’t worry less about laws, standards or political politeness, he cares a great deal about Wall Street. Stories about stocks tumbling this year are the last thing the new US senator wants.

But Trump is also spoiling for an incredible clash with China, particularly once he realizes that Xi is n’t Shinzo Abe.

Beginning in December 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Abe pledged to revive an market hard being eclipsed by China. In the years that followed, Abe empowered the  Bank of Japan  to force its ultraloose guidelines into unknown territory and took steps to improve corporate governance.

Next came the Trump 1. 0 age, threatening trade war the likes of which Asia had never seen. Instantly, Abe snapped to focus to attempt to protect Asia’s No. 2 business from Trump’s taxes.

Following Trump’s impact vote win in November 2016, Abe made a run for New York. He was the first earth leader to visit Trump Tower to thank the man.

Abe did more than that, vouching for the “America First” leader in flowing words. “ I am convinced Mr. Trump is a leader in whom I may have great confidence ” and “a relationship of trust, ” Abe told investigators that day.

In the months and years that followed, Abe made a world splash  wining and dining  with Trump’s second White House group— including at Trump’s Florida sport team. On top of throwing praise, He gifted him premium golf equipment, including a US$ 3,755 motorist, among other extravagant gifts.

Abe was feted as a political Trump vehicle, credited for protecting Japan from the worst of the business conflict. One method Abe tamed Trump was acquiescing to a diplomatic trade deal in 2019. Abe’s genuine success was in running out the time on Trump 1. 0. By slow-walking on negotiations, Tokyo managed to achieve a “draw ” between the two nations.

At the end of the process, Japan effectively agreed to the same market-opening steps it had under the Barack Obama-led Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) pact that Trump scrapped.

Group Abe distracted Trump with greater market exposure for US meat, pork, and maize exporters. But the offer clearly did n’t include electrical products. Tokyo rejoiced.

“With typical hyperbole, President Trump declared the deal phenomenal, ” notes Matthew Goodman, who at the time led economic policy for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “ But once again, President Trump … settled for a simple package. ”

You Xi pull off a comparable rearranging-of-the-deckchairs US business deal? The question is whether Xi’s group may even care.

After all, some earth leaders had a worse  2024  than Xi. China ’s home issue, weak home need, near-record youth unemployment and aging people have produced negative forces for seven consecutive rooms now.

The second-biggest market also saw an alarming increase in in-person demonstrations. And  China Inc.   is also dealing with the fallout from Xi’s tech-sector onslaught.

Xi, in other words, has some issues for which to reply. It is questionable his group would be glad to see the most prominent Chinese leader since Mao Zedong appearing to lose ground to Trump — or appearing to bow to Washington on the world stage.

But Xi even definitely knows that after a period of quiet, Trump will almost certainly purchase up the taxes he’s threatened — and perhaps even bigger types than he’s telegraphed. Trump’s leading patron, Tesla businessman Elon Musk, last month talked about the  needed for tariffs on Chinese energy cars.

“The Taiwanese car companies are the most economical car companies in the world, ” Musk told investors. “So, I think they will have major success outside of China depending on what kind of taxes or business restrictions are established. ” Musk has since walked backwards these remarks, but China has every reason to worry Trump might come after China ’s car market.

For today, Trump claims to have commissioned a broad overview of Washington ’s trade ties with China and other vital trading lovers. The White House, Team Trump says, will “investigate and treatment consistent trade deficits that damage our business and safety. ”

Such evaluations take occasion, of course. Times, in some cases. But Trump’s US Trade Representative company almost needs satellites to know that his 2018 cope with Xi was a failure. To Chad Bown at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the way in which the second Trump-Xi trade deal “fell little ” is the “anatomy of a dud. ”

As Bown sees it, “attempting to  maintain trade  — to join Trump’s goal of reducing the diplomatic trade imbalance— was self-defeating from the  begin. It did not help that neither China nor the United States was eager to de-escalate their painful price war. ”

Nor does that seem the path now as Trump surrounds himself with China secularists. They include assistant Peter Navarro, who co-wrote a text titled  “Death By China. ” And deal king Robert  Lighthizer, who’s signaled that Trump 2. 0 is considering a  currency devaluation ploy.

Yet US Treasury Secretary-nominee Scott Bessent, who’s considered less MAGA-ish than most Trump government takes, has taken to discussing China in dark conditions. During his subsequent confirmation reading, Bessent  said China had “the most uneven business in the history of the world ” and that it might be suffering a “severe recession/depression. ”

Bessent even segued to MAGA talking factors about Beijing’s presumably flooding the world with cheap products to finance its military passions. Commenting on Trump’s earlier deal, Bessent argued that “China has not made good on their [agriculture ] purchases ” and that the US will push Beijing to resume those purchases and perhaps add a “make-up provision. ”

But all this speaks to the great odds that Trump’s industry war may reemerge sooner rather than later. “If there’s any training for US-China ties from Trump 1. 0, it is that he is a fluctuation system and predicting what he will do is a sucker’s game, ” says lifelong China watcher  Bill  Bishop, who writes the Sinocism email.

Bishop notes that investors “had found some comfort in the fact that President Trump did not impose more tariffs on [ China ] on his first day in office, but they forget his earlier promise to impose 10 % tariffs, in addition to any other tariffs that may come on, because of fentanyl. He reiterated the 10 % tax hazard Tuesday. ”

The wait does purchase Xi a huge opportunity. While Trump is distracted with local exploits – from avenging his critics to overseeing a large imprisonment system for illegal residents to devising tax cuts – Xi’s team may expand efforts to reduce its trade surplus the natural way by increasing regional demand as a means of boosting import activity.

On the one hand, China ’s nearly US$ 1 trillion trade surplus proves that efforts by Trump 1. 0 and the West in general to alter the mechanics of world trade came up short. China ’s global manufacturing dominance has only grown since 2017, a fact Trump 2. 0 can verify with a mere Google search. Yet Xi has the power to alter these  global dynamics.

A vital first step would be to end the property crisis once and for all. The drip, drip, drip of bad news about housing demand and prices is deflating consumer prices and confidence simultaneously. Beijing’s slow response continues to inspire “Japanification ” chatter and have some on Wall Street debating if China is “uninvestable. ”

On Monday, Fitch Ratings downgraded homebuilder  China Vanke Co. , a reminder that default risks continue to hover over the sector. The move “reflects a deterioration in China Vanke’s sales and cash generation, which is eroding its liquidity buffer against large capital market debt maturities in 2025,” says Fitch analyst  Rebecca Tang.

Trouble is, Vanke’s challenges are hardly unique. The extreme downward  pressure on the yuan, meantime ,  could increase default risks as offshore debt payments become harder to make. This tug of war is limiting the People’s Bank of China ’s latitude to cut interest rates.

Xi could take steps to accelerate China ’s pivot toward increased domestic demand-led growth, reducing Trump 2. 0’s argument that Beijing is n’t sharing its 5 % rate of annual output globally.

At the moment, “China’s  economy is showing signs of revival, led by industrial output and exports, ” says Frederic Neumann, chief Asia  economist at  HSBC.

Yet a trade war would put these drivers in harm’s way. What’s needed are large and robust social safety nets to encourage  households  to spend more and save less. Xi and Premier Li Qiang talk often about doing so, but little has been achieved to transform China ’s consumption dynamics.

The drop in “spending on property by roughly half since the peak in 2021 represents a huge drop in  domestic demand, which cannot be easily replaced by more spending on consumer goods or government investment, ” says economist Duncan Wrigley at Pantheon Macroeconomics.

Only top-down policy shifts in Beijing could jumpstart household demand and halt the deflationary pressures making headlines. At the same time, international funds are still waiting on moves to strengthen capital markets, improve corporate transparency, reduce the dominance of state-owned enterprises and make more space for startups to disrupt the economy.

This will require considerable political will in Beijing – and patience on the part of investors. Though markets crave major retooling, they don’t often afford Team Xi the space and time needed to execute them.

Moves to repair, change or tweak China ’s engines are certain to depress growth somewhat. Markets, though, tend to react badly when upgrades soften growth.

This paradox has carried over into 2025. The slow pace of reform in recent years is catching up with Xi’s government, and markets are reacting badly. Mainland stocks began 2025 with their  weakest start since 2016. That has Beijing rolling out measures to stabilize equities.

Among them is boosting how much pensions can invest in listed Chinese companies as investors brace for the second Trump administration. It’s part of a Beijing directive is to “steady the stock market, and clear bottlenecks for the introduction of mid-to-long-term capital, ” according to the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

Yet nothing might steady Chinese markets faster than knowing how or when Trump might tax Beijing– and by how much. Until traders get an answer, 2025 is sure to make market volatility great again.  

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

Continue Reading

With highest household debt in Southeast Asia, can Thailand break the ‘vicious cycle’?

By:
On:
In: Asia

Pavida agrees that credit cards in particular have become an “easy trap” for younger individuals exposed to intense marketing campaigns from lenders.

Non-productive loans- those considered to enhance spending power but no output- exceed effective loans now in Thailand. They include bills for automobiles, personal funding and credit cards.

COVID-19 contributed to another rise in these types of debt amounts as home incomes ran clean over the extended pandemic time.

Mali, a then 42-year-old Bangkok-based entrepreneur who likewise declined to give her complete name, started a car loan during the time the authorities was offering its car buying system. She then has two of them, on top of a loan for an apartment, a circumstance she considers “normal” now in Thai culture.

“A bunch of Thais are in debt because their income is low when compared with the cost of living, ” she said.

Average income in Thailand were about 15,700 baht in the second quarter of 2024, according to the National Statistical Office of Thailand.  

Mali admitted that bill had become a “big burden”, although she felt comfortable to handle it going ahead. For this century while, the debt narrative has evolved to be tougher to argue with compared to the past, she thinks.

Part of that can be explained by life- the purchase demands of modern life with the influence of social media- and the changing attitudes of younger years who never more live at home until they are married like in the past.

“It seems like the older technology were paying off their debts easier than us. It feels like a really long quest for us, ” Mali said.

Jack the instructor even flagged the challenges of living in rural areas, with fewer people resources.

“Living in the landscape, there is no public transportation that enters straight to your doorstep. That is why a bicycle is important. And the older generation can even survive without a phone or computer but our generation could, ” she said.  

Jack’s position is what is playing out all over the country, Pavida said, and proof of the fundamental problems that exist beyond the visible signs of overspending.  

Do not just responsible those in debt, she said, but instead research the “fundamental concerns with the Thai economy ” for both individuals and small business owners.

“It is a monetary condition. But if you ask yourself why people want to buy a car, one of the dilemmas is that they don’t have an option, ” she said.

“And I think the kind of dominant dominance of big company is one factor that has taken the air out for smaller businesses. ”

There could be pain away for the Thai market depending on the next moves by both the state and the Bank of Thailand.  

Nonarit expects both to move slowly, forecasting the authorities to try and boost public debt to GDP towards the sky restrict of 70 per cent- above where it now sits at about 64 per cent- to keep the money flowing through the economy over the next five years.

“ But then we will have higher and higher debt. And this is the way they try to push the problem into the future, ”   he said.

The alternative would be to let people “feel the crisis and learn the pain” of bad borrowing.  

“That’s the hard way. But I don’t think the Bank of Thailand will choose to let this happen”.

Additional reporting by  Grissarin Chungsiriwat.

Continue Reading

Trump rekindles hope for a US-China trade deal – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

Some were bracing for an instant and terrible increase of US-China industry conflicts upon Donald Trump’s returning to the White House on January 20.  

For decades, his campaign rhetoric had hinted at violent actions targeting Chinese imports, with some fearing taxes as high as 60 % on goods flowing from the world’s second-largest market into American businesses.  

But his starting moves, though destructive, were not the sledgehammer some had anticipated. Rather, they signaled a potential way toward dialogue, leaving space for cautious optimism in Beijing and among specific industry observers.

The initial volley—a 10 % tariff threat linked to China ’s role in America’s opioid crisis, particularly in relation to fentanyl—was enough to rattle markets.   The CSI 300 index fell by 1 %, Hong Kong ’s Hang Seng slid 1. 6 %, and the onshore yen weakened somewhat against the dollar.

However, the threatened methods paled in comparison to the blanket 25 % taxes Trump announced for Mexico and Canada.   For Beijing, it seems that this caution is a sign that the door to discourse remains available, at least for today.

Strategic beginning strategy

Trump’s original techniques suggest a calculated plan. By pairing the tax risk with an exploration into China ’s broader business procedures, he has given both flanks room to maneuver.  

While this method is doubtful to remove the deep trust that has built up over years of economic opposition, it does create an opening for creative deals. Beijing, accustomed to Trump’s chaotic fashion, is no fear taking note of this recorded preface.

China ’s management appears to know that Trump’s transactional approach to international relations usually leaves space for bargains. His hinted connection of business taxes to the future of TikTok—a Chinese-controlled social media platform that has drawn scrutiny from US protection eagles —underscores this place.

A package that addresses Washington ’s safety concerns while preserving some financial ties may serve as a model for broader contracts. The Chinese authorities, now faced with a slowing economy, entrenched home problems and mounting debts forces, has little taste for a full-scale trade conflict with the US.  

The consequences from the last round of US-China price wars, which strained supply chains and weighed on development, may be new in politicians ’ thoughts. With international demand uncertain and local challenges piling up, Beijing possible sees negotiations as a way to maintain its economic perspective.

For Trump, a package with China represents a major political option. While his foundation generally celebrates his aggressive stance, it also values outcomes. A trade deal that delivers agreements on issues like intellectual property theft, morphine exports or market exposure for US firms may help Trump to claim victory without tipping the global market into conflict.

At the same time, Trump’s tendency to view economic policy through the lens of personal branding complicates the picture. His willingness to reverse course or shift priorities based on perceived political gains could undermine the consistency needed for successful negotiations.  

Yet, this unpredictability may also work in his favor, creating opportunities to extract concessions from Beijing in exchange for scaling back his more extreme threats. The critical question now is what kind of deal would satisfy both sides.  

For the US, a meaningful agreement would need to address longstanding grievances such as forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft and the two sides ’ yawning trade imbalance. For China, the priority will be securing relief from tariffs while preserving its sovereign control over key industries and technologies.

One possible area of compromise could be technology regulation.   If Beijing agrees to stricter controls on data security, Washington might ease restrictions on Chinese tech companies now operating in the US, not least TikTok. Another potential avenue is joint commitments to supply chain resilience, which could help both economies weather future disruptions while fostering a sense of mutual benefit.

Risks to optimism

Of course, the risks to a potential deal remain significant. Trump’s unpredictability and penchant for last-minute demands could derail progress, as could hardliners on both sides who view compromise as weakness. Additionally, any agreement would need to address deep-seated structural issues, a task that may prove too complex for short-term diplomacy.

There is also the matter of trust—or the lack thereof. Years of tension have left both sides wary of each other’s intentions. And any agreement would likely face scrutiny from domestic constituencies eager to portray the other side as an unreliable partner.

Still, the mere possibility of negotiations has provided a glimmer of hope in an otherwise fraught relationship. For markets, Trump’s softer-than-expected opening has already delivered a sense of relief, even as uncertainty lingers. For businesses, it suggests that a return to the trade chaos of years past is not yet a done deal.

Ultimately, the road to a deal will be fraught with challenges. But the fact that both sides appear willing to engage in dialogue is a positive sign. Trump’s approach, while far from conciliatory, leaves room for pragmatism.  

For Beijing, the focus will be on crafting a deal that stabilizes its economy without conceding too much ground. For Washington, the challenge will be to balance toughness with the need for tangible results.

Continue Reading

US and Spain careening toward a strategic breakdown – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, World

Under the Trump presidency, the future of US-Spain relationships appears to be moving along a way to fix a proper conundrum. On the one hand, the American and Spanish security and intelligence communities communicate a genuine desire to enhance and deepen their bilateral safety agreement.

For Madrid, that stems from the strategic calculus that it is better to hedge with the United States to avoid overdependence, misalignment, and uncertainty in Spain-European Union ( EU) relations. For Washington, that stems from the social essential for greater corporate independence in Europe and increased burden-sharing in North Africa and the Sahel.

On the other hand, the Americans and Spanish find themselves on opposite sides of the political debates over the spending targets for North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) member states, ongoing military operations by the Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and the impact of Silicon Valley on democracy.

The concern for both countries is that it is clear that there are significant events on the horizon, quite as NATO Summit 2025 and South Africa ’s massacre circumstance against Israel trials, that will provide huge policy windows for the Trump administration and the 119th United States Congress to work on their problems.  

The US National Security Council may, therefore, try to take some stress out of the program by engaging in strategic partnership control in a way that strikes the right stability between political grievances and geopolitical interests on both sides.  

One option that they should consider is to immediately relocate select military units from Naval Station Rota ( Spain ) to Ksar Saghir Naval Base ( Morocco ). That includes the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team ( FAST ) Company Europe. That move do have distinct advantages.

Second, it may solve a communications magnification concern for the White House. Next, it would take an earlier message to the Government of Spain that the strategic relationship is in danger of a break. Third, it would provide a mechanism for broadening and deepening security cooperation between Morocco and the United States, which will be necessary if the Trump administration chooses to abandon the strategic partnership with Spain.

Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, there has generally been a strong bilateral security relationship between Spain and the United States. In terms of security cooperation, the Government of Spain has regularly deployed its armed forces to fight alongside the United States and other NATO member states.

Examples include Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The Government of Spain has also deployed its armed forces to conduct large-scale non-traditional security operations with the United States and other NATO member states. Examples include Libya, Somalia, and Yemen.

In terms of global posture, Spain hosts an important node in the American overseas basing network. Naval Station Rota ( NS Rota ) is a critical node for logistical support and strategic presence in Europe and Africa. Among other things, NS Rota hosts Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team ( FAST ) Company Europe.

FAST Company Europe is responsible for providing security forces for strategic weapons and rapid response and forward-deployed expeditionary anti-terrorism security forces in large parts of Europe and Africa. This includes evacuations of US diplomatic posts in times of crisis.

That said, there have been some major hiccups in the strategic partnership along the way. One occurred during the first Trump administration. That was over the extension of NS Rota. At the time, the Government of Spain sought to use that extension as leverage in bilateral trade negotiations. That did not go over well with The White House.

Strategic autonomy

Although the prime minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, once declared that he is “a militant pro-European, ” the Government of Spain has found it difficult to pursue its national interests and adopt a foreign policy of its preference solely through the European Union ( EU) and NATO.

His problem is that Spain’s national security and foreign policy interests are not fully aligned with the national security and foreign policy interests of other major European and NATO powers ( e. g. , France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey ). To compound matters, Spanish citizens tend to have extremely unrealistic preferences for their government on matters of national security and foreign policy.

Examples include a strong desire for the establishment of a common foreign policy and a “true European army. ” As a consequence, the Sanchez administration faces a multidimensional challenge that is preventing his government from being able to “claim” what it perceives to be Spain’s rightful place in the international system.

Under the Trump administration, this dilemma presents a strong incentive for the Sanchez administration to try to pursue national interests and adopt a foreign policy of its preference with much less dependence on either the EU or NATO. That begs the question of how best to achieve such strategic autonomy given the scarce resources at Sanchez’s disposal.

One option would be for his administration to pursue greater strategic autonomy through increased hedging in North Africa and the Sahel. At present, most European countries are single mindedly transfixed on events unfolding in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Spain is watching the balance of power shift radically in North Africa and the Sahel with great apprehension. On the descent are the French, who have now been effectively expelled from their former colonial possessions across the Sahel.

This has left a strategic void throughout the region that other powers have sought to exploit in different ways. Some are internal powers like Algeria and Morocco. Others are external powers such as China, Israel, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

In Italy and Spain, this power struggle is viewed as a serious risk to their national security and foreign policy interests. The Sanchez administration, therefore, needs to try to mitigate these risks. Despite Sanchez’s personal animosity toward President Trump and “ultra-Right wing American billionaires, ” the most obvious option would be to try to broaden and deepen its strategic partnership with the United States.

The problem is that the Trump administration does not respond well to world leaders who launch public attacks on his supporters. Nor does the National Security Council want to repeat the past mistakes of the Elysee Palace.

The Trump administration faces its own strategic conundrum. The White House knows that there is a clear and present strategic imperative to fill the power projection void that currently exists in North Africa and the Sahel. However, it does want to take on more financial burdens for American taxpayers in the process.

Faced with this two-way pull, the Trump administration has a strong incentive to search for allies and partners who are willing and able to assume a large part of the burden at their own expense. Finding the right allies and partners will prove difficult, though.

There might be some interest in the NATO bloc from Turkey. There might also be some interest in the Major Non-NATO Ally bloc from Israel, Morocco, and Qatar. And there might be some interest in the Gulf Cooperation Council from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

However, all of these options come with strings attached. Some also come with daggers drawn. Whatever choice is made, none would be seen as a perfect substitute for the United States in the eyes of the Spanish military and intelligence agencies.

Some will not have sufficient power to be able to stabilize the region. Others may have sufficient power but their national security and foreign policy interests will not be well-aligned with the Government of Spain and the Spanish Royal Family.

If the Trump administration offloads the alliance burden inherited from the French onto others, then it is reasonable to expect that the Sanchez administration will pursue secondary against those American burden-sharing partners.

That would interject more complexity into US-Spain relations, which would run the risk of further destabilizing the strategic partnership.

American grievances

The problem with multi-level hedging is that there is already a lot of tension in US-Spain relations without it. On the American side, this largely stems from two major grievances.

First, there is strong opposition against the failure of the Sanchez administration to act on spending targets for NATO member states. In 2024, the Government of Spain reportedly spent a meager 1. 3 % of its gross domestic product ( GDP ) on defense expenditures. Without adjustments, that puts Spain “dead last ” among NATO member states.

That reality stands in sharp contrast to the 5 % target that has been set by President Trump. Second, there is equally strong opposition against the choices made by the Sanchez administration about how to respond to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.

Over the last year, the Government of Spain has recognized the State of Palestine. It has intervened in the South African genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice ( ICJ). And it has reportedly blocked “American-flagged ships from using its ports because it believed the vessels were carrying military equipment to Israel. ”

These moves have infuriated both Israel and the United States. As evidence, the Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz sent the following message to the Spanish prime minister on X: “Hamas thanks you for your service. ” In the coming months, the Spanish response is likely to draw renewed criticism from the Trump administration and 119th Congress for these moves.

The Government of Israel has asked members of Congress to put as much pressure as possible on South Africa to drop the case. Now, there are efforts well underway to impose Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on South African elites who have committed corruption and human rights violations. That includes providing material support to Hamas, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.

If the first day of the second term of the Trump administration is any indication, winter is coming hard and fast for US-Spain relations too. Speaking at a technology industry conference, Prime Minister Sanchez went on the offensive against the “Silicon Valley techno caste” that he claims threatens democratic institutions.

According to Sanchez, Elon Musk and others are “trying to exercise absolute power over social media in order to control public discourse and as a result, government action in the west. ” For that reason, Sanchez urged other world leaders to “rebel and consider alternatives. ”

On the other side of the Atlantic, President Trump appeared to take his own jabs at the Sanchez administration. During a press conference at the Oval Office, Trump referred to Spain as “a BRICS nation. ” He then issued what appeared to be a thinly veiled threat: “Spain. Do you know what a BRICS nation is? You’ll figure it out. ”

Whatever the message President Trump was trying to convey, it ’s safe to assume that coercive measures against Spain are being discussed over the NATO spending thresholds and ICJ case in The White House and 119th US Congress. One should expect that those options will include some in-kind response to Sanchez’s attacks on Trump supporters.

If so, then the Trump administration could try to take a page out of the playbook for South Africa– a BRICS member state – and use Magnitsky sanction requests to try to expose Spanish elites who have committed corruption.

Proactive relationship management

With a cold front fast approaching, time is running out for both sides to course correct before there is a severe breakdown in the strategic partnership.

On that note, the Trump administration should take the initiative and immediately start imposing graduated pressure on the Sanchez administration to more fully align with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

One way to send such a signal would be to immediately relocate a small number of Rota-based military units to Morocco. These units should include FAST Company Europe. Such a move would have the following benefits.

First, it would mitigate the following risk. If there was an attack on a US diplomatic or military footprint by Hamas or another Iranian-backed terrorist organization within the areas of responsibility of the US Africa Command or US European Command, then the US Department of Defense might have to deploy FAST Company Europe from NS Rota.

That, in turn, might spur criticism from American and Israeli foreign policy experts who believe that the Sanchez administration has frustrated their efforts to eliminate these very organizations.

Second, it would send an unambiguous signal to the Government of Spain that the strategic partnership is in jeopardy. However, that signal would be so loud that it deafens both sides. That would open the door to conflict resolution efforts that might help to salvage the future of US-Spain relations.

Third, forward-deployed crisis response operations would provide a useful mechanism for broadening and deepening security cooperation between the militaries, foreign services and intelligence agencies of Morocco and the United States. For the Trump administration, that makes sense either way. Morocco is becoming an even more important security partner for Europeans and the United States “in the crisis-ridden Sahel. ”

However, it could also prove pivotal if the Trump administration makes the decision to freeze the strategic partnership between Spain and the United States.

Michael Walsh is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the Lasky Center für Transatlantische Studien at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. He is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own.  

Continue Reading

Trump’s executive orders all about power and theater – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

In a piece of real social theatre, Donald Trump began his next president by signing a host of professional requests before a euphoric crowd of 20,000 in Washington on Monday.

The directions immediately reversed expanses of Biden administration policy and basically began what Trump christened a “golden years of America ” in his inaugural address.

But there are limits to what Trump may reach through for purchases. And they face a deeper necessity for the new supervision over how to deal with possible Republican in-fighting and a frantic people frightened for change.

What did Trump get?

Executive purchases are commonly used by US president at the beginning of their terms to immediately start implementing their plan.

Important orders signed on Trump’s second time included:

Here’s a summary of the remainder.

Because they are legally bound, professional orders are a powerful tool. Democratic and Republican leaders everywhere have been accused of despotic goal over their usage.

However, executive orders remain constrained by the authorities, Congress and public view. Birthright citizen, in specific, is protected by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, but Trump’s get will undoubtedly encounter legal challenge.

Perhaps most important, executive orders can be swept away by a leader. Trump did this in dramatic fashion by revoking 78 Biden-era commands, many of which dealt with national diversity, equity and inclusion activities.

The limits of executive orders have been tested in recent years and surely will be repeatedly by Trump.

But there is political worth in issuing orders to show action, even if they are inevitably ineffective, reduced in scope or reversed. That was the situation with the legal wrangling over Trump’s travel restrictions on citizens of Muslim-majority places in 2017 and Biden’s student loan debt forgiveness plan.

Trump presumably recognized this in the dance of his executive commands on Monday. For example, the order aiming to “restore freedom of speech and end federal censorship ” is heavy on political rhetoric, but may have little practical effect.

Is the honeymoon next?

Trump is relishing his highest preference assessments and the usual post-election getaway enjoyed by most leaders.

But this aid was easily vanish if his followers ’ high expectations are not met rapidly. In this context, the executive orders were the fastest way to indicate progress on vital interests to an anxious state.

Across much of the US, fears over prices and failing facilities remain high. Less than 20 % of the land is satisfied with the direction of the country.

For a country hungry for change, there was tremendous appeal in Trump’s election promises to promptly stop foreign wars, curb rising inflation and tackle illegal immigration. But for campaign promises have frequently been short on details from Trump so far.

Half of Americans expect the price of everyday things to occur down during his administration– including almost nine in ten of his followers. Three-quarters even expect him to carry out large arrests.

However, the public remains divided on other parts of the Trump plan or does n’t know them.

The rapid and serious nature of professional orders are, therefore, an appealing option for Trump. He may show he is taking steps to meet his election promises while buying himself time to figure out thornier problems.

However, he runs the risk of losing people assist if the orders do not generate substantial shift. For this, he may have major legislative actions from Congress.

Uncomfortable alliance with Congress

Republicans power both chambers of Congress, as well as the White House. But the previously narrow margin of Republican power in the House of Representatives and the persistent thorns of the Senate filibuster could harm Trump’s legislative plan.

Until three intended jobs are filled in the House, the Republicans may not be able to obtain a second diplomat in a party-line voting. House Speaker Mike Johnson is now encountering barriers in consolidating help behind an all-encompassing “MAGA bill”, which he hopes to offer to Congress later this year.

In 2017, when Trump had a similarly pleasant Congress with a far more pleasant ratio, Republicans still struggled to unite behind a parliamentary plan. Big tax breaks were passed, but modifications to Obamacare and other objectives failed amid celebration bickering.

This paved the way for sweeping Democrat increases in the 2018 midterm elections — a pattern that could be repeated in 2026 depending on Republicans ’ progress in the next two years.

Like Barack Obama before him, Trump does turn to professional requests to avoid Congress, especially if Democrats lose control of the House in 2026. However, his executive order to halt the TikTok restrictions bypasses a bipartisan law passed by Congress last year and just upheld by the traditional Supreme Court.

For moves can produce friction with legislators– even those in his own party.

As late as Sunday, Johnson insisted the US “will enforce the law ” against TikTok. And two Democratic lawmakers warned against offering TikTok any type of improvement, which they claimed may include “no constitutional basis. ”

Groups between Republicans are also apparent over the possibility of taxes and the future of Trump’s immigration scheme.

For today, these tensions may get put off amid the ongoing opening euphoria. But they will eventually reemerge and could also result in a returning to congressional gridlock and inaction. Such delays could find much patience among Americans troubled for quick solutions to insurmountable problems.

Samuel Garrett is exploration affiliate, United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

Continue Reading

6.0-magnitude earthquake shakes Taiwan

By:
On:
In: Asia

TAIWAN’S Superior WARNING SYSTEM Taiwan is often hit by disasters due to its location on the ends of two seismic plates near the Pacific Ring of Fire, which USGS says is the most seismically active area in the world. The next major disaster occurred in April 2024 when the isleContinue Reading

Q&A with Indranee Rajah on support for young families

By:
On:
In: South-East Asia

Q. Is cash is the main concern for people to have children, and how has the federal helped?

It’s about the wealth to some extent because the cost of raising a child weighs on a parent’s head. But I think it ( also ) goes way beyond that. We have done quite a bit to increase the help when a family is having a baby, as well as care for the child. We’ve been taking measures to make sure that there is greater mobility to accommodation, because Taiwanese couples are quite rational, they want a house of their own, even before they have a kid. What we hope will be a game change, is the innovative shared parental leave that was announced by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong at the National Day Rally next year– that will be 10 weeks of shared familial leave, by default shared equally between mum and dad, but certainly they can change it.

Q. Is the government looking at specific measures that are going to further support parents, and what can parents expect for 2025?

( They can expect ) increased support for infant care, because the feedback we were getting from parents is that it’s actually the first 18 months ( that’s the toughest ). Because that’s when a child is most dependent on the parents but there’s a period when you still need somebody to look after the very young child as you go back to work. If you have parents and grandparents who are willing to help out, that’s great, but some don’t. The Ministry of Social and Family Development is looking into piloting a new model of infant care. There are infant care centres, but the model that they are looking at is that either somebody comes to your home, or you drop off your child at the home of somebody else. So, infant carers. The other thing that we are looking at, which PM Wong touched on as well, is how can we increase support for large families, because we do recognise that if you have more children, obviously your costs increase with every child.

Q. How do you track the effectiveness of policies that are supportive of families?

From the time that the child is conceived, you have subsidies for healthcare. From the time the child is born, you ’ve got the Baby Bonus cash gift – about S$ 11,000 ( US$ 8,000 ). Then you’ve got the Child Development Account, with the First Step Grant, and then the co-matching amounts, and that takes you through the preschool period. Then, once you enter primary school, education is heavily subsidised. So, I think parents should come away knowing that the government is investing very heavily in the child’s education and giving a lot of support for that. So, when you look at all of these … it’s a whole ecosystem. What we are really building is a society that is supportive of families and puts families front and centre.

Q. Let’s talk a bit about balancing economic success with fertility rate concerns in Singapore– is there a trade-off between them?

Well, there is a trade-off. But what we are doing, with the recent measures, is trying to make sure that the trade-off is not win-lose. Making sure that we have shared parental leave, and dividing it between the mother and the father, because this is a signal to employers that the parents need some time to be with their children. You can’t be working all of the time, and expecting to be with your child all of the time. You’re going to have to give up a little bit of time at work, spend that with your child, but then you can come back, because your shared parental leave can be taken in portions and after that spend time back with your career.

Q. Some people in the workplace may not feel as empowered to necessarily speak up and say what they need and that includes young married women and men. What needs to happen there?

I’ve a message for employers– which I’ve been saying repeatedly, which is that if you want to recruit and retain good people, you must enable them to also have a fulfilling family life, in addition to a good career. And the key to this is a really good HR ( human resources department ) that understands the needs of both. Because if you have a purely transactional relationship, which is that you work for me and I command your hours for x number of hours in the day, and you must devote your whole life to the company, at some point people are going to say: ‘ I can’t do that – I have a family and I have needs of my own’, and they will walk.

Q. A phrase we hear a lot with Forward Singapore is redefining what success means – the pursuit of not just a good life but a life that is good enough. Is that where we want to go as a society?

The question is: how do you balance it, so that you earn enough to provide for yourself and for your family in due course, but at the same time, still have enough bandwidth for yourself as an individual, where you don’t feel so wrung out and hung out to dry. Enough time to breathe, enough time to step back and look at the direction your life is going. And at the same time also being careful not to pressure your children so much. You want their journey in school and in life to be a happy one, not one that is fraught with stress, and where waking up to go to school is much more a chore than a joy. You do have to ask: ‘How can I achieve these things? ’ Also, it ’s not one size fits all. There’re some individuals who thrive on stress and some who just don’t. You need to know for yourself which kind of individual (you are ) and what works for (you ). And because obviously it takes place in a work context as well, you need employers who are understanding, open-minded, progressive, and pragmatic.

Q. It sounds like a mindset shift is required – will we take a long time to achieve that?

It’s going to take some time, but it may not take as long as we think. It’s very important that we need to keep talking about it, keep thinking about it and with these policy moves, nudging people and employers in the right direction.

Continue Reading