Europe’s dangerous delusion of defense without the US – Asia Times

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US President Donald Trump unceremoniously showed Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky the door following an acrimonious exchange at the White House on Friday. Trump’s angry words for Zelensky were televised for all of America to hear, and no doubt shocked many in the viewing audience.

“You’re gambling with the lives of millions of people. You’re gambling with World War III. You’re gambling with World War III,” Trump said. “You’re not winning. You’re not winning this. But you’re either going to make a deal or we’re out.”

Just as shocked as the American TV audience about Trump’s blunt “make a deal or you’re on your own message” were the US’s European allies and rushed to pledge their support for Zelensky and condemn Trump –moves and words they may soon live to regret.

European Union chiefs Ursula von der Leyen and Antonio Costa jointly tweeted: “Be strong, be brave, be fearless. You are never alone, dear President@ZelenskyyUa.” 

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said: “Ukraine, Spain stands with you”; his Polish counterpart Donald Tusk wrote: “Dear [Zelensky], dear Ukrainian friends, you are not alone.”

Incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz addressed a tweet directly to “Dear Volodymyr” and vowed to stand with Ukraine “in good and in testing times.”

Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz and Keir Starmer chimed in with similar profundities.

Kaja Kallas, the EU’s chief diplomat and former prime minister of Estonia, outgunned them all: “Ukraine is Europe! We stand by Ukraine. We will step up our support to Ukraine so that they can continue to fight back the aggressor. Today it became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.”

Most of them were scheduled to meet the Ukrainian leader on March 2 in London for a summit on Ukraine organized by Prime Minister Starmer. Zelensky was set to be honorably hosted by King Charles III at his Sandringham country retreat.

As a welcome to London on Saturday, Zelensky was handed a 2.6 billion pound check (a loan), a down payment on the UK’s “standing with you as long as it takes to protect the integrity of your country.”

In a Nikkei Asia opinion piece, Trump’s peace initiative is portrayed as “forcing Kyiv to concede its occupied lands and deny its ambition to join NATO” and “closer to appeasement than clever dealmaking.”

In the same op-ed, Trump is compared to “British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain [who] proclaimed that he had brought ‘peace for our time.’ But this ultimately led to the Nazis marching into Czechoslovakia in March 1939, and the outbreak of World War II. Similarly, Richard Nixon’s 1973 ‘peace with honor’ deal in Vietnam resulted in the fall of Saigon just two years later.”

Presumably, in this British-inspired charade (the Nikkei owns and channels the Financial Times), Zelensky is assigned the role of Churchill.

The only dissenting European voices were those of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban who wrote: “Strong men make peace, weak men make war. Today President Donald Trump stood bravely for peace.… Thank you, Mr. President!

And of a man who may be worrying that he’ll lose his job, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who told the BBC he had called Zelensky, said: “I said: I think you have to find a way, dear Volodymyr, to restore your relationship with Donald Trump and the American administration. That is important going forward.”

Which European stance and view will prevail? That is dictated by reality, not the will and delusional thinking of Eurocrats such as von der Leyen and Kallas or the leaders of the UK, France and Germany, just to pick the top three.

Trump’s basic peace plan, which specifies no NATO membership for Ukraine, territorial concessions and no NATO Article 5-type US security guarantees but relies on the repair of US–Russia relations and prospective new security structures for Europe, will either be implemented or there will be continued war ending in Russian victory or, should European NATO forces intervene directly, World War III as Trump has warned.

Europe today has no military forces capable of successfully confronting a full-scale Russian onslaught without reliance on the US military and the US nuclear umbrella, nor will it likely ever have such capabilities even with a sustained crash rearmament program.

Not even in the 1980s, when this writer served in the (West) German military, with its strength at its peak of 500,000 soldiers and 7,000 tanks, was the defense of Western Europe without the US ever so much as contemplated. Today, it’s a dangerous fantasy.

Germany’s authoritative Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) released detailed studies proving the point in September 2024 (“Fit for war in decades: Europe’s and Germany’s slow rearmament vis-à-vis Russia”) and February 2025 (“Defending Europe without the US: First estimates of what is needed”).

The summary of the 2024 study states:

Germany did not meaningfully increase procurement in the one and a half years after February 2022, and only accelerated it in late 2023. Given Germany’s massive disarmament in the last decades and the current procurement speed, we find that for some key weapon systems, Germany will not attain 2004 levels of armament for about 100 years. When taking into account arms commitments to Ukraine, some German capacities are even falling.

For the record, Germany currently has 180,000 active personnel (61,000 in the army, 27,000 air force, 16,000 navy, remainder support staff); 350 main battle tanks compared with 2,398 in 2004; 120 howitzers compared to 978 in 2004; 218 combat aircraft compared to 423 in 2004. It is not capable at this time to field a single combat ready division of 20,000.

Other European NATO forces similarly lack manpower and equipment, with no early change in sight. That includes the UK. The UK Ministry of Defence last released detailed figures on the number of trained personnel in combat-ready roles in July 2024. British Army: 18,398. Royal Air Force: 21,915.

Meanwhile, the Russian military is expected to reach its target strength of 1.5 million by mid-2025, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The only NATO member other than the US in the same general class is Turkey, with 511,000 under arms.

The Kiel Institute estimates that Europe would need an additional 300,000 troops and an increase of about $250 billion in defense spending to even begin to redress this sorry state of military affairs. The spending looks doable even in the near term; the manpower increase is not.

And the critically important role the US plays in NATO, planning, coordination and commanding large-scale multinational forces, will not be replaceable for many years. Nor will US real-time tactical intelligence and targeting capabilities. 

It is hard to believe that even the most belligerent European leaders, grandiloquently speaking of “strategic independence” (such as Germany’s Merz) and of going it alone are not aware of these facts.

And the same Merz, so eager to launch German Taurus missiles against Russia, will likely think twice about such bravery if the US is not around to back him up.

Europe can dream about strategic autonomy after peace is made in Ukraine. But it has no military capability to defy or undermine the Trump peace plan. In reality, there is no other.

Uwe von Parpart is editor-in-chief of Asia Times.

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Indonesians swindled by scams using President Prabowo deepfakes

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JAKARTA: Wearing a traditional Indonesian black hat and shirt, President Prabowo Subianto speaks to the camera in an Instagram video, asking his people how he can help them after his election last year.

“Who hasn’t received aid from me? What are your needs right now?” Prabowo appears to ask viewers in the clip posted in November.

But while the Indonesian leader’s mouth moves and his eyes blink, the words he utters are part of a fraudulent deepfake scam uncovered by police last month that has swindled Indonesians across 20 provinces.

Those ensnared by the message were asked to contact a WhatsApp number and hand over between 250,000 and one million rupiah (US$15 to US$60) as an “administrative fee” to get aid that never materialised.

Since last year’s Indonesian election, experts have warned of a tidal wave of deepfakes – audio, images and video appearing to come from a known person but which are in fact the work of scammers using artificial intelligence tools.

And victims say the hoaxes are so sophisticated they leave others vulnerable to being conned too.

“People should be more careful. Don’t be easily fooled by the lure of prizes,” said Aryani, 56, who handed over 200,000 rupiah to fraudsters after seeing a deepfake video of a prominent Indonesian businessman.

“I need money, but instead I’m asked to send money. They even made video calls with me, as if I were talking directly to them.”

During the Southeast Asian country’s presidential campaign, deepfakes became a prominent tool to spread misinformation both harmful and helpful to candidates.

But now that technology has fallen into the hands of criminals looking to make cold, hard cash.

WIDE CIRCULATION

AFP’s fact-checkers found the account behind the Prabowo clip has posted dozens of similar videos appearing to show various high-profile figures, including Indonesian Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka.

Those videos also promote the bogus financial aid.

Police arrested a suspect who pocketed 65 million rupiah from the scam, Himawan Bayu Aji, director of the Indonesian National Cyber Crime Unit told reporters in February.

He said officers detained a second person involved in another scam that also used deepfake technology, without disclosing the amount raised.

AFP Fact Check’s investigation found the spread of such videos had a much wider reach than the two accounts that police announced.

Deepfake videos of the president, a popular ex-general, were still circulating on social media after the arrests, including dozens on TikTok with the hashtag “Prabowo shares blessings”.

At least 22 TikTok accounts were touting the same fraudulent scheme since Prabowo took office in October, AFP journalists found, with some appearing to take advantage of his recent rise to the presidency.

One account with more than 77,000 followers racked up 7.5 million views on a fabricated video of Prabowo apparently doling out financial assistance.

Another account with thousands of followers has shared 100 videos since January alone, the majority featuring deepfake videos of the president offering cash.

TikTok said it had removed one of the deepfake scam videos and the associated account, adding it would continue to remove any that violated the platform’s community guidelines, which prohibit misleading posts.

Facebook parent Meta did not respond to AFP’s request for comment.

AFP, along with more than 100 other fact-checking organisations, is paid by TikTok and Meta to verify social media posts that potentially contain false information.

MORE ACCESSIBLE

Aribowo Sasmito, a co-founder of Indonesian fact-checking organisation Mafindo, said his team were finding new deepfake scams every week because of their prolific spread online.

“We have started to see deepfake videos since last year as AI tools have become more accessible and affordable,” he told AFP.

Schemes using deepfakes of prominent figures appear to be on the rise.

Tech billionaire Elon Musk and Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau are among a string of celebrities targeted in recent years by sophisticated impersonations to push cash scams.

Aribowo said his team of fact-checkers was working harder than ever to debunk these scams using the latest technology available to criminals.

“We noticed the quality of these videos has improved over time. It has become more difficult to distinguish between fake and real videos,” he added.

“The challenge is the volume of these scams.”

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A 5-year-old moves in with new foster parents. This is what happens in the first month

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Fostering provides these children with a secure family environment, with the aim of returning them to their birth families eventually, once the latter are assessed as safe to resume care for them.

Foster care applicants undergo suitability assessments, which include interview sessions, home visits, medical screening and reference checks. After approval, foster parents need to attend foundational and intermediate training courses to equip themselves with skills for supporting their foster child.

As to Ong and Chia’s approach to fostering? That would be to take things one step at a time.

“There’s a first for everything, so we didn’t know what to expect,” said Chia, who is a civil servant. “For the first night together, we’ve heard stories of kids who can’t sleep or (who) start crying and vomiting.”

To their relief, Isaac not only showed up cheerfully at their door, but also slept through the first night.

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GST hike did not ‘turbocharge’ inflation as WP chief asserted; figure fell in both years of increase: PM Wong

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DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY DECISION

Mr. Wong responded to MPs ‘ questions about the need to raise the GST given Singapore’s strong fiscal status by stating that the current status is “precisely because the authorities took the necessary steps earlier in this word to increase revenues.”

He claimed that Singapore may have run out on a gap after the state had chosen not to support the GST increase due to its unpopularity and that it would have avoided the sudden corporate income tax collections that have only been made in the previous two years.

The anticipated gap in FY2025 would also have been a gap, which would have resulted in less money for important service, less support for our elderly, and less money to invest in our potential. In essence, Singapore and Singaporeans would have been in a little worse place, he said.

The nation saw five costs in 2020 and three in 2021, with the government asking the president’s permission to pull from previous reserves five times. At the top of the COVID-19 crisis at the start of this century, Mr. Wong said, “feels like a bad vision and a distant recollection to all of us.

According to Mr. Wong, there was a lot of confusion regarding when the crisis would close, whether additional restrictions would have to be imposed, and how much deeper a fiscal opening Singapore may end up with.

” But we already knew for certain that spending demands may increase over the coming years. It was coming year after year. We could see it taking place. Healthcare saving was rising, particularly given our population’s fast aging, he said.

We looked at various ways to increase fees, including property and income taxes, but these measures were insufficient to cover the anticipated increase in spending, which was certain to occur.

The “difficult choice” was made to increase the GST, according to Mr. Wong, to close the cash gap.

” Government is about making dependable decisions, not only popular people, and it’s never easy to raise income, and certainly not a revenue like the GST,” he said.

” We must consider whether we want long-term security or short-term democracy. Do we want to make the difficult, but important decisions or to drop the can?

Mr. Wong emphasized that the GST enhance even included a detailed confirmation package, properly delaying its impact for the majority of Taiwanese households for at least five years.

” At the same time, we have a continuous GST ticket, which we also enhanced. He said that this makes sure that the GST and the GST card plan, when combined, support and protect the lower income groups over the long term and long term.

Mr. Wong emphasized that Singapore’s tax and transfer system is” reasonable and progressive,” and that organizations like the OED and other organizations have long recognized its strong fiscal system.

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Vouchers not a long term solution, government spending much more on structural programmes: PM Wong

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Mr. Wong argued that the current global culture is “very uncertain,” and that this will put pressure on smaller and available economy like Singapore.

” We have to be prepared for tougher competitors and do everything we you,” he continued.

According to Mr. Wong, the government announced a$ 3 billion addition to the National Productivity Fund to provide “extra firepower” to stay competitive and draw in investors.

The fund was established in 2010 to help with initiatives to increase efficiency and teach staff members. &nbsp,

” We are taking steps to improve our business ecosystem, our innovation and technology vehicles, and strengthen our system.” And these actions will ultimately lead to better jobs and better options for all Singaporeans, he continued.

According to Mr. Wong, the specialists will take “proactive steps” to make sure Singapore continues to be a trustworthy and trustworthy partner in international trade and commerce.

We may work even harder to remain present in today’s scattered world as a hub where businesses from all over the world you operate with confidence and assurance, he added.

Cultural Paying ARE EXPECTED TO AGREE,

Even with a robust and expanding business, Singaporeans ‘ day-to-day circumstances does change, according to Mr. Wong. &nbsp,

Members on both sides of the house were quick to bring up this in their remarks over the past two weeks, he said,” Life in a small town like Singapore with no countryside can be aggressive and difficult.” &nbsp,

He noted that “bolder moves” had been suggested by some aspirants for the government to implement social laws. &nbsp,

He claimed that there are numerous instances of social support programs that started with the best intentions but merely turned out to be more problematic around the world.

For instance, some states provide universal health care, but they are now dealing with rising prices and a clogged healthcare system.

This is not about federal spending, Mr. Wong said to be evident. &nbsp,

” We are willing to spend more where needed,” according to the statement” we are equally as important to get the policies right and make sure the general system is financially sound and sustainable.”

He claimed that” the foundations of our social system and social compact” are being gradually strengthened.

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Asia easing fast and furious against Trump’s tariffs – Asia Times

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Japan — It’s been years since financial activities in Bangkok had global repercussions. But the Bank of Thailand’s surprise rate cut on Wednesday ( February 26 ) signals how rapidly Donald Trump’s trade curbs are upending Asia’s 2025.

Bangkok was the site of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the next day it experienced financial conflict. Back then, the economy of Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea collapsed in spectacular currency crises style.

That dark time isn’t always about to repeat itself. The area has come a very long approach: banks are healthier, currencies trade more widely, governments are more visible, markets are more tenacious and main banks have enormous foreign exchange reserves.

But the BOT’s 25 basis-point cut to 2 %, its lowest level since July 2023, follows similar moves in Jakarta and Seoul to counter downside risks that bear US President Trump’s prints.

Bank Indonesia kicked points off with a 25 % interest rate cut in the middle of January. Governor&nbsp, Perry Warjiyo&nbsp, called the split “pro-stability and development” given “global and regional economic relationships”.

The Bank of Korea hit the economic fuel this year. On Tuesday, Governor Rhee Chang-Yong’s team sharply reduced its economic growth projection as it cut prices to 2.75 %. In the BOK’s speech, it cited Trump’s fast-expanding business conflict as the main motivator for easing.

Due to deteriorating socioeconomic sentiment and US price policies, the BOK predicted that local demand growth and export growth would be slower than originally anticipated. It is believed that local economic growth will continue to be stable while inflation will continue to grow.

Of course, the BOK is burying the result, financially speaking. Trump, it’s obvious, is only just getting started. And in a way that sends the three markets into a whirl and battens down the doors. On Thursday, for example, Trump said he’ll double tariffs on China to 20 %.

” While industry have begun to respond to these advances, deep tax risks are still being underpriced”, says Kamakshya Trivedi, a leading global strategist at Goldman Sachs.

Deborah Tan, an analyst at Moody’s Ratings, says Asia’s “overall plan response may be crucial in determining the total effect on credit power. We expect governments will probably work pragmatically, aiming to avoid increase with the US, preferring to communicate on a diplomatic basis, as shown by new developments”.

Even Trump seems unsure about where he’ll impose tariffs next and the scope of the curbs, according to earlier statements. Trump immediately addressed tariffs in Canada and Mexico at a Cabinet meeting this week about the latter being a done deal. Then, he suggested no taxes will ultimately be imposed.

” I have to tell you that, you know, on April 2, I was going to do it on April 1″, Trump said. ” But I’m a little bit superstitious, I made it April 2, the tariffs go on. Not all of them, but many of them.

In a note to clients, Capital Economics claims that Donald Trump’s victory in the November presidential election has only increased the uncertainty by causing significant penalties, tariffs, and the potential upheaval of traditional geopolitical alliances, which could also cause the rest of the world to become more uncertain.

The uncertainty, Capital Economics warns,” could end up weighing on global investment and consumer spending for an extended period, particularly if Trump repeatedly pushes back his tariff deadlines”.

To Paul Donovan, chief economist at UBS Global Wealth Management, the bewilderment factor makes for a uniquely challenging year for markets.

Case in point, he says, is” Trump’s very big announcement on reciprocal tariffs, which turned out to be a plan to investigate taxing US consumers at a future date. Markets had to decide whether the president was being a pushover or a protectionist, and for the time being, they are leaning in favor of pushover.

Of course “delay is seen as an opportunity to do’ deals,'” Donovan says. ” So far, such deals have been more spin than substance”.

Even though the headlines about US import tariffs continue to be a hot topic, according to Thierry Wizman, global rates strategist at Macquarie Bank,” there has been a clear deceleration of the” tax train.” There’s a sense that the administration’s approach to economic and national security issues is more transactional and less punitive”.

One explanation for the ever-shifting trade war plans is that Trump does indeed have his “kryptonite” ,&nbsp, notes Benjamin Tal, economist at CIBC World Markets. Shortly after the stock market reacted negatively to the news, Canada and Mexico were granted 30-day extensions on the 25 % tariff, Tal says.

One world leader who’s not confused about the turbulence to come is Xi Jinping, whose economy is Trump 2.0’s main obsession. Trump’s most recent announcement is a plan to levy an additional 10 % on imports from mainland China.

However, this week, China’s leader sounded more jittery than confident when he urged officials to stay calm as Beijing’s economic storm clouds loom.

China “must strengthen its political will and calmly respond to challenges brought about by changes in the domestic and international situation,” Xi told Politburo and State Council party members, according to Xinhua News Agency.

As Trump raises the stakes, Xi’s economic team begins. Trump has so far avoided paying 60 % tariffs on China, which he frequently threatened during the campaign trial. And now he’s reversing his previous approach, Joe Biden, and specifically focusing on the trade war.

For all its Biden criticisms, Team Trump is mulling ways to expand Biden’s curbs on Chinese semiconductors. The White House is also encouraging influential allies around the world to intensify efforts to stop China’s chip industry from expanding.

DeepSeek, a Chinese AI startup, is being investigated in the US. White House investigators are looking into DeepSeek‘s suspicions that it violated export controls to purchase sophisticated Nvidia chips in Singapore through a third party.

Tariffs, though, are still the main Trumpian event, raising collateral damage risks for Asia. And Trump trade advisors, like China hawk Peter Navarro, are angling for more.

” Trump’s new ‘ America First Investment Plan ‘ seals the fate of a deepening US-China conflict, reinforcing the earlier America First Trade Plan”, says Yale University’s Stephen Roach, formerly chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia.

” This isn’t an artful ploy for a grand deal with Beijing. Trump’s MAGA base is incredibly anti-China, which makes it all but impossible for him to change his tune. He’s cornered”!

From Trump World, new ways to complicate China’s year keep coming in. Case in point: possible fees on China-made commercial ships used for moving goods to slow China’s domination of ship-building.

China’s place in harm’s way has officials in Bangkok, Jakarta, Seoul and elsewhere slashing rates – and odds are there’s more monetary easing to come. That includes the Philippine central bank, which cut interest rates by 25 basis points in December.

It’s not that developing Asia worries about sustaining direct hits from Trump’s tariffs. It’s prepping for the indirect, but still devastating, blows to come as mainland China’s trade, investment and tourism shifts into reverse. China, which is subject to Trump’s tariffs, poses a serious threat to all of the world’s South.

Risks abound as Trump and his unelected enforcer Elon Musk systematically monitor US institutions that safeguard the value of US Treasury securities and the dollar, which are crucial to developing Asia’s trade-dependent economies. A US national debt that is close to$ 37 trillion would be significantly increased by the trillions of dollars in proposed tax cuts, according to Trump.

Trump and Musk are undermining the Internal Revenue Service’s function, which could alarm investors and credit rating organizations. This includes Asian central banks, which have nearly$ 3 trillion in assets.

Regardless, there are numerous economists who disagree on whether Trump’s bite will be as bad as his bark. &nbsp,

Our “aggressive Trump” scenario, which assumes high trade tariffs and significant deportations, would be stagflationary for the US economy and likely plunge the rest of the world into recession, according to Schroders ‘ economists in a note.

But, Schroders argues, “upside risks are also emerging. While DeepSeek could speed up AI adoption, macroeconomic reform is back on the agenda for governments looking for growth, and bank lending displays signs of life.

The economists add that” steep falls in oil prices could also conceivably relieve inflation pressures later in 2025″ at the same time.

Of course, the inflationary effects of Trump’s tariffs could dominate global pricing dynamics instead.

According to Chief Goldman Sachs economist Jan Hatzius, Trump’s tariffs will increase personal consumption expenditures (PCE), the preferred measure of the US Federal Reserve, by about 1 %. Already, that rate is running at 2.8 % annually.

According to our general rule,” We estimate that the proposed tariff increases would increase core PCE prices by 0.9 % if implemented, based on the assumption that every 1percentage point ] increase in the effective tariff rate would raise core PCE prices by 0.1 %.”

Gene Ma, head of China research at the Institute of International Finance, adds that “tariff-driven inflation complicates monetary policy, raising uncertainty for the Fed”. And for developing nations who fear that Trump might restore Asian financial crises.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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China’s grand plan for food self-sufficiency – Asia Times

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China’s plans to become an agrarian self-sufficiency by 2025 are crucial for both home stability and the broader international food landscape as global food security becomes a pressing issue.

While China remains the world’s largest food producer and exporter, with the largest meal supply system, Beijing remains vigilant about the long-term balance of its foods source.

Beijing continues to promote measures aimed at reducing dependence on outside sources while also boosting local manufacturing and securing outside agricultural investments to assure self-reliance in agrarian production.

Agriculture, the foundation of China’s business, is undergoing a critical change. The nation is transitioning from a “big nation with little farmers” to a “big and robust agricultural nation.”

In light of rising geopolitical tensions, shifting business relations, and environmental concerns, China’s approach to this problem and its ability to maintain its proper position on the global stage will be significant.

In a precarious political climate, China has increased its efforts to ensure a credible and lasting food supply. It also recognizes the urgency of safeguarding the country’s agricultural future.

According to Chinese President Xi Jinping,” The foods of the Chinese people must be produced by and be in the hands of the Taiwanese.” Xi and China’s policymakers have consistently placed food security at the forefront, recognizing it as a” top national priority” ( 国之大者 ) amid an increasingly complex global environment.

Resilience in the food supply has become more important than ever as a result of geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions, climate change, trade disruptions, systemic tensions with the US ( US), and unstable international food markets.

In reply, China has recently raised political objectives for food safety and endurance. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The transfer of China’s 2025″ No. 1 Central Document” on February 23 more underscores this commitment to ensuring national food safety. The report, an important policy speech from the central government, outlines important national targets.

For 2025, it focuses on remote regeneration, agricultural development, and securing the world’s food supply amid domestic and international issues.

The 2025 template highlights six key areas of focus: ensuring a steady supply of grain and important agrarian products, consolidating the gains of poverty alleviation, developing native industries, advancing remote construction, improving remote governance, and optimizing resource allocation in remote areas.

This report emphasizes the importance of self-sufficiency and steadiness in China’s food supply, positioning the nation to manage international uncertainties. Two key priorities for the nation’s food security strategy for 2025 include:

Ensuring grain supplies

China, the largest agricultural producer and importer in the world, has a significant influence on global grain markets, importing more than 157 million metric tons of soybeans and grains last year. Grain security remains central to China’s food policy, reflecting its crucial role in safeguarding the nation’s long-term food supply.

China’s need to increase output continues to grow despite record-high grain production in recent years, largely due to population growth and dietary changes, which are being driven by China’s growing population’s growing need for more meat, eggs, and dairy products. Maintaining a stable and trustworthy grain supply has become even more important as dietary habits change.

Grain production remains a cornerstone of China’s food security strategy. The 2025″ No. 1 Document” outlines a multi-pronged strategy: stabilizing grain planting areas, raising yields, and improving crop quality.

It uses biotechnology and targeted subsidies to boost the production of soybeans and oilseeds ( like canola and peanuts ) while putting a top priority on expanding production. For instance, pilot loan programs aim to incentivize grain and oilseed production in key regions, alongside inter-provincial coordination to optimize distribution.

At a press conference held by the State Council on February 24, officials stated that food security is still a top priority. Han Wenxiu, director of the Central Rural Affairs Office, warned against complacency, stating,” Grain production must be strengthened, not relaxed. The possibility of temporary price fluctuations shouldn’t let us forget that food security is still fragile.

To safeguard farmer morale, the central government also plan aims to introduce a policy toolkit that includes minimum purchase rates for rice and wheat, with market support purchases in various provinces ( such as Henan, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, and Anhui ), alongside the expansion of grain storage in key provinces.

These efforts build on the 2024 Central Rural Work Conference, which reaffirmed the government’s commitment to stabilizing domestic grain supply, with a focus on “absolute” stability in wheat and rice production—key pillars of China’s food security.

From 2003 to 2013, domestic grain production rose from 430 million metric tons to <a href="https://bioone.org/journals/journal-of-resources-and-ecology/volume-11/issue-4/j.issn.1674-764x.2020.04.004/Changes-in-Chinas-Grain-Production-Pattern-and-the-Effects-of/10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2020.04.004.full”>over 600 million metric tons, especially in key regions like the Yangtze River, Northeast China, and the North China Plains. Additionally, China has &nbsp, designated key areas&nbsp, for the production of staple crops like double-cropping rice and high-quality wheat in the Yangtze River Economic Belt.

Recent achievements underscore this momentum. In 2024, China’s grain output reached a record high of 706.5 million metric tons, a 1.6 percent increase from the previous year. At the same time, the national average yield per mu ( 0.0067 hectares ) rose to 394.7 kilograms (kg ), an increase of 5.1 kg from 2022. This is largely due to yield improvements contributing to&nbsp, more than 80 percent&nbsp, of the overall grain production increase.

To sustain this trajectory, the MARA released a statement in January outlining ambitious targets: raising annual grain production by&nbsp, 50 million metric tons by 2030&nbsp, ( a 7 percent increase ) and maintaining over&nbsp, 1.75 billion &nbsp, mu&nbsp, ( 117 million hectares ) of farmland dedicated to grain cultivation.

In line with these objectives, China’s current&nbsp, Five-Year Agricultural Plan&nbsp, targets annual grain production exceeding 770 million tons, alongside a push to increase domestic soybean production to 23 million tons by 2025. In response to uncertainty surrounding global trade, the central government aims to lessen its reliance on imports from Western nations.

Agricultural innovation and technology

Amid rising supply chain uncertainties and climate challenges, China has prioritized agricultural security and technological self-sufficiency. China’s current” No. 1 document” emphasizes agricultural technology as central to its food security strategy.

The central government plans to accelerate the research and application of advanced, domestically produced agricultural machinery and smart farming systems, including artificial intelligence ( AI), 5G, big data, and low-altitude systems, to enhance efficiency across the sector.

To support this, China aims to establish 500 national-level agricultural industrialization consortiums by 2025. These consortiums will foster collaboration among research institutions, agribusinesses, and farmers, focusing on drought-resistant crops, smart machinery, and sustainable practices.

China is expected to continue encouraging efforts in agricultural innovation, particularly regarding the&nbsp, productivity of key grains and oilseeds&nbsp, ( like rice, wheat, corn, soybeans, and rapeseed ) to achieve national food production and related food security goals.

To this end, &nbsp, Beijing&nbsp, has &nbsp, consistently emphasized&nbsp, the need for increased local production, evident in policy measures, &nbsp, targets, and&nbsp, five-year plans.

More broadly, to support this technological transformation and help safeguard the country’s food future, China has already heavily invested in biotechnology and digital technologies. Despite some public opposition, this includes supporting the development of genetically modified ( GM ) crops like soybeans and corn.

Although the country’s plans for food security still contain the commercialization of GM crops, a number of things suggest that it is moving in this direction. Notably, in late 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs ( MARA ) approved safety certificates for 12 GM crop varieties, signaling a long-term strategy to integrate biotechnology into China’s food security framework.

More recently, in February 2025, MARA released the Key Areas of National Agricultural Technology Innovation ( 2024-2028 ) which outlines 10 key priority areas: the cultivation of new agricultural varieties, soil quality improvement, agricultural

machinery equipment development, pest and disease prevention in crops, livestock and aquatic diseases control, efficient planting and breeding, green and low-carbon agriculture, agricultural product processing and food manufacturing, agricultural product quality and safety, and rural development.

The document further underscores the importance of technological innovation in China’s pursuit of global ( agricultural ) leadership, particularly in AI and biotechnologies.

Concurrently, the central Chinese government is pushing to create new seed varieties. Chinese President Xi has called for an independent seed industry in recent years. This goes against previous leadership objectives to bring about technological advancements in seed development.

In order to reduce reliance on imported seeds, current research also looks at high-yield hybrid seed technologies for important crops. These efforts are more broadly linked to national five-years ( such as the&nbsp, National Medium and Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan ( 2021-2035 ) and the 14th Five-Year Agricultural Plan ( 2021-2025 ), which emphasize the creation of new food sources to achieve China’s broader strategy of agricultural self-sufficiency.

Simultaneously, the country is embracing&nbsp, digitization&nbsp, to modernize agriculture, as exemplified by a multitude of national plans like the&nbsp, National Smart Agriculture Implementation Plan ( 2024-2028 ) &nbsp, and the 14th Five-Year Plan for Agricultural Modernization ( 2021-2025 ).

The former includes, among others, the construction of&nbsp, “digital villages” &nbsp, and modern agricultural parks aimed at enhancing productivity through technological innovation. China’s goal of transforming agriculture through improved efficiency and digital technologies is crucial to these initiatives.

Food challenges

Significant domestic and international challenges face China’s agricultural transformation and wider efforts to ensure food security. In addition to concerns about growing import reliance on key agricultural products ( such as edible oil ), which reshape the country’s food consumption, and extreme weather events that destroy parts of local production, other factors should be considered.

Despite these successes, challenges remain. Demographic and environmental pressures, which call for significant investment and structural shifts in technology and infrastructure, make scaling up grain production difficult to achieve. China’s ability to accomplish these lofty objectives will depend on how far it can go.

China’s agricultural model, primarily based on small family farms scattered across the country, faces significant challenges to modernization, particularly in adopting&nbsp, agricultural technologies&nbsp, and standardizing practices.

Some initiatives, like the&nbsp, National Agricultural Technology and Education Cloud Platform, &nbsp, aim to address these gaps through online training. However, more aggressive efforts are required to expand agricultural innovation to ensure long-term food security.

Additionally, growing certain agricultural products can be&nbsp, much more expensive&nbsp, in China than in other countries, such as the US, and the yield may be much lower too. According to data from the United Nations&nbsp, Food and Agriculture Organization, corn and soybean yields in China are roughly half as high as those in many of the Americas ‘ exporting nations, which have comparatively high yields per hectare.

When it comes to soybeans, for instance, the average yield for soybeans in the US is about 3.5 tons per hectare in comparison to China’s 1.6 tons per hectare.

Similarly, for corn, the average on-farm yield of corn is 11-12 tons per hectare in the US, while China’s average corn yield is 6.2 tons per hectare. Given China’s major water, soil, and arable land constraints, addressing yield gaps is important for Beijing to achieve its food production goals. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

Additionally, disposable income increases are causing the country’s changing food consumption structure, with consumers demanding more of the pricey animal protein and dairy, as well as sugar, edible oils, and processed foods. This is reflected in the country’s changing food consumption structure. &nbsp, By 2025, China is expected to account for 31 % of the&nbsp, total global increase of protein consumption.

China’s overall food demand is projected to increase by 16 to 30 % by 2050, while demand for meat like beef and dairy products is projected to nearly double due to the middle class’s continued growth. To meet this demand, some&nbsp, researchers&nbsp, argue that up to 12, 000 square kilometers of additional agricultural land within China is necessary. &nbsp,

Financial barriers exacerbate challenges. Smallholder farmers, who manage&nbsp, more than 70 % &nbsp, of China’s agricultural land, are particularly burdened by these financial constraints. Many also struggle with&nbsp, limited access to credit.

Studies show that 18.87 % of family farms in China&nbsp, face a gap in operating funds, with&nbsp, around 26.20 percent&nbsp, unable to fully bridge funding gaps even after securing lands, further deterring investments in agricultural technologies.

At the same time, local governments are trapped in a vicious cycle of&nbsp, high debt and dwindling revenues. This implies that they may struggle to raise money for rural initiatives or put a lower price on them. While the government has &nbsp, introduced measures&nbsp, such as&nbsp, a 10 billion yuan ( US$ 1.38 billion ) in one-off subsidy&nbsp, in 2023 to boost farmers ‘ incomes, these efforts fail to tackle the underlying financial and structural barriers.

A 2024 debt relief package of&nbsp, 10 trillion yuan&nbsp, ($ 1.4 trillion ) also offers limited respite, as municipalities grapple with plummeting revenues from land sales —a consequence of the ongoing real estate crisis.

Local governments will be under even greater fiscal strain as total government debt is projected to rise by nearly 150 percent of the GDP by 2030. As a result, this could put investments into agriculture—such as rural infrastructure and technological innovation—at risk.

Concurrently, China grapples with demographic challenges, including&nbsp, declining fertility rates&nbsp, and a shrinking workforce. In 2022, approximately&nbsp, 176.6 million people&nbsp, — or 24.1 percent of the workforce — were employed in agriculture, fishing, and related industries.

The vast majority of this workforce (90 % ) are &nbsp, smallholder farmers. Nevertheless, the average age of agricultural workers is 53, with over a quarter aged 60 or older. This growing population poses a significant challenge to agricultural productivity and, conversely, wage growth. &nbsp,

Projections are also grim. By 2050, the proportion of the country’s agricultural workforce in China could plunge to&nbsp, around 3 %, while the total agricultural labor force may fall to under&nbsp, 31 million.

These workforce issues, which are essential to the agricultural supply chain, extend beyond agriculture and affect industries like transportation and logistics. By the end of 2021, China faced a shortage of 4 million truck drivers, a problem likely to worsen as the working-age population declines and younger people pursue&nbsp, better opportunities&nbsp, in cities.

In 2021, the number of&nbsp, rural migrant workers&nbsp, reached&nbsp, 292.51 million, a 2.4 % ( 6.91 million ) year-on-year increase. Due to this demographic shift, China will soon experience a shrinking agricultural workforce and fewer rural workers available for crucial industries like transportation and logistics, which are essential to maintaining food supply chains.

China has made significant advancements in ensuring its food security. But the path to agricultural self-sufficiency by 2025 is fraught with challenges. In the end, the country’s ability to provide a stable and resilient food supply to its expanding population will depend on how well it can overcome these obstacles, which range from technological limitations to demographic shifts.

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A coming age of changing borders – Asia Times

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The US senator has been putting pressure on NATO allies for weeks as he continues to deliberate Donald Trump’s programs for trying to resolve problems in Ukraine and Israel.

After his 2024 election win, Trump repeatedly raised the possibility of annexing the Danish province of Greenland, having initially done so in 2019. His new attack on a vital ally shocked Europe and the world community, which he had previously dismissed as absurd.

Trump has reiterated his position and also reiterated his intention to create the state’s 51st express in November 2024. Up until the middle of the 20th century, there was violent conflict between the two countries, but violent annexation is now unthinkable due to operational difficulties, close ties, and pleasant relations between the US and Canada.

Trump has since doubled down, adding that his comments about capturing the Panama Canal and Gaza have heightened fears that the world’s most powerful nation is genuinely interested in expanding its territory.

Trump’s motivations—whether a business strategy against Canada, securing greater military right in Greenland, or another reasons—remain vague. However, Washington’s interventionist policy tilt coincides with fast-moving negotiations with Russia to try to end the war in Ukraine, good by ceding area to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Israel is considering its unique border combination, including probably permanent pogroms of Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, and formalizing its invasion of Syria’s Golan Heights.

Trump’s actions, which were once seen as social theater, now appear to be a part of wider efforts to alter the debate on borders, which could lead to an unpredictably new era of regional conflicts.

Following World War II, the global community generally resisted border modifications, even in the context of independence, in dread of spreading instability, independence, and conquest. The 1975 Helsinki Accords, in change, cemented Europe’s postwar borders, discouraging harsh shifts while allowing for peaceful and mutually agreed changes.

After the Cold War, aspiring innovators hoped this design would continue. Germany’s unification in 1990 was followed by Czechoslovakia’s affectionate cut in 1992, and European regional issues had by then been reduced to legal fights, as part of a international, administrative approach to conflict resolution that was expected to spread into Eastern Europe and beyond.

Territories erupted in the newly independent states emerging from former communist Europe, despite having no clear ways of resolving them. In the former Soviet Union, Russian-backed separatists in Moldova and Georgia kept conflicts unresolved.

Uneasy peace was brought on by US and NATO involvement in former Yugoslavia until Western support for Kosovo’s 2008 independence sprang up tensions and divided allies.

Similarly, Western-supported independence efforts in Eritrea ( 1993 ) and South Sudan ( 2011 ) led to prolonged violence, while other secessionist and annexation movements continued to test the West’s commitment to managing territorial integrity globally.

Despite these difficulties, the US-led efforts to uphold the status quo largely lasted until 2022, when Russia launched the largest territorial expansion campaign in Europe since World War II.

Russia’s incursion as it unfolded on NATO’s doorstep was unavoidable despite the fact that Western powers have provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine and prevented Russia from acquiring Kyiv. Since then, confidence in the permanence of established borders has been shattered by the exposed limits of Western deterrence.

Trump appears eager to normalize it and designate the US as its primary beneficiary if a new era of territorial changes has begun. While negotiating border changes elsewhere, the US asserts dominance in a changing world order and even assumes more de facto control over Greenland or the strategically important Panama Canal.

In his first term, Trump hinted at recognizing Crimea, seized from Ukraine by Russia in 2014, and appears to accept that Ukraine will not return to its pre-2022 or even pre-2014 borders. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio convened in Saudi Arabia on February 18, 2025, to discuss Ukraine peace talks.

What does Trump want, though, given that Trump’s intentions regarding Ukraine remain vague, leaves room for improvement? Cutting costs, positioning the US as a peacemaker, calming international markets and potentially securing access to Ukrainian resources are among the possibilities.

However, crafting a deal that looks like a win for US foreign policy will be difficult, making the perception of Washington’s own territorial expansion key.

While increasing control over Canada seems unlikely, Moscow is” closely watching” Trump’s remarks about Greenland. Trump’s open proposal has some weight, following a covert attempt by the US to buy Greenland in 1946.

Russia’s officials and media have suggested that Greenland should be divided equally, but they take it more seriously because they think Washington is pressuring Denmark for more military access.

Given their growing Arctic military presence, proposals for agreements like a Compact of Free Association with Greenland after its potential independence from Denmark would likely sputter heavily on Russia and China. Moscow’s resistance may be softened by concessions in Ukraine, though this remains uncertain.

Washington’s openness to bilateral territorial adjustments, bypassing multilateral arbitration, will still require Ukraine’s consent and consideration of Greenlanders ‘ ( or any other territory’s ) wishes.

Any US-Russian territorial agreement could have an impact on Israel’s territorial ambitions in Gaza and Syria following Bashar al-Assad’s government’s demise in December 2024.

In 2019, Trump recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a strategically important Syrian region under Israeli control since the 1967 Six-Day War.

His decision, which the Biden administration later upheld, established a precedent for the US acknowledging Israeli territorial claims. Israeli forces quickly retreated to the UN-designated buffer zone to take control of the country after Assad’s government fell, and the Israeli government announced plans to expand its population there.

The Golan Heights provides Israel with a strategic, elevated military position, critical freshwater reserves, and other natural resources. Israel faces little resistance to reinforcing its hold and potentially expulsion the UN in the process, with Syria’s government collapse and Damascus no longer a significant threat.

Strengthening its influence may also allow Israel to portray its most recent military operations as victories, as well as the deterioration of” Iran’s proxy network.”

Russia wants to keep a military presence in Syria despite the fall of Assad, which could stifle other countries from blocking Israeli incursions into the Golan Heights while using its influence over Hamas in Gaza to control tensions.

By deepening cooperation with Israel—closely tied to Trump—Moscow may hope to secure concessions in Ukraine. On February 24, 2025, Israel was one of 18 countries, including the US, to vote against a UN resolution condemning Russia as an aggressor for its actions in Ukraine.

Trump’s unwavering support for Israel strengthens its position and compels other regional nations to do the same. Jordan, which relies on water from the Golan Heights, will likely be compelled to accept Israeli actions, a dynamic that also extends to Gaza.

After Trump had suggested their relocation, King Abdullah II of Jordan met with Trump on February 11, 2025, to discuss the relocation of Palestinians from Gaza. The King, wary of Jordan’s past instability with Palestinian refugees, firmly rejected Trump’s proposal for large-scale Palestinian resettlement.

However, his offer to immediately take in 2, 000 injured children was a tacit acknowledgment of the feasibility of limited relocation, inadvertently lending a degree of credibility to Trump’s larger proposal.

Although the timing of these agreements is still uncertain, agreements with Russia and Israel could reshape international border laws and lead to uncontrollable consequences as the US withdraws from enforcing territorial integrity. Russia and Israel are likely to increase their gains.

Syria is engaged in conflict with Kurdish independence movements and Turkish control in the north. Kurdish independence aspirations extend into Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, directly clashing with those countries, while Turkey‘s ambitions of a “greater Turkey” include expansive control over Cyprus and the Aegean Islands.

Sudan and Ethiopia have territorial disputes in Africa, whereas Ethiopia has longstanding disputes with Eritrea and Somalia. Meanwhile, the country’s growing internal divisions threaten to worsen.

Additionally, the decades-long conflict between Morocco and the Algeria-backed Western Sahara reignited in 2020. In exchange for Morocco’s recognition of Israel in December 2020, the US became the first nation to do so during Trump’s final weeks of office.

Yet here, Trump appears to have paved the way for a new direction, with Israel recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in 2023 and France following in 2024. Numerous other nations have since increased their support for Morocco’s position, but they have abstained completely.

Unabhängig of whether the US was simply ahead of the curve in Morocco, a risky escalation is looming elsewhere. China, observing Russia’s potential acquisitions in Ukraine, has numerous territorial disputes it could escalate, a traditional part of its geopolitical strategy.

Tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea, in particular, could lead to clashes with the US and its allies. China and India continue to fight over their Himalayan border despite recent de-escalation, while India and Pakistan continue to be locked in a conflict over Kashmir, with the threat of nuclear war raising the stakes even more.

Closer to home, tensions along the Belize-Guatemala border also carry the risk of escalation. And, since 2023, Venezuela’s growing claims to Guyana’s Essequibo region, 70 % of Guyana’s territory, have marked a significant shift in the Americas.

An increase in violence on the US southern border could worsen the migrant crisis, putting the question on American borders whether they are strong enough to handle additional pressures.

Despite efforts to defend border integrity, colonial-era boundaries, long-established grievances, and sudden state collapses after the end of the Cold War have challenged territorial stability, with the West largely attempting to maintain order.

His administration instead concentrates on strengthening borders at home while utilizing vulnerabilities abroad, which suggests that global territorial management is not worthwhile.

Changes in Ukraine and Israel may not occur overnight, but years of groundwork, coupled with ongoing deliberations, could accelerate the process and potentially include US territorial expansion.

It’s uncertain whether other nations or upcoming administrations will accept these decisions. However, if Washington sets a new standard, it will prompt other nations to pursue territorial changes more openly, inviting ethnic cleansing and even genocides.

Washington’s ability to control this dynamic is unproven, as is its response to emerging foreign disputes and potential internal secession attempts. What will come after agreements with Russia and Israel over territory allow the White House political breathing room, it’s not clear what will happen.

John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, DC, and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book,” Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas”, was published in December 2022.

The Independent Media Institute’s Economy for All project produced this article. It is republished with permission.

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If Trump attempts World Bank retreat, China-led AIIB could step in – Asia Times

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Donald Trump is well known for his hostility toward internationalism and international businesses. The US senator made the announcement to leave the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the World Health Organization shortly after taking office on January 20, 2025.

Was the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund follow? Surely, supporters of the twin organizations – that have formed the backbone of world economic order for 80 years – are concerned. A Trump-ordered evaluation of Washington’s support for all international organizations has sparked fears that the US will endow more money or withdraw it immediately.

But any receding of U. S. authority in international financial institutions may, I believe, run counter to the president’s apparent political goals, creating a suction for China to move into and get on a bigger international role.

In particular, weakening the World Bank and any other multilateral development banks, or MDB, that has a large US presence may present an opportunity for a little-known, fairly new Chinese-led global business: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank– which, since its inception, has supported the pretty diplomacy the U. S. is attacking.

AIIB’s contradictory function

Nine years ago, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ( AIIB ) as a means of investing in infrastructure and other related sectors in Asia while promoting “regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions.”

Since then, it has provided an example of an international organization that is willing to cooperate closely with other significant international organizations and adhere to global growth banking standards and standards.

This may conflict with the portrayal of Beijing’s global efforts that are frequently portrayed by China eagles, of whom there are many in the Trump presidency, who frequently envision a China that is determined to undermine the progressive, Western-led world order.

However, as some researchers and other Chinese experts have suggested, Beijing’s policies in international monetary management are frequently nuanced, with actions that both support and denigrate the liberal world order.

As I explain in my new guide, it is apparent that the AIIB is a paradox today: an institution created by an authoritarian government but connected to the rules and standards of the progressive global order.

A group of men and women sits during a forum.
Foreign Finance Minister Lou Jiwei addresses the audience at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank signing ceremony on October 24, 2014, in Beijing. Photo: Takaki Yajima / POOL

The AIIB has a strong connection to the rules-based system, as demonstrated by its numerous joint relationships with other significant multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank under the leadership of Japan.

In this context, the AIIB might offer a Taiwanese opposition in a country where US leadership is waning.

The AIIB’s collaborative pattern

Multilateral development banks have been providing the crucial role of lending billions of dollars annually to promote economic and social development for years.

They can be important sources of funding for poverty reduction, inclusive economic growth and lasting development, with a newer focus on climate change. These global lenders have also been remarkably resilient in the current climate of discord and crisis, with member countries earnestly looking into ways to improve their standing.

At the same time, MDBs frequently receive criticism from civil society organizations because they point out areas of poor performance and are concerned about potential negative effects of the main MDBs ‘ greater focus on working more closely with the private market. Big” MDBs were built around a set of geopolitical and economic strength relationships that are disintegrating before our eyes,” according to MDB professional Chris Humphrey.

There was a lot of concern among key countries about China’s motives when Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed in 2013 the establishment of the AIIB to aid in the development of infrastructure in Asia.

The Obama administration responded by urging different nations to abstain from joining. Its priority was that China may use lending to expand its influence in the area without upholding strict environmental and social standards.

However, all the other main nonborrowing countries, with the exception of Japan, joined the new lender. Now, the AIIB is the second-largest international development banks in terms of member states, behind simply the World Bank. It now has 110 member governments, which translates to over 80 % of the world population. With US$ 100 billion in cash, it is one of the medium-sized international loans.

From the get-go, the AIIB was designed to be collaborative. Jin Liqun, the first president of the bank, has a long history of multilateralism, having spent many years working for the Chinese banking department, the World Bank, the Global Environmental Facility, and vice president of the Asian Development Bank.

Previous executive managers and staff from the IMF and other development bankers were among the international group of experts who assisted in the creation of the AIIB, as well as two American with much careers at the World Bank who played key roles in the creation of the company’s articles of agreement and its environmental and social model.

How the AIIB influenced people to learn from them

In a variety of ways, the bank fits into the international development environment. The Asian Development Bank’s mandate, which promotes “regional cooperation and collaboration in addressing growth challenges,” is directly related to the Asian Development Bank’s base.

The AIIB has environmental and social norms in line with other important multilateral development banks, as well as its conventions and policies.

The AIIB collaborates closely with its classmates, besides stealing fundamental ideas. The World Bank originally ran the AIIB’s government functions. In its early years, the AIIB co-financed a significant portion of its assignments with other bilateral development institutions.

In a recent sign of cooperation, in 2023, a deal between the AIIB and World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( IBRD ) saw the AIIB issue up to$ 1 billion in guarantees against IBRD sovereign-backed loans. This increased the IBRD’s capacity to provide more money, while diversifying the AIIB’s payment collection.

As of February 6, 2025, the AIIB had 306 approved initiatives totaling$ 59 billion. Its two biggest lending sources are transport and power. Recent projects that have received approval include funding for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s wind power plants and an Indian solar power plant. India, which has a slippery partnership with China, is one of the company’s largest consumers, together with Turkey and Indonesia.

collaborating and competing with China

From its conception until recently, the bilateral AIIB has frequently distinguished itself from China’s diplomatic efforts. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a framework for network borrowing by Chinese corporations that has been criticized for lacking transparency and accountability, is one of them.

However, some Belt and Road-linked initiatives have faced problems about problem, costs and the transparency of the loan contracts.

The AIIB has made more mention of the benefits of working with Belt and Road lenders in recent years, and the lender now houses the Secretariat of a service called the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance, which provides grants and assistance to developing nations seeking to finance equipment in nations where Belt and Road lending takes place. This may blur the distinction between loaning under Belt and Road and AIIB, but it doesn’t appear to lower the company’s standards.

No fresh concerns about the impact of the Chinese government at the AIIB. In June 2023, Canada froze its ties to the bank in a pending investigation into a French employee’s dramatic resignation after claiming that the bank was ruled by Communist Party users.

No additional member countries expressed their concern, and Canada has not yet released a report on the situation. An internal review by an AIIB executive director contained no findings to support the claims.

It would be wise for the new US administration to consider the variations in China’s strategies in global economic leadership as its formulation of its policies toward China may require more complex responses. Recognition of areas of assistance, competition, and conflict calls for more complex responses. The US will cooperate with China in many areas while competing with China.

Interestingly, any actions by the Trump administration to reshape multilateral organizations could put the AIIB in a better position to collaborate than the world’s leading multilateral development banks and the US, regardless of whether or not it is an anomaly. role.

At American University, Tamar Gutner is an associate professor.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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