Moves (Page 12)

Editors seeking a tale typically concentrate on answering the “five Ws,” but in South Korea that has often been challenging.

That was undoubtedly the case during a time of military rules in the 1970s and 1980s, when the military-backed authorities had all the means to terrify Asian editors. Federal officials were known to use wiretaps to spie on international journalists, and they even blackmailed some of them after being caught in honey traps with sexual partners.

The nation has become more transparent since it first became a republic in 1987, and a shoddy coup attempt by President Yoon Suk Yeol failed before any judges from the coup plotters ‘ group may prevent the world from learning the fairly completely compiled responses to four of the five W questions regarding the incident: the who, the what, the when, and the where.

It appears that Yoon colluded with some members of the military by appointing General Park An-su, the chief of staff of the Republic of Korea Army, to be in charge of military rules. But, in the National Assembly in Seoul on Tuesday ( December 3 ), with soldiers in battle gear trying to get in and shut down the country’s parliament, Yoon’s own civilian party leader turned on the president.

Yoon had stacked the defense with loyalists. but he hadn’t protected his civil side. He had decreed military laws, but his order was rejected in congress.

We’re still waiting to see if the public and his quick boss, Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, who are reportedly held responsible by the leader for poor advice, resign, and how the whole situation ends up having an impact on the president’s reputation, who is apparently very unhappy halfway through a five-year elected term.

Some people will feel justified in joke describing the situation as a ludicrous returning to 1980s politicians from responses to those four Ws. As Karl Marx said: First moment drama, next day comedy.

But in reality we don’t hear quite enough to be certain that’s a good judgment. The second W, or “why,” is what has been lacking in this story thus far. Yoon did it for what reason?

Begin with the description he gave in his televised statement announcing martial law on Tuesday night in Seoul:

I therefore declare crisis martial law to protect a liberal South Korea from the dangers posed by North Korea’s communist troops and to stop anti-state groups from plundering people’s freedom and happiness.

This give the president the benefit of the doubt and believe, for the moment, for purposes of figuring things out, that he was advised to do so by his troops.

Retired US Marine Colonel Grant Newsham, who frequently writes for Asia Times about military issues, says in an message that he is” curious to know why he did it and why the army went down.” In response to Yoon’s mention of” challenges posed by North Korea’s socialist causes, Something specific? If not, not a good move”.

Let’s find out why the defense minister and the army under General Park continued to support Yoon’s plan until National Assembly lawmakers stood up and voted to reject the presidential order.

First, there is, indeed, a history here. The military-backed regime rolled back in the 1970s and 1980s by using an alleged heightened threat from North Korea as a pretext for grabbing power.

One of the two authors in the article you’re reading, who is asking today if the Seoul Hilton concierge is still holding his gas mask and helmet in preparation for the following round, was directly involved in this situation.

The North did not resist the temptation to move militarily south in large enough units to be found after the assassination of South Korean President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, at a time when there was great conflict in the South. Some of the reports coming out of Seoul to the contrary were pure lies created by the forces supporting ailing Major General Chun Doo-hwan’s ultimately successful power grab.

South Korean government officials were caught red-handed by reporters from the Baltimore Sun Tokyo bureau in fabricating a report that claimed Northern plans to invade the South appeared to be taking off.

Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwak claimed that a” close ally” had informed the government that North Korea’s infiltration-trained Eighth Army Corps had been a long distance from intelligence surveillance in a briefing with South Korean journalists on May 10, 1980. The unit might show up in South Korea, perhaps between May 15 and May 20.

At the time, South Korea had only two” close allies”, the United States and Japan. Thus it was a simple matter to check, and to report in the Sun the next morning, that neither ally had provided this information.

Instead, the Japanese said the South Koreans had been trying to peddle the “intelligence” to them, claiming it came from China – a country that certainly was not a close ally. A Japanese source blatantly stated,” The South Korean inquiry appeared to be something of an advertising balloon.

With this historical background, it should have been no surprise on early on Wednesday when the military announced that no unusual North Korean movements had been detected after the South Korean special forces soldiers assigned to enforce martial law had left the premises and the mission had been abandoned.

What do you believe Kim Jong Un will accomplish? asks Stanford’s Daniel Sneider, whose Asia Times byline is familiar to you, dear readers. ” Sit tight and enjoy the show, I imagine”.

In fact, Kim Jong Un of North Korea doesn’t believe it’s time to act now that the recent events on Seoul’s streets don’t sound remotely sufficient.

Korean Military Academy loyalists dispute the claim that North Korean forces even actively participated in the Gwangju uprising a little later in May 1980, when Seoul’s streets were on fire.

They contend that Chun and his sidekick Roh Tae-woo, both of whom were honorable KMA graduates and later became president, would not have oppressed the populace in the manner that those two and their special forces subordinates were, and that doing is said to have contributed to the uprising.

History as guidance has its limits. Before the soldiers who enforce martial law stood down at the National Assembly, Sneider noted in an email that” we will have to see how much of the army follows the orders.” ” This is not 1979 or 1980″. &nbsp,

Moving on, and again giving Yoon the benefit of the doubt, note that, in the president’s justification for martial law, he tied North Korea to “anti-state” elements at home.

Yoon has been a significant critic of pro-North groups who he believes are attempting to politically overthrow South Korea with some success. We all seem to be at odds with South Korea and its allies that this is a serious issue. The Asia Times has long been making it known.

However, it is not a new problem. Moon Jae-in’s five-year noticeably pro-North presidency immediately preceded Yoon’s taking up residency in the Blue House. And Kim Jong Un did not occupy South Korea at the time.

We are not aware of the evidence if the issue has reached the certifiable Fifth Column stage and needs to be recognized as an emergency that warrants the establishment of a new military dictatorship.

One more element of this subject might be involved here. Very likely, there was no measurable, more significant threat from North Korea. The entire world was furious at the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, allegedly even to the Kursk frontline, so Yoon made the perfect hints at one.

Oh, and add one more thing: Yoon and the military may have intended to stop Trump from speaking with Kim again. What does the not-quite new background tell us about Yoon’s motivation to pull the martial law stunt at this specific time, though?

Here we must get into purely domestic politics. Yoon has a history of fighting with his own party leader Han and rules against an opposition majority in parliament. With a tight budget, the opposition wants to stifle him, and they’ve got to go after his wife on corruption charges as well.

Meanwhile, apparently the drill is to take a leaf out of ancient South Korean 1970s and 80s history, hype the North Korean threat and rule by decree. Yoon’s move had some potential success, as the president had stacked the military against rebellious anti-North Korean sympathisers. But the venture failed.

Where do we go from there in this argument? Even deeper into domestic politics, probably. Stay tuned for that.

” This is an act of political suicide”, says Newsham. ” Yoon did a shoot, ready, aim sort of thing. He’s right about pro-NK and pro-CCP elements in the opposition. But, man, this doesn’t look good. Hard to put the egg back together. It’s not difficult to imagine a few parties who can benefit from this turn of events if one is a chess player.

Uwe Parpart&nbsp, is publisher and editor-in-chief of Asia Times. Follow him on X @uwe_parpart

Associate Editor Bradley K. Martin covered the democratization movement in South Korea for Newsweek and the Baltimore Sun before moving on to the Baltimore Sun. Follow him on X @bradleykmartin

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India’s strategic nuclear arsenal took a bold leap forward with the first operational trial of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, setting the stage for intensified rivalry with China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean.

Last month, Indian Research Defence Wing (IDRW) reported that the INS Arihant, India’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), successfully tested the K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

The K-4 SLBM has a range of approximately 3,500 kilometers and represents a substantial upgrade over the K-15 missile, which has a range of only 750 kilometers. The IDRW report notes the trial marked a crucial step in integrating long-range SLBMs into India’s underwater strategic forces, enhancing the nation’s nuclear second-strike capability.

The K-4’s tests were conducted from submerged platforms, ensuring the missile’s effectiveness in realistic underwater launch scenarios, the IDRW report said. The successful trial underscores India’s commitment to maintaining a credible minimum deterrent while adhering to its no-first-use nuclear doctrine.

The K-5 SLBM, which is under development and has a range of over 5,000 kilometers, will further bolster India’s strategic capabilities.

In a September 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and other writers mention that the K-4’s capabilities are similar to those of the Agni-III intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

Kristensen and others say that India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) claims the K-4 reaches “near zero circular error probability,” although they view that statement skeptically. They assess that the K-4 can hit all of Pakistan and most of China from protected bastions in the northern Bay of Bengal.

They write India’s SSBNs have launch tubes that carry one K-4 or three K-15 SLBMs. While they note rumors and speculation that the K-4 SLBM has multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, this seems unlikely, given the missile’s limited capability.

However, that may change soon. In March 2024, Asia Times reported that India had successfully conducted its first flight test of the Agni-5 missile equipped with MIRV technology, marking a significant advancement in its strategic defense capabilities.

The test, carried out on Abdul Kalam Island in the Bay of Bengal, positions India among the elite nations with MIRV technology, including the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Pakistan.

Integrating MIRV technology enhances India’s second-strike capability, complicating adversaries’ missile defense strategies and reinforcing its no-first-use nuclear policy.

Further, Kristensen and others mention that senior Indian defense officials have stated that the DRDO is planning to develop a 5,000-kilometer-range SLBM based on the land-based Agni-V. This would enable Indian submarines to strike targets across Asia as well as various regions of Africa, Europe and the Indo-Pacific area, including the South China Sea.

Debak Das mentions in an April 2024 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article that India’s sea-based nuclear arsenal, possibly equipped with MIRV SLBMs, will be the cornerstone of its second-strike capability and could seek to nullify China’s recent advancements in missile defense. He notes that MIRV-ed SLBMs will bolster the Indian Navy’s “continuous at-sea deterrence” capability, ensuring survivable nuclear force during a first strike.

China is unlikely to ignore such developments. In June 2024, Asia Times mentioned China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

China’s potential utilization of its economic influence to secure base access at Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, thereby strengthening its sole overseas military installation in Djibouti, could contest India’s supremacy in the Indian Ocean and heighten India’s concerns regarding encirclement.

While China’s base in Djibouti can facilitate its naval operations in the Indian Ocean, it is situated at the terminus of fragile supply lines, isolated and operationally constrained due to the lack of mutual support from other Chinese military installations in the Indian Ocean.

However, China’s dual-use commercial facilities at Gwadar and Hambantota have emerged as significant nodes for its naval operations.

Due to its geographic location, military significance and the involvement of a Chinese port operator, Gwadar has the potential to serve as a long-term rest and replenishment site for China’s People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLA-N).

Further, certain factions within the PLA perceive Chinese access to the Gwadar base as effectively secured, with one PLA officer reportedly remarking, “The food is already on the plate; we’ll eat it whenever we want to.”

Hambantota is likely to become China’s next military base in the Indian Ocean. China has direct control of the facility, constituting its most significant port investment overseas.

From a military perspective, Gwadar and Hambantota can facilitate a sustained Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, potentially threatening India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.

However, the US may also factor in this negative Indian Ocean feedback loop. In a May 2024 report for the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), Rajeswari Rajagopalan mentions that India’s nuclear program has been driven more by threats from Pakistan than China.

Rajagopalan says that China’s accelerated modernization of its nuclear forces—marked by the development of long-range, land-based missiles and a potential arsenal expansion to thousands of warheads—has raised alarm in India.

She states this growth threatens India’s doctrine of minimum deterrence and could pressure India to reconsider its no-first-use policy, especially as China’s nuclear strategy moves toward parity with the US as the latter modernizes its nuclear arsenal.

She mentions these implications extend to border disputes, where a more assertive Chinese nuclear posture might encourage China to escalate conventional conflicts with India, such as their ongoing border dispute in the Himalayas.

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