5 get death for Malaysian’s killing

SONGKHLA: Five of seven people involved in the murder of a Malay merchant in 2015 to clean a 120-million-baht debts have been sentenced to death.

On Wednesday, Songkhla Provincial Court read out the Court of Appeal Region 9’s decision.

Five people: Yutthasak, Tan, Thanadech, Nongyao and Apichon ( surnames withheld ), were sentenced to death for the murder of Lee Ah Han, a 44-year-old Malaysian businessman. The other two, Ekapol, the gunman, and Shinapat, the pilot, however, had their death sentences commuted to living prison as they both pleaded guilty.

Tan, who is also Malay, hired Apichon and the others to take out the death, which occurred on Dec 4, 2015, on Karnjanawanich Road in Moo 8 Village in tambon Patong of Songkhla’s Helmet Yai area. In his vehicle, they shot Lee killed with an M16 weapons. According to police, the purpose of the crime was to clean a bill of more than 120 million ringgit owed to the entrepreneur.

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Srettha Thavisin’s dramatic rise and fall in Thai politics

BANGKOK: Srettha&nbsp, Thavisin won a parliamentary vote to be Thailand’s prime minister next August, after a closely-fought vote where his party had finished just next. Just under a year later, the 62-year-old property tycoon-turned-politician was dismissed from the premiership by a court order on Wednesday ( Aug 14), plunging SoutheastContinue Reading

Thai court dismisses PM Srettha for breaching ethical rules in Cabinet appointment

Transfer OF THE SHINAWATRAS? According to some political professionals, it is likely Pheu&nbsp, Thai&nbsp, would still have the strength to guide the future management, after a period of horse-trading and confusion over who will be in demand. ” The partnership remains united”, said Olarn Thinbangtieo, assistant professor of Burapha University’sContinue Reading

China has a bond vigilante problem – Asia Times

Xi Jinping, the president of China, is competing with much success to convert stock bears to bulls. However, China has the same issue with foolish joy pushing long-term yields very low in the bond industry.

Officials are now trying to control the third-largest federal loan market in the world. On Monday, prices tumbled as the People’s Bank of China ( PBOC ) intervened assertively in the market. It was the worst moment in 17 times for China’s 10-year government prospects, sending yields up 4 base points.

At the same time as Xi favors a stable-to-firmer trade price, bond prices have recently fallen. The issue with Xi and the PBOC is that bond bull claim that the rally is supported by basics like negative forces and slowing growth, and that it still has room to grow.

Beijing’s regulators have constantly aimed to increase the volume of immediate funding. When combined with bonds and stocks, it made up only 31 % of the cultural finance overall last month, with bank loans accounting for the rest.

In the US, by contrast, the number is more than 70 %. China’s Communist Party intends to sell more long-dated sovereign bonds in order to aid efforts to accelerate progress in its US$ 17 trillion market.

PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng issued a warning about bubble problems as wobbly stock prices flooded into bonds and walls of money flowed from weak stocks in recent weeks.

In July, flows from Chinese securities “are largely explained by the lingering problems that investors see in the Foreign economy”, said Jonathan&nbsp, Fortun, an analyst at the Institute of International Economics.

It’s not all that surprising that Asia’s largest economy is experiencing significant domestic funding withdrawals. China’s direct investment liabilities, a balance of payments barometer of incoming foreign investment, fell by$ 14.8 billion in the second quarter year&nbsp, on year, only the second time the figure has turned negative, according to Bloomberg.

The first-half of 2024 saw a decrease of$ 5 billion, which would be the first net outflows since 1990. As a result of trade tensions between the US and Europe, China’s possess additional investment is declining while these diminishing capital flows are occurring.

All of this has resulted in Pan’s PBOC stepping up efforts to combat the friendship cows. The problem, though, is that the merchants testing Beijing are increasingly looking like so-called “bond police”, or activist investors who often take matters into their own hands.

Pan’s crew is about to discover what James Carville had warned the world about 30 years earlier. In 1994, Carville was a planner for US President Bill Clinton and is best known for his “it’s the economy, idiotic” phrase. That year, Carville made another popular study: that he’d like to be reincarnated as the&nbsp, bond&nbsp, business because” You you scare everybody”, he quipped.

The framework was balanced-budget conversations in Washington. Back then, tie investors were sensitive to the slightest tilt in Washington’s fiscal path. Carville’s reference to the influence of relationship vigilantes is now the issue for China as continent assets are being priced by traders.

A “hopeful flip” is starting to appear about what the PBOC is doing, according to Bill Bishop, who writes the Sinocism email. The goal may be to stress organizations to reduce their exposure before a more immediate fiscal stimulus package that would raise provides. However, the desire to invest in these bonds does not indicate assurance in the economy or the prospects for different asset classes.

Officials in China’s Jiangxi province advised commercial banks this week against paying back their government bond purchases. It’s daring to encourage institutions to rely on trades in a bid to lower risk.

The issue is that this could undermine Xi’s slow economic growth. Trust in Chinese bonds was decline even further if counterparties in relationship trades worry that further transactions might go wrong.

Very often in recent years, Xi’s authorities intervened in investment and foreign exchange trading, turning off international money managers. It’s not surprising that foreign transactions are dumping money into China’s economy in unprecedented amounts as a result.

Since April, the PBOC has frequently warned the business about price risks, according to Becky Liu, mind of Standard Chartered’s China macro strategy. ” This time, they want to take a strong enough message to the market, to greater recognize their’ comfort’ level of long-dated bonds, to minimize potential theoretical positions”.

Pan even cited the Silicon Valley Bank collapse in the US in early 2023 in a June press release. The concern is that Chinese regional banks may become alarmed by bond yield movements that are unpredictable.

The SVB in the United States has taught us that the central bank needs to monitor and evaluate the state of the financial market from a macro-prudential perspective, Pan said. ” At the moment, we must pay close attention to the maturity mismatch and interest rate risks that come with the large holdings of medium and long-term bonds by some non-bank entities.”

Entities in potential harm’s way include insurance companies, investment funds and other financial firms. That’s particularly the case as China flashes some Japan-like warning signs.

” The property woes are causing the weak credit demand.” In consequence, banks are forced to purchase more bonds because the interbank market is where money is trapped, according to Larry Hu, chief China economist for Macquarie Group.

Just as in the case of Japan in the 1990s, says Ken Cheung, currency strategist at Mizuho Securities, low government bond yields can do more harm than good to an economy.

At least four Chinese brokerages put new restrictions on domestic government bond trading earlier this week. One even went so far as to halt dealing with certain maturities. This likely makes the threat of additional intervention” the main factor driving yields higher”

For now, the financial equivalent of” the sword of Damocles is falling”, says Tan Yiming, analyst at Minsheng Securities. Tan points out that “while the scale of any selloff&nbsp, in China&nbsp, bonds may not be substantial in the medium and long term due to the fragile growth momentum in China, chasing duration returns in China does not seem appropriate in our opinion.”

But risks abound going forward. With this so-called “asset famine” environment where high-yielding assets are in short supply persisting,” the&nbsp, bond&nbsp, bull market remains alive”, Tan says.

The concern for Xi and Pan is that the yuan would fall if the Chinese yields dropped even further. That could increase the risk of default for large property developers as they struggle to make payments on offshore bonds. Before the November 5 presidential election, where China has been a punching bag for both parties on the campaign trail, it may enrage US politicians.

Of course, China is n’t alone in fretting about bond vigilantes. The Bank of Japan is tussling with traders in Tokyo, which causes the yen to rise more quickly than Tokyo wants.

Meanwhile, the US’s record-breaking national debt, which is up to$ 35 trillion at a time of severe political dysfunction, could stoke the appetite of speculators. &nbsp,

The concern is that bond vigilantes will make a comeback in a troubled time rather than use deficit spending, according to analyst Tan Kai Xian of Gavekal Research. Geopolitical tensions and attempts to “waffear the dollar,” which are making non-US allies consider diversifying away from Treasuries, have increased this risk.

China’s difficulties would be less somber if its capital markets were prepared for the world’s prime time. To build trust among global investors, Team Xi must accelerate moves to improve liquidity.

It needs to develop new hedging tools, reform a sizable and opaque state sector, create a top-notch credit-rating system, and increase transparency to lessen risk and facilitate a more advantageous allocation of capital. These and other actions are essential to boosting the yuan’s reputation as a leading currency in trade and finance.

Some of China’s largest state banks recently received advice from regulators to gather more information about the owners of sovereign notes. The idea is to tighten the leash on speculators. Officers are meeting with financial institutions at the PBOC’s branch in Shanghai to discuss bond market risks.

According to Citigroup economist Xiangrong Yu,” the PBOC’s concerns about financial risks are valid.” ” Whether its moves are sufficient to lift the long-end yield appears uncertain”.

Fundamentals may at this point support the PBOC’s desire to see lower Chinese yields. According to Pictet Asset Management’s analysts,” the lack of low-volatility investment opportunities should make Chinese government bond investments attractive for many investors, especially at a time when the country’s stock market is still under pressure and the economy recovers only slowly.”

It implies that more than a lot of people think, authorities may have a harder time taming the market. &nbsp, Though heady demand for China’s government bonds dovetails with Beijing’s long-term agenda, it’s colliding with PBOC efforts to support the yuan.

Overall, the recent flattening of the yield curve has hampered Pan’s policy flexibility, which has fueled renewed rumors that more monetary easing is on the horizon. This explains why the PBOC’s tug-of-war with bond vigilantes is only just beginning, and why China wo n’t have a chance to win.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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US, Japan stock bubbles deflate – Asia Times

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US, Japan share bubble deflate

According to David P. Goldman, Japan’s economy is facing significant issues because of its high levels of debt and inflation. China’s trade growth, however, is slowing, largely due to weakening US need, complicating its financial outlook for 2024.

All gaze on Ukraine’s Kursk borders strategy

James Davis describes how Ukraine invaded settlements in the Kursk area to deceive Russian troops and potentially smuggle them into upcoming negotiations. Russia may be subject to force to declare war on Russia as a result of this decision.

In the property market, doubt breeds panic.

Scott Foster examines the recent severe volatility in the Japanese stock market, with investors advised to be careful and carefully watch future earnings reports and guidance, and witness dramatic swings driven by uncertainty and hysteria.

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Carry trades and financial crises – Asia Times

The” carry trade” is a new term that many casual users of the financial media have come across recently. Some market commentators and reporters have expressed their disapproval of the spiral state of the markets.

However, it also contributed to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and credit crunch that resulted. If we fear a duplicate? This moment, the answer is both yes and no.

The latest rumpus started on August 2 when the US economy saw a decline in demand for new jobs in response to less-than-expected data released in July. Then Chinese shares took a bigger beating on Monday, posting the biggest ever one-day cut in the Nikkei, the country’s major promote score. Since then, as traders and investors try to understand what is happening, businesses have fluctuated.

Why is the carry business blaming it then? Second, a quick description of how it works. Professional traders and photographers in the currency market use the” have trade” to profit from variations in interest rates across nations. To turn a profit, buyers take out loans in currencies with low interest rates and engage them in higher interest rates.

Investors had been going to town with this strategy in recent years, borrowing cheaply in Japan in yen, where interest rates are still low ( 0.25 % ), and investing in place where rates are higher, such as the United States ( 5.25 %-5.5 % ) and Mexico ( 10.75 % ). According to UBS’s research team, more than US$ 500 billion in US dollar-yen have deals have occurred since 2011.

Nikkei normal, 2023-24

Chart of NIkkei stock market
Buying See

Without putting any of your own funds in danger right away, you can make a sizable profit consistently from these interest-rate differences on borrowed money. However, it’s more like putting pennies in front of a machine as it occasionally happens when currencies or interest rates change, making the trade unsustainable.

At this point, money flows quit. The asset bubble, which had been inflated in price by these cross-border moves, next music. When even small losses start to increase, lenders start demanding that these traders pony up more money to cover their potential losses. This spreads infection throughout the financial system.

This process began in recent days, which is one explanation for why Chinese investors are now quickly dumping their nation’s shares, causing them to dominate the world stock market.

The idea that these carry accidents should concern us is supported by financial history. The Carry Trade, the Banking School, and British Financial Crises Since 1825, my most recent publication about the history of financial problems, demonstrates how they have been involved in every big bank problems in the country over the past 200 years.

The yen-dollar carry industry also contributed to the year-end global financial crisis of 2007-08. A study by academics at the Bank for International Settlements, a worldwide network of central banks, discovered in 2009 that the start of the credit squeeze in August 2007 caused lending to suddenly become accessible throughout the financial structure.

This led to a decline in asset prices for collateralized debt obligations ( CDOs ), which are debt-related bundles that lenders sell onto the market. These had formerly attracted take traders ‘ investment, but carry traders stopped doing so, leading to a general lack of funds for banks to use to fund themselves. As the funds crunch turned into a serious economic crisis in the second half of 2007 and into 2008, this continued.

However, a softer getting is more likely than 2007-08, despite the fact that the carry trade really concern us. Current trends indicate a small reduction in the interest rate change between Japan and America. The past space, which was greater than 5 %, has only gotten smaller by 0.15 %. You should feel really anxiety only when curiosity rates between nations converge more frequently.

In any case, in hindsight, it seems more likely that Japan’s choice to significantly raise standard interest rates was to blame for the current market meltdown.

And those employment figures did n’t paint a dismal picture rather than be unremittingly bad. The US’s economic crisis is far from certain, which suggests that owners may have sold their shares more than is appropriate.

The recent activities should be seen as yet another example of the rapid rise in interest rates around the world in 2022 and 2023, which is a sign of financial sluggishness. These include Silicon Valley Bank‘s loss in March 2023 and Liz Truss ‘ mini-budget in September 2022, which caused a wave of panic in Britain.

More turmoil are possible, though maybe nothing the size of the 2008 financial problems. If you’re involved in monetary industry, either as entrepreneur or investee, the wild journey is not over yet.

Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge, is home to Charles Read as a brother in economics and background.

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Thai Airways targets SET return in 2025

Boeing 787-800, Thai Airways. (Photo: Kuakul Mornkum)
Boeing 787-800, Thai Airways. ( Photo: Kuakul Mornkum )

Thai Airways International Public Company Limited ( THAI ) intends to complete its capital restructuring plan by the end of the year and will request that business rehabilitation be discontinued before stock exchange trading resumes in the second quarter of 2025.

The reform focuses on debt-to-equity change and right and consecutive offering of newly issued stocks to owners, employees, and investors.

Full profits for THAI and its subsidiaries was 43.9 billion baht in the second quarter of 2024, an increase of 17.7 % over the same period last year.

314 million baht, less than the 2 billion rmb profit in the second quarter of last year, was reported as gross profit.

Due to changing costs, the 38 billion baht’s full profit decreased by 32.1 % from the previous year, accounting for the higher total expenses.

Next month, the company plans to submit the SEC and the Stock Exchange of Thailand ( SET ) with the registration statement for the sale of securities and the draft prospectus for a capital restructuring.

The company rehabilitation will also be prompted by a petition to the Central Bankruptcy Court to end its operations and continue SET share trading in 2025.

The company’s trials and the SEC, SET, the Central Bankruptcy Court, and other important authorities are the bank’s certain deadlines.

The government mandated that the Ministry of Finance reduce its ownership in the symbol provider by at least 50 % before THAI submitted a petition to the Bankruptcy Court in May 2020 to start rehabilitation proceedings. Thus, THAI was no more considered a state sector.

This has enabled the business to have freedom in its control, raise its profitability, essentially alter its business, and conduct actions under the business rehabilitation plan, a source said. The bank’s measures include operational reduction, ships and engine similarity, cost reduction, and system growth, according to the source.

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De-dollarization the path to global financial freedom – Asia Times

Restrictions on the economy and finances frequently have negative effects. The dollar’s use of force against Russia is the most significant example. The estimate has sparked a global action to de-dollarize, the reverse of the disciplinary move’s proper intent.

Despite the legendary error, US Senator Marco Rubio of Florida was able to introduce a bill into Congress to chastise de-dollarized nations. The bill aims to outlaw economic organizations that devalue the world’s currency.

The Sanctions Evasion Prevention and Mitigation Act, a ominous acronym for Rubio’s costs, may involve US president to impose sanctions on financial institutions that use Russia’s SPFS financial messaging services, China’s CIPS payment system, and other solutions to the dollar-centric SWIFT program.

Rubio is not alone in targeting places selling to de-dollarize. Donald Trump’s financial advisors are weighing ways to chastise nations that are constantly devaluing the money.

The Trump administration has proposed to” sanction both supporters and opponents who seek effective means of bilateral trade in assets other than the dollar.” Violators may be subjected to import restrictions, tariffs and” dollar manipulation charges”.

Awakening BRICS

Initial de-dollarization was criticized by US policymakers and economic media critics. They argued the money is used in some 80 % of all international financial dealings. No other money perhaps approaches.

But economic sanctions against Russia, imposed after Russia’s military action in Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2022, became a turning point. De-dollarization has accelerated, and it is now probably unsustainable.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) made the announcement in May of its intention to stop transnational trade and instead use local currencies. Although the statement made little stories in the world, ASEAN is a significant trading bloc made up of ten nations and 600 million people in total.

Bartering contracts are another way to get around the dollar program. While Pakistan has authorized bartering with Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia, Iran and Thailand are trading foods for fuel. China is building a state-of-the-art aircraft in Iran, to get paid for in oil.

Additionally, using cryptocurrencies to defy the dollar system and prevent being scrutinized by American courts. Beyond the traditional banking system, cryptography, such as Bitcoin, enables users to send and receive money anywhere in the world in a secure manner.

The BRICS, which are quickly emerging as the largest economic bloc in the world, have large priorities regarding de-dollarization.

Aside from a shared desire to build a counterpoint to the G7, the BRICS had some clearly defined goals as of 2022. However, the group’s strong new focus and purpose were facilitated by the dollar system’s weaponization and the melting of US$ 300 billion in Soviet reserves held in Western banks.

BRICS started as an improbable partnership. The five foundation families have different cultures, political systems, and financial systems, with locations on three different continents. However, they are both eager to create a unipolar earth.

The majority of the world’s nations trade with China mostly through China. Their mutual trading may undoubtedly eventually go against the dollar.

The BRICS has no intellectual program and is driven by economics. It concentrates mainly on cooperation and socioeconomic development. Its philosophy is based on consensus and cooperation.

China is the BRICS’s financial statement because it is the largest trading partner of the majority of nations. As China steadily de-dollarizes, its investing partners are likely to adopt in different degrees.

The consists

The US government’s influence over the world monetary system dates back to 1974, when it persuaded Saudi Arabia to simply buy its oil in bucks. The deal came after the US declared its intention to leave the gold standard in 1971. The’gold window’, in which money could be exchanged for real gold, was closed by President Richard Nixon.

The US was fighting two wars at the same time – the war in Vietnam and the war on poverty – and the government issued more dollars and debt than could be backed by gold. The consists assured continued global demand global for dollars.

All oil-importing nations were required to keep money reserves, according to the deal. Oil-exporting nations invested their money surpluses in US Treasury and Bonds, providing ongoing funding for the country’s debts.

The money technique was used to support the world economy by selling oil in dollars. Oil accounts for only 10 % of global trade, but it is a significant contributor to the remaining 90 %.

US bill issues

The US has a significant advantage over other nations because it has power over the country’s reserve currency. It has the authority to acquiesce to any nation it sees as an economic or political interlocutor, and it has the ability to sanitize it.

Also, the government can issue loans to overseas countries in its own money. Countries that require imports of essential commodities like fuel, meal, and medicine but lack the funds can use the International Monetary Fund to obtain loans.

The beginning of the business, privatizing people companies, and liberalizing financial markets are typical neo-liberal conditions that countries are subject to when lending to them. The outcomes were not ideal.

IMF customers include Pakistan, Argentina, and Egypt, which demonstrate how frequently nations struggle to pay off debts. In April this year, Pakistan received its latest aid package of$ 3 billion, its 23rd IMF loan since 1958.

The consists made it easier for the US to finance its debt and led to profligate spending by the US government. In 1985, just ten years after the petrodollar agreement, the US became the biggest debtor in the world.

In 1974, the US national debt was$ 485 billion, or 31 % of GDP. This year, the national debt surpassed$ 35 trillion, representing 120 % of GDP.

This year, the federal debt’s interest payments will surpass$ 8 billion, making it the most important budget item forward of defense and social security. In a few years, discretionary spending will surpass all other types of investing without a significant course adjustment.

The debt crises reinforces rising US concerns about de-dollarization. Less money buyers of US bill mean less money is spent on them.

US securities have long been viewed as a safe haven for buyers. Bonds provide a predictable transfer, and the government guarantees payment. But in the past few years, buyer desire for long-term US loan has come under stress. A obvious sign of trouble: the money and golden, which for years had traded in a small speed, started to vary.

Prior to the Biden administration’s huge stimulus spending in 2020, the dollar and gold exchanged in tandem. The money lost value in comparison to gold, which was previously the world’s anchor of wealth, but gold did not.

The problem of buyers is based on simple arithmetic. If the US problems more dollars/debt than socioeconomic development justifies, it causes inflation. When bond yields are 4 % and inflation is 8 %, bonds are a loss-making investment, which is not good for pension funds and other investors with long-term commitments.

The US bond market is valued at$ 50 trillion, a substantial amount by most measures. The minimum value of the world’s dollar system, which is essentially unimaginable but has more than a quarter of a billion dollars, is a pale figure. &nbsp, &nbsp,

  • The off-shore shadow banks is estimated at$ 65 trillion
  • The generic business is valued at$ 800 trillion
  • The off-shore dark banking sector is$ 65 trillion
  • The eurodollar market is$ 5 trillion to$ 13 trillion

De-dollarization results in the gradual return of some trillions of dollars to their original owners. The need for money will only decrease as a result of countries ‘ transition to multicurrency trading.

The US’s ability to attract more foreigners may be diminished as a result of US dollar flow. Fewer buyers means higher interest payment, which leads to higher debts.

Gold versus Bitcoin

To minimize US debt, which is thought to be about 70 % of GDP, several measures have been suggested by academics and politicians. Socially, however, the necessary drastic spending cuts and higher fees are in order.

A second option for addressing the debt-death circular has been suggested by a number of officials and economists: strengthening the US stability sheet by adding Bitcoin to the country’s resources.

More than 200, 000 Bitcoins have already been seized and declared a debt by the US government. Donald Trump, the US government’s nominee for president, has pledged to keep Bitcoins on the balance sheet.

Bitcoin is also inexpensive, claim Bitcoin’s proponents. They predict its price may reach six images, up from$ 60, 000 in recent months. Cyber bull contrast a sizable order of Bitcoin with the Louisiana Purchase in the 19th century, when the US purchased almost a third of France’s territory for$ 15 million.

Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the president’s nominee, has gone one step further and suggested that the US government purchase Bitcoin in exchange for the country’s recent golden resources. &nbsp,

Cryptocurrency is in line with gold’s dollar amount.

A portion of the US government’s$ 615 billion in silver is now held by the government, which is a fraction of its$ 35 trillion loan. The government would need to purchase more than 9 million Bitcoins at present prices to suit the value of its golden reserves.

Importantly, Kennedy Jr wants the authorities to up the money with a combination of resources like gold, gold and platinum, in addition to Bitcoin. A “basket” of these assets may be a new group of US ties.

Ironic, let Bitcoin save the money. The crypto was designed to avoid, if not destroy, the dollar and the stablecoins money system.

Similarly humorous, Bitcoin is generally denominated and valued in cash. That is, whatever happens to the money will affect the dollar-denominated Bitcoin. Silver, on the other hand, is in a course of its own.

If the money or Bitcoins goes to zero, the owner is left with nothing. If silver goes to zero, the owner still has the metal.

The next supply money

Kennedy Jr. is probably correct to assume that all painful assets will be used to support the money. The Argentine peso and Zimbabwe’s dollar could change their currencies if that is the case. Both nations almost eliminated their currency depreciation. In order to enforce governmental control on the government, Zimbabwe suddenly turned to gold-backed money.

The Bretton Woods Agreement, which set the gold-backed money as the standard for all other currencies, has been the first de-dollarization challenge to the penny since 1944. Given the political pressure between BRICS and G7 countries, a Bretton Woods II is very unlikely.

Otherwise, there will be more multicurrency agreements being created, and perhaps a BRICS exchanging currency will be introduced. The BRICS money unit will only be online, with asset-backed backing. No paper money or coins may be distributed.

The global financial system is therefore likely to fragment into three sections: the dollar-led stablecoins system, multicurrency contracts and a BRICS-led investing money. The money will be the world’s next reserve money in addition to the other two, but the dollar is most likely to be the last one.

Reserve currencies are a ( neo)colonial remnant. They mainly benefit rich people and corporations. Countries will generally benefit from a multicurrency system because it will reclaim their financial and financial autonomy and make them accountable for their own future.

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China looking like a ‘buy’ as US, Japan markets sag – Asia Times

As global investors dump US and Japanese stocks, China’s beaten-down markets are suddenly looking more attractive.

The debate over whether China is “uninvestable” has plagued Xi Jinping’s government since late 2020. That was back when Xi’s Communist Party cracked down on tech platforms, starting with Jack Ma’s Alibaba Group.

It hardly helped that Xi’s draconian Covid-19 lockdowns drove China’s growth into the red. Or that Xi’s party was slow to add fresh stimulus to Asia’s biggest economy when it arguably needed it most.

Now, China has a unique opportunity to shine as a bastion of stability as the US and Japanese economies face fast-mounting challenges.

US employment growth is slowing, spooking global punters who had grown used to the economy adding 200,000-plus new jobs per month. The US Federal Reserve, meanwhile, has been slow to cut interest rates as inflation has remained stubbornly close to 3%.

Adding to the drama is extreme political polarization at a moment when Americans prepare to pick a new president on November 5. This, against the backdrop of the US national debt topping US$35 trillion.

In Tokyo, markets are in abject trauma following the Bank of Japan’s July 31 rate hike. On Monday, the Nikkei Stock Average fell the most since “Black Monday” in 1987. Though stock prices later stabilized, fears of additional BOJ rate hikes have global investors on edge.

A big worry is the “yen-carry trade” blowing up. Since 1999, when the BOJ first cut rates to zero, investors everywhere have been borrowing cheaply in yen and using those funds to bet on higher-yielding assets around the globe.

This explains why sudden moves in the yen can savage asset markets in New York, London, Dubai, Seoul and Shanghai. And raise questions about hedge funds everywhere blowing up.

All of this presents China with a chance to appear above the fray. To be sure, there’s an argument that China could indeed offer the calm that global investors seek. Particularly as events from Washington to Tokyo ring alarm bells.

Yet this requires Xi’s team to step up efforts to revive the narrative that China is moving upmarket as an investment destination.

A decade ago, Xi pledged to let market forces play a “decisive” role in decisions about economic and financial policy. A few years later, in 2015, a sudden plunge in stock prices slowed the reform process.

At the time, China Inc circled the wagons. Beijing directed waves of state funding into markets, suspending trading in thousands of companies, scrapped all initial public offerings and enabled mainlanders to pledge homes as collateral on margin loans. It even rushed out buzzy marketing campaigns to encourage stock-buying as a form of patriotism.

This treating-symptoms-over-reforms pattern has played out time and time again during Xi’s tenure. All of which explains why marshaling the state-sector-industrial complex to save the day, again, could backfire.

That episode, and others since then, exemplify why gains in Chinese shares too often haven’t been matched by moves to champion the private sector, increase transparency or strengthen corporate governance.

In recent years, investor disappointment sent capital fleeing China. Between late 2021 and early 2024, a $7 trillion rout in mainland shares shook global markets. Though Chinese stocks have stabilized somewhat since, the Shanghai-Shenzhen CSI 300 Index is still down 13.5% this year.

The question now, with price-to-earnings multiples trading at 13 versus 22 for the Dow Jones Industrial Average and 23 for Japan’s Nikkei Stock Average, is whether China is a “buy.”

“Chinese assets are expected to become a better choice for global funds in this round of global market turmoil triggered by the expectation of a US recession,” says Zhang Qiyao, analyst at Industrial Securities, arguing that the market boasts low valuations and improving fundamentals.

Analysts at Shanghai Securities said in a note that they “think a deep correction in the Japanese market has limited impact on China’s A-shares. Funds are expected to flow back into A-share. We believe that increased uncertainty in the overseas market and increased expectations of a recent interest rate cut by the Federal Reserve may prompt funds to seek safe havens.”

There are many risks to consider. One is the so-called “yen-carry trade” blowing up. The rebound in the Nikkei this week, a day after the market collapsed, was a relief for investors everywhere.

But the fact investors are buzzing about “contagion” effects is not a great sign as these things go. Nor is the yen’s continued upward trajectory after a powerful rally that’s already unnerving global markets.

It’s also worth noting that officials in Tokyo are preparing for the worst. Early next week, BOJ Governor Kazuo Ueda will be questioned by a parliamentary committee. Lawmakers are clearly spooked by the market freakout over a rather gentle July 31 rate hike.

Part of this paranoia reflects memories of what happened back in 2006 and 2007, the last time the BOJ tried to move rates away from zero. Back then, the central bank managed to get rates up to 0.5%.

The recession that followed still haunts Tokyo. By 2008, the BOJ was slashing rates back to zero and restoring quantitative easing. What lawmakers want answered are questions about whether Japan will suffer a rerun of that episode.

Ueda can’t say, of course. No one can. No Group of Seven nation has ever held rates at zero or near zero for 25 years. Or conducted a 23-year QE experiment, one that’s now backfiring on Asia’s second-biggest economy.

The uncertainty factor here is rather epic. It stems from the yen’s role as a key funding currency. Over the last quarter century, the most crowded trade anywhere has been borrowing cheaply in yen and redeploying those funds in higher-yielding assets around the globe.

This yen-carry trade explains why big yen rallies tend to pull the floor out from under asset markets from New York to Seoul. The yen’s 13% surge since a July low shoulder-checked global markets.

There’s concern now about similar dynamics in the Chinese currency. “The next carry trade unwind could be the yuan,” says Khoon Goh, the head of Asia research at ANZ.

On Monday, the yuan rallied against the dollar along with the yen. This move could bolster the China-as-safe-haven argument as markets from New York to Tokyo gyrate.

Yet to build trust among global investors, Beijing needs to step up efforts to improve Chinese capital markets. That’s the key to increasing the appeal of the yuan as the key currency in trade and finance.

“If they really wanted to de-dollarize China’s trade, preferably shifting at least some of it into renminbi over time, China’s leaders would need to ensure two things,” says Louis Gave, analyst at Gavekal Research.

“The renminbi should remain a stable, not excessively volatile, currency. Given the size of China’s export industry, currency stability was always a policy priority, but the drive to internationalize the renminbi made it even more important.”

Gave notes that it’s also important for Chinese government bonds (CGBs) to begin outpacing returns on US Treasuries. “If China was going to convince the central banks of Thailand, Indonesia, South Africa or South Korea to move some of their reserves from US Treasuries into CGBs, then the reserve managers at these central banks would have to be rewarded for their courageous decisions to shift away from the US dollar,” Gave said.

Sure enough, he adds, “in the years that followed, returns on CGBs crushed the returns from government bonds in the US, Germany and Japan — the world’s other major bond markets. China’s outperformance is almost as striking as the capital destruction endured by Japanese and German bondholders. Over the last 10 years, China has been the only major bond market where US-dollar-based investors were able to outperform US inflation.”

Over the last five years, Gave notes, “none of the big government bond markets have kept abreast of US inflation, but again CGBs have outperformed the others. And over the last three years, CGBs are the only bonds that have delivered positive nominal returns, although not enough to keep up with US inflation.”

Yet reforms have been uneven. News late last month that Beijing is increasing opacity surrounding the flow of capital – limiting daily data on the amount of capital international funds deploy into and out of China – is a step in the wrong direction.

Those signals came the same week as the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) pledged to improve market operations, strengthen comprehensive research capabilities, deepen response mechanisms to manage market risks and hone regulations for trading.

Still, the extreme volatility from New York to Tokyo could restore China’s appeal as a reliable investment destination. Xi’s team just needs to shift the reform process into higher gear.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Looking for the upside of tariffs on China – Asia Times

I’ve been talking about&nbsp, vibes&nbsp, a lot over the past year, but this talk about something a little more substantial. Essentially, Trump and his movements have two key policy tenets: 1.) immigration limitations, and 2.) more taxes. This think about the next of these.

Taxes are no longer merely a Trump thought; they are a significant component of the Democratic policy kit. Biden’s tariffs on Chinese goods, announced up in May, went well beyond everything Trump did in his first word.

Some Democrats want to protect United manufacturing capacity in the face of a potential war with China, but I doubt a Harris presidency would do the opposite. But, regardless of who wins in November, tariffs will likely continue to be a significant policy instrument for the US.

I wrote a post about why tariffs frequently do n’t reduce trade deficits as effectively as their backers hoped back in February.

Generally, there are three factors tariffs tend to be disappointing. Most importantly, when you put up taxes against another country’s products, it causes that country’s currency to decrease against your money.

That raises the price of your export while lowering the cost of your goods. The taxes ‘ expected effect is partially offset by this. In fact, the Chinese currency drastically decreased a year and a half after Trump imposed tariffs on China during his first term:

Cause for authentic table: Xe .com

The numerous ways that Chinese businesses can circumvent tariffs are another aspect that reduce their success. They may “re-export” — generally, send someone to a third region, slap a” Made in Vietnam” or a” Made in Thailand” logo on it, and then offer it to America, free of taxes.

They can establish factories in third countries to ensure that those nations ‘ items are actually produced there. The US is unaware that it is importing a lot of Chinese goods because they can buy parts and components to builders in third countries.

They may take advantage of flaws like&nbsp, the “de minimis” rule&nbsp, that allows China to buy smaller items to America free of taxes. And so on. These techniques may all theoretically be corrected with sufficient information and surveillance. They hardly ever are in reality.

The second problem with taxes is that they make transitional products – components, parts, and components – more costly for US manufacturers. Taxes on steel and aluminum raise rates for American carmakers, aircraft companies, device manufacturers, and so on.

Building EVs in America costs more because of battery levies. Solar panel tariffs increase the cost of US production of strength. And so on. This&nbsp, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-03-07/trump-s-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-will-do-more-harm-than-good?sref=R8NfLgwS”>weakens US manufacturing&nbsp, and may harm US exports. 1

But between circumvention techniques, currency movements and harm to American companies, Trump’s levies on China ended up reducing the trade deficit a lot less than their engineers had hoped.

Even though Trump’s taxes are likely to be higher in a second word and Biden’s, these components will still have an impact. This is not to say that taxes are &nbsp, ineffectual&nbsp, — they’re just a weaker coverage instrument than their proponents like to believe.

Despite these fundamental weaknesses, tariffs are still&nbsp, an essential part of the toolkit&nbsp, for preserving offer chains and defence production capacity against the possibility of a major war.

However, it’s possible that tariffs will have other unanticipated benefits for people all over the world, including developing nations and Chinese consumers who are receiving bad deals from the nation’s current economic model.

We should also consider these advantageous side effects when we consider tariffs.

Tariffs might prompt China to reconsider its economic model.

Zongyuan Zoe Liu has &nbsp, a widely read article&nbsp, in Foreign Affairs this week about the drawbacks of China’s manufacturing-focused economic model.

The article excellently describes how manufacturing is promoted by China. Basically, it’s all about bank finance — banks loan huge amounts of money very cheaply to manufacturers, who then compete fiercely, resulting in a flood of cheap, often undifferentiated products.

Because all the Chinese manufacturers slam the market with goods they do n’t want to buy, these price wars cause collapsing profit margins. It also results in a flood of exports, as Chinese manufacturers try to&nbsp, sell their excess capacity overseas. And as a result, there is a mountain of corporate debt that obliges Chinese businesses to keep making interest payments even as they continue to be paid for it.

What’s interesting is that this is very similar to how&nbsp, Japan&nbsp, promoted manufacturing from the 1950s through the 1980s. As Chalmers Johnson explains in his book&nbsp,” Miti and the Japanese Miracle”, a key component of Japanese industrial policy was “overloaning” to manufacturers, using a combination of public and private banks.

Japan discovered that domestic overcapacity would only be a side effect of the domestic glut if it were to promote exports.

The main distinction between China and Japan is that the government of Japan attempted to counteract this overproduction by introducing price increases to prevent the country’s private companies from losing money. Cartels and other price-fixing measures – basically, antidotes to overcapacity – were one of the core features of Japan’s industrial policy.

China’s industrial policy, in contrast, &nbsp, leans in&nbsp, to overcapacity by dispensing&nbsp, absolutely massive government subsidies&nbsp, to manufacturers. This is why China’s overcapacity problem is much worse than Japan’s in the 20th century, which is why countries around the world are &nbsp, getting mad&nbsp, and&nbsp, putting up tariffs.

At the same time, China’s industrial policy is just exacerbating the price wars that are making its manufacturers unprofitable. Chinese consumers are unable to afford cheap goods because their employers had to lower their wages in order to sell more goods so they could pay off their loans, which is also hurting consumption.

Nobody benefits from creating an ocean of rusting metal and bankrupt companies because this system needs to change. Interestingly, though, Liu thinks tariffs are n’t the solution. She believes that developing nations should encourage China to voluntarily slash its exports and lessen their subsidies for its manufacturers:

China could start by developing more trade policies at the negotiation table rather than simply imposing tariffs. Since the escalation of the US-Chinese trade war, in 2018, Chinese scholars and officials have explored several policy options, including imposing voluntary export restrictions, revaluing the renminbi, promoting domestic consumption, expanding foreign direct investment, and investing in R &amp, D…

Apart from voluntary export restrictions, Beijing has already tried several of these options to some extent. It could kill several birds with one stone if the government started voluntary export controls, which would ease trade and potential political unrest with the US, force mature industries to consolidate and become more sustainable, and aid in the transfer of manufacturing capacity overseas to serve target markets directly.

However, Liu’s argument here goes against her own. She notes that China began exploring voluntary export restrictions, currency appreciation, domestic consumption promotion, etc. only because of Trump’s tariffs on Chinese goods. There must be some kind of penalty for taking these steps, not for taking them, if the US wants to make Chinese policymakers consider these salutary options even more seriously.

In fact, earlier in her post, Liu lists tariffs as a big downside of China’s current overcapacity-promoting policies:

Since the mid-2010s, the problem has become a destabilizing force in international trade, as well. Chinese companies are pushing prices below the break-even point for producers in other countries by creating a glut of supply on the global market for many goods. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, criticized Beijing for engaging in unfair trade practices by releasing ever-larger quantities of Chinese goods onto the European market at unbeatable prices in December 2023. In April, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned that China’s overinvestment in steel, electric vehicles, and many other goods was threatening to cause “economic dislocation” around the globe. Yellen remarked that” China is simply too large” for the rest of the world to take advantage of this enormous capacity.

For the US and other countries to spontaneously and voluntarily remove the threat of tariffs would thus&nbsp, remove one of the major downsides&nbsp, of overcapacity. If China were to simply ignore the warning and dump its excess capacity onto the rest of the world, it would be pointless to try to wheedle it into enacting voluntary export restrictions.

Yes, it would benefit the&nbsp, people&nbsp, of China if their government changed the country’s economic model to raise the living standards of ordinary consumers instead of encouraging unprofitable overproduction. However, the government would have already done it if it had been important to the country’s general population.

Therefore, the Chinese government needs a second motivation to change its economic model. That incentive is tariffs. When Chinese companies find themselves unable to offload their goods at any price, the US and other countries can quicken the day of reckoning by preventing China from using the rest of the world as a release mechanism for its overproduction. The Chinese government will have to determine how to reduce production in response to that assessment.

If China agrees to a voluntary export ban and increases its currency, the US and other nations can make an offer to remove tariffs at that point. But without the” stick” of tariffs to force China to deal with its own overcapacity, nothing is likely to change.

China’s tariffs could spur development in the Global South and possibly even the US.

Another significant benefit could China’s tariffs have for the rest of the world. One way for Chinese companies to partially avoid tariffs is to move their factories out of China to other countries, like Vietnam, Mexico, or Morocco.

Because China’s businesses are required to pay the labor, land, and energy costs in the nation where they set up their factories, this results in a slightly lower revenue. But Chinese companies still get to sell materials, parts, and components to their overseas assemblers, and they still get to keep the profits. So they get to&nbsp, partially&nbsp, avoid the impact of tariffs.

The US and other countries could close this partial loophole, if they really wanted to, by imposing tariffs on goods made by Chinese-owned&nbsp, companies&nbsp, instead of just on goods made in&nbsp, China. In order to avoid being caught up in the tariff regime, Chinese companies would attempt to establish elaborate systems of shell companies and foreign partners.

However, in the end, selling goods to America and other tariff-free nations would cause Chinese companies to become so congested that they might abandon their jobs and head elsewhere.

However, if the tariff-paying nations do n’t close this loophole, or only partially close it, such as by imposing tariffs on Chinese-made goods but not Chinese brands, it will be highly motivating for Chinese companies to set up factories abroad. In fact, as&nbsp, The Economist reports, this is already happening on a large scale:

]China’s ] greenfield FDI ( building a new mine or factory, say, rather than buying one ) surged to a record$ 162bn last year, up from$ 50bn a year before…Nearly three-quarters of that was in manufacturing …

By moving their production from China to other developing nations, some Chinese companies are attempting to circumvent trade restrictions. That is an approach long taken by Chinese solar firms, which were, in effect, locked out of the American market in 2012 by anti-dumping duties. America imports almost no solar panels directly from China, but buys lots from South-East Asia, where Chinese firms like JinkoSolar, Trina Solar and Longi, the world’s three largest producers of solar modules, have built big factories…

That approach is now being used in other sectors, which accounts for Chinese companies ‘ exploding manufacturing overseas. Although some factories are being built in the West, the lion’s share of activity is in the global south, home to nine of China’s top ten destinations for greenfield FDI last year… In July BYD, a Chinese electric-vehicle company, opened a new car factory in Thailand, its first in South-East Asia. Chinese battery company CTL is reportedly looking into investments in Morocco and Turkey as well as expanding production in South-East Asia.

And here is The Economist’s chart of where the Chinese investment is going:

It’s difficult not to see this as a good thing. The nations where China is investing are generally quite a bit poorer than China, excluding Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan, which are obviously just energy plays.

Mexico is still slightly richer, but it’s stagnant.

In other words, these are all nations that could benefit greatly from Chinese manufacturing investments. China is becoming a mature economy, while Vietnam, Indonesia, Egypt, and Morocco still badly need the growth in living standards that foreign-owned factories help provide.

And it ‘s&nbsp, tariffs&nbsp, in the US and other countries that are making this happen. Other factors, such as rising Chinese labor costs and sluggish domestic demand, are influencing Chinese companies ‘ plans to set up factories overseas, according to The Economist, but tariffs are proving to be the driving force.

Many strong factors bias Chinese companies toward keeping their factories in China – lack of language barriers, ease of navigating local regulations, political pressure, and so on. The key motivation is a spread of wealth throughout the developing world through tariffs, which help to break this home bias.

Cynics may now say that Chinese companies will only export high-quality components to themselves while preserving high-quality assembly work there. Indeed, multinational corporations have done to China for a long period of time with this exact strategy!

As recently as the early 2010s, many Chinese factories&nbsp, were still stuck&nbsp, doing low-value assembly work on high-value components made in Korea, Taiwan, Japan, or the US, using machines made in Germany or Japan. It was only recently that China started doing more of the high-value component manufacturing, design, branding, and marketing.

But if China could climb up the value chain, then so can Vietnam, Indonesia, Morocco and Egypt. The factories that make the factories for China will eventually learn enough of the trade’s nuances to start producing more and more of the harder, more valuable goods.

The US and other tariff-paying nations can aid in accelerating that process. By putting tariffs on Chinese components, &nbsp, but not on Chinese brands, they can incentivize Chinese companies to move more of their high-value work to poorer countries in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Companies like BYD will only be able to avoid tariffs if they transfer their technology to developing nations.

In other words, tariffs by the US, Europe, and others might help usher in&nbsp, the next phase of globalization. They’re a costly, ineffective policy that occasionally backfires, but it’s still a fair price to pay to reverse the unsustainable, toxic pattern of China-centric globalization that persisted in the 2000s and 2010s.

1 Of course, you can get around this problem by only putting tariffs finished consumer goods, like cars or appliances. But the problem is that intermediate goods are &nbsp, most of what China sells to the U. S., and since&nbsp, one primary goal of tariffs&nbsp, is to secure US supply chains against a possible war, then tariffs on intermediate goods are unfortunately necessary.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here and become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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