Pacific Island security cooperation still crucial for Australia – Asia Times
This article first appeared on Pacific Forum, and it has since been republished with your type agreement. Read the original below.
Australia launched its National Defense Strategy ( NDS ) in April 2024 by , stating , that the country will remain the “partner of choice” for the Pacific Island countries ( PICs ) when it comes to security cooperation. But why does this standing subject to Australia?
Australia, as a , end energy, is a vital regional head in the Pacific. Since the end of World War II, Australia has been in the Pacific place for safety assistance. Australia continues to be one of PIC’s biggest dealing partners and sponsors. Since 2008 Australia has  , invested , nearly A$ 14 billion of its official development assistance in the Pictures.
Being “partner of option” remains a key component of Australia’s NDS for the PICs, for many reasons, and now that competition with China for influence in the Pacific is a continuous reality, this means using Australia’s foreign influence and relationships to advocate for the Pacific’s needs.
First, climate change remains one of Australia’s best foreign policy interests. As a pro-Paris Climate Accord position, Australia has  , played , a major responsibility since 2015 in addressing the climate change matter in the Pacific and worldwide. In reality, Australia’s major  , global growth initiatives , have been driven mainly by its climate policy agenda.
Climate change remains the , second largest safety threat , in the region and since Anthony Albanese’s Labor authorities took office in June 2022, a more transformative , approach , has been taken to address the issue. Through its assorted , climate investment work, Australia aims to , reduce , carbon emissions by 43 % in 2030 and reach net zero in 2050.
Australia’s increased engagement in the Pacific in its climate action efforts has led the country to , <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2351128-pacific-islands-back-australia-joint-bid-to-host-cop-29″>receive the full support , of the Pacific Islands Forum ( PIF ) members of Australia’s bidding to co-host the 31st , Conference of the Parties ( COP31 ) in 2026 with PIF.
Second-largest challenge for Australia to be a companion of choice for the Pictures in security cooperation is geostrategic competitors. The geostrategic competitors between the US and China has  , intensified , in the region.
As a key ally of the US Canberra has been involved in a variety of initiatives to counteract the rise of China in the Pacific even though the great power rivalry continues to be a concern for the PIF members ( including Australia ).
China has emerged as a global powerhouse and is advancing regionally in the Indo-Pacific. China’s wedding in the Pacific has thus far largely been about economic growth.
Through its Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI), for instance, China has provided infrastructure projects in countries like Papua New Guinea ( PNG ),  , Solomon Islands , and , Vanuatu.
However, China’s energy to , establish , a bilateral security deal with Solomon Islands in 2022 has changed the entire narrative of energy relationships in the Pacific given that Australia and the US have been the PICs ‘” standard safety partners”.
The term “partner of option” in security cooperation falls under the umbrella of a standard protection partner, in which Australia tightly adheres to its foreign policy through dialogue with its Pacific neighbors and ensures that the US maintains its status as the Pacific power.
While Australia, within the course of a season,  , signed three diplomatic security agreements , with Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and Papua New Guinea to maintain its influence in the region in security assistance, China’s growing influence in the Pacific issues and concerns the concept of “partner of selection”.
In her recent interview, Sen. Penny Wong, Australia’s foreign affairs minister , stated , that:” ]w ] e are now in a position where Australia is a partner of choice, but the opportunity to be the only partner of choice has been lost and we’re in a state of permanent contest in the Pacific]with China ] —that’s the reality”.
Australia, apart from its security engagement with the PICs, also supports a free and open Indo-Pacific through engagement with key partners.
This include AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership , established , in 2021 with the US and UK in which both countries would build Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine capabilities ( conventionally armed ), including through , acquisition , of five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the US over the next three decades for$ 368 billion.
The AUKUS partnership also entails technology and information sharing among the three countries as well as , deployment , of US and UK submarines as early as 2027 to have rotational presence in Western Australia at HMAS Sterling through Submarine Rotational Force-West, a strategic move not just to help Australia build its nuclear-powered submarine fleet but also , counter , China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
As one of the members of the , Quadrilateral Security Dialogue , (” Quad” ) with the US, Japan and India, Australia’s status as a founding member of PIF ensures that humanitarian assistance, the key reason why the Quad was  , established , in 2004, is delivered to PICs, who remain vulnerable to non-traditional security threats like climate change.
Australia, along with New Zealand, Japan and South Korea also maintains the presence of NATO through , Partners in the Indo-Pacific , ( IP4 ).
Although NATO was  , established , to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War in Europe after World War II, its partnership with IP4 exists to , maintain , the international rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
There is this , notion , that” countries in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific count on the US to guarantee their security —a guarantee]that ] they have not had…to question for three-quarters of a century”.
However, China in the Indo-Pacific is already battling that security guarantee from the US. The US and its NATO partners see China’s emerging superpower status and its , provocative actions , in the South China Sea, particularly with the Philippines, as a threat to the liberal order.
Second, Australia sees the Pacific as a crucially important region for both its national security interests and the security interests of its allies as a US ally and as a NATO partner.
This implies that Australia seeks to prevent China from imposing coercion or attempts to establish bilateral security arrangements with PICs and to ensure that PICs remain under its control in security cooperation.
For instance, the former prime minister of Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare was  , described , as the polarizing, pro-China figure in the Pacific when he , signed , the security deal with China and PNG was  , urged , early this year by Washington and Canberra to reject China’s bilateral security offer.
When responding to China’s bilateral security offer to PNG, Australia’s Prime Minister Albanese , stated:” ]W] e are a security partner of choice for]PNG], as we are for most of the countries in the Pacific”.
PNG did not take up China’s bilateral security offer, intended to help improve PNG’s internal policing, as PNG already has a similar , bilateral security arrangement , with Australia.
Geoeconomic competition is the most important factor in Australia’s choice for partner of choice in security cooperation for PICs. Both the US and China are  , key trading partners , of Australia, and the Pacific region is critical to their economic development as it houses the , trans-Pacific route, the world’s largest shipping lanes linking Asia and North America.
In 2023 alone, approximately 30 million 20-foot equivalent units ( TEU) of cargoes were transported across the trans-Pacific route.
Secondly, while China has done significant investment in infrastructure development through the , BRI in the Pacific, Australia through its Pacific Step-up , introduced , the$ 2 billion Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific to increase its engagement in the region, as the BRI was  , accused , of a “debt-trap” diplomacy.
Australia’s membership in the Partners in the Blue Pacific helps , support Pacific priorities , envisaged in the , 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, as PICs are not included in the US-led , Indo-Pacific Economic Framework , for Prosperity except Fiji.
PICs are aware of Australia’s traditionally dominant position as a key regional influencer in security cooperation. While China’s interests, apart from economic development, are also to , constrain , Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in the Pacific, PICs perceive all parties involved, including big powers as its key development partners without any geopolitical interest in security and economic cooperation.
Australia will need to work more closely with the PICs as a traditional leader to maintain its position as the partner of choice in security cooperation while maintaining the sovereignties of each individual PIC.
For instance, the Pacific Policing Initiative ( PPI), just , endorsed , by PIF leaders in their 53rd , meeting in Tonga late last month would be a good start for Australia’s investment in its effort for regional leadership in security cooperation as the PPI will be entirely funded by Australia in the next five years.
Moses Sakai ( sakaimoses@outlook .com ) is a Research Fellow at the Papua New Guinea National Research Institute and a Young Leader of the Pacific Forum. He taught at the University of Papua New Guinea from 2018 to 2023.
