Commentary ,Asia (Page 2)

SCAM SYNDICATE CRISIS

In fact, thousands of people have been tricked into buying things that are strewn around Thailand’s frontiers like barnacles around the ship’s deck. &nbsp,

They typically come from hard-working, poor youth from countries like India, Pakistan, China, Myanmar, Philippines, and even as far as Ethiopia and Somalia. They frequently arrive in Thailand primary, are taken to a scam center, and their visas are taken there.

They are now the equivalent of drug mules trapped in a billion-dollar illegal market, run by wealthy and powerful people, the majority of whom are well-known but appear to work with violence.

According to the United States Institute of Peace ( USIP ) in a report from May 2024, scam syndicates in our area steal almost US$ 64 billion from victims around the world. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The unfortunate staff occasionally escape or are saved. 549 Indians were repatriated in March after being rescued from con factories close to the Myanmar-Thailand border. In February and March, China even repatriated thousands of its members. &nbsp,

Following Wang Xing’s violence in January, who had been duped into Thailand for a movie shot, was trafficked to Myanmar and caught in a flurry of activity. &nbsp,

After landing in Bangkok, Wang had exchanged a number of texts with his partner in China, but he remained silent until he reached Mae Sot, the Thai border area directly across from Myawaddy, a infamous fraud hub in Myanmar.

His girlfriend, who was alarmed, made public on social media by posting a message to Thai authorities and judicial officials in China. In the end, Thai authorities took Wang Xing off Myawaddy and brought him back to Thailand, in a process whose information are mysterious. &nbsp,

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HIGH Focus

Although the cost of this substance may be a factor, Myanmar’s sparse foreign exchange has always been a top priority for knowledge to support military operations.

Myanmar had more options than ever before to gather and analyze pictures intelligence after the quasi-civilian government was established in Myanmar in 2012. &nbsp,

An extremely large range of satellite images was made available online, both for free and with paid services. High-quality electro-optical photography and infrared pictures were included in this. &nbsp,

Additionally, it is believed that the military forces use 11 Sky-02A security drones, which were purchased from China. Apparently, a further 22 was constructed in Myanmar under the name of the Yellow Cat A2. These unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAV ) could house infrared and digital color cameras.

Myanmar purchased a hundred CH-3A UAVs from China between 2013 and 2015. Although the CH-3A was a fight drone, it was not the most advanced of China’s autonomous platforms capable of long-range monitoring missions and had a beneficial imaging capability. &nbsp,

For instance, the Bangladeshi government complained that Myanmar had flown drones over its borders to track the movement of Rohingya refugees and, probably, the insurgent Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. The legal defiance activity spotted CH-3 surveillance drones over street protests following the coup in 2021.

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POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS TO DELAY THE TRIAL

The social desires to postpone the trial are apparent for some lawmakers. Seven are running for re-election in the May semester elections. The test, which could last for months, did divert them and the country from their political campaigns.

As the congressional elections are an extremely economical race, for some candidates including celebrities and political elites, the worry is that an impeachment trial may damage their re-election chances if the public views them as lacking in lawful expertise or knowledge ( and therefore unqualified to render judgment on Sara Duterte ).

The congressional allies of Marcos Jr and a true criticism of politicians and pro-democratic civil society organisations now find themselves in the same social boat seeking the vice president’s faith to keep her guilty.

But, Sara Duterte’s supporters believe that the first team’s ulterior motive is to stop her from running for the president in 2028, as Marcos Jr is limited to a single six-year political expression. Constitutionally speaking, a conviction verdict may suggest that Sara Duterte is continually barred from holding any workplace.

Current polls indicate that Sara Duterte remains the strongest presidential contender in 2028 ( she is the choice of just under a third of respondents surveyed ). So, her supporters see the impeachment trial as less of a major drive to keep power to accounts but more of a means to hinder the Duterte dynasty’s return to the peak of Spanish politics.

Another Duterte presidency in 2028 will pose a direct existential threat to the Marcoses and their allies.

Democratic forces seem caught in a quandary given the Marcos-Duterte clans ‘ polarisation. Politicians and activists seem unable to differentiate their own positions from either the Marcos or Duterte camps’ since the break-up of the dynasties ‘ short-lived alliance.Continue Reading

On resolving the issues near the Thai-Malaysian borders, Thaksin’s report in the Deep South speaks for itself. He is best remembered for dismissing rebels as “petty thieves” and acting on imperfect knowledge during his tenure as prime minister, leading to a series of radical policies that sharply escalated tensions between rebel groups and the village’s safety forces.

In October 2024, under his mother’s state, the statute of limitations expired for those concerned for the Tak Bai murder, allowing them to walk completely without responsibilities. Four months later, in a traditional visit to Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, Thaksin apologised for his earlier activities, but his thoughts may ring dull as long as his daughter’s state makes no effort to seek justice for the patients ‘ people.

Chance OF ERODING MALAYSIA’S Trust

If Anwar’s plan is for Malaysia to enjoy a more effective role in mediating peace talks in Thailand’s Deep South, involving or associating with Thaksin is not just ill-advised- it risks more eroding Malaysia’s credibility in a process where its neutrality is currently unclear to begin with.

Some analysts note that Malaysia has nothing to lose from a low-intensity conflict: It prevents Thailand from exerting full control of the Deep South, while avoiding the direct spillover of refugees heading southward into Malaysia.

The Anwar-Thaksin deal only makes sense for Thaksin: It gives him a way back into regional diplomacy and a chance to rehabilitate his image after forging a toxic alliance that tarnished his political brand. Most importantly, the deal provides Thaksin a convenient excuse to get court approval to travel abroad if things go south back home.

Napon Jatusripitak is a Visiting Fellow and Acting Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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3, 081 undergraduate students from six South Asian countries were surveyed by the ISEAS study. With 41.1 % of male respondents and 51.9 % female respondents, they are 18-24 years old. In addition to Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, one of the six nations surveyed was Vietnam. &nbsp,

Youth satisfaction with a country’s social system and its future economic prospects was one of the topics covered in the survey. Indian youth was the most pessimistic about this. &nbsp,

Compared to their East Asian counterparts, Indian children displayed the highest levels of discontent with their social system. Only 27.7 % of respondents to the survey said they were satisfied, compared to 71.5 % who said they were.

In contrast, the ISEAS survey also revealed that 63.9 percent of Indonesian children favored paying taxes on the wealthy to assist the financially underprivileged, which is the highest rate in Southeast Asia. &nbsp,

A crucial aspect that formed youth pessimism was economic hardship. According to the survey, only 2.6 % of Indonesian youth think their country’s economy is “very good” and 37.8 % think their country’s economy is “bad”

Additionally, only 62.6 percent of Indonesian respondents expressed a strong opinion or consensus that the nation’s economic outlook for the next five years is promising, which is significantly lower than that of other Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam (88.1 % ) or Malaysia ( 84.1 % ).

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Adding to the problem, patients who were saved experience stress, grief, social stigma, and possible legal repercussions in their home states for crimes they were coerced into committing. Also, social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram are frequently flooded with fake outside job advertisements that bypass the site’s current moderation.

WHAT MORE CAN BE Completed?

The issues cited above highlight important policy gaps, which could be filled by both helping existing victims and preventing potential victims. East Asian governments may take more proactive steps to discover and assist scam victims.

As many of these victims are legally entering these situations through traditional immigration channels and travel arrangements under false job offers, embassies in nations that are known to host scam operations may implement an opt-in system for people staying abroad for extended periods of time to remotely” check in” with their governments ‘ offices on a regular basis to ensure their safety. &nbsp,

This can be integrated into existing modern recognition systems used by East Asian nations, such as Singapore’s SingPass or Malaysia’s MyDigital ID. Doing so can help determine smuggling cases by flagging people who have not checked in for an extended period, prompting follow-up studies. &nbsp,

Using local structures like ASEAN’s Multi-Sectoral Work Plan Against Trafficking in Persons 2023-2028, embassy engagement with anti-trafficking Organizations can be used to stifle cooperation with local officials and accept patients who have been identified.

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CALCULATED Goes

The lieutenant administration has always been a conflict zone for PKR.

In the” Sheraton Walk” in February 2020, next deputy leader Azmin Ali, along with about a dozen different PKR MPs, defected from the group, leading to the decline of the Pakatan Harapan state. Following Mr Azmin’s withdrawal, Mr Rafizi beat Mr Saifuddin to get the deputy president place in the 2022 group vote.

If Mr Rafizi, 47, were to be challenged in the upcoming election and lose, he had certainly lose his government.

Given his age and background as Selangor’s general secretary, 45-year-old PKR vice president Amirudin Shari appears to be the only real contender to succeed Mr. Rafizi.

Both people face a problem. To battle risks losing their current jobs, to abstain from doing so would stifle their political passions, and to challenge one’s present position.

Mr. Anwar could replace Mr. Rafizi in the government if Mr. Amirudin were to face off against him, successfully dethroning him.

For Mr Amirudin, nevertheless, the stakes are high. Selangor is Malaysia’s most powerful state in terms of economics, and his position as general secretary gives him a lot of fat. If Mr. Amirudin were to gain, it might cost him both his party control and his position as chief minister.

In light of this circumstance, Mr. Anwar might be able to employ Tengku Zafrul Aziz, a minister of trade and investment, who is close to the original prince. There is a growing rumor that Mr. Zafrul, who is currently employed by the United Malays National Organization ( UMNO ), is considering joining PKR in an apparent bid to become Selangor’s next chief minister.

His relationships to Malaysia’s nobility, whose family is a member of the royal family, may assist Mr. Anwar strengthen his relations to the Sultan of Pahang, whose marriage has been strained by the Najib clause story.

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NOT A Cure

Given that the program involves thousands of restaurants and other service companies in transportation and logistics, good governance (especially food safety ) would be a must. &nbsp,

Additionally, it is crucial to understand the responsibilities of numerous federal bodies, including the National Nutrition Agency, the Coordinating Ministry of Food Affairs, the Ministry of Health, and the local institutions. The widespread use of the military and the centralized home method could also stifle local micro and small businesses, which the government intended to support. &nbsp,

The president’s free school meals program is not a cure for addressing Indonesia’s triple burden of health issues. &nbsp,

Additionally, it might not be the only program that may address the problem. Stunting, for instance, is an irreversible malnutrition issue after the age of two years old, which is already being addressed under the National Strategy to Accelerate Stunting Prevention ( Stranas ). It is caused by factors beyond foods supply. Free school meals programs are not a program to stop stunting, but they can help reduce the long-term effects of malnutrition. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

Indonesia’s completely school lunch program would be more successful if it was coordinated with other complementing programs. These include behavioral modification, improved diet habits, and monitoring children’s health standing at college both at the baseline and throughout the program. &nbsp,

Another needed comparable programmes include actual actions, deworming programmes and food fortress.

Besides more targeted treatments, there are other programs to handle Indonesian children’s health status that might be easier to implement and more cost-efficient. This includes intended subsidies to full-day school, which has been proven to positively impact children’s advancement including demographic status. &nbsp,

In short, there is no such thing as a free meal. The potential consequences and coverage gaps should be addressed by the state.

Maria Monica Wihardja is an alternative associate professor at the National University of Singapore and a visiting brother and co-coordinator of the Media, Technology, and Society Programme at the ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute. She oversaw the meal plan changes and stunting protection plan at the Executive Office of the President of the Republic of Indonesia in 2017. Arianto Patunru is a fellow of ANU Indonesia Project, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, &nbsp, Australian National University and the president of Center of Indonesian Policy Studies. This remark first appeared on the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s site, Fulcrum.

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