Commentary: Instagram is making you a worse tourist

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1. Do your research

Even if you’re a seasoned traveller, you may not realise the impact your actions have on local communities. But a bit of information – from your own research or provided by local governments – might be enough to help you act more appropriately. Before you go, look up guidelines or background information on local cultural or safety norms.

Whether you agree with the customs or not is irrelevant. If it is a more conservative place than you are used to, you should be mindful of that – unlike the two influencers who were arrested for explicit behaviour in a temple in Bali.

2. Put down your phone

Research shows that when travelling, people can become alienated from their surroundings if they are more focused on their devices than the destination.

Often the most memorable travel experiences will be when you have a meaningful connection with someone, or learn something new that you’ve never experienced before. That becomes harder if you’re constantly looking at your phone.

3. Use your influence for good

In popular “Instagram versus reality” posts, influencers are revealing the huge crowds and queues behind the most Instagrammable locations.

Showing the less-than-glamorous conditions behind those iconic shots could influence your own social media connections to rethink their personal travel motivations – are they just going somewhere to get the perfect selfie? Having more evidence of these conditions circulating online could lead to a larger societal shift away from social media-induced tourism.

If you have the urge to post, try to promote smaller businesses and make sure you are demonstrating proper (and legal) etiquette on your holiday.

Lauren A Siegel is Lecturer in Tourism & Events, University of Greenwich. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

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Commentary: Oppenheimer could trigger useful discussion on nuclear weapons for Japan

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TOKYO: What can we learn from a country’s choice of when – or whether – to screen World War II drama Oppenheimer? Christopher Nolan’s blockbuster biopic was released in the United States just after the anniversary of the Trinity test, the culmination of the Manhattan Project on Jul 16, 1945, that paved the way for the postwar Pax Americana. 

In South Korea, it will hit screens on National Liberation Day, which marks Tokyo’s Aug 15 surrender in World War II – something the atomic bomb is credited with. And in Japan itself, which next month will see 78 years since Little Boy and Fat Man were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, the movie isn’t scheduled for release at all yet.

That might reflect the country’s complicated views on the war. 

In the US, the movie has reopened the debate on the bomb and whether it was a war crime. These revisionist discussions, which are based on what we know now, aren’t especially helpful. 

Contrary to some reports, Oppenheimer has absolutely not been banned in Japan – unlike some of its Asian neighbours, the country rarely takes such steps, even for politically insensitive content. But the movie’s distributor has yet to schedule a release date; assuming one comes at all, it will be some time after the Aug 6 and Aug 9 memorials.

JAPAN’S AMBIGUOUS STANCE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Even on those anniversaries, Japan tends to avoid discussion of the rights and wrongs. That’s not to say its citizens have a uniform position – far from it. A 2015 poll by public broadcaster NHK found that 40 per cent of the population agreed with the proposition that the US had no choice but to use the bomb. 

Interestingly, in Hiroshima, that number was 44 per cent – higher than the country at large – and topped those who called it “unforgivable”.

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Commentary: Forget Washington, Pyongyang’s most important target has always been Beijing

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BOSTON, Massachusetts: It’s easily forgotten now, but just over five years ago North Korea and China were not getting along. 

Beijing was adamant about implementing United Nations sanctions as a punishment for Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile testing. China had increased its military facilities, bolstered its defence capabilities, and constructed refugee camps along the China-North Korea border to prepare for any Korean contingencies. 

China even discussed the prospect of a North Korean regime collapse with the United States, perhaps anticipating such joint US-China economic and military pressure might contribute to North Korea’s decision to de-escalate tensions to break out of complete isolation.

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

How times change. North Korea and China have just celebrated the 62nd anniversary of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, having renewed the Sino-North Korean agreement for another 20 years in July 2021. 

Ever since North Korea mended fences with China in early 2018, it has been a regular occurrence for the two countries to emphasise their “like lips and teeth”, “immortal and invincible” friendship and “unbreakable” relationship. In contrast to the now hostile relations with the United States and South Korea, and the failed attempts to have sanctions lifted, North Korea’s charm offensive with China has been a resounding success.

The intense focus on US-North Korea and North Korea-South Korea summits, when they do occur, paints a distorted picture of North Korea’s diplomacy. In these efforts, Pyongyang’s most important target has always been Beijing.

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Commentary: China needs immigrants to escape a ‘low fertility trap’

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But changing immigration policy will likely require a change in mindset.

In a recent story by The Economist, the reporter notes that Chinese “officials boast of a single Chinese bloodline dating back thousands of years”. And that taps into a seemingly deep-rooted belief in racial purity held by many leaders in the Chinese Communist Party. 

In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping told former US president Donald Trump: “We people are the original people, black hair, yellow skin, inherited onwards. We call ourselves the descendants of the dragon”.

The best way to maintain this racial purity, many in China believe, is to limit or prohibit migration into China.

But relaxing immigration policy will not only boost numbers, but it will also offset any drop in productivity caused by an ageing population. Immigrants are typically of prime working age and very productive; they also tend to have more babies than native-born residents.

The US and many European countries have relied for decades on international migration to bolster their working-age population. 

For immigration to have any reasonable impact in China, the number of people coming into China will need to increase tremendously in the next decade or so – to around 50 million, perhaps higher. Otherwise, in the coming decades, China’s demographic destiny will be one of population losses every year, with more deaths than births, and the country will soon have one of the oldest populations in the world.

Dudley L Poston Jr is Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M University. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

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Commentary: Despite the excitement, India’s South China Sea policy remains unchanged

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NEW DELHI: An India-Philippines joint statement last month has caused a stir. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s Foreign Minister, and his Filipino counterpart, Enrique Manalo, issued a joint statement on Jun 29 calling for China to abide by the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea. 

It sparked a flurry of commentary in the media speculating a shift away from India’s long-standing neutrality on competing territorial claims in Southeast Asia. 

While India has long supported norms enshrined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), some experts pointed out, this was the first time that New Delhi had explicitly called on China to heed the arbitral tribunal’s 2016 ruling.

The development – although significant – ought to be viewed in perspective. A joint statement by countries seeking improved ties follows diplomatic practice. Not infrequently, one side pushes the other to take positions the latter may not be entirely comfortable with but is potentially open to considering as the matter is deemed a core interest by its partner. This is often the case with Southeast Asian states and their partners in Asia and Europe.

When the G7, the Quad, and the European Union expressed their support for the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea last month, for instance, some member states were wary of the prospect of riling China. 

Yet, they said what had to be, knowing full well that China would object. It did. Beijing slammed the move, terming it a blatant interference in its internal affairs.

OTHER FACTORS AT PLAY

It’s not as if geopolitics is the sole factor influencing the implementation of rules and norms in the South China Sea.

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Commentary: Why is NATO expanding its reach to the Asia-Pacific?

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And from a defence standpoint, NATO and the four partners will aim to improve the “interoperability” of their militaries – the ability of different military forces and defence systems to effectively work together and coordinate their actions.

This might entail deepening the knowledge of each other’s military assets, improving the relationships between their soldiers and other military personnel, and expanding joint drills.

DEEPENING RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND INDO-PACIFIC PARTNERS

The intensifying and deepening relations between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners can be interpreted in two ways.

First, these partnerships form another important link in the expanding network of diplomatic and security ties between the US, its Western allies and the Indo-Pacific region. They complement partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad.

Beyond this, we can also view these agreements in the context of NATO’s evolving outreach with the rest of the world over the past couple decades.

Previously, NATO’s collaborations with Indo-Pacific countries involved pooling resources for security operations in non-NATO members, such as the Balkans in the 1990s and Afghanistan in the 2000s.

Nowadays, strengthening these partnerships is seen as a vital part of responding to the new challenges and threats posed by Russia and China.

Of course, this does not mean we will see NATO military equipment or troops permanently stationed in the Indo-Pacific. Nor would it be realistic to expect the Indo-Pacific countries’ military contributions to Ukraine to lead to a more permanent set-up in Europe.

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Commentary: How Barbie got caught in the South China Sea dispute

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It turned out, however, that this was not a widely known or shared view by the international community. Since then the commission has become something of a de facto legal battleground for various views regarding the status of the nine-dash line.

In addition to China continuously advancing its position regarding the legitimacy of the nine-dash line, countries including Australia, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam have rebutted China’s assertions.

But the commission is not a court and is comprised of scientists who assess continental shelf claims.

It was up to the Philippines, as the other nation with possible claims on the region, to separately challenge the legality of China’s nine-dash line claim under the law of the sea. In 2016, a United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Tribunal ruled unanimously that China’s claim had no basis in international law.

That ruling was clear-cut and conclusive, but it was immediately rejected by China. While the Philippines conclusively won the legal argument that the nine-dash line had no basis in modern international law or the law of the sea, China refused to respect the outcome of that case and continues to assert its South China Sea entitlements.

China does this in multiple ways. It has built artificial islands in the South China Sea, harassed foreign naval and military aircraft passing through the region, intimidated Vietnamese and other foreign fishermen, asserted rights to explore and exploit maritime oil and gas reserves, and continued to publish maps depicting the nine-dash line claim.

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Commentary: Jokowi’s visit to Australia is about much more than electric vehicles

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The EV ambition is emblematic of this vision for Indonesia and has become the focus of the President’s trip to Australia, particularly in securing raw materials required to establish successful battery production. But the ambition is wider.

In office, Jokowi has adopted a hands-on approach, frequently engaging with citizens, visiting remote areas, and listening to their concerns. Policy-wise he has maintained a focus on infrastructure development, economic reform, healthcare, social welfare, digitalisation, and sustainable growth.

Central to this is the government’s “downstreaming” policy, with the aim to unlock the full potential of Indonesia’s abundant natural resources as the basis for a more prosperous and sustainable future.

Jokowi wants Indonesia to capture a larger share of the value chain by moving out of raw material exports into processed and finished goods production. This is seen as key to unlocking greater economic value, creating jobs, and fostering innovation.

MORE THAN JUST EV PRODUCTION

For EVs, Jokowi’s administration has sought partnerships with other countries to leverage Indonesian advantages in nickel production, a crucial component in EV batteries.

However, Indonesia has limited lithium resources, another essential element in batteries and a resource Australia has in abundance.

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Commentary: Can China help bring peace to Myanmar?

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With more high-level engagement likely soon, the question of how China can encourage positive outcomes for Myanmar requires a focus on its core interests. While Myanmar’s economic growth until the coup was advantageous, the fact that the coup leaders are almost friendless – and despised even in ASEAN – offers a different upside.

CHINA’S COURSE OF ACTION

For now, China can harness the Myanmar military’s appetite for attack aircraft, heavy weapons and constant resupply of ammunition and technical equipment to bolster its role as the patron-in-chief. Russia has traditionally taken a similar approach. For Beijing and Moscow, Myanmar is part of a convenient global constellation of countries pushed to the outer edge of the international system.

Whatever its short-term strategy, it would help China’s standing in ASEAN, and even in countries like Australia, if it showed a creative instinct to use its wealth and influence to broker better outcomes for the people of Myanmar.

The fear is that China will instead continue to manipulate Myanmar’s impoverished and downtrodden status while fuelling, through its lucrative weapons exports, some of the most atrocious violence seen in Southeast Asia for generations.

When the dust finally settles in Myanmar, its people will rightly ask who sustained the reviled military regime. Right now, the answer is that Beijing offered “friendship” to the coup-makers, an irony for a Communist Party so committed to regime and institutional stability.

Yet with the right attention to China’s role and self-interests, it is still possible to imagine shifting positions, where Chinese institutions eventually work out how to negotiate a more peaceful settlement. At a time when China talks regularly about peace in European, Middle Eastern and African conflict zones, a positive contribution in Myanmar would be welcomed by all.

Nicholas Farrelly is Professor and Head of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: Thailand’s military machinations will define post-election political manoeuvring

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Prawit-loyalist Assistant Army Chief General Suksan Nongbualuang has a chance to beat out Jaroenchai as Army Commander, after which Pana would succeed him. Should Pita or Srettha become prime minister, they would likely prefer the weaker General Ukrit Boontanonda to be army chief.

But a military selection board, dominated by arch-royalist service chiefs, votes on promotions above the level of general and it is doubtful that Ukrit would get the nod. Moreover, though Pita or Srettha could try to cancel Prayut’s reshuffle, Jaroenchai, as Deputy Army Commander, would simply become the acting chief and only he or Suksan could pass the board. 

The leadership of Thailand’s army-dominant military will not be obedient to progressive civilian leaders and look set to oppose any reformist measures by Move Forward or Pheu Thai.

Thailand’s progressive 2023 election winners are confronted by a gauntlet of obstacles. Move Forward and Pheu Thai face cases before the Election Commission and must pass the junta-appointed Senate. 

An alternative coalition comprising only conservative parties or Pheu Thai with conservative parties could easily form, especially if the Election Commission disqualifies Move Forward MPs. 

If a progressive prime minister takes office, Thailand will likely look forward to growing pandemonium. Meanwhile, caretaker Prime Minister Prayut will use the reshuffle to ensure that the military leadership remains firmly independent of elected civilian control for years to come.

Dr Paul Chambers is Lecturer at the Centre of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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