G20 India: Can a divided group deliver results?
shabby graphicsIndia has transformed the G20 into a brand-new political scene.
The plan to turn India’s G20 president into a world victory has reached fever ball in the run-up to the leaders’ summit this trip after 200 discussions held in 60 Indian cities throughout the year.
Huge billboards and banners that show Prime Minister Narendra Modi and a message welcoming members, demonstrating India’s willingness to embrace the world, have been placed all over Delhi.
And the crest of the officials and their capacity to issue a joint resolution that signals broader agreement on issues of global concern will ultimately determine the outcome of all of this work.
India has been working hard to make a resolution; if there isn’t one at the summit, it will be the first. But with a G20 that is divided on some problems, the biggest of which is the Ukraine conflict, that’s not going to be simple.
However, things have changed since then; Russia and China might not agree to make such concessions, and the West, led by the US, won’t accept anything less than a categorical criticism of the battle.
The absence of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin may produce decision-making a little more difficult. Instead, Sergey Lavrov of Russia and Premier Li Qiang of China will speak for their respective nations, but they might lack the political clout to create last-minute concessions without first consulting their leaders.
Early this year, the meetings of the G20 unusual and finance officials also came to an end without a joint declaration.
However, India will continue to hold out hope that the Ukraine problem won’t undermine the issues it wants to talk about with the developing nations of the Global South.
75 % of global trade and 85 % of the country’s economic output come from the G20 nations. Two-thirds of the world’s people lives there. India has positioned itself as the tone of the Global South by repeatedly asserting its duty to nations not included in the G20.
The presence of the African Union at the G20 has strengthened India’s location on the needs of developing nations.
The conflict and the pandemic have made problems like arrears, rising food and energy prices worse. According to Tanvi Madan, older brother at the Brookings Institution, India and other developing nations in the G20 do like industrialized economy to add money to these problems.
However, it is also uncertain whether these issues will be resolved. Consider debt refinancing. For instance, India and other developing nations have argued that wealthy nations and organizations like the International Monetary Fund ( IMF) should assist struggling borrower countries.
However, there can be no dialogue on this without bringing up China. The country’s poorest nations owed$ 62 billion in annual debt services to creditors, with China owing two-thirds of this, according to David Malpass, chairman of the World Bank until recently.
This has increased poverty, put some nations at risk of default, and skyrocketed food and energy prices.
American officials have frequently accused China’s lending practices of being aggressive, but Beijing disputes this claim.
According to Ms. Madan, developing nations” need their creditors to help them rebuild their timeframes” and, in some cases,” support them with more funding.”
She continues,” We don’t know what will come of this meeting yet, but the idea has been to come to some sort of compromise.”
A Common Framework ( CF) for the debt restructuring of poor countries was agreed upon by the G20 governments in 2020, but progress has been sluggish. China denies the accusation made by the West that it dragged its foot.
However, India, which has ongoing boundary disputes with China, will need more support from wealthy nations. It has advocated expanding the CF to more Global South nations( including middle-income countries ), a walk the EU has previously supported.
However, China could become a hindrance if the West continues to hold it responsible for the debt problems.
India also wants the World Bank and the IMF to be overhauled, as well as international cryptocurrency rules; these issues will probably be less contentious.
Another topic Delhi has brought up time and time again is weather change, claiming that some of the poorest nations are most prone to extreme weather events.
In an article published on Thursday, Mr. Modi stated that” actions on climate financing and technology transfer must be matched with ambitions for weather activity.”
His remarks are a reflection of the group’s disagreements over funding for climate shift. Developing nations are reluctant to commit to ambitious goals to reduce greenhouse gases out of concern that doing so would impede their progress. Instead, they attribute the issue to industrialized nations and demand that they shoulder a greater portion of the responsibility and invest in infrastructure, technology, and money to help them reduce emissions.
Professor of international coverage at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, Happymon Jacob, says he doesn’t anticipate making a significant contribution to the fight against climate change.
However, it is obvious that it will be a key G20 agenda item, and Delhi do encourage wealthy nations to contribute more solutions to the cause, he continues.
It is likely that agreements on crops, pandemic preparedness, care, and the global supply chain may be reached, but it is unclear whether these agreements will form part of the joint declaration.
However, a subject that is unlikely to be brought up is India’s deteriorating record on human rights under Mr. Modi, which detractors and opponent figures have frequently questioned.
Experts claim that despite pressure from campaigners and rights organizations, European leaders may not bring up this subject at the speaks in India, which is regarded as a crucial friend in efforts to halt China’s rise.
The presence of a pronouncement, according to some experts, including Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center think-tank, had hurt Mr. Modi, India, and the G20.
He does, however, add that India has a history of collaborating with nations that don’t get along, demonstrating how it has” safely managed its connections with both Russia and the US.”
Delhi might therefore get the nation that can resolve its differences. It wants to take advantage of its popularity as a balance, but it will be very challenging.
According to Ms. Madan, the presence of a joint declaration won’t actually result in failure because Delhi will be able to present summing up the meeting( which the host countries may do ), which can demonstrate agreement on 90 % of the problems.
However, a tumultuous G20 may also cause some to doubt the forum’s usefulness in the face of rapid change.
One of the few nations that participates in the SCO, Brics, and West-dominated communities like the Quad, G7( as an invited member ), and G20 is India.
In light of this, it is crucial for Delhi to carry out a summit that is effective and produces results that will strengthen both Mr. Modi’s reputation as an influential international leader and its position as such.
It will demonstrate Delhi’s capacity to not only comprehend but also strike a balance between the competing demands of various international forums. Additionally, it will help to improve the reputation of the American PM at house, where a general election is scheduled for next year.
The stakes are high for Mr. Modi both at home and in the international political purchase because he is implementing G20 activities to expand his foreign policy to smaller American towns and cities.
Learn more BBC reports about India here:
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Analysis: Children can sue governments over climate change inaction, but don’t expect boom in Southeast Asia litigation
A Contested SUMMARY
The UN general commentsupports a developing trend of growth in climate lawsuits around the world, especially in the Global South – a term used to group poor or least developed countries including many in the Southeast Asia region.
According to statistics from the Sabin Center and the UN Environment Programme, there will be 2,180 legal cases worldwide in 2022, away from 885 in 2017.
The highest court in China issued a directive in February encouraging prosecutors to present weather cases to force businesses to abide by environmental laws and aid the country in achieving its decarbonization goals. & nbsp;
China-& nbsp; despite this approval for the court to hear cases on a variety of environmental issues; and usually the majority of the Asia region-& nbsp; is also putting off filing a lawsuit against climate change. & nbsp;
Just a little portion- 6 of the cases documented worldwide between 2017 and 2022. 6 percent of cases have their roots in Asia, with 12 circumstances in Indonesia being the highest in the area. & nbsp;
The country’s Commission on Human Rights found that fossil energy companies were responsible for climate damage in a high-profile event in the Philippines next year.
It implies that those businesses may be held legally responsible for the nation’s climate disasters if the commission determined that they deliberately contributed to climate change and posed” a clear threat to the right to arise.”
The Commission’s ruling may establish potential legal responsibility in any claim for loss and damage caused by climate change, even though it is not legally binding.
It was an exceptional achievement in what is still a limited area of local regulation firms’ target.
A stain and a dearth of scientific evidence that also surrounds climate change locally may be one of the causes. And according to experts, several governments view dispute as a barrier to economic growth because of climate actions.
According to Dr. Tigre,” I believe that in Asia and Africa, most litigators prefer not to use that vocabulary of climate change precisely because they feel that it might hurt their cases.”
In fact, experts concur that bringing climate litigation to Southeast Asia continues to be a controversial and dangerous endeavor for anyone, let alone children.
“What we’re seeing now, is a lot of interest in trying to explore various pathways to hold governments and corporations accountable. But my sense is that you won’t get an explosion of litigation in Southeast Asia,” said Associate Professor Jolene Lin fromthe Faculty of Law at National University of Singapore, who is also director of its Asia Pacific Centre for Environmental Law.
Southeast Asia is never a closed-off area; Each individual nation differs slightly in terms of its legal framework, the circumstances, and the social environment in which prosecution will take place.
” Generally speaking, weather dispute is viewed as hostile to governments who believe they are being pushed to do more and held accountable for their inaction.” “”
Experts claim that even though the UN declaration is not legally binding, it may still have an impact on business behavior, federal legislation, and environmental protection for children.
According to Assoc Prof. Lin,” It is a very motivating growth because it opens up an additional possible route to support litigants’ says.” & nbsp;
It’s crucial to acknowledge the progress or creation of additional help, like a scaffolding process, when discussing the development of climate change litigation. The staging is increased as a result, she said. & nbsp;
Although these decisions from global organizations may not be legally binding, she explained that they are a crucial source of legal advice. & nbsp;
State typically prefer not to be perceived as outcasts. They may therefore want to at least appear to follow these rules. “”
Biden hosts historic SK-Japan summit to counter China
Getty ImagesThe United States and China have achieved what many deemed impossible – a historic meeting between US President Joe Biden, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol.
Mr Biden is hosting the first stand-alone meeting among the three countries at the Camp David presidential retreat in the US on Friday. It’s a diplomatic – but still tenuous – coup for the American leader.
South Korea and Japan are neighbours and old US allies, but they have never been friends.
Now, however, an increasingly assertive China has renewed US interest in East Asia. And it has brought together two countries who for decades have struggled to overcome deep historical grievances.
“I find the meeting at Camp David mind-blowing,” Dennis Wilder wrote on X. A professor at Georgetown University, Mr Wilder managed the Japan and South Korea relationship under former President George W Bush.
At that time, they could “barely get South Korean and Japanese leaders to meet with us in the same room,” he said.
In recent months, Mr Kishida and Mr Yoon have taken tentative steps to resolve their hostilities, and strengthen ties with Washington. This once-inconceivable alliance is driven by shared concerns – the biggest of which is China.
The meeting at Camp David – also the first time foreign leaders have visited the presidential retreat since 2015 – is an attempt to “signify and to demonstrate how seriously” Mr Biden takes the relationship between Japan and South Korea, according to a White House spokesman.
“The Camp David summit is truly historic, unimaginable until now, because the Seoul-Tokyo relationship was always fraught with historical disputes miring the two legs of the triangle,” says Duyeon Kim from the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for New American Security in Seoul.
“It’s an extremely rare opportunity for the three countries to propel their vision to the next level. They should seize it and push ahead boldly on even ambitious issues before presidential election cycles test or even strain the durability of their commitments.”
Why has it taken this long?
For one, the wounds are old.
Some may describe the two countries as “frenemies”, but it’s too trite a term to describe the deep hurt among South Koreans, including the thousands of so-called “comfort women” who were abducted and used as sex slaves by the Japanese army during Wold War Two.
South Koreans believe the Japanese never properly apologised for the colonisation of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Tokyo, however, argued that it had atoned for its historical sins in several treaties.
Any detente has always been fragile, almost akin to a game of Jenga. Even when the East Asian bloc appeared solid, a single wrong move could bring the whole edifice down.
In 2018, a long-running court case in Seoul over Japan’s use of forced labour during WW2 started a trade dispute which plunged relations between the neighbours to their lowest since the 1960s.
But there has been progress recently, including a milestone meeting in March, offering Washington a new window of opportunity.
But there is a good reason for the two new administrations to put their differences aside, even at the cost of political capital on the domestic front.
This is, after all, the era of pragmatic politics – and they see a bigger threat looming.
China’s assertive posture in Asia has alarmed its neighbours. Beijing claims Taiwan, a democratically governed island, and has not ruled out the use of force to “unify” it with the mainland. Incursions into Taiwanese airspace and major military drills are now the so-called “new normal”.
There is also North Korea. which has carried out more than 100 weapons tests since the start of 2022, including firing missiles towards Japan. The war in Ukraine too has prompted many countries, including South Korea and Japan, to prioritise national security.
All of this appears to have helped Mr Biden win where previous administrations in Washington have failed.
“This marks a major milestone in the history of the trilateral relationship that has moved in fits and starts over the last three decades,” said Andrew Yeo, the SK-Korea foundation Chair at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
He says the three sides will aim to “cement the gains” they have made in the last year or so, “while building momentum… to address a range of security challenges in north-east Asia and the Indo-Pacific region”.
That would mean signing agreements on defence, diplomacy and technology. It’s already known that they will agree to hold regular military exercises, set up a new three-way crisis hotline and, crucially, pledge to meet once a year. Washington’s goal then is to establish long-term ties that will last well beyond the sitting presidents.
“Biden, Yoon and Kishida have a chance to make even bigger history that lasts beyond a milestone meeting at Camp David,” said Duyeon Kim.
“Their respective governments will need to implement their joint vision proactively and beyond their leadership terms because the Seoul-Tokyo relationship will continue to ebb and flow. If an ultra-leftist South Korean president and an ultra-right-wing Japanese leader are elected in their next cycles, then any one of them could derail all the meaningful, hard work Biden, Yoon and Kishida are putting in right now.”
And here lies the challenge.
Will it last?
Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant to President Biden and Co-ordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, has praised the “political courage” of Mr Kishida and Mr Yoon, calling it “a breathtaking kind of diplomacy”.
But a change of leadership could see a change of heart.
“Tensions that run deep, particularly in South Korea due to past historical animosities related to Japan’s colonisation of Korea, do not disappear overnight, and we’re likely to continue to see diplomatic spats arise, as was the case a couple of weeks ago when the Japanese ministry of defence claimed Dokdo (Takeshima islands) as its own in its national security strategy,” said Andrew Yeo.
“Relatively low approval ratings for Kishida and Yoon back at home may limit the amount of diplomatic capital the two leaders could sink into Korea-Japan relations. I also believe at some point the two sides, and Japan in particular, will need a more thorough reckoning of its colonial past in Korea and elsewhere.”
Japan and South Korea may also not want to go as far as Mr Biden in criticising China. Fearing a backlash, they may hardly mention Beijing in their public remarks following the summit.
And pacts involving economic measures might be harder to secure than agreements on national security.
US-China tensions, especially economic restrictions, have come at a cost to both South Korea and Japan. China is a key trading partner for both. And companies in Seoul and Tokyo – such as Samsung and Nissan – rely heavily on Chinese workers and consumers.
Beijing has already made its displeasure over the summit known. It will see it as yet another attempt by the US to “contain” its influence, no matter how much the White House denies this. It has already dubbed it a “mini-Nato”.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged South Korea and Japan to work with Beijing to “revitalise East Asia”.
In July, in a video that has now been widely shared, he made an unusually blunt appeal: “No matter how blond you dye your hair or how sharp you shape your nose, you can never become a European or American, you can never become a Westerner. We must know where our roots lie.”
While Mr Biden has – successfully perhaps – focused on building defence alliances in Asia, it has left little room for engagement with Beijing and Pyongyang.
There were signs this was changing, with a flurry of recent Beijing visits by senior US officials – Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and US special envoy on climate John Kerry. There are also reports that Washington has approached the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un with an offer of high-level talks “without preconditions”.
But time is running out as another US election cycle begins.
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Emerging Asiaâs climate pledges look like empty promises
Many emerging Asian economies require billions of development finance to meet climate and economic growth targets. Developed countries have repeatedly committed to supporting the green transition but they have consistently fallen short of expectations.
Developed countries committed to mobilizing US$100 billion per year by 2020 to support climate action in developing countries but fell well short of expectations.
Indonesia, for example, requires about $281 billion of funding from 2018 to 2030 — or about $22 billion annually — to achieve its Nationally Determined Contributions and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 43.20% with international support.
Several Asian economies, including Indonesia and Vietnam, have been negotiating a Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP).
JETP Indonesia includes $10 billion in public sector pledges from International Partners Group members and other actors such as the European Union, United States, Japan, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. It also includes a commitment to mobilize an additional $10 billion in private financing.
But relying solely on such promises poses risks to national climate and development progress due to uncertainties and signals of backsliding by developed countries. Indonesia and other emerging Asian economies need to recognize the challenges associated with accelerating the implementation of climate finance commitments.
Public and private climate finance is difficult to deliver internationally. This climate finance often lacks specified sovereign commitments and relies on risk-reward analysis for private-sector investments. This contrasts with China’s approach of combining public and “commercial” finance through policy banks and state-owned enterprises.
Even with international climate finance through JETP, financing large-scale green energy projects becomes challenging due to increased foreign exchange risks. This limits local financial institutions’ capacity to provide long-term loans.
Sovereign guarantees, which are essential for derisking larger projects, are harder to obtain due to sovereign debt risks. The dominance of state-owned enterprises in most Asian developing countries’ energy markets also restricts private investor participation in power and grid projects.
Lastly, support for domestically financing the energy transition has experienced setbacks due to energy security concerns amid rising energy prices. This has resulted in increased coal production in Indonesia and reversals of no-new-coal commitments in countries like Pakistan.
Developing Asian economies can consider strategies to address these challenges such as strengthening commitments, mitigating investment risks, improving market mechanisms and cooperating with regional partners.
To accelerate the green energy transition, developing economies can strengthen political and regulatory commitments. Green-minded investors — including development finance institutions — cannot credibly provide coal-transition finance while political support for coal is not reduced.
This was highlighted in the June 2023 draft of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero Guide to Managed Phaseout of Coal in Asia-Pacific. The guide states that the foundation for attracting green and coal-transition finance is to ensure the “credibility of relevant energy transition and coal phaseout commitments and plans.”
Existing climate change partnerships with multilateral organizations or bilateral countries — such as Indonesia’s partnership with Norway — can help strengthen domestic institutions and capacity building.
Another strategy for developing economies is to enhance collaboration between local financial partners and major donor countries to mitigate investment risks. This can be achieved through currency hedging support and guarantee instruments to attract private investors.
Recent discussions at the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in Paris emphasized the importance of innovative financing mechanisms.
The development of innovative financing mechanisms could consider ASEAN’s sustainable finance taxonomy with a traffic light system which supports coal retirement and Indonesia’s new sustainable finance framework. This would help to build on Bank Indonesia’s previous experience of issuing green bonds.
Market mechanisms should also be improved to attract private investors across the green energy supply chain. Providing tax incentives for green energy projects, expediting negotiations of green energy power purchase agreements and ensuring priority payments for green electricity provision can attract these private investments.
Encouraging green transition investments in state-owned enterprises through international partnerships could also leverage green finance instruments.
Developing economies should also seek cooperation with regional partners such as China and South Korea for additional renewable energy project funding. China’s increasing investments in overseas green energy and hydropower projects — as well as its efforts to “green” the Belt and Road Initiative — make it an important regional partner.
China–Indonesia partnerships, supported by the Belt and Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition and Indonesia’s Institute for Essential Services Reform, can accelerate green Chinese investments in Indonesia.
South Korea is another promising regional partner in climate cooperation with its commitment to supporting the Green Climate Fund in providing a total of $30.3 billion for climate projects in partner countries.
Successfully accelerating the greening of the energy system in emerging Asian economies requires significant willingness and risk-taking to tackle financing and political constraints in addition to important transition considerations.
Mengdi Yue is Visiting Researcher at the Green Finance & Development Center at Fudan University.
Christoph Nedopil is Associate Professor and Director of the Green Finance & Development Center at Fudan University.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.
AmBank and Huawei sign MOU for sustainability financing and business solutions
Will introduce Solar Energy, Green Data Centers, EV Charging, and Energy Storage solutions
NRECC working on Long-Term Low Emissions Development Strategies
AmBank and Huawei Technologies Malaysia (Huawei Malaysia) have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to propel their organisations’ sustainability agenda. The MoU scope entails both parties working together in support of the introduction…Continue Reading
Italy flirting with NATO Asia-Pacific expansion
Italy’s right-wing Prime Minster Giorgia Meloni returned from recent talks with US President Joe Biden that included discussions of how to distance her country from tight economic ties with China.
The discussion was part of NATO’s efforts to “de-risk” – that is, reduce – economic activity with Beijing.
Meloni let it be known she was working to cancel Italy’s participation in China’s so-called Belt and Road Initiative, the trade and infrastructure partnerships that Rome joined four years ago. Meloni indicated Rome could somehow maintain “good relations with China” even as it dropped Belt and Road.
One of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy programs, Belt and Road drives relations with countries from the Pacific to Africa and, in Italy’s case, into Europe.
No sooner had Meloni returned to Rome from Washington than her defense minister, Guido Crosetto, described Italy’s Belt and Road participation as “improvised and atrocious.”
“The issue today is: how to walk back without damaging relations, because it is true that China is a competitor, but it is also a partner,” Crosetto said.
The Meloni-Crosetto diplomatic duet mirrored Biden’s tricky two-track strategy of dealings with China, which he regards as a combined economic powerhouse and military threat. Washington’s policy couples apparently benign cooperation on issues like trade and carbon emissions reduction with an adversarial approach toward what the US and allies call China’s international “coercive behavior” and challenge to “the rules-based international order.”
Meloni, for example, expressed hopes that benign post-Belt and Road relations with Beijing will continue. But she also steered clear of touting Italy’s other China policy feature: entry into the anti-China arms race. Italy joined the United Kingdom in a partnership with Japan to develop new fighter jets.
It was the first time since World War II that Japan partnered with militaries other than the United States. Tokyo had become alarmed at what it sees as China’s aggressive posture toward uniting Taiwan with the mainland, its unilateral occupation of island outcroppings in the South China Sea and support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As a result, Japan is undergoing a massive weapons development program.
Because the UK and Italy both belong to NATO, China complained about the alliance’s expansion to its shores. In June, Beijing’s mission to the European Union said China opposes “eastward movement into the Asia-Pacific region” by NATO.
“Any act that jeopardizes China’s legitimate rights and interests will be met with a resolute response,” the diplomatic note said.
The official Xinhua news agency chimed in and called NATO a “grave challenge” to global peace. “NATO is spreading its tentacles to the Asia-Pacific region with an express aim of containing China,” Xinhua asserted.
‘NATO is spreading its tentacles to the Asia-Pacific region with an express aim of containing China.’
Xinhua
Italy’s bifurcated policy toward China mirrors the ongoing one that Joe Biden is trying to practice. High-visibility dispatches of US officials to Beijing this spring and into summer exemplified the effort to find common ground on some issues while, at the same time, the US puts into place its long-planned military “pivot” to Asia.
In early July, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen met with Chinese trade counterpart in Beijing to discuss economic disagreements. She said economic competition between the US and China ought not be a “winner-take-all” contest. Chinese officials, on the other hand, made a specific demand: the US must remove sanctions recently placed on Chinese companies.
Shortly after Yellen’s visit, Secretary of State Antony Blinken “had candid and constructive discussions on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues” with top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi. According to a State Department report on the meeting, Wang told Blinken the US must “stop interfering in China’s internal affairs and compromising China’s sovereignty” – an apparent reference to Washington’s efforts to shore up Taiwan’s defenses against Chinese military pressure.
Wang also said the US ought also to stop “suppressing China’s economy, trade and technology.” That complain centered on obstacles to technology transfers to China and sanctioning of Chinese companies.
US climate change envoy John Kerry then arrived to encourage cooperation to reduce carbon emissions. China appeared reluctant to join hands in the effort; while Kerry was visiting, President Xi Jinping told officials at a climate conference that China’s reduction of carbon emissions “must be determined by the country itself rather than swayed by others.”
Kissinger was provided a lavish luncheon with Xi, who urged the 100-year old visitor to play a role in getting bilateral relations on track.
Prior to all this outreach, the Biden administration has been feverishly working to construct interconnected military relationships in the seas bordering China:
- The US renewed a program of military cooperation along with Britain and Australia, in which Australia is slated to construct and host nuclear submarines.
- Washington also revived a moribund grouping known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, involving the US, India, Australia and Japan – to discuss defense issues.
- Another grouping known as the Asia-Pacific Four, made up of Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, began to exhibit signs of being a branch of NATO. Its members have attended the past two NATO summits.
- The Philippines recently increased the number of nominally temporary military camps for US use from five to nine. The US closed its Cold War-era military bases in the Philippines in 1992.
This necklace of military relationships does not constitute an alliance in the style of NATO, in which members pledge by treaty to defend each other in case of attack. Still, China views it all as an effort to hem it in militarily. And it has responded by sending an aircraft carrier beyond the coastal China Seas into areas generally patrolled by US ships and by transferring jet bombers from land to both its operating carriers; a third newly built ship is soon to come into operation.
Beijing has island-hopped beyond its coastline. Last year, it signed a pact with the Solomon Islands, an archipelago northeast of Australia. According to a leaked secret document, under the deal the Solomons government “may request China to send police, armed police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces” and that Beijing could also send ships for stopovers and to resupply.
Despite this foray into a distant outpost, China’s attention appears focused on Taiwan and the possibility of invading it to forcibly join the island to the mainland. In April, China held naval and air maneuvers in which its forces surrounded Taiwan to secure control of “the seas, air and information” and to simulate precision strikes on “key targets.”
As for Italy, Beijing seems unready to give up on its once promising economic partnership, as exemplified by Belt and Road. Michel Geraci, an Italian politician who favors close relations with China, wrote in China’s English-language China Daily newspaper that Meloni would err in dumping Belt and Road.
Instead, he advised Meloni to focus on making changes in the Belt and Road deal “to put emphasis on stronger cooperation with China on climate action, peace and security, and Africa’s development.”
All of these issues are of greater interest to members of Meloni’s coalition partners who are unconcerned about China’s growing influence and power.
In short, Geraci thinks Meloni needs to embrace benign, non-security related issues with China and dump Biden’s concerns about China’s military power.
Xi Jinping meets Henry Kissinger as US seeks to defrost China ties
ReutersChinese president Xi Jinping has met former top diplomat Henry Kissinger, as the US pursues warmer ties with China.
Mr Kissinger’s surprise trip to the Chinese capital comes amid a flurry of visits by top US officials.
The former secretary of state, who played a crucial role in helping China emerge from diplomatic isolation in the 1970s, has also met senior Chinese officials this week.
The US has stressed he is visiting in his capacity as a private citizen.
But given his outsized stature in China, he is likely playing a crucial role as a backchannel for US-China negotiations, say experts.
Mr Kissinger was welcomed by Mr Xi at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, a more intimate space than the sprawling Great Hall of the People where official meetings with foreign diplomats are usually hosted.
A brief read-out did not give further details of their meeting, but lauded Mr Kissinger as a “legendary diplomat” and noted his previous achievements in brokering US rapprochement with China.
Mr Kissinger, who landed on Monday, also met top diplomat Wang Yi and defence minister Li Shangfu – who is under US sanctions – this week.
Chinese statements on the meetings have struck a conciliatory tone, with Mr Wang and Mr Li emphasising the need for respect, co-operation and “peaceful co-existence” between the two superpowers.
The read-outs also quoted Mr Kissinger as saying he was a “friend of China” and that “neither the United States nor China can afford to treat the other as an adversary”.
It is not known to what extent the US government was involved in Mr Kissinger’s trip. A State Department spokesman said earlier this week that they were aware of his visit, and that Chinese officials had also informed Secretary of State Antony Blinken when he visited Beijing in June.
Apart from Mr Blinken, Mr Kissinger is the only US figure Mr Xi has met in recent weeks – a measure of the respect the 100-year-old veteran diplomat still commands in China. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and US special envoy for climate John Kerry have also paid visits to Beijing, but did not get face time with China’s president.
Though Mr Kissinger has gained a controversial reputation in other parts of Asia for his role in the Vietnam War, in China, he remains highly regarded for helping the country emerge from diplomatic isolation.
In 1971, while the US and China officially had no diplomatic ties, Mr Kissinger had paid secret visits to Beijing to arrange a visit by then-US President Nixon.
The following year Mr Nixon landed on Chinese soil and met top leaders including Mao Zedong. It paved the way for the normalisation of US-China diplomatic relations and the opening-up of China to the world.
Since then, Mr Kissinger has been welcomed in China more than 100 times, Thursday’s read-out said.
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Singapore launches mandatory climate reporting consultation | FinanceAsia
Earlier this month, Singapore’s Accounting and Corporate Authority (Acra), together with Singapore Exchange Regulation (SGX RegCo), instigated a public consultation on a proposed set of mandatory climate-related disclosures (CRDs). The two bodies partnered in June 2022 to form Singapore’s Sustainability Reporting Advisory Committee (Srac).
The public consultation runs from July 6 until September 30, during which the public can access related documents through a portal on Acra and RegCo’s websites and submit feedback via a designated form. The two bodies (Acra and SGX RegCo) plan to consider public feedback and finalise the recommendations by 2024.
If further amendments are proposed to listing rules around sustainability reporting, a separate consultation will launch before the end of the year, SGX RegCo added in a press release.
The mandatory CRDs will require issuers listed on the Singapore Exchange (SGX) to report their climate impact in line with the standards set by the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB), starting from financial year 2025 (FY2025).
Similar requirements for large non-listed companies with annual revenue of over $1 billion will be mandatory starting from FY2027, according to the recommendations. In doing so, Singapore becomes among one of the first markets in Asia to consult on CRDs that are set to affect large, non-listed companies.
“To transition to a net zero economy, we need the critical mass to move the needle. With more companies adopting climate related disclosures, we are better able to drive actions and impact to meet our climate targets and make Singapore a better and more sustainable place for our future generations,” Esther An, chair of Srac told FinanceAsia.
New requirements
The new recommendations advance the city-state’s current reporting requirements, which were initially introduced in a phased manner in late 2021 to elevate Singapore’s role in Asia’s ESG arena and to uphold its position as a global business hub.
The market’s current CRDs require listed companies active in five prioritised carbon-intensive industries (finance; energy; transportation; materials and buildings; agriculture, food and forest products) to submit data related to their corporate climate impact.
However, the proposed amendments expand these requirements to all issuers listed on the SGX.
All SGX-listed corporates will be required to report their scope 1 and 2 emissions – those direct emissions that result directly from their activity or their production processes.
Corporates will also be required to submit data around scope 3 emissions – the indirect pollutants that result from the full breadth of a company’s supply chain. However, because these involve more complex calculation, Srac is offering companies one to two years to prepare for these reporting requirements before having to submit exact data, the press release explained.
“Scope 3 emissions are typically the largest component of many companies’ greenhouse gas emissions,” An elaborated to FA.
“To facilitate companies in making the disclosure, the ISSB standards have provided relief. For example, the standards allow the use of estimates to prepare this disclosure when the information cannot be obtained without undue costs and efforts,” she explained.
External assurance on scope 1 and 2 emissions provided by Acra-registered audit firms will be expected from all listed firms starting FY2027, and from large non-listed companies starting FY2029, according to the recommendations.
Dominoes
Commenting on the new disclosure requirements, Helge Muenkel, chief sustainability officer at DBS Bank told FA, “By starting with economically significant non-listed companies in Singapore, the goal is to eventually create a domino effect with better quality ESG data across the value chain, especially in relation to scope 3 emissions.”
As a Singapore-headquartered lender, DBS has been an active participant in Singapore’s sustainability effort. The bank announced in early July that it had upskilled over 1,600 institutional banking relationship managers and 170 credit risk managers to deepen their knowledge of sustainable financing practices, in order to better help corporate clients navigate the sustainability landscape.
Last September, market regulator, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and SGX collaborated to launch a platform, ESGenome, aimed at enhancing companies’ ESG reporting processes, FA reported. The assistance provided by the capability includes processes for sustainable procurement across supply chains.
To further facilitate large non-listed companies that are new to climate reporting, Srac suggests that scope 3 emissions need only be disclosed in the third year of mandatory reporting, An added.
The Srac team confirmed that mandatory CRDs for large non-listed companies with revenue over $100 million is set to commence from FY2030, but this timeline will be further reviewed in 2027, depending on the outcome from implementation of the current recommendations.
“With more countries pledging for net zero and the rising carbon cost globally, climate strategy and reporting can help companies, listed or non-listed, to mitigate and adapt to risks in the transition to a low carbon economy,” An said.
Whether the requirements will expand to include other aspects of ESG-related reporting remains undecided. The recommendations begin with CRDs as a starting point, An said, emphasising the urgency to combat climate change.
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