Before the missiles: How disinformation could spark Asia’s next war – Asia Times
” The issue with false information is not that citizens believe it. The issue is that they no longer assume anything.
— Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Training for the 21st Century
The largest Western issue since World War II was sparked by Russia’s massive invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, this conflict is more than just being won with tanks and missiles; it is also a constant struggle between reality and understanding.
Propaganda, propaganda, and media exploitation have become essential tools of contemporary war from Kyiv to Moscow, and from Washington to Beijing.
The battle for tale dominance is fundamentally influencing the war’s course even though the focus is still largely on natural battlegrounds. The fight against details is occurring all over the world, and Asia is carefully watching.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict teaches somber lessons about how disinformation can be used to destroy, separate, and rule as geopolitical tensions increase throughout the Indo-Pacific, especially in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and as always the Korean Peninsula.
Propaganda as a means of corporate warfare
Propaganda has long been used to stifle opposition, support anger, and elicit acceptance. However, thanks to digital platforms, analytic synthesis, and a squabbling media environment, its scope and scale have grown rapidly in the 21st century.
Russian position advertising sources like RT and Sputnik have become a key component of the Kremlin’s tale planning. These platforms condition reality rather than just broadcasting information.
Moscow has swung local support and soiled international waters by portraying Russia’s actions as “defensive” and portraying Ukraine as a European marionette state.
However, each country’s narrative is unique. The issue is described by US and Western media as an unprovoked war of a royal state, a view that NATO, EU institutions, and international human rights organizations have reinforced.
The outcome? Competing experiences where viewers watch vastly various adaptations of the same function.
” Misinformation and disinformation” are among the biggest threats to global security, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2024. This danger is even greater in conflict areas.
False stories, elaborated theories, and coordinated promotions blur the line between fact and fiction, lowering public confidence in journalism, governance, and yet democracy itself.
This distrust is way beyond Ukraine. Governments in Asia have faced and used disinformation campaigns, both domestically and internationally, that polarize cultures and misrepresent votes.
China’s online advertising in Taiwan aims to denigrate and divide the country. These aren’t just isolated incidents; they represent a vision of the unseen war that will shape the world.
Russia and the West internet conflict
How people interpret fight in the media is a crucial part of the equation. How how information is presented, in Erving Goffman’s Framing Theory, affects how people perceive truth.
Consider the missile attack launched by 2022 against a shopping mall in Kremenchuk, an Ukrainian capital. According to the Western press, it was a deliberate Russian invasion on citizens, citing satellite imagery and Russian sources. Russian media accused American media of fabricating information and claimed the destination was a military installation.
The incident demonstrates how the same event can lead to two contradictory conclusions, one for the West and the country’s private audience.
Propaganda produces compromise rather than just manipulating information. State media claimed 95 % of people supported the proceed during Russia’s 2014 annexation, despite reports of persuasion and a lack of international spectators.
The purpose of the conquest was to silence opposition by presenting unification as fact rather than just to justify it.
Similar strategies have been employed in Asia to window contentious activities. How institutions use internet control to create the illusion of national compromise while marginalizing opposition voices are shown by China’s management of the protests in Hong Kong, India’s narrative surrounding Kashmir, or Myanmar’s protection of the Rohingya crisis.
International fragmentation and horizontal realities
The design of horizontal realities is one of the most disturbing outcomes of information warfare.
The invasion of Ukraine is widely regarded as a” special military operation” by Russia to defend ethnic Russians from NATO anger. It is viewed as a flagrant violation of international law in the West.
This fragmentation makes political exchange almost unattainable. When people are fed jointly exclusive philosophies, settlement turns out to be a sign of weakness rather than development.
This style is present in Asia as well, from China and Taiwan’s cross-Strait ties to domestic disagreements over international legislation in Japan and South Korea.
Ukrainian public opinion has remained mostly pro-Western despite Russian media’s and its allies ‘ constant pushback. 89 % of Ukrainians support joining NATO, according to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 2023. Support for Russian independence is rising even in previously pro-Russian regions.
However, the stress of battle is beginning to percolate. Gallup reported that the percentage of people who supported fighting until they won the battle dropped from 73 % in 2022 to 38 % in 2023. These shifting sentiments identify the psychological impact of persistent issue, which authoritarian governments frequently exploit through info adjustment.
Asia’s conundrum of propaganda
Unregulated disinformation can do harm, not just to countries at war, but also to the international system as a whole, with the Russia-Ukraine war providing a terrible forecast for what unregulated disinformation can do.
The implications for Asia are clear: if disinformation persists, it may continue to undermine public trust, undermine political institutions, and aggravate local tensions.
The Indo-Pacific is now a location for narrative conflicts. A potential where electric influence operations become the norm, as evidenced by China’s growing media coverage, North Korea’s growing private disinformation, and Southeast Asians ‘ growing private disinformation.
To combat this unknown war, Asia may engage in media education, cybersecurity, and cross-border collaboration. Then, Asia might be the front line, and the next major conflict might be won with words rather than weapons.
The Russia-Ukraine issue redefines how wars are fought and understood, not just by reinventing Eastern Europe. The greatest danger, as Harari suggests, may not be that people stop believing everything, but rather that they do so in spite of what Harari suggests.
The stakes don’t get higher for Asia. The region has take decisive action to safeguard truth, transparency, and trust as information becomes more and more a weapon.
Zaheer Ahmed Baloch is a professor of international relations with a focus on media dynamics in world affairs and security.