The US Columbia-class SSBN program’s reliability and ability to compete with China’s growing naval force are threatened by disruptions and cost overruns.
Issues about the reliability of its position and ability to keep up with China’s growing naval force are a result of the US Navy’s plan to replace its aging underwater nuclear deterrent, which is facing expensive delays.
The US Navy is expected to receive its first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN ) with an estimated 12- to 16-month delay in the delivery of its first ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN), which is mentioned in a report released this month by the US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ). This could mean the US Navy will have to wait until the age of Ohio to replace its aging SSBNs.  ,
Worries about the delay are raised by shipyard labor shortages, supply chain disruptions, and part delivery delays, which are attributed to Huntington Ingalls Industries ‘ bow section and Northrop Grumman’s late engine generators.
To reduce risks, the US Navy is considering extending the service life of five vessels of the Ohio class, but this approach involves extra charges and logistical difficulties.
Meanwhile, shipyards and suppliers struggle to scale production as the construction of Virginia-class attack submarines ( SSNs ) and Columbia-class SSBNs ( SSNs ) simultaneously poses industrial-base challenges. Virginia-class production is expected to be increased to two boats per year by 2028, but the US Navy and economy still produce 1.1 to 1.2 submarines periodically.
Rising costs only add to the problem, with the purchasing resources for the Columbia-class program growing 12.1 % in the last year alone. Further overruns could squander money from other US Navy shipbuilding initiatives, putting strain on the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) long-term naval strategy.
The US may need to increase underwater production more urgently than ever in the face of rising prices and difficulties. Logan Nye mentions that China currently relies on anti-ship ballistic missiles ( ASBM ) like the DF-21D and DF-26B to keep US carrier battlegroups from reaching Taiwan in an article from We Are The Mighty this month.
Nye argues that SSNs who can evade them by jumping cannot be defended by those ASBMs. He even makes a point that SSNs can provide themselves with money for months, which could be crucial if US supply stores in the Pacific are in jeopardized.
Further, Jerry Hendrix suggests that SSNs may be referred to as the” first response force” during a Taiwan conflict in a 2024 American Affairs article because of these benefits. Hendrix does point out that the US underwater industry was eroded by the post-Cold War peace dividend, which led to the US never having enough ships when it was most needed.
The US SSBN fleet’s situation is not much better because it also suffers from a sagging US underwater business foundation. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 14 Ohio-class SSBNs form the basis of the US navy-based nuclear barrier as of August 2024.
Each Ohio-class SSBN is equipped with the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile ( SLBM ), according to NTI. Additionally, according to the report, the US Navy is replacing these outdated weapons with the Trident II D5LE, which has an enhanced instruction program for reliability.
According to the report, 960 warheads are present in the US Navy, assuming it operates 12 SSBNs of the Ohio class with 20 build tubes and four missile launchers. The number of effective weapons in the field may be closer to 720 because only 8-10 Ohio-class SSBNs are usually deployed at once as a result of ordinary minimal maintenance.
Worries about the reliability and endurance of the US undersea nuclear deterrent given that they represent 54 % of the US deployed nuclear arsenal are raised by the US Navy’s plan to retire Ohio-class SSBNs at an average of one per year starting in 2027.
Geoff Wilson and other writers make reference to the US’s SSBN ship in a February 2025 Stimson Center post, which notes that SSBNs are the basis of the US’ fixed punishment doctrine, with SSBN cunning and survivability disincentivizing a second strike that would eliminate all other radioactive forces, creating geopolitical stability at lower cost, while also highlighting the importance of the US SSBN fleet.
Wilson and others contend that the US SSBN fleet can provide deterrence against a number of targets at lower costs than intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBM ), which are less expensive than conventional bombers.
Nevertheless, a smaller US SSBN ship might destroy the US’s underwater nuclear arsenal. Thomas Mahnken and Bryan Clark argue in a June 2020 article for The Strategist that the US’s sea-based radioactive arsenal is the most resilient member of its nuclear family, but it is also the most rigid.
All of an SSBN’s missiles will become lost, according to Mahnken and Clark, if it is unable to establish its missiles, communicate with commanders, or be destroyed. Additionally, they point out that the nuclear trio may be completely destroyed if there was just one SSBN on guard.
Additionally, they point out that near-peer adversaries like China and Russia have increased their anti-submarine warfare ( ASW) capabilities to target US SSBNs because of the lethality of the US’s undersea nuclear deterrent.
They predict that during the 2030s, it is likely that only one Columbia-class SSBN will be in operation in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, supported by one or two ships at sea as back, highlighting the potential fragility of the US’s underwater nuclear arsenal.
Despite these concerns about weakness, Owen Cote Jr makes reference to SSBNs in a January 2019 content in the peer-reviewed Bulletin of Atomic Experts book that they remain the US’s most reliable barrier due to their unparalleled endurance and cunning.
Cote Jr. emphasizes the US SSBNs ‘ traditional viability, especially during the Cold War, as they proved resilient to Soviet ASW features. He also raises questions about potential future applications of emerging technologies like AI and quantum computing, which could make waters open.
Regarding those worries, Cote Jr asserts that these fears are largely unfounded because they are exacerbated by US advanced acoustic surveillance systems like SOSUS and the Fixed Distributed System ( FDS ), which can detect Chinese or Russian submarines alongside its advantageous maritime geography, which makes it difficult for near-peer adversaries to identify its SSBNs.
Additionally, Stephen Biddle and Eric Labs notice in a European Policy content this quarter that while China’s manufacturing capacity is smaller by a element of 230, US warships are usually larger and have more advanced sensors, electronics, and weapons.
Biddle and Labs discuss submarine capabilities by contextualizing how China’s submarine force is primarily composed of conventionally powered submarines, while the US has an all-nuclear fleet of 49 SSNs, 14 SSBNs, and four nuclear cruise missile submarines ( SSGN ). They stress that US crews have superior training and combat experience in contrast to their Chinese counterparts.
According to Biddle and Labs, China can produce nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers in half the amount of time that the US can produce the same types of vessels. They warn that the US puts itself in grave danger by assuming that naval conflicts will be brief, and that tensions over the US-China naval balance should be tempered by considering the dynamics of naval attrition’s competitive production dynamics.