According to a top aide to President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine has strongly ruled out any agreements in its conflict with Russia.
Andriy Yermak, the Ukrainian government’s chief of staff, said that while Kiev welcomed advice on how to approach a” only peace”, Ukraine is” certainly ready to go to the bargain for the very critical issues and beliefs … freedom, freedom, democracy, territorial integrity, sovereignty”.
Yermak’s remarks came a moment after Viktor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister, suggested that Kiev may agree to a ceasefire with Moscow. Orban, who is well-known for being close to Russian President Vladimir Putin and who has only assumed the role of the rotating presidency of the European Council, brought up the idea during his first war visit to Kiev on July 2.
Orban has expressed the most receptivity toward the EU’s leaders when it comes to the country’s financial and military aid for Ukraine. He played a significant role in putting off the signing of the 50 billion euro ( US$ 54 billion ) aid package for several months earlier this year.
However, the EU just agreed to a bilateral security agreement with Zelensky while he was in Brussels on June 27 despite Orban’s reservations.
According to the terms of the agreement,” the European Union and its Member States will help to security pledges to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine defend itself, resist collapse work, and hinder acts of aggression in the future,” along with colleagues.
The EU package is the latest of 20 for diplomatic agreements, including with the US and major European powers. However, they fall short of offering real security guarantees, even though they represent a show of support for Ukraine.
Nothing of Kiev’s partners are willing to send troops to the defense of the nation, mainly because it views this as a means of a full-scale conflict between Russia and NATO.
So, it’s unlikely that any of these security arrangements will stop Putin from starting his anger. They are, however, not at all inefficient or pointless. They provide ten- yr commitments to educate and equip Ukraine’s military forces, to improve the country’s defense business base and lead to its financial recovery.
They also stress the need for sanctions against Moscow to be in place, as well as the need for Russian leaders to be held responsible, and that they should also be extended. All of this signals to the West that Ukraine’s lovers are serious about supporting them.
Beyond the symbolic significance of the numerous agreements, they have also had beneficial, useful effects on Ukraine. Kiev’s ground rude last month may have failed to conquer little place, but Ukraine’s forces have decimated the Russian Black Sea fleet. It has had to move to locations on the Soviet island from Sevastopol, where it had traditionally been.
This has made it safer for Kiev to establish a safe maritime trade corridor in the northern Black Sea, facilitating its agricultural exports, and reduced the risk of Russian forces landing on Ukrainian shores of the Black Sea.
Similar to this, Ukrainian drones have been able to attack Russian military installations, provide routes, and energy infrastructure it. Ukraine’s standing on the ground has gradually improved as a result of less restrictions on the use of advanced defense arsenals against Soviet territory.
This can, and should, not detract from the fact that Russia has made gains in the area conflict and continues to do so while even targeting Ukraine’s vital national network. But it does suggest that for as long as Western help is timely, it is doubtful that Putin’s aggression may succeed.
All gaze on Washington
Despite its bravery on the ground, Ukraine is still far from establishing a clear path to victory. Moscow’s sector is still strong, and Moscow is still mobilizing more troops than Kiev, and its alliances with Iran, North Korea, and China provide it with significant economic, military, and diplomatic support.
How long will Russia be able to maintain this at least relative strength position? But neither is it clear that Ukraine’s situation will continue to improve.
A Donald Trump return to the White House after the US presidential elections in November 2024, which is currently looking more likely, would bring with it a resurgence of Trump’s so-called” America first” foreign policy.
The US would then likely try to persuade Ukraine and its other Western allies to agree to negotiated terms.
Kiev would find itself back where it was a decade ago if there were no real, hard security guarantees for Ukraine in such a settlement. Faced with Russian occupation of Crimea and a sizable portion of eastern Ukraine, it had to rely on a worthless “agreement” with Russia and no assurances against further Russian aggression.
But this is n’t a foregone conclusion, whatever the outcomes of November’s presidential election in the US. Instead, the numerous security agreements that Ukraine has signed over the past few months also allow for a different future.
With Western assistance, Kiev can demonstrate the futility of Russian aggression by regaining more territory and providing its population and infrastructure with more effective air defenses.
Russian military bases will benefit from Western military aid and the right to attack them, which will help to obliterate the supply lines that have allowed Russia to win on the battlefield.
Putin may not appear to be the kind of winner Trump prefers to support in this situation. Over the next six or so months, Ukraine’s Western partners will have an opportunity to increase and strengthen their support for Kiev, which may prove to be a winning strategy in a war of attrition after all.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham
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