If Iran receives the turkey, anticipate Saudi Arabia acquiring one shortly. When asked what Riyadh would do if Iran claimed to have developed a nuclear weapons in an interview in late September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at least implied that.
When asked how his kingdom had react, the prince quavered,” We will have to get one.”
According to Breaking Defense, Saudi Arabia is pushing for atomic energy guidance as part of a US-brokered agreement with Israel. If granted, this request could start the Middle East nuclear arms race.
According to Breaking Defense, Saudi Arabia is looking for US assistance to launch a domestic nuclear program with the same capabilities that the West has given Iran under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ).
According to the report, Saudi Arabia wants US assistance to enrich uranium so that it can eventually build a nuclear weapons. In order to give the president a victory in foreign policy before the 2024 primaries, it also states that the Biden administration wants to complete the Israel-Saudi agreement.
Riyadh may switch to China and Russia for assistance in developing the skills required to restore the balance of power with Iran if the US and Saudi Arabia disagree on nuclear restrictions and security agreements.
In order to remove the nuclear agreement signed in 2015— which former US president Donald Trump renounced in 2018— the Biden administration has been negotiating a new one with Iran.
Like US flip-flopping might have caused Saudi Arabia to question its American security assurances, prompting it to acquire nuclear issues into its own fingers, including by looking for new allies.
It wasn’t the first day bin Salman had said something so thought-provoking. Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire nuclear weapons, but we will undoubtedly do so as soon as possible if Iran develops one, according to bin Salman in a March 2018 CBS meeting.
Saudi Arabia has long been bothered by Iran’s nuclear program, a lifelong arch enemy. Somayeh Sadat Moosavian and other authors mention that Saudi Arabia earnestly opposed Iran’s nuclear activities during the Ahmadinejad management in a March 2022 article published in the peer-reviewed Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences.
But, Moosavian and others point out that Saudi Arabia changed its stance to a compromise of menace and army coalition despite the success of the succeeding Rouhani management in global negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.
Additionally, Al Jazeera reported in August 2020 that Saudi Arabia had partnered with China to construct a uranium yellowcake running plant near Al Ula, raising questions about the village’s nuclear programme and possible nuclear weapons development.
Al Jazeera claims that the Saudi Energy Ministry, which had signed a contract in 2012 to work together on the quiet development of nuclear power, denied the facility was built but acknowledged working with Chinese organizations for uranium exploration within Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia has built a research furnace and invited bids to build two civil nuclear power reactors, according to the Al Jazeera statement. The UN’s nuclear watchdog has been requesting full-fledged safeguards for years, and Saudi Arabia announced on Monday of this week that it has decided to end light-touch oversight of its radioactive activities.
Additionally, Ludovica Castelli notes in a March 2023 Stimson post that Saudi Arabia’s extensive energy resources cast doubt on its plans to develop nuclear power. In line with bin Salman’s assertions, Castelli also draws attention to Royal officials’ claims that” all bets are off” if Iran develops a nuclear weapons.
Additionally, Saudi Arabia has an active ballistic missile system that, if necessary, can be used as a nuclear weapons delivery system.
Mark Fitzpatrick notes that Saudi Arabia has relied on Chinese DF-3 missile imports since the late 1980s and has recently sought out indigenous production capacity in an article published in August 2021 for the International Institute of Strategic Studies ( IISS ).
Fitzpatrick notes that although Riyadh has previously acknowledged the order, Saudi Arabia purchased more sophisticated DF-21 rockets from China in 2007. Additionally, he claims that Saudi Arabia’s purchase was authorized by the US Central Intelligence Agency( CIA ) due to modifications made to prevent nuclear warheads from being carried.
However, because of their poor accuracy, these missiles are only effective against significant targets like cities and would be useless against anything other than a nuclear weapon.
According to US knowledge, Saudi Arabia is officially constructing its nuclear weapons with China’s help, Asia Times reported in December 2021. Saudi Arabia has expanded the Al Watah weapon base to contain services for building and testing jet engines, as seen in planet images.
Riyadh is today looking to acquire vital equipment needed to produce ballistic missiles as a result of the ongoing negotiations between Saudi Arabia and China. Fitzpatrick notes that if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, for actions would lead to Saudi Arabia’s equivocal deterrent position.
Iran may speed up its nuclear programme as a result of Saudi Arabia’s confusing stance. Kelsey Davenport notes that Iran had enriched uranium to 84 % this February, just a few points below the 90 % required for nuclear weapons, in an article published by the Atlantic Council in March 2023.
According to Davenport, Iran has been enriching uranium to 60 % since January 2021. This increase in enrichment could result in a” breakout time” in which four nuclear weapons could be produced using Iran’s stockpiles of 60 % and 20 %.
But, there are compelling arguments against Saudi Arabia for not pursuing nuclear weapons in the near future.
Colin Kahl and other authors note in a study published by the Center for New American Security( CNAS ) that Saudi Arabia’s decision to develop nuclear weapons would jeopardize its strategic situation by posing new threats to regional and domestic stability, endangering crucial US relations, taking on significant reputational risks, and possibly even inviting international sanctions.
Given the US’s crucial interests in Saudi Arabia and its vast standard and atomic capabilities, Kahl and others claim that Saudi Arab Arabia will probably come to the conclusion that its nuclear umbrella and extended punishment guarantees are more effective and believable.
They also point out that Saudi Arabia may take action to fortify its defenses against standard or innovative attacks from Iran while maintaining a radioactive hedging strategy that entails building up its civilian nuclear capability, which could potentially be weaponized, while being careful to avoid international sanctions or severing ties with the US.