Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to re-establish political ties in March, with China serving as the sponsor of the negotiations. This sparked a lot of debate among decision-makers and the academic community. Some people thought this signaled a new shift in China’s strategy for the Middle East, which has mainly been concerned with trade relationships.
However, it is overstated to believe that China will soon play a more significant and active role as the A & nbsp, conflict mediator, in the Persian Gulf region. Although Beijing hosted the negotiations that resulted in the contract, the majority of the important work had already been completed, chiefly by Oman, Iraq, and NBP.
Because the United States does not have relations with Iran, making it challenging for the US to mediate a work, China’s soon involvement was also made possible.
China’s involvement mirrored its earlier initiatives to manage local conflicts. During the Darfur issue, it made an effort to bridge the gap between the foreign community and the Syrian government between 2004 and 2007. Beijing then took similar action regarding the Iranian nuclear program in 2013 – 15 between the West and Tehran & nbsp, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
A pre-established model of discourse and the determination of each side to include Beijing in both cases contributed to Chinese involvement.
Since the Saudi-Iran understanding, debate has shifted to how China might maintain ties between the two rivals. This exaggerates the significance of the understanding, which only involved reestablishing political relations.
Actually if China had the desire, it lacks the ability to establish itself on the two members, not the least of which is the persistence of a number of problems between them. Although there are indications that the two sides may be beginning to find some common ground, they include andnbsp, Iran’s creeping nuclear military, and their opposing stances regarding the Yemen civil warfare.
Even if China cannot guarantee future durability, there are enough regional opportunities to make this possible.
There were good reasons for Iran and Saudi Arabia to come to an agreement. On the Royal section, there is a perception that Washington has lost its credibility. Riyadh also acknowledges that over the past 20 years, Saudi Arabia’s financial ties with China have significantly increased due to diversifying relationships, which is not a good thing.
Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia totaled US$ 12.78 billion between 2005 and 2022, compared to Iran’s$ 4.72 billion.
Iran’s economy is currently in trouble. The GDP nearly halved between 2012 and 2021, from$ 644 billion to$ 360 billion, exacerbated by & nbsp sanctions. Additionally, it had to deal with widespread protests against Mahsa Amini’s murder in police custody in 2022, which prompted it to break down on the activists.
In comparison to Saudi Arabia, Iran has fewer options. Although it entered into an investment agreement with China two years ago, there are few indications that it has resulted in a significant increase in resources. Iran may have been able to stay in Beijing’s line of sight by having China host political negotiation with the Saudis.
The China-China agreement between the two sides will possibly lessen Gulf competition while equally indicating that Beijing may be becoming aware of the political repercussions that the region’s expanding economic status entails.
China has long worked to stay out of inter-regional tensions, conflicts, and in & nbsp. But it’s turning out to be harder than it seems. A joint announcement reaffirmed the GCC’s long-standing support for the United Arab Emirates’ cases over the Tunb and Abu Musa islands following the Gulf Cooperation Council summit with China in December 2022. Tehran already asserts ownership of these islands, and the Chinese embassy was called after the announcement.
The Chinese now seem to be paying closer attention to the Gulf region’s unrest. Then-foreign pastor Wang Yi released China’s Five-Point Plan on the day of his trip to the Gulf in 2021. It made reference to the Gulf’s desire for locally and collectively generated security. Wang emphasized the necessity of a” trust mechanism” as well as” safety for shipping lanes and oil facilities.”
It is important not to overstate either the nature of the contract or China’s part in the region, even though it is noteworthy that China was involved during the final stages of re-establishing diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Some local conflicts are probably going to continue without Chinese treatment, like those in Syria, Israel-Palestine, Libya, or Yemen.
It will be unattractive for a third party like China to resolve as long as conflicting events and their physical supporters believe that the current benefits of continuing the fight outweigh the costs of ending them. Beijing may come to the conclusion that failing to reach a successful outcome may harm its overall local credibility if it believes that serving as the mediator may make and nbsp, boost its stature.
As long as relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are thought to be improving, this will & nbsp will benefit them as well as Beijing and its regional standing. However, if they become stagnant or worsen, this could be bad news for China’s meddling in local elections.
Beijing has so far resisted taking a more consistent and engaged stance toward the two regional rivals, probably for this reason.
This article and its accompanying article were first published by East Asia Forum, a nonprofit organization based at the Australian National University‘s College of Asia and the Pacific and housed within the & nbsp, Crawford School of Public Policy. A Creative Commons license is used to republish it.