The new KTSSM bunker-buster missile from South Korea improves standard strike capabilities while subtly positioning the nation for a possible independent nuclear deterrent.
The missile’s deployment represents a wider strategic shift that might allow standard and radioactive postures to be blurred.
This quarter, Yonhap News Agency reported that South Korea has fielded the Asian Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missile (KTSSM), a internally developed precision-strike tool designed to destroy North Korea’s underwater artillery websites.
Dubbed” Ure” ( Thunder ), the KTSSM can conduct rapid, simultaneous precision strikes, targeting North Korea’s long-range artillery, much of which is positioned within striking distance of Seoul.
With a range of 180 meters, the weapon increases South Korea’s deterrent posture amid escalating conflicts. The rollout gives the government an “overwhelming” ability to “destroy” army posts in a situation, according to the North Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
Following North Korea’s assault of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, the KTSSM was first developed. KTSSM is a reasonably priced tactical ballistic system comparable to the US Army’s Tactical Missile System ( ATACMS ), but it offers improved accuracy at the expense of a shorter range.  ,
There are two variants: KTSSM-1, which is intended to target North Korea’s M1978/M1989 Koksan 170-mm howitzers and M1985/M1991 240-mm multiple rocket launchers ( MRL), and KTSSM-2, a self-propelled unit designed to strike North Korea’s KN-09 300-mm MRLs and KN-02 short-range ballistic missiles ( SRBM ).
The Koksan’s collection with regular shell is 40 km and 60 km with rocket-assisted weapons, while North Korea’s 240-millimeter MRLs have a similar spectrum. The KN-09 has an estimated collection of 200 meters and the KN-02 falls within the 120-170 mile range.
KTSSM Block 1 features a infrared absorbing weapon, while Block 2 employs a sovereign high-explosive weapon. While its Army Missile Command maintains the Hyunmoo and ATACMS systems, South Korea uses the KTSSM at the army levels.
North Korea’s hardened artillery sites ( HARTS ) remain a significant threat. In a January 2021 article for The National Interest ( TNI), Kyle Mizokami claims that North Korea has between 200 and 500 HARTS positioned in the mountains north of the Demilitarized Zone ( DMZ).
These weaponry parts may fire before reloading in the mountains. These websites will be used by North Korea as a means of assault against Seoul or to help a possible invasion. It can also apply its artillery risk to coerce the US and South Korea without using chemical or nuclear weapons as a force weapon.
According to a report from August 2020 RAND Corporation, North Korea reportedly has about 6, 000 jet and pipe artillery pieces that are capable of striking major South Korean population centers with highly explosive ammunition. Yet a small, focused barrage could inflict fatal damage.
RAND warns that if these artillery products fired for an hour, there could be 100, 000 mortality, and strikes on business services could wreak havoc on South Korea’s business. The report asserts that the US and South Korea’s ability to stop a large number of casualties or protect human populations may be hampered by the rapid onset of destruction.
Other experts advise against overstating North Korea’s artillery functions, despite these assessments highlighting the threat’s scope.
In a November 2024 Modern Warfare Institute ( MWI ) article, Ju Hyung Kim argues that North Korea’s artillery, though significant, may not be as formidable as often portrayed. He points out that North Korea is only possible to have 200 240 mm MRLs and about 100 self-propelled guns that are capable of reaching Seoul.
Kim furthermore highlights the poor reliability and great disappointment level of North Korea’s artillery. During the 2010 Yeonpyeong assault, North Korea fired 400 shells, but merely 80 reached their goals, while 320 fell into the sea. Of the 80 that hit their targets, 20 failed to ignite.
From that, Kim estimates that in a full-scale assault on Seoul, North Korea’s 170-millimeter artillery was fire 100 shells, while its 240-millimeter MRLs could flame 4, 400 missiles, but just 48 shell and 1, 840 missiles would reach the city.
He contends that a similar attack would cause significantly less damage than worst-case projections suggest given Seoul’s large urban sprawl, prevalence of reinforced concrete structures, and high prevalence of dud-rate munitions in the country.
South Korea’s investment in conventional arms like the KTSSM demonstrates the ongoing impact of non-nuclear deterrence, despite North Korea’s nuclear arsenal dominating discussions about deterrent.
In a 2019 Federation of American Scientists ( FAS ) report, Adam Mount critiques South Korea’s reliance on the US nuclear umbrella, arguing that it is an inadequate response to North Korea’s limited acts of aggression and risks unnecessary escalation.
He contends that standard responses are desirable due to nuclear escalation’s functional, socioeconomic, political, human and prescriptive costs. Mount adds that using nuclear weapons to deter war is a proper choice while having little real liquidity.
Socially, he contends that South Korea’s rely on US extended punishment presents a problem, the US is unlikely to forward-deploy atomic weapons to the Asian Peninsula, and even if it did, their operating power may be limited. Further, the US’s potential use of nuclear weapons against the former’s will could complicate South Korea’s strategic calculations.
Given these constraints, South Korea’s development of the KTSSM aligns with its broader conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy.
Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim argue in a 2021 International Security journal article that South Korea’s pursuit of these capabilities is a result of a long-term strategy of hedging against potential US abandonment while strengthening its nuclear latency.
The threat that the US might weaken its nuclear-extended deterrence commitments to South Korea is increased by North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs) capable of striking the US mainland.
South Korea is encouraged by this strategic uncertainty to improve its ability to use its own deterrence, as well as to ensure that it will continue to be able to preemptively neutralize North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and leadership if necessary.
South Korea can effectively threaten North Korean military assets in the short term thanks to its emphasis on conventional deterrence, without going so far as to demonstrate nuclear brinkmanship.
However, in the long run, developments like the KTSSM provide South Korea with the technological foundation for rapid nuclear weaponization in the event that the security environment requires a change.
Bowers and Hiim say South Korea’s nuclear hedging strategy is based on dual-use missile systems. This implies that South Korea is purposefully developing capabilities that could be used to deter nuclear war, if necessary, while avoiding the immediate risks and political ramifications of developing nuclear weapons.
The KTSSM’s deployment highlights South Korea’s evolving security calculus. South Korea’s investment in advanced conventional strike systems, which is still covered by the US nuclear umbrella, indicates a growing need for strategic autonomy.
The missile serves an immediate tactical purpose—countering North Korea’s artillery threat—but its broader implications extend into nuclear strategy.