Russia’s use of conventional-armed multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle ( MIRV ) -equipped intermediate ballistic missile ( IRBM ) in Ukraine signals a significant escalation, putting NATO on edge and raising fears of nuclear brinkmanship.
Russia launched a previously unheard ballistic missile strike on Dnipro, Ukraine, according to The War Zone. The projectile was initially identified as an intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) launched from the Astrakhan region by the Ukrainian Air Force ( UAF ), but US and Western officials later confirmed it to be an intermediate-range ballistic missile ( IRBM ).
According to the War Zone statement, the missile, which was fitted with MIRVs, struck the Russian military’s Pivdenmash factory.
Following recent US and allied choices that allowed Ukraine to launch long-range missiles against Russia, Moscow was advised to deploy recently unnecessitated weapons.
According to the War Zone record, Volodymyr Zelensky, president of Ukraine, and other officials are looking into the rocket’s specifics, despite conflicting reports about its kind. Given that Ukraine lacks the sophisticated defense systems required to intercept for missiles, the mention of the attack highlights the conflict’s growing intensity and Russia’s proper messaging.
The Russian nuclear missile, the Oreshnik, is a derivation of the RS-26 Rubezh nuclear missile, according to The War Zone. The report says Russia developed the RS-26 in 2008 as a solid-fueled, road-mobile system designed to operate within the constraints of the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty. It boasts a range of 3, 000 to 5, 500 meters.
The difference between IRBMs and ICBMs is clarified by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. An IRBM has a range of 3, 000 to 5, 500 meters, while an ICBM has a collection beyond 5, 500 meters. Opposed to UAF claims, this explanation makes the Oreshnik an IRBM, hardly an ICBM.
Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, confirmed the start of the Oreshnik IRBM, according to Politico. The US Department of Defense ( DOD ) also confirmed the launch, according to Polititico, adding that Russia had notified the US via channels to reduce nuclear risk prior to the attack.
Stephen Bryen argues that the UAF’s say that the Oreshnik IRBM strike was an ICBM attack is propaganda by Ukraine, leading to NATO intervention on its part.
Former US assistant undersecretary of security Bryen points out that the missile’s claim that it was an ICBM was not an IRBM was refuted by UAF claims that it was an ICBM, not an IRBM, as well as the lack of dish detection or defensive responses.
Using conventional-tipped MIRV-armed IRBMs or ICBMs poses major technical problems. Steve Andreasen mentions accuracy in an article published by the Arms Control Association (ACA ). For successful strikes with regular warheads, sophisticated guidance and targeting techniques must be adapted from tactical munitions.
Andreasen says knowledge is another obstacle, as identifying and tracking high-value, time-sensitive targets remains challenging. He adds that the issue of targeting mobility gets even more complicated because smart goals can evade attacks while pursuing a missile’s strike range, necessitates yet greater accuracy and intelligence. He mentions that swift decision-making is required without putting up the possibility of mistaken nuclear launches.
Andreasen also points out that having IRBMs or ICBMs can be expensive for such arms for anything less than a radioactive attack.
Additionally, goals may not be able to determine whether an incoming missile has a conventional or nuclear load depending on how futuristic IRBMs or ICBMs are designed. They only have a few days to choose their next move, regardless of the circumstance, because of this confusion.
A hostile strike may occur before the weapon reaches its goal, leaving the defending part aware of the nature of the weapon, known as “launch on warning.”
The RS-26 and Oreshnik may have a “hot swappable” weapon part, enabling it to be readily adapted for regular or atomic use. Russia’s main weapon of deterrence is ambiguity and uncertainty, particularly in relation to short-range ballistic missiles ( SRBMs) like the Iskander.
Russia’s Oreshnik strike highlights its approach to nuclear confusion, which has stifled European support for Ukraine due to concerns about nuclear escalation, which could lead to a nuclear warhead attack in the future.
In a 2019 Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) report, Maggie Tennis mentions that Russia’s nuclear strategy leverages ambiguity as a deterrence measure, focusing on dual-capable systems that blur the lines between conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Tennis notes that arms like the Kalibr boat weapon, Iskander SRBM, and Kh-101 air-launched weapons can take standard or nuclear weapons. This duality, in tennis ‘ opinion, makes it more difficult for opponents to determine a potential strike’s nature, increasing the possibility of misunderstanding during crises.
She says Soviet military exercises, typically featuring dual-capable devices, more muddy the waters, leaving observers uncertain about the purpose and potential for nuclear increase. She adds that using such impenetrable doctrines and systems increases the risk of “entanglement” in which misinterpreted standard conflicts could turn into nuclear weapons.
While Tennis points out that Russia’s intentional ambiguity, rooted in Soviet-era strategic deception ( maskirovka ), aims to confuse adversaries and maximize flexibility, this approach may undermine strategic stability, as it fuels worst-case scenario planning by the US and NATO.
In line with tennis ‘ ideas, Simon Saradzhyan makes the point that Russia’s 2024 version, which has just been released, has significantly altered its nuclear philosophy, widening the parameters under which it may use nuclear weapons.
According to Saradzhyan, the modified theory removes the phrase “exclusively” from its definition of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, indicating a potential shift to a more confrontational position. He claims that it expands the arguments for nuclear use to include threats to Belarus ‘ and Russia’s territorial integrity.
He mentions that the revised doctrine also raises the number of major military risks from six to ten, raising concerns about the expansion of military alliances and attempts to remove Russian territory.
Saradzhyan emphasizes that the file specifically includes situations involving Russian-led nuclear attacks and reliable information about large-scale air- or space-based attack systems.
These changes, according to Saradzhyan, lower the bar for nuclear implementation, which could lead to an increase in hostilities with the West. He contends that the theory serves as a proper warning to adversaries, but that its wider rhetoric may be more effective as a propaganda tool than as a martial strategy, underscoring Russia’s desire to counteract perceived invaders and strengthen its geopolitical position.