As the Russian government tries to capture as much territory as it can, perhaps with one eye on a possible peace deal, reviews have emerged in recent months of especially violent casualties among Soviet troops fighting in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.
Many will depend on how the US election turns out. If Donald Trump is elected, he did stop providing military aid to Ukraine, ending the conflict in “one day.”
Kiev may be forced to cede Russian country in accordance with the country’s recent occupation strategy. Because the place that Ukraine had captured in August would serve as a useful bargaining chip in negotiations, analysts have speculated that this was one of the reasons behind the country’s Kursk unpleasant inside Russia.
However, Russia’s offensive in eastern Ukraine has been specifically terrible, with US knowledge studies of fatality numbers of up to 1, 000 per time, dead and wounded. This calls to mind the “meat grinder” methods of past Russian and Russian military activities.
A “meat grinder” is a group tactic on the battlefield that values great troop density and intensity of defeat. It is a truly Russian approach , nine decades , in the doing, consisting of a combination of two little older strategies, especially retention and large mobilization.
At the heart of attrition is the notion of abundance. The sheer force of numbers causes the opponent to physically and psychologically exhaust them as wave after wave of cannon fodder is relentlessly used.
Mass mobilization refers to the extensive troop movements made at a specific location in an effort to overthrow the adversary. The intrinsic value of individual lives is not acknowledged by either approach.
Despite being outmatched in terms of organization and tactics, the Russian army successfully waged an attrition campaign in 1812 to defeat Napoleon’s invasion. The Russian empire suffered significant casualties a century later, but it was able to launch massive counterattacks during the First World War.
The “meat grinder” became embedded in Soviet military tactics. The idiom “quantity has a quality of its own” has apocryphal roots in Stalin’s administration during the Second World War.
Millions of soldiers were deployed during important battles like Stalingrad and Kursk, and the Soviet army eventually overcame the Nazi blitzkrieg due to the sheer volume of the numbers on the eastern front.
Success from the past is not guaranteed in the future. However, it seems that the dead and disabled bodies of their own soldiers are required collateral damage, according to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and his military planners.
Since 2022, more than 70 000 Russian soldiers have died, according to estimates. However, it has been reported that Russian casualty rates are now rising more quickly as a result of the country’s growing reliance on inexperienced fighters.
Since the invasion started, civilian recruits now account for the majority of deaths. Their lack of military training in a difficult environment against a highly motivated enemy contributes to this increase.
However,  , inadequate medical care , and poor-quality protective kit are also important factors. Russian state media circulates expertly curated images and accounts of the dead, but morale is still waning and military wives and mothers are rebelling.
Ultimate sacrifice
Putin’s meat grinder continues to expand, however. The Russian government announced plans to spend £133.8 billion ( US$ 174 billion ) on national security and defense in 2025, equivalent to 41 % of annual government expenditure. All healthy men aged 18 to 30 can now be conscripted, and Russia has recently ordered a third increase in Russian troops.
The recruitment of a further 180, 000 soldiers will make Russia’s army the second largest in the world, with nearly 2.4 million members. However, this army is unqualified and does n’t protect the individual soldier.
Ukraine’s soldiers are comparatively well-trained and resourced, compared to other nations, and they do not view their lives as disposable. But the dynamic in Ukraine may be changing.
In April of this year, Volodymyr Zelensky, the nation’s president, passed new conscription laws that made men eligible for the army recruiters be dragged out of bars and nightclubs.
Russia’s meat-grinder tactics are not infallible and will eventually collapse. In a world of remote reconnaissance, large formations can quickly turn into large targets.
A large, unmotivated army is not well-equipped for contemporary warfare and will eventually result in diminishing returns, despite Russia’s ability to coerce military participation with high wages and the force of forced conscription.
Even a declaration of martial law in Russia, such as Putin’s recently introduced martial law in the occupied region of Ukraine in September 2022, would not address the deeply ingrained structural issues Russia faces.
Long-term challenges will be posed by the inadequate care of soldiers and veterans, including post-traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD ) treatment and disability.
In Russia, poor care practices are already causing social and cultural harm. Veterans who return home have committed 190 serious crimes. We can only hope that the Russian war machine burns itself out and that the long-term effects are not terminal now that Putin shows no interest in peace.
Becky Alexis-Martin, Peace Studies and International Development, University of Bradford
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.