The Assad regime’s drop is a significant blow to Russia’s reputation and international policy. Not least of the difficulties are the possibility of having to deal with the loss of Syria’s even overseas naval base, which is located in the port of Tartus on the Mediterranean coast.
The base’s destiny is still a mystery. There is no denying that the Kremlin’s best officials will work closely with the new leaders of Damascus to establish their sole inventory and repair facility in the Mediterranean.
However, the fact that all Russian ships left the base last year suggests that events have overtaken the Russian army. At this stage, the possible result is that Moscow’s long-term exposure to this center will be at least compromised.
Since Peter the Great established the traditional Soviet army in 1696, Moscow’s diplomatic and military forces have made unwavering efforts to gain access to “warm waters.”
In fact, Russia’s exposure to the world’s communication channels is restricted by enclosed seas ( such as the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Sea of Japan ), which do not allow Russian ships to have unimpeded access to the world’s sea, or by unfriendly natural settings ( such as the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea ), where problems frequently make navigation dangerous.
One of Moscow’s most beloved benefits was having access to a naval hospital at Tartus for supporting the Assad government during the Syrian civil war that started in 2011.
Since 2013, Assad provided the Soviet army with a secure area for its medium-sized vessels operating in the Mediterranean. Its main objective is to maintain and repair Russia’s marine resources, enabling them to remain in the area for longer periods of time.
The work force has used Tartus as a foundation from which to carry naval exercises and operations to dark NATO troops in the Mediterranean, despite being frequently overlooked. The purpose of this, in the framework of global political tensions, has been to battle ( or at least check ) European dominance of the Mediterranean.
Greater political effects
If Russia loses Tartus for good, Moscow will suffer a number of losses as a result. Most notably, its everlasting naval task force in the Mediterranean would have to either embark on a lengthy, humiliating journey up to Russian installations or relocate to a new temporary base in the area.
In accordance with the Montreux protocol, Ankara closed the Greek Islands to Russian ships after Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Any warships operating in the Mediterranean are unable to travel via the Bosphorus to the Russian outposts in Sevastopol or Novorossiysk in the Black Sea.
In the longer word, Russia’s presence in the Mediterranean and, by extension, the Middle East may become diminished. Marine forces are crucial in shaping power and force prediction. In fact, American states’ military supremacy is based on their ability to deploy troops across the globe for extended periods of time.
Big carrier battle parties, for example, are frequently used as prepositioning causes. It’s a website in which , Russia has typically lagged behind , NATO and the West. This has generally hampered Russia’s skill to use its military might abroad.
Logistics is essential here. Russians ‘ loss of Tartus, in addition to the Turkish Straits ‘ enduring closure of its warships as long as the conflict in Ukraine persists, may significantly impair Moscow’s capability to install marine task forces and support operations on land in the area and beyond.
In addition, the naval forces ‘ duties include protecting one’s personal merchant marine and the world’s communication paths of communication. Moscow is significantly dependent on its ships of Russian-flagged boats to keep its supply chain as a result of American sanctions limiting commercial shipping businesses to and from Russia.
Any restriction placed on the Russian navy might have an impact on the security of its industrial and civil operations.
Russia’s ability to save its customer in Syria does have a significant impact on Moscow’s politics in Africa, Asia, and South America, where it won’t be able to work with the same convenience.
Aside from all of this, it is important to remember that the risk of a naval facility strikes at Russia’s international reputation. With the numerous failures Russia has suffered to its Black Sea fleet, this had now taken a hit.
Without a doubt, the loss of Tartus didn’t prevent Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. In the past, Moscow has shown endurance to tactical flops. But it is a major blow to Moscow’s image as a great authority.
And in advance of a second Trump administration, the Kremlin is ill manage this.
Basil Germond is professor of global stability, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University
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