In the midst of the bloody Ukraine conflict, Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat ICBM has gone stand, signaling the latest nuclear saber-rattling move.
Yuri Borisov, general director of Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, confirmed that Russia has operationalized its next-generation RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile system( ICBM ) as reported by numerous media outlets this month.
The ICBM, which was originally scheduled to be deployed by the end of 2022, has come under fire after a check failed and US President Joe Biden visited Ukraine in February 2023.
The heavy missile, the RS-28 Sarmat missile system, which Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to as” invincible,” represents a significant advancement in ICBM technology in Russia.
The RS-28 Sarmat is intended to replace Russia’s aging stock of SS – 18 Satan ICBMs, according to Missile Threat. The RS-28 was developed in the 2000s, and Russia finished its prototype in 2015 after awarding manufacturing contracts in 2011. With 50 missiles on order, it was originally planned to start services in 2018, but technical problems delayed that date.
The RS-28 Sarmat, according to Missile Threat, is a three-stage, liquid-fueled weapon that is 35.3 feet long, 3 meters wide, weighs 208.1 measurement tons, and has an 18, 000 km range.
It is apparently capable of carrying a payload of up to 10 tons, which includes the potential combination of 10 big warheads and 16 smaller ones, countermeasures, and hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.
In February 2023, which also happened to be Russia’s Defender of the Fatherland Day and a time when Putin repeatedly uttered nuclear threats directed at the European allies of Ukraine, the weapon was deployed. The implementation of the RS-28, according to analysts, may put existing arms control systems to the test and make proper deterrence more difficult.
Deploying the RS-28 Sarmat has significant ramifications for both the Ukraine war and overall strategic stability in light of Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ( New START ) in February 2023.
The suspension of New START by Russia could have three effects on the conflict in Ukraine, according to Heather Williams in a February 2023 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies( CSIS ).
Second, according to Williams, the choice suggests that Russia may increase its nuclear arsenal strategically and depart from New START. Russia produces dual-capable devices like the Kh-101 cruise missile, despite the fact that it requires more employees and drones than nuclear warheads. She claims that this demonstrates Russia’s capacity to increase its nuclear arsenal despite Western sanctions and the continuous retention of the Ukraine War.
Williams adds that Russia’s decision to stop taking part in the New START is a part of its effort to expand its story that the US and NATO are responsible for the Ukrainian invasion. Williams concludes by pointing out that one of the few remaining venues for important US-Russia discourse has been eliminated as a result of Russia’s decision to halt its participation in New START.
Williams claims that the conflict in Ukraine has increased public awareness of the risks associated with nuclear arms and emphasized the significance of setting up efficient communication channels in times of crises.
Williams claims that although US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Soviet Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu have occasionally spoken, these conversations need to be more open and predictable in order to handle weapons.
She emphasizes that there is a lack of confidence on both sides, Russia’s history of non-compliance, and its claim that the US is refusing to” enjoy fairly” in the New START, all of which pose challenges to the future of arms control. She does, however, stress that integrated arms control is also important and that the US should do it as part of its integrated deterrence strategy.
The RS – 28 Sarmat may only have a small proper effects from purely technical and administrative terms. Timothy Wright notes that the anticipated supply and loadout of the RS-28 Sarmat are still unknown in an article published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in June 2022.
Wright emphasizes that the RS-28’s weaponized deployment may be delayed as a result of prior delays in its testing programme, which could put pressure on the products of the old SS – 18 Satan.
He emphasizes that Russia will achieve its goal of maintaining nuclear warhead parity with the US if it prioritizes outfitting the RS-28 Sarmat with Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles( HGV ) or multiple independent re-entry vehicles.
He does, however, point out that prioritizing MIRVs over HGVs may result in Avangard weapons remaining on the older SS – 19 Stiletto until plenty are delegated for distribution, meaning that these new nuclear-armed arms may have minimal effects on proper balance between Russia and the US until the end of the decade.
While Russia is constantly modernizing its nuclear arsenal, Maxim Starchak claims in a Jamestown Foundation article from January 2023 that there are significant obstacles to the development of proper weapons like the RS-28 Sarmat. According to Starchak, Russia is rushing its protection sector and demanding shorter testing times for arms.
Starchak’s study suggests that Russia is unlikely to carry out its nuclear development plans by 2023 as a result of American sanctions, which, in his opinion, have lowered the effectiveness and quality of production as well as the weapons themselves. As a result, he anticipates that Russia’s atomic language will be more subdued for the remainder of this year.