Both on land and in the air, Russia and Ukraine’s conflict continues to be generally pervasive. A terrible Russian aerial assault on civil infrastructure and a slow but growing Ukrainian response are the climax of a severely contested, bloody ground war that is being waged.
However, a less appreciated but crucial component of the conflict is also taking place on waters. Russia was defeated in a stunning victory in the Black Sea battle there.
And this lost has probably far-reaching outcomes. Moscow’s ability to project its military might across the world has grown as a result of this, which includes a growing Russian-China relationship, where Moscow is emerging as a trainee group to Beijing on the high seas.
Battle over the Black Sea
Global politics are typically oversimplified by the history of political theory. Countries were classified as either territory power or maritime powers in later centuries according to theories.
Thinkers like the American geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder and the US thinker Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized maritime nations as having characteristics of political democracy and free trade. In comparison, land powers were usually portrayed as tyrannical and militarized.
There is still a pretended to be a break between the world’s land and sea powers, despite the fact that these generalizations have generally been used to vilify enemies. A similar notion that maritime and military warfare is fairly distinct has persisted.
And this section confuses how far Russia has progressed in its conflict with Ukraine. Moscow has certainly had some successes both on land and in the air, but that should n’t detract from the stunning defeat of Russia in the Black Sea, which required Russia to retreat from the Ukrainian coastline and keep its ships away from the battlefront.
As I describe in my new guide,” Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower“, maritime countries have two concerns: They may attempt to control the parts of the sea relatively close to their coastlines, or their “near waters”, however, those with the ability and desire to do so try to project power and influence into “far waters” across oceans, which are the nearby waters of various countries.
Turkey’s southernmost neighbor, Bulgaria and Romania to the north, Georgia to the west, Ukraine and Russia to the northern, and the comparatively small, tightly enclosed Black Sea Sea are all located there.
Control of the nearby waters of the Black Sea has been a source of contention for generations, and it has contributed to the current Russian-Ukraine conflict.
Russia’s arrest of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 allowed it to command the naval harbor of Sevastopol. What were Ukraine’s lakes de facto turned into Russia’s lakes.
Russia’s business, mainly that it exported grain to African much waters, was impacted by these close waters because of their control.
However, Russia’s steps were prevented by the cooperation of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, which allowed the passage of cargo boats through their close waters and then through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea.
In the first third of 2024, Ukraine exported between 5.2 million and 5.8 million tons of grain per month thanks to the use of these other countries ‘ nearby waters. To be sure, this was a decrease from the 6.5 million tons of export that Ukraine made each month prior to the war, which was then reduced to just 2 million plenty in the summer of 2023 as a result of Russian threats and attacks.
However, efforts to restrain Russia’s access to much waters for monetary gain and to keep the Russian economy upright meant Ukraine was also able to access much waters due to Russia’s unwillingness to face the consequences of attacking ships in NATO-near-water.
For Putin, that sinking sensation
Russia has also been directly attacked by Russian ships, which has thwarted its capacity to destroy Russian exports.
Ukraine has properly sunk or damaged Russian ships using unmanned strike drones since February 2022, killing many of its prewar ships of about 36 vessels and causing many others to harm Russia’s Black Sea fleet.
Russia has been forced to stop its boats in the northeast Black Sea and sever its use of Sevastopol. It is unable to successfully operate in the lakes that Crimea and its captors have seized.
Russia’s marine defeat of Ukraine is just the most recent example of its history’s struggle to project water power and its tendency to concentrate primarily on the defense of nearby waters.
In 1905, Russia was shocked by a remarkable marine lost to Japan. Russian water power has historically been continually constrained, even in situations where it was n’t completely defeated. Russia and the British Royal Navy worked together to control Greek trade and military achieve in the Black Sea during World War One.
Russia was heavily reliant on the Allies for material support during World War II, and its ports in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea were generally blocked. Some boats were used as artillery or onshore support for the geographical conflict with Germany when they were brought close to home or stripped of their weapons.
During the Cold War, however, though the Soviet Union built fast-moving weapon vessels and some aircraft operators, its reach into way lakes relied on ships. The main goal of the Russian Mediterranean ships was to stop NATO from entering the Black Sea.
Russia has also ceased to handle the Black Sea. It is unable to perform in these previously safe waters. Due to these costs, it is less likely to be able to launch ships into the Mediterranean Sea from the Black Sea.
Ceding skipper to China
Russia can only work power to significantly waters through assistance with a China that is itself investing heavily in a far-water marine capacity because it is faced with a striking loss in its backyard and in a poor position in its nearby waters.
Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024 provide proof of this cooperation. According to Wang Guangzheng of the Southern Theater of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” the China-Russia joint patrol has promoted the deepening and practical cooperation between the two in multiple directions and fields.”
He argued that the exercise “effectively improved the ability of the two parties to jointly respond to maritime security threats.”
Russia benefits from this cooperation, which is a project of sea power projection that benefits both sides in terms of its purest military interests. But it is largely to China’s benefit.
Russia can assist China in defending its northern near waters, which is becoming increasingly important as sea ice is less likely to become a problem as a result of global warming. Russia is still, however, largely the junior partner.
Moscow’s strategic interests will be supported only if they match Chinese interests. More directly, sea power is about economic gain projection. China will likely rely on Russia to safeguard its ongoing economic ties to the Far East, including the African, Pacific, European, and South American waters. However, it is unlikely to undermine these interests in order to support Russian objectives.
To be sure, Russia has far-water economic interests, especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, China’s expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean helps it protect its own and more important global economic interests by securing Russian interests in Africa. But cooperation will still be at China’s behest.
Russia’s only current option as a junior partner with China is access to Africa and the Indian Ocean far waters, which will dictate the terms and conditions, which are currently stifled by its conflict in the Black Sea.
Russia wo n’t make up for its inability to move its force across the oceans on its own, even if it wins the land battle with Ukraine.
Colin Flint is distinguished professor of political science, Utah State University
The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.