A significant time in the sea conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been witnessed in the last few days. On Monday, July 15, Ukraine’s military official, Dmytro Pletenchuk, claimed:” The final police send of the Black Sea fleet of the Russian Federation is bolting from our Crimea only today. Consider this day”.
This historic achievement serves as a reminder of Ukraine’s ongoing victory on the sea front of the conflict. While Kyiv’s floor soldiers continue to struggle and lose ground at points along the field, especially in the south of Ukraine, it’s a different tale at water.
Russia’s Black Sea fleet has been unable to make a significant contribution to the conflict despite having a sizable quantitative benefits when it first started it. Moscow has lost command of the Black Sea, while also Crimea’s ports– including Sevastopol, usually a symbol of Russia’s energy – can no longer be seen as secure bases for its warships.
A depleted Black Sea fleet
There are only a few smaller patrol boats in Ukraine, and there are no major surface warships or submarines operating. With the aid of missiles and maritime drones, But Kyiv has developed a verifiable capability to use long-distance missiles to destroy Russian warships, as far ahead as Crimea. It serves as a lesson in the evolving nature of coastal battle and the growing power of asymmetrical weapons, or weapons that are much less expensive to produce than the destroyers they are destroying.
Due to the fact that warships are among Russia’s most costly military assets and have a recruitment cycle that can last for decades, it poses a major issue for the country. Additionally, Turkey’s application of the Montreux Convention prevents the Black Sea fleet of Vladimir Putin’s exhausted fleet from being boosted by warships from Russia’s another fleets. This is the law that governs naval traffic through Turkey’s Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, including that all allies ca n’t move warships through these straits.
Moscow has no choice but to defend its remaining ships in the Black Sea, which explains the numerous “redeployments” further apart from Crimea – in certain, to the dock of Novorossiysk.
Diminishing operating choices
Some operational options are now out of the question because Russian surface warships ca n’t operate safely, especially in close proximity to Ukraine, such as starting an amphibious assault on Odesa. Also providing transportation to soldiers on land is proving a problem, while Moscow’s eventual loss to embargo Ukraine – in particular, its grain exports – has been instrumental in sustaining Ukraine’s business.
Russia’s Kilo-class boats are also relatively safe when underground, and are able to establish Kalibr cruise rockets against goals in Ukraine. However, it is unlikely these submarines will be crucial for Russia’s heat strategy against Ukraine’s energy and human infrastructures, given their limited unpleasant threat compared with Ukraine’s resilience to damage. However, they can only contribute a small amount to the overall threat posed by Ukrainian air defense systems by Russia.
At a symbolic level, Ukraine’s successes at sea constitute a political blow for Putin. Crimea is central to the president’s narrative of Russia’s revival as a “great power” that, on the domestic front, is a pillar of his regime.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s frequent victories over the Black Sea fleet are raising morale, at a time when it has become increasingly difficult to motivate Ukrainian soldiers who have been fighting on the front lines without witnessing” concrete” advances. In the context of a protracted war of attrition, the symbolic value of these successes should not be understated.
Crimea as a breaking point?
Russia has focused on the land, where it has consistently been gaining incremental amounts over the past 12 months or more. Yet Ukraine’s constant successes at sea are meaningful. They kick off a trend that began in April 2022 with the sinking of the cruise ship Moskva and later in July 2022 with Snake Island being recaptured. At least 27 Russian naval vessels have been seriously damaged or destroyed by Ukraine overall.
These successful attacks should be understood in the wider strategic, operational, and tactical evolution of the Crimea conflict, not just as a victory over Russia’s naval forces.
Pressures on Crimea are strategically important. Kyiv is aiming its sights on naval assets, airstrips, air defense systems, as well as transportation infrastructure, including the Kerch bridge, a crucial gateway for Moscow’s entry into the peninsula. These attacks have been boosted by the use of West-supplied long-range missiles.
This forces Russia to almost operate on two fronts, forcing it to do so because the loss of Crimea, or even a significant setback there, would be disastrous both militarily and politically.
On the mainland of eastern Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region, Russia has a massive numerical advantage. Russia is becoming more and more aggressive in Crimea, where Ukraine can use a flexible strategy and make the most of asymmetric technologies. And these successes in the Black Sea and Crimea can divert Russia’s resources and attention away from the land front.
Ukraine’s “victory at sea” will not directly help its forces on the ground– at least, not for now. However, any significant breakthrough, such as if Kyiv was able to finally end the Kerch bridge, could have a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict.
Basil Germond is a professor of international security in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.