I led a smaller team of experts to Paris forty years ago. We arrived at Terminal 2 early in the morning, loading a 12 by 12 wooden field that was about 5 or 6 feet long. The adviser at the Customs office inquired as to what was in the field. We responded,” Soviet sonobuoy.”
We were heading there as the examiner yelled,” Bien sûr.”
We purchased the Sonobuoy to demonstrate how Russian technology was being copied by Americans to our associates at the Coordinating Committee on Multilataeral Export Controls. COCOM was the international organization that was established in 1949 to govern delicate exports to China and the USSR.
Our goal was to try to stop Russian access to US technology, specifically computers and microelectronics, in the middle of the Soviet arms boom. Soviet sonobuoy, which had been recovered from the ocean, had printed circuit boards that resembled American integrated circuits, with the US company branding diligently displayed on the internal wiring.
We at the time believed that the Soviets did not actually possess an independent microelectronics industry, but that its silicon industry, which was based in a town called Zelenograd to the north of Moscow ( then a closed city ), was advised to copy American technology rather than create its own pieces.
We also thought of electronics as a significant force multiple because automated weapons were more effective at locating and destroying targets than conventional weapons. All of this was before the advent of bright arms or robots. Perhaps so, it was a significant step in weapons systems.
A “black box” system that was introduced to US and Israeli F-15s from the beginning of the 1980s was a particularly potent potential. The F-15’s detector and fire power systems were integrated, allowing the aircraft to shoot down an opponent from above and knock him out of the atmosphere before he realized what had happened. Russian radars couldn’t detect an airplane below from ground clutter, so the black box was sort it out.
It was first used for battle by Israel in a well-known conflict with the Syrian air pressure in the Bekaa Valley. The result was that Syria lost between 82 and 86 MIG and Una fighter planes, and two F-15s were damaged by Israel. Additionally, Israel was able to eliminate 29 of 30 Arab surface-to-air missile sites, in part due to superior tactics and efficient radar jamming.
The Russians were undoubtedly in catch-up style. Russia’s electrical sector hasn’t really developed despite their efforts. Russia even lost access to important people in Eastern Europe that supply technology and computers, including the German Democratic Republic ( East Germany ), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Ukraine, after the USSR’s breakdown in 1991.
Fast forward to 2025. 40 years ago, Russia attempted to steal American and western laptop and microelectronics know-how, primarily through flattery and spying. Overall, it didn’t function. At least it wasn’t effective enough for the Russians to develop cutting-edge system and nanotechnology capabilities.
The most recent area reports from Ukraine provide insight into a pressing Russian problem for the future.
The Russians showed off the fresh S8000  and Banderol  cruise weapon, which some believe is a joint venture with China during a visit to the Kapustin Yar missile test variety in the Astrakhan region of Russia this previous April.
The Banderol can be launched from a helicopter or a drone, according to reports of the Kronshtadt Orion ( Ambler, инооде ). Banderol’s range once launched is 500 km ( 311 miles ), while Orion has a range of 1,440 km (890 miles ). According to the Ukrainians, Banderol you either communicate with and target with an orbital navigation system or use satellite links for navigation and tracking.
Banderol proves to be intriguing for three factors. The first is that some of its parts, including its flight website, are damaged. are Taiwanese. The Swiwin SW800Pro website model is available on Alibaba for$ 18, 000 and is commercially priced at$ 18. China, the US, Europe, and perhaps Australia are the other countries that supply the elements. Following are some of the elements that the Ukrainians statement:
- Australian RFD900x or its Chinese equivalent monitoring component
- Probably of Taiwanese source, orbital navigation system
- Japan’s Murata recharge chargers
- Dynamixel MX-64AR servo drives ( Robotis, South Korea )
- CRP jamming antenna Kometa-M8 ( Russian Federation, VNIR-Progress ), which is also used in UMPK kits for converting unguided bombs into precision-guided glide bombs, UMPB precision-guided bombs, Geran loitering munitions, and UMPK precision-guided munitions conversion,
- Nearly two hundred electronics were produced in South Korea, the US, China, Switzerland, Japan, and the United States.
Take notice that the Russians must have been able to start producing the Banderol cruise weapon in large numbers. This is related to the fact that some Russian weapons used in Ukraine are full of pieces made by the West and Chinese people. This implies that there must be a large, probably even enormous supply chain to transport these goods to Russia.
The US and its allies have done absolutely nothing to disassemble the Chinese-Russian offer network, and it’s possible they don’t understand how or acquire any chances of success really slim.
There are a few significant drawbacks for Russia. The first is that Russia may rely on China to provide the necessary components to Russia’s arms business. The Russians face an unpleasant challenge of providing their defense, so if the source chain get broken.
China may cooperate with Russia off until a point, but the Chinese does not give Russia the most cutting-edge parts, keeping their position in terms of lead in some weapons. This implies that Russia will need to develop hands in the future rather than away of China.
Although we don’t yet see that much, Russia may eventually need to beg Beijing for assistance if China is successful in establishing its own production of artificial intelligence electronics and computers. The Chinese are undoubtedly interested in some potent Russian functions, most notably the Avangard fast ICBM and its mid-range rival, Oreshnik.
Functionally, Russia’s domestic manufacturing base and its local military base continue to pose a significant challenge for Europe, but not as much globally. On the other hand, China is more suited to increase its global footprint thanks to its enormous business potential and benevolent supply independence.
Former US assistant secretary of defense for policy, Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent for Asia Times. This post, which was previously published in Weapons and Strategy, his Substack newsletter, is republished with permission.