Regional implications of Taiwan elections

As 19.5 million Taiwanese voters cast their votes this Saturday, they will not only be electing a new presidency and a new Legislative Yuan but shaping the future contours of US-China contestations and especially the future of their cross-Strait relations, with deep strategic implications for the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.

To some extent, this has been the story since early 1990s when Taiwanese saw an end of a long-standing military rule by Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo of the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), ending in latter’s death in 1988. This period had heralded a new era of local leaders and direct elections.

However, with the rise of Communist China and its resultant rivalry with the United States, Taiwan has become a ping-pong ball in US-China power politics. The People’s Republic China, which does not govern Taiwan, claims it to be a renegade province and does not recognize any of Taiwan’s institutions. 

Meanwhile, the PRC’s insistence on a “one China” policy has over the years seen the number of nations that recognize Taiwan as sovereign nation shrink drastically. Currently no more than 13 small nations have diplomatic relations with Republic of China, or Taiwan.

But the United States, which switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing during 1970s, remains most committed to ensuring Taiwan’s security.

Greater credit, though, lies with the Taiwanese for making historic strides in various fields of technology, ensuring rapid economic growth. It is today seen as a superpower for production of semiconductors.

All this makes the outcome of this weekend’s elections all the more determinant for the future of US-China power politics.

China-centric electioneering

For the last three decades, there has been little change in a clear China-centered divide between Taiwan’s two main political parties, namely the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The latter was set up in 1986 and propagates independence and stronger relations with the United States.

Leaders of the DPP have often accused the KMT of being not just soft toward but aligned with Beijing. Disillusioned by this excessive focus on US-China contestations and cross-Strait tensions, another political party, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), was set up in 2019 to highlight local issues such as women’s empowerment and the cost of living.

In the presidential election, the frontrunner in opinion polls at this writing is the outgoing vice-president, Lai Ching-te of the ruling DPP.

Lai promises to carry forward the work of the outgoing president Tsai Ing-wen and propagates sovereignty and democracy. Understandably, he is deeply distrusted by Beijing. Tsai’s eight years in power witnessed suspension of dialogue with Beijing, with the August 2022 visit of then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi marking the peak of their saber-rattling.

Pelosi’s visit saw China unleashing its largest ever military exercises in the Taiwan Strait including four days of blockade showcasing its capabilities. This, however, made no dent in Tsai’s policies, with the last leg of her tenure marking her visit to Latin America with well-publicized stopovers in the United States that included interactions with American leaders.

Upping the ante as part of his election speeches, Lai now explains China’s alleged interferences in the Taiwan election as nothing but an experiment that China may later repeat against other countries in the region.

By comparison, Hou Yu-ih of the main opposition, the KMT, who is reported lately catching up with the DPP candidate, favors closer ties with mainland China by further strengthening their economic partnerships.

On the issue cross-Strait relations, Hou advocates that Taiwan and the mainland belong to one China but with each side being free to interpret what that means – a view that is acceptable to the PRC, which has always propagated the template of “one country, two systems” for Taiwan. 

Then there is a third candidate, a former mayor of Taipei, Ko Wen-je, of the TPP. He focuses on local issues and seeks to find his space by appealing to young voters who may be disillusioned by the excessive China-centric rivalry between the DPP and KMT.

He also appeals to increasing emotions of indigenization of politics with focus on issues of reviving the economy and reducing taxes and housing prices. Indeed, many Taiwanese believe that doomsday scenarios of a cross-Strait war have been exaggerated by US-China contestations and by Chinese and American commentators.

US-China contestation

The PRC, which treats Taiwan as a renegade province, has also evolved its narratives from liberation to integration of Taiwan, if necessary with use of force.

China’s 2005 Law of National Succession, for the first time, officially authorized such use of force and it was reiterated most recently in Beijing’s August 2022 white paper on “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era” that describes reunification being inevitable for realizing China’s national rejuvenation. President Xi Jinping’s speeches have reiterated it multiple times.

The United States, on the other hand, only “acknowledges” (rather than recognizes) “one China” and does not endorse the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. Indeed, at the time of its formal diplomatic recognition of Communist China, the US Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 promised ensuring the security of Taiwan.

More recently, the Donald Trump presidency, which saw a ratcheting up of US-China trade and technology wars, initiated a new Taiwan Policy Act that was finally enacted in 2022. 

This act designates Taiwan as a non-NATO alliance partner, pledging long-term military aid of $4.5 billion during the next five years. Moreover, it upgraded the US Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office to just Taiwan Representative Office, giving it a ring of a normal or quasi-formal US embassy.

This period has also seen the US leading narratives and initiatives for reframing Indo-Pacific geopolitics and increased naval patrolling by the US and its alliance partners, though the Ukraine and Israel wars have partially distracted media attention away from this flashpoint.

The current US administration of President Joe Biden has increased its support for Taiwan, approving new arms sales, sending high-level officials, and conducting joint military exercises.

The US likely hopes that the Taiwan election will result in a peaceful and democratic transition of power, and that the elected leader will uphold Taiwan’s autonomy and dignity, and maintain constructive dialogue with Beijing.

Washington also expects the elected leader to cooperate with the US and its allies on regional and global issues, such as countering China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and in promoting human rights and rule of law, and addressing climate change and public health issues.

Regional implications

This weekend’s elections remain relevant for regional powers like Japan, which ruled Taiwan for five decades before, at end of World War II, returning it to Kuomintang-ruled mainland China. Even today, Japan remains Taiwan’s strategic partner, and Tokyo sees it as vital part of the larger regional security architecture.

Japan has often expressed concern over China’s military activities near Taiwan, and supported Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Japan has also enhanced its cooperation with Taiwan in various fields, such as trade, technology, culture, and defense.

Japan likely wants to see the Taiwan election resulting in a stable and friendly government, and that the elected leader will respect Japan’s interests and values, and work together with Japan and the US to safeguard regional peace and prosperity.

India has also expanded its partnerships with Taipei, with the opening of a third representative office of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre in Mumbai in addition to one in New Delhi and a second one in Chennai that were opened respectively in 1995 and 2012.

This is where a DPP victory for a third consecutive term may see China intensifying its coercive measures against Taiwan resulting in more military drills, cutting off trade and tourism, and diplomatically isolating Taiwan.

Western media have already accused China of influencing public opinion in Taiwan by spreading disinformation and propaganda. This will push a re-elected DPP presidency further toward the US, Japan, and other like-minded nations and become more suspect in Beijing’s eyes.

If the KMT wins, which is not completely unlikely, it is expected to pursue a more pragmatic and conciliatory approach toward Beijing, thus putting an end to mutual provocations.

At the least, it may resume dialogue and exchanges with Beijing hoping to ease tensions, and China may allow it an expanded market access and even reduce tariffs, to entice the KMT to accept the one-China principle and move toward unification.

But the KMT exploring a balanced relationship with the United States and its Western partners will have its challenges.