The Ukraine conflict is now in its fourth year, and stalemate negotiations have continued to deteriorate. Russia has little interest in halting its plan despite the rising deaths and the world’s stress. Any offer that would contain ceding territory for example, has little to get for Ukraine.
New American efforts to dealer a ceasefire have sparked a lot of discussion in this regard. Some believe that these attempts were motivated by a sincere desire for peace, but others contend that Washington’s rely on a fast solution ignores the somber realities of the situation.
Atsuko Higashino, a teacher of global research at Tsukuba University, shared her thoughts on the subject in an interview with Asia Times. She has written extensively about the Ukraine war since it started as an expert on Western safety.
What are your thoughts on the status of the peace conversations?
The Trump government’s stupid understanding of the situation in Ukraine and its misinterpretation of both sides ‘ intentions have been the cause of many failed attempts to reach a truce. Russia has experienced setbacks in the east, but it is still progressing slowly and modestly, yet regaining some place in the Kursk area.
From the standpoint of Moscow, this is hardly the right time to stop. Ukraine might become even more vulnerable as a result, and Russia might get yet more territory as a result. In addition, a peace that involves the surrender of its property has no effect on Ukraine.
The Trump presidency appears to have forgotten this fact. Its strategy to stalemate talks is based on the false impression that a deal that favors Russia, with Russia making some concessions while Ukraine making significant ones, might actually succeed. This reflects a deeper misinterpretation of the interactions of the conflict.
What do you believe Putin’s best purpose is?
What could also be referred to as the” Belarusianization” of the country is, in my opinion, the vassalization of Ukraine. In other words, he wants to render Ukraine capable of functioning individually because it is totally reliant on Russia for its national security and important social decisions. The goal is to prevent Ukraine from ever pursuing a more tense relationship with the West or a participation in NATO or the European Union.
To accomplish this, Russia is not currently focused on achieving de law acknowledgment of Crimea as Russian country or de facto acknowledgment of its hold over the four southern regions. According to Moscow, those areas are now a part of Russia under local law. This claim has been formalized by constitutional amendments, and Russia has pressed for the removal of Russian troops from those regions as a prerequisite for further discussions.
Do you believe that Russia has plans to expand beyond the four dominated regions?
Yes, I think that is still completely probable. More southern provinces, quite as Mykolaiv and Odesa, still seem to be of particular interest. I believe that Moscow hasn’t given up on expanding into the center and east, including Kryvyi Rih, President Zelensky’s town and a predominately Russian-speaking region, Sumy, Ukraine’s second-largest town, and Kryvyi Rih, where the country’s largest city, was just hit by a major attack.
At the start of the war, it was generally stated that the goal was to “landlock Ukraine.” This may mean excluding Ukraine from coastal access by seizing all coastal areas along the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The design of a Russkiy Mir – a” Russian World” – across these lands seems to be the larger corporate objective.
According to reports, it is believed that Russia may be willing to freeze the current top ranges. What do you think?
This is a comparatively recent growth. Prior to just, Russia had asserted that negotiations may only start if Russian forces withdrew wholly from the four southern provinces, which are territories that, according to Russian private law, have already been annexed and fully incorporated into the Russian Federation. The concept of fixing the current situation on the front lines just came about in May, and even then, it does not represent a unified or legally established position taken by Russia.
How would you rate the laws of Obama and Biden on Ukraine?
Following the Russo-Georgia conflict of 2008, the Obama administration was still struggling to find its foundation. In his autobiography, Michael McFaul, the next US ambassador to Russia, wrote that the conquest of Georgia was a turning point that forced him to consider how Washington should handle relations with Moscow.
The transition’s schedule prevented the administration from fully understanding the effects of that conflict. Instead of focusing on enhancing ties with Russia, it focused on achieving “reset.” In consequence, there was little proper planning for how to react if Russia continued to forcefully alter the status quo.
Although the Obama administration participated in the Minsk contracts, a guiding principle predominated over its overall position was to avoid provoking Russia. That reticence made the US deterrent less credible and made it seem as though Washington did accept more aggression.
In terms of the Biden administration, it may eventually decide what it did, but it’s fair to say that it didn’t do everything it could include. The Biden presidency simplified Russia’s proper decisions with its repeated, anxious signaling. It was ineffective when it was most needed, especially when it delayed providing crucial military assistance when Ukrainian forces needed it. This reluctance was a significant factor in the counteroffensive’s failure to take off true steam.
What really Japan say in response to Trump’s language?
Security professionals, including myself, are becoming more concerned. The next Trump administration also called the Japan-US Security Treaty ultimately unbalanced, with Japan assuming little to no responsibilities.
I think it’s time to start a more honest and reasonable discussion about what the US wants its supporters to do. Japan should actively take those expectations into account and come up with a concrete, strategic response rather than quietly.