Kim Jong Un, the supreme head of North Korea, traveled to the Russian Far East on a formal basis from September 12 to September 17, 2023. The journey was longer and more intensive than his first one, which was from April 24 to 26, 2019. Kim’s travel plans made it clear that a key goal of his trip was to advance defense and scientific ties with Russia.
In Vostochny, Kim held a one-day mountain with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The main Russian missiles, Soyuz and Angara, were highlighted during the Russian host’s tour of the shuttle with his North Korean visitor. Kim then traveled to a factory in Komsomolsk-on-Amur where some of Russia’s most cutting-edge planes are produced.
Kim spent two full days in Vladivostok, the last stop on his journey across the Russian Far East. He went to an airfield and saw a variety of Russian fighter planes and tactical aircraft. Additionally, the North Korean president was housed on a guided missile ship.
Regarding the content of the Putin-Kim speaks in Vostochny, not much is known. No agreements were signed, and no combined statement was made public. Putin and other Russian authorities made it clear that” all problems” were discussed, including the possibility of diplomatic military cooperation and the nbsp. The visit was hailed as a turning point in” strengthening strategic and tactical cooperation between the two countries” by North Korea & nbsp.
Sergey Lavrov, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, was sent to Pyongyang in October, which also happened to be the 75th anniversary of the establishment of political relations, as a follow-up to the Kim-Putin mountain. Lavrov spoke with Choe Son-hui, his North Korean rival, and Kim Jong Un was present.
Moscow’s relations with Pyongyang were described as a” strategic, all-encompassing partnership” by the Russian foreign minister & nbsp. The Kremlin reportedly used the term” strategic” to describe bilateral cooperation with North Korea for the first time at this point.
Numerous aspects are bringing North Korea and Russia closer together. North Korea is the only UN part, aside from Syria, to acknowledge Crimea, Donetsk, Luganzhn, Zaporizhzha, and Kherson as Soviet lands. Moscow appreciates North Korea’s willingness to speak out in favor of Russia and openly violate the West.
There is no question that South Korea’s aid for Ukraine also serves as a driving force for Moscow to adopt Pyongyang. Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, has become one of Volodymyr Zelensky’s principal foreign supporters. & nbsp,
Despite Seoul’s claims that it only offers non-lethal assistance to Ukraine, it is well known that Russian forces on the Russian frontlines are very likely to be killed by South Korean artillery shells that are formally sent to replenish US weapons depots.
The Moscow-Pyongyang relationship is also the result of economic calculations. The most natural place for a business partnership would be North Korean labor in exchange for Russian goods and cash.
The most interesting feature of Kim’s conference with Putin may have been the potential for North Korean arms sales to Russia, though both North Korea and Russia deny that this was a possibility. In any case, even if North Korean munitions did make it to Russia, they may only serve as a support force there.
Pyongyang might be thinking about receiving Russian money, oil, and food in exchange for labor and weapons for short-term business reasons. However, Kim is probably most drawn to a long-term balance of power analysis.
North Korea can now feel safe in its corporate isolation thanks to nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons are subject to technical change, just like all other weapons. Pyongyang runs the serious risk of having its atomic weapons replaced by new, emerging arms. Even its most cutting-edge delivery vehicles are woefully out of date by Russian and US criteria.
The combined power of the US-South Korea alliance is greater than that of North Korea’s standard forces, which are also ill-equipped to handle the new era of very precise weapons, remote sensing, and potent artificial intelligence.
For the time being, nuclear weapons may serve as Pyongyang’s barrier against head-on aggression, but in the majority of another crisis situations, they are useless. Kim Jong-un is unable to utilize his nuclear arms in a conflict that he anticipates winning.
The recent & nbsp trilateral summit at Camp David serves as an example of the US-South Korea-Japan coalition’s emergence, which worries North Korea even more.
North Korea is unable to effectively close the growing gap in contemporary warfighting functions on its own. Finding proper friends is the only way to address the exceedingly precarious balance of military strength.
Moscow might be a willing man, giving the North access to crucial non-nuclear weapons and systems like fighter jets and reconnaissance satellites. Russia and North Korea may also conduct joint military exercises, a possibility that was alluded to perhaps before Kim’s explore.
A transfer to the Cold War era, when Moscow and Beijing served as Pyongyang’s security underwriters, may occur in the years to come. However, the functions may be divided differently this time. & nbsp,
While Russia serves as the North’s principal military ally, China will continue to serve as Pyongyangs primary financial patron and political protector. If only because it has little to gain with Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, Moscow will be content with such a position.
At Far Eastern Federal University’s Vladivostok School of Regional and International Studies, Artyom Lukin holds the positions of Associate Professor and Deputy Director for Research.
This andnbsp, post, and was originally published by East Asia Forum and are being reprinted with permission from Creative Commons.
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