Vladimir Putin has attempted to sell the image of a strongman, lord, and keeper of the Soviet people in the quarter-century of his rule, which he has done since August 1999, as prime minister or leader.
However, the” special military function” in Ukraine, as the Kremlin has described the war, was presented as a charitable project to conserve ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
However, the reality is quite diverse. Putin’s inability to protect the Russian populace has been repeatedly demonstrated since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022.
Many municipalities in Russia, including Moscow, have been content to drone strikes. In June 2023, Wagner Group main Yevgeny Prigozhin orchestrated a brief revolt that saw insurgent army flee Ukraine and move through Russian towns, killing people.
Probably most humiliating for Putin has been Ukraine’s rapid and sustained intrusion into Russia’s Kursk area. Since August 6, 2024, Russian forces have taken over 490 square kilometers of Russian territory, resulting in the removal or fleeing of over 100, 000 Russians, some of whom reported feeling “left under flames” and irritated by media downplaying the severity of the situation.
The most significant concern to Putin’s account of the war since the invasion has come to be from Ukraine. Additionally, it runs the risk of giving the Soviet leader a defenseless and weak appearance.
As a professor of post-Soviet says, I see reflections of the previous in Putin’s present. Putin has frequently struggled to respond to the needs of the Russian people firmly and swiftly when faced with problems.
Since Boris Yeltsin appointed the then-unknown apparatchik as excellent minister on August 9, 1999, Putin has appeared to be more focused on the story of the lord than the real saving of life.
The Battle of Kursk ( redux )
Putin and Russia have an important and complex position in Kursk.
As some Russians refer to World War II when, the Battle of Kursk in 1944 was a crucial Communist success. It serves as a powerful illustration of the devotion and triumph that have evolved into a key component of Russia’s identity under Putin.
As a result, Moscow has been greatly impacted by Ukraine’s swift progress through the area in recent weeks, which included the capture of numerous towns and Russian troops. The conquest of Kursk and that of Nazi Germany were immediately compared in Russian media, using the eloquence of the situation.
However, Putin’s response has been delayed and, to numerous observers, puzzling. After several days of silence and avoidance, a visibly upset Putin held a televised meeting with top security officials and regional governors, in which he promised a “worthy response” and payment of 10, 000 rubles ( US$ 150 ) for residents displaced by the incursion. However, it was n’t until several days later that the Kursk population received a mass evacuation or clear instructions.
While the invasion of Kursk was afoot, Putin delegated the” position” to another. He rather made a trip to Azerbaijan to meet with President Ilham Aliyev and visited a agricultural land.
Training from a different” Kursk”
Ukraine’s intrusion into Kursk and Putin’s response has reflections of yet another earlier” Kursk” turmoil: the 2000 falling of the nuclear submarine that bears the state’s title. After an blast in the missile nest on August 12, 2000, which left the majority of the 118-member team dead, the Kursk sank during tasks in the Barents Sea.
Some 23 of the first blast’s individuals squatted in a subcargo and waited for help. Many nations offered assistance in the rescue of the explosions, and many nations in Europe were able to pick up the seismographs. However, Putin refused to provide international aid until it was too late. On August 21, Norwegian divers discovered all the dead crew members when they reached the murdered sub.
The Kursk crisis exposed what some had called “political immobility” at the Kremlin, with Putin facing criticism for a year of direct criticism for lying about the disaster for days.
Six weeks into the issue, he decided to travel to Yalta in Ukrainian Crimea for an informal gathering with the eyes of the Commonwealth of Independent States, hosted by the then-president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma. He refused to take an offbeat holidays in Sochi on the Black Sea.
A anxious Putin met with the people of the team members in Vidyayevo, their home, on August 23, 2000.
The uncomfortable exchanges between Putin and angry grieving moms were broadcast on Russian TV despite strong controls over foreign media exposure. It was a disaster for Putin’s photo.
According to a see, Putin was enraged by the media portrayal of him, accusing the TV channels of hiring” 10-dollar women” to discredit him.
Failing in the face of violence
Since Putin’s face with the patients ‘ people in 2000, Russia’s tightly controlled press has fallen significantly more in line with the Kremlin’s job of portraying Putin as “protector”.
Leaning into this tale, pro-Putin media usually frame the Russians in the current conflict as “terrorists” and” Nazis“.
However, Putin’s management of real terrorist attacks once more demonstrates how unprepared he is to defend Russian life.
Taking his handling of the harm in Beslan, a town in North Ossetia, five years into his career. On Sept. 1, 2004, a group of over 30 military militants stormed a school and took over 1, 000 victims, including children, instructors and some family members.
The victims were kept in the school without food or water until on September 3, when Russian special troops entered the structure. The battle ended in a disorganized struggle in which thousands of hostages were killed, including 186 kids.
Survivors and relatives alleged in court documents that the Russian state, including Putin, had handled the situation improperly and brought legal action against the state in the European Court of Human Rights. The court determined that the Soviet government “did not defend the victims.”
Russian responses to terrorist attacks have been recurring themes of unfair use of force, mishandling, and fraud. During Putin’s quarter-century in command, Russian has seen over a hundred terrorist assaults, the latest of which, an attack by members of the Islamic State group at a Moscow musical on March 22, 2024, competitors Beslan in regard to loss of life.
Putin made an effort to link the present state of Kursk to the strike by saying that “enemies are suddenly trying to destroy the country.” He went to Beslan on August 20, 2024. In both instances, what is popular is that Putin was unable to defend Russians.
Protecting Russians or his picture?
Putin’s reputation as a strong protector is in serious danger as a result of the successful Ukrainian incursion, which is not for the first time.
In front of a private audience, Soviet propaganda will undoubtedly do what it needs to do to appoint a president.
Never has this image appeared thus vulnerable during Putin’s 25 years of power; instead, what is coming through is more of a savior of an image.
Lena Surzhko Harned is a social research associate professor at Penn State.
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