Sure A Not

A recent comment from a major business figure in Japan is bound to increase alarm among the country’s nativists.

Hiroya Masuda, the chief executive of Japan Post Holdings, a major conglomerate that operates the country’s post offices, told the major business news outlet Nikkei in a June 21 interview that some towns and cities needed to prepare for a future in which “40-50% of the population … will be foreigners.”

Speaking on behalf of the independent policy group Reiwa Rincho, of which he is a co-leader, Masuda called on the government to undertake reforms relating to immigration as well as education, social security, and taxation policies with more foreign residents in mind.

Masuda’s prediction of a more immigrant-dominated Japan mirrors population projections produced by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. A report released by IPSS on April 26 concluded that by 2070, Japanese nationals will make up only 77 million of Japan’s total population of 87 million.

The IPSS report predicted that the coming years will see a continued decline in the fertility rate and an increase in net immigration, implying that a larger foreign population will prevent a sharper decline in the total population. IPSS’ projection of a Japan with more than 10% foreign-born population is a dramatic increase from the current estimate of 2.2%.

Dubai’s experience

As Japan thinks about how to live with more foreigners in its midst, Dubai, the largest city in the United Arab Emirates, could be a good reference.

Dubai, with foreigners making up some 92% of its 3.3 million residents, represents an extreme case of an immigrant-dominted society that the likes of Masuda believe Japan may eventually become. Yet rather than succumbing to conflicts between “natives” and foreigners, Dubai has grown to become a major business hub in the Middle East.

Through large-scale automated visa processing, the provision of long-term “golden visas” to high-skilled, high-wealth individuals, and the establishment of free-trade zones allowing 100% foreign ownership of businesses, Dubai has attracted and leveraged foreign talent for rapid economic development.

For Japan to replicate Dubai’s experience in utilizing foreigners for economic growth, a particularly important point of reference is how to prevent the native population’s ambivalence toward the wealth and success of foreigners from becoming outright resentment.

Data show that more than two-thirds of the Japanese population believes that hiring for jobs in Japan should prioritize Japanese nationals, the highest figure among multiple countries surveyed. And despite record numbers of foreigners in Japan, survey results from 2003 to 2018 show a steady decline in the general public’s interest in interacting with foreigners.

Reduced interest in studying or traveling abroad among Japan’s youth only exacerbates the problem.

Two-tier system

Dubai’s answer to preventing native resentment has been the systematic use of discriminatory policies favoring natives.

Dubai provides no pathway to permanent residency or citizenship for the vast majority of foreign residents, forcing them to leave once they no longer provide economic value to the city. Only citizens are availed of benefits such as free education, cheap land, and highly paid jobs in the bureaucracy.

The combination of such policies ensures that natives feel that they are concretely benefiting from a continued influx of immigrant labor. In other words, they are made to feel that the government is “on their side,” using the output of immigrant labor to sustain the natives’ comparatively higher standard of living and, by extension, higher socioeconomic status.

Policies that provide additional benefits to the native population have largely prevented widespread xenophobia despite a large foreign population.

Whether Japan is willing to replicate this Dubai model of conscious policy discrimination against foreign residents may comes down to the moral values of its business and political leaders.

Dubai is certainly no paradise for immigrants. Various research has shown that the city’s immigration policies have failed to protect Dubai’s migrant workers from exploitation by employers, with many blue-collar workers perishing under harsh working and living conditions.

As a self-declared liberal democracy with respect for universal human rights, Japan may find it ethically difficult to codify the unequal treatment of foreigners in its laws, even if the result is a native population more accepting of a larger foreigner presence.

As Japan rethinks its immigration policies in facing a future with dramatically more foreign residents, Dubai provides both an optimistic and cautionary tale.

On one hand, Dubai provides a blueprint for a foreigner-driven economic renaissance, based on natives accepting an economic environment dominated by foreign talent and money.

On the other hand, it has achieved economic success by often turning a blind eye to, and even enabling through discriminatory policies, widespread mistreatment of its most vulnerable foreign workers.

As Japan’s more immigrant-dominated future becomes more imminent, the pros and cons of the Dubai model should be more closely examined.

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Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, staged a revolt against Russia after claiming the Russian army deliberately attacked his forces. Prigozhin demanded justice — and that took the form of an armed insurrection.

Before Prigozhin reportedly backed down after negotiations with the leader of Belarus, the Wagner Group controlled key military facilities in Rostov-on-Don, the headquarters of Russia’s southern military district.

Now Prighozin is reportedly fleeing to Belarus and he and his fighters will avoid repercussions.

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Open hostilities between the Wagner Group and the Russian military are nothing new. The two groups have made numerous defamatory comments and taken hostile actions against each other since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war.

The attempted insurrection is largely the result of both the Russian army and the Wagner Group’s deployment in Ukraine — and the political system that underpins their actions.

Providing plausible deniability

The bonds between the Wagner Group and the Russian army broke down immediately after the start of the war in Ukraine. Prior to the conflict, the Wagner Group advanced Russian state interests in an unofficial capacity.

In areas where Russia had a vested interest but wanted to limit its direct involvement, like in Syria and Sudan, the Wagner Group provided the Russian government with plausible deniability.

For example, Russia used the Wagner Group to assist in its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine in 2014 also allowed the Russian army to deny involvement. The Wagner Group and Russian military’s domains, in other words, supported the other’s objectives.

The Russia-Ukraine War altered the dynamic between the two groups. The Russian army expected a rapid military victory in Ukraine. Instead, it suffered setbacks almost from the outset of the conflict. These setbacks were so substantial that they forced Russia to deploy the Wagner Group to directly support its operations.

Helping Russia in Ukraine

In military terms, Russia’s deployment of the Wagner Group helped stabilize its operations in Ukraine.

In 2022, the Wagner Group, in contrast with the bulk of the Russian army, was a highly trained force. Wagner Group soldiers, in fact, were responsible for many of Russia’s early successes, such as the Battle of Sievierodonetsk.

These operations, however, weren’t without cost. The Wagner Group suffered such significant casualties that it couldn’t maintain its traditional tactics. Instead, the Wagner Group initiated mass recruitment efforts, including from Russia’s prisons, to replenish its depleted forces.

That blurred the lines between the Wagner Group and the Russian army. Whereas previously the two organizations had distinct spheres of influence, both now operated as, essentially, conventional forces.

Overlapping domains of influence, while forced by necessity in the case of the Russian army and the Wagner Group, aren’t exceptional for Russia.

In fact, they’re a feature of the Russian political system, and one person is responsible — Vladimir Putin.

Putin’s influence

Ultimately, only the Russian president can arbitrate disputes among his subordinates. This not only limits the ability of Putin’s subordinates to build power bases that can challenge him, but also reinforces his importance to the political system.

This aspect of the Russian political system is highly effective in peacetime, so long as the goal is for Putin to maintain his influence and power. In times of looming conflict or outright war, however, overlapping functions can easily become a liability.

In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it became evident that Putin’s subordinates didn’t provide him with an accurate and clear picture of the capabilities of either the Ukrainian or Russian armed forces.

During the conflict itself, that meant cooperation among competing factions — in this case the Russian army and paramilitary forces — has been nominal, at best. In the worst-case scenario, these tensions can lead to open conflict, as we’ve witnessed between the Wagner Group and the Russian army.

While this tempest has seemingly passed for Putin for now, the Wagner Group is only the most prominent example of simmering discontent among paramilitary forces towards Russia.

Escape hatch for Putin?

Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen leader who commands a paramilitary group of 12,000 soldiers, has previously noted problems between his forces and the Russian army.

It’s important to note that while Putin appeared to condemn the Wagner Group in his address to the nation as Prigozhin’s revolt was underway, he didn’t mention its leader by name. This omission was assuredly by design: it kept Putin’s options open in depending upon the success — or failure — of Prigozhin’s revolt.

The short-lived insurrection could still be a turning point in the war in Ukraine, but how it will shift the conflict is still uncertain.

Had it gone on longer, the revolt could have potentially provided Putin with a way to end the conflict and save face. From the outset of the conflict, Putin knew he couldn’t afford to suffer a loss in Ukraine.

If he could shift blame for the defeat onto one or several scapegoats — like Wagner Group forces or other paramilitary groups who are still agitating about Russia — it could provide an exit ramp.

It could still cause a shift in the power alignment beneath Putin. He is arguably in one of the most vulnerable positions of his presidency since winning the 2000 election, but he won’t relinquish control easily.

To maintain his influence, Putin will consider any and every possibility for reasserting his dominance over Russia, with direct implications for the war in Ukraine.

James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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