China prepares to send first civilian into space
JIUQUAN, Gansu: China will send its first civilian astronaut into space as part of a crewed mission to the Tiangong space station on Tuesday (May 30) as it pursues its ambitious plans for a manned lunar landing by 2030. The world’s second-largest economy has invested billions of dollars in itsContinue Reading
Higher risk of haze in southern ASEAN region between June and October 2023
SINGAPORE: Weather and climate authorities on Monday (May 29) flagged a higher risk of haze in the southern ASEAN region between June and October this year amid expectations of a more intense and prolonged dry season.
The ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) made this announcement as it issued Alert Level 1, indicating the start of the dry season associated with the Southwest Monsoon in the southern ASEAN region.
“Persistent drier weather has been observed over most parts of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and southern Thailand in recent days, as the monsoon rain band moves north of the equator.
“With a high likelihood of El Nino conditions developing in the coming months, the dry season is expected to be more intense and prolonged compared to recent years, and extend into October 2023,” it said.
Hotspot activities in the southern ASEAN region are presently still subdued, with 14 and 13 hotspots detected in the southern ASEAN region on May 27 and May 28 respectively, said ASMC.
A few localised smoke plumes were detected in parts of the region on some days in May, but no transboundary smoke haze occurrence has been observed so far.
Malaysia detains Chinese ship linked to suspected illegal salvage of British WWII wrecks
A ship registered in Fuzhou, China and carrying 32 crew failed to present anchoring permits during a routine inspection in waters off Malaysia’s southern Johor state on Sunday, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) said. Authorities found scrap metal and cannon shells on the ship upon further checks. The shellsContinue Reading
CNA Explains: Why did the Singapore dollar hit an all-time high against the Malaysian ringgit?
The currency had surged by 1.8 per cent on the day of Mr Anwar’s appointment on Nov 24 – the largest single-day gain since March 2016.
He noted that predictably, the ringgit has not seen similar gains since.
“In November, the ringgit strengthened primarily due to the semblance of political stability post-election. However, it has since depreciated due to external factors such as the (US Federal Reserve’s) highly aggressive interest rate hikes, the US banking crisis and geopolitical uncertainties,” said Mr Afiq Asyraf.
Mr Hafidzi Razali, a senior analyst with strategic advisory firm Bower Group Asia, added the weaker ringgit recently can be attributed to China’s ongoing economic recovery.
“Given that China is one of Malaysia’s largest trading partners, China’s economic recovery is important for the value of (the ringgit),” said Mr Hafidzi.
He noted that Malaysia’s exports had contracted 1.8 per cent year on year in the first quarter of 2023, and that this could largely be attributed to the decline in exports to China.
Domestically, Mr Hafidzi posited that Malaysia’s relatively weaker investment opportunities and impending structural reforms have held back the ringgit’s value.
“Private investment opportunities remain relatively limited; compared to developed economies such as the US and Singapore,” said Mr Hafidzi.
“The market is still anticipating whether impending structural reforms will be implemented (by the Malaysia government); particularly on large subsidy bills, low tax base and the ability to attract value-added foreign direct investments,” he added.
WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR THE SGD TO MYR RATE?
Analysts whom CNA spoke to added that the value of the Singapore dollar to the Malaysian ringgit could spike to new highs in the near term especially if the US dollar continues to appreciate.
However, some have stressed that the Singapore dollar to Malaysian ringgit value would stabilise given that the US government has agreed to raise the debt ceiling and that Congress would vote on the deal on Wednesday.
After the agreement was announced on Saturday, US President Joe Biden said that the deal was “good news for the American people, because it prevents what could have been a catastrophic default and would have led to an economic recession, retirement accounts devastated, and millions of jobs lost”.
The tentative agreement to suspend the US$31.4 trillion debt ceiling must now get through the Republican-controlled House of Representatives and Democratic-led Senate before June 5 to avoid a crippling first-ever default.
Pita would face cabinet dissolution petition
Move Forward leader Pita Limjaroenrat will face a challenge over his qualifications and a request for the dissolution of his cabinet if he becomes prime minister, serial petitioner Ruangkrai Leekitwattana said on Monday.
Mr Ruangkrai said at the office of the Election Commission that if Mr Pita becomes prime minister he would file a petition signed by at least one-in-ten House representatives asking the court to consider the qualifications and eligibility of Mr Pita and his cabinet.
Mr Ruangkrai is a member of the Palang Pracharath Party, which still leads the caretaker government. PPRP came fourth in the May 14 general election. Mr Pita’s Move Forward Party won the most seats and has first option to form a coalition government.
“If Mr Pita overcomes hurdles and becomes the prime minister, I will proceed with a petition for the disbandment of his whole cabinet,” Mr Ruangkrai said.
On Monday Mr Ruangkrai was at the office of the Election Commission to testify in his complaint about Mr Pita’s qualifications. The complaint was based on Mr Pita’s alleged holding of 42,000 shares in iTV Plc, a registered but now defunct media company. The constitution prohibits shareholders of media organisations sitting in the House of Representatives.
Mr Ruangkrai said Mr Pita had run in the 2019 general election as a candidate of the since-disbanded Future Forward Party and the EC would need to ask the Constitutional Court to disqualify Mr Pita retroactively.
If Mr Pita were to be retroactively disqualified, there would be problems with the allowances paid to Mr Pita and his assistant MPs, Mr Ruangkrai said. He had asked the EC to do the retroactive investigation.
Disqualification would also affect Mr Pita’s approval of Move Forward candidates in the May 14 general election this year, and his status as his party’s prime ministerial candidate, Mr Ruangkrai said.
Ruangkrai Leekitwattana
Interest rate for CPF Special and MediSave Account up to 4.01% in Q3; first increase since 2008
The SMA interest rate will be 4.01 per cent per annum from Jul 1 to Sep 30. The OA interest rate will remain unchanged at 2.5 per cent for the same period as the pegged OA rate remains below the floor rate. Meanwhile, the concessionary interest rate for HDB housingContinue Reading
Parsing Chinaâs ambiguous Ukraine war mediation
After a year of diplomatic inactivity towards the war in Ukraine, the Chinese government has made demonstrable attempts to look like a peacemaker. But while these moves indicate a change in its behavior, there is little reason to anticipate that China’s efforts will end the war.
China’s 12-point “peace plan” and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s direct phone call to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, 2023, though met with skepticism and criticism in the West, led the international community to believe that China might be able to move the needle far enough to bring the Ukraine war closer to a solution or at least some sort of peace process.
But neither Russia nor Ukraine is ready to negotiate and make concessions. While the conflict is mutually detrimental, there is no clear battlefield stalemate or strategic impasse that would necessitate immediate negotiations. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is exhausted enough to engage in negotiations, with both sides digging in for a long haul.
Beijing’s relative success in brokering a Saudi-Iran agreement should not be extrapolated to the Ukraine war. In the Saudi–Iran case, a pre-established dialogue framework helped China’s late involvement. Iraq and Oman had done much of the substantive work before Beijing stepped in.
Most importantly, given the power vacuum in the region, both Iran and Saudi Arabia were willing to reach an agreement with each other.
This does not apply to the case of Ukraine, where the irreconcilability of Kiev’s and Moscow’s demands and the lack of a strong “give peace a chance” camp in Europe make protracted war the most likely scenario. If China’s mediation attempts are driven by the desire to boost its status, there is a risk for Beijing that a failure to achieve a successful outcome will damage its credibility.
The conflict between Moscow and Kiev has become an acute manifestation of global great power rivalry, an epicenter of the struggle for influence between Russia and the West rooted in long-term systemic trends.
The Russia–West stand-off in the post-Soviet space surfaced long before the Ukraine war. Soon after the August 2008 Russia–Georgia war, former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev stated that Moscow had demarcated a “traditional sphere of Russian interests”, to which then-US vice president Joe Biden rebutted, “we will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence.”
Russia and the West ruled out any possibility of a positive-sum scenario involving Ukraine. This means that China must mediate not a Russia-Ukraine territorial dispute but a full-blown zero-sum confrontation between Russia and the West — a daunting task.
China’s own precarious position in great power politics and its deteriorating relations with the United States, aggravated by Beijing’s commitment to winning back Taiwan, make Beijing an unlikely candidate to solve tensions between Russia and the West. The crux of the problem is that Russia is China’s only great power ally, and China will rely on Russia in the event of a confrontation with the United States.
Unlike the United States and its allies, China does not want Russia to suffer a devastating defeat in Ukraine. Such a scenario would mean a triumph for the United States’ international order and global influence.
This would deal a blow not only to China’s aspirations for a new global order with “Chinese characteristics” and “dreams” but also to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy, especially from the standpoint of unification with Taiwan. If Russia falls in its confrontation with the West, China will become the West’s next target.
In contrast, a protracted war or some form of Russian victory will erode the US-led international order, exposing its flaws and opening new avenues for China’s global rise. China will tread the tightrope of Ukraine geopolitics very carefully, coming up with unfulfillable “peace initiatives” that combine a Russia-friendly stance with a desire to protect its own interests.
Given these considerations and China’s overall knowledge of the conflict, China’s plans to mediate the conflict are questionable. China’s activities regarding Ukraine seem to be dictated by Beijing’s broader foreign policy goals.
By becoming involved in the global “Ukraine project”, Beijing can consolidate a coalition of like-minded developing countries with ambivalent stances on the Ukraine war, such as Brazil and South Africa.
China can not only strengthen its influence in the developing world but also circumvent the uncompromisingly binary “barbaric and authoritarian Russia versus civilized and democratic West” structural environment.
In doing so, Beijing can expand the room for foreign policy maneuvering, simultaneously undermining the unity and global standing of the West.
Still, China’s “peace initiatives” should not be dismissed entirely despite their limited potential to end the Ukraine war.
While they may not bring about peace talks, they can facilitate ‘talks about talks’ and talks about avoiding vertical escalation when the use of tactical nuclear weapons is no longer a distant risk but an imminent threat. Given the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, these possible outcomes make China’s recent moves a worthy endeavor.
Alexander Korolev is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.
Abuduwaili Abudureheman: Hong Kong denies detaining Uyghur student
Amnesty InternationalHong Kong has denied detaining a Uyghur scholar who human rights activists say went missing after arriving in the city earlier this month.
Abuduwaili Abudureheman texted a friend on 10 May saying he was being interrogated by police at the airport.
He has not been heard from since, his friends told Amnesty International.
The rights group has demanded Hong Kong reveal his whereabouts, but the government said such a call was slander and “groundless and unfounded”.
The Hong Kong government also said there was no record that Mr Abudureheman had arrived in the territory or was denied entry.
The Chinese government has been accused of a brutal crackdown against the Muslim minority Uyghurs, which it denies.
Mr Abuduwaili, who was born in Xinjiang, had been based in South Korea for the past seven years where he had earned a PhD in sports industry and leisure. He had flown from Seoul to Hong Kong to visit a friend, Amnesty said.
The group said it had received information that Mr Abuduwaili was on a “watch list” of Uyghurs and other Muslims from the north-western Xinjiang region, who had travelled outside of China.
Amnesty said it had recorded numerous cases of Uyghurs detained in China and abroad based solely on having a history of foreign travel.
“The unknown fate of Abuduwaili Abudureheman is deeply worrying, given the background of crimes against humanity committed against Uyghurs by the Chinese government in Xinjiang, and its ongoing pursuit of Uyghurs who have travelled overseas,” said Alkan Akad, an Amnesty researcher.
The US, UK and international human rights monitors have accused Beijing of detaining about one million Uyghurs in so-called “re-education camps” in Xinjiang, mass sterilising Uyghur women, separating children from their families and breaking their cultural traditions.
The region is also cloaked in a pervasive network of surveillance, including police, checkpoints, and cameras that scan everything from number plates to individual faces.
China has also been accused of targeting Muslim figures and banning religious practices in Xinjiang, as well as destroying mosques and tombs.
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Covid deaths dropping
Virus adapting to co-existence with humans, says top health official
Covid-19 related deaths declined last week as the dominant strain is neither more transmissible nor more severe, according to the Public Health Department.
Permanent secretary Opas Karnkawinpong said on Monday there were 42 fatalities related to Covid-19 last week, down from 64 deaths the previous week.
“The (fatality) rate is starting to fall,” he said.
Most of the deaths were elderly people, those with underlying illnesses and pregnant women. Deaths resulted from lung inflammation, respiratory failure and complications including chronic kidney disease.
“Most of them had not sought the vaccination advised by the health ministry. Some peole had fears of side effects,” Dr Opas said.
“Vaccines reduce symptoms and fatalities. Young family members should take their elders for vaccination. However, sometimes it turns out that the children and grandchildren are the people who are afraid of side effects,” he said, while recommending annual Covid-19 inoculation.
Dr Opas said that the XBB.1.16 strain was spreading in Thailand but it was neither more transmissible nor more severe than other strains. Covid-19 infections were rising more in Greater Bangkok than in other provinces, he said.
Most cases now were asymptomatic because of vaccination. A survey found that 90% of Thai people had Covid-19 antibodies from vaccination or infection, Dr Opas said.
“It may now be similar to other respiratory diseases which evolve. After infection, people have antibodies and the disease tries to adapt for co-existence. It is a time of balance between humans and the disease,” the public health permanent secretary said.
He said there was no shortage of hospital beds for Covid-19 inpatients. The bed occupancy rate for Covid-19 patients nationwide was 22%. Any reported shortage may have been at hospitals that had reduced the number of beds reserved for Covid-19 cases, Dr Opas said.
Russia struggling to keep its SE Asia arms markets
Russia continues to pitch arms sales to Southeast Asia, pinning its hopes on the economically vibrant and strategically challenged region to save its embattled weaponry industry amid the ongoing Ukraine war and punitive Western sanctions.
This month, Asian Military Review reported that Russia is looking at new opportunities for “military-technical cooperation” – Russian parlance for arms sales – with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members.
In an interview with Russian Aviation & Military Guide (RAMG), Dmitry Shugaev, director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), said that Russia enjoys good diplomatic relations with ASEAN states, with all parties reputedly maintaining active dialogue on “military-technical cooperation” issues.
In the same interview, Shugaev noted that Russia has been an ASEAN Dialogue Partner since 1996 and that a legal and regulatory framework for such cooperation has long been established.
Shugaev criticized Western diplomatic pressure and sanctions for undermining Russia’s arms exports to the region while claiming that alternative payment mechanisms in national and other currencies have recently been formed. He also said that Russia is open to new joint production schemes with the bloc’s members.
Russia’s arms exports have slowed since the Ukraine war, including to Southeast Asia’s growing markets. David Brennan and Yevgeny Kuklychev note in a March 2023 Newsweek article citing data published this year by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that Russia’s total military exports have fallen by 31% over the past five years compared with the previous five years.
Western sanctions on Russia over its 2014 annexation of Crimea have slowly chipped away at Russia’s defense industry, undermining its position as the world’s second-largest arms exporter, the authors said.
Brennan and Kuklychev note that Russia’s global arms exports fell from 22% to 16% of the world market between 2013 and 2017 and from 2018 to 2022, leaving it in the dust of the US, which accounts for 40% of global exports, and only slightly ahead of France, which accounted for 11% over the last five years.
An anonymous source cited by the writers said that Russia’s export contracts have been relegated to “last priority” as Moscow doubles down on trying to replace its battle losses in Ukraine.
The same unnamed source mentioned that Russia would face considerable difficulties in fulfilling export contracts as foreign-made parts become harder to source due to sanctions and with its domestic arms industry struggling to produce substitute components. The anonymous source said that the poor performance of Russian weapons in Ukraine is a “demonstration” of their inferior quality.
The source estimated Russia could fall from among the world’s top arms exporters, with its future market confined to selling relatively low-tech weapons to impoverished, sanctioned and pariah states via barter mechanisms while losing its market share of high-end weapons to competitors like the US.
Before the Ukraine war, Russia was the leading arms supplier to Southeast Asia. In a May 2022 article for The Diplomat, Sebastian Strangio notes that between 2001 and 2021 Russia shipped US$10.9 billion worth of arms to the region, leading other major arms exporters including the US ($8.4 billion), France ($4.3 billion), Germany ($2.94 billion), and China ($2.9 billion).
Strangio notes that Russia’s main comparative advantage over other arms exporters in Southeast Asia is price and its willingness to sell weapons to rights-abusing states such as Myanmar and Cambodia, which are under various Western sanctions and embargoes.
Southeast Asian countries continue to buy Russian weapons amid intensifying US-China strategic competition. David Hutt mentions in a May 2022 article for DW that Southeast Asian nations are hedging between the US and China regarding their arms purchases, as big arms purchases from either would potentially peeve the other.
Hutt notes that buying weapons from Russia is viewed, within certain limits, as acceptable by both superpowers. He notes that the US is reluctant to sanction Southeast Asian states like Vietnam and Indonesia for buying Russian arms when its top diplomatic priority is to rally regional states against China.
Mike Ives writes in a November 2022 article in the New York Times that, from 2017 to 2021, South Korea eclipsed Russia as Southeast Asia’s top arms supplier, accounting for 18% of the region’s arms purchases over the period. No other global exporter accounted for more than 14% of the region’s arms exports, according to the report.
Ives also claims that the US is increasingly seen as an attractive arms supplier, even as the US increasingly ties its arms exports to diplomatic and military support against China. He also says European arms suppliers have been willing to sell arms to Southeast Asian states to grow their defense industries, with some cases involving significant technology transfer.
Despite Russia’s challenges in maintaining its grip on Southeast Asian arms markets, Vietnam may remain Russia’s reliable customer.
Le Hong Hiep notes in an April 2022 Fulcrum article that Vietnam is Russia’s 5th largest arms customer, with Russia accounting for 90% of Vietnam’s arms imports from 1995-2014 and 68% from 2015-2021. Hiep notes that Vietnam’s limited defense budget means it could not afford more expensive Western arms.
He also says compatibility between Russian and newer non-Russian weapons will be problematic. The writer notes that many senior Vietnamese military officers who trained in the Soviet Union or Russia are accustomed to doing business with their Russian counterparts and may find it challenging to deal with more transparent and demanding Western business cultures.
Indeed, Richard Bitzinger and Kenneth Boutin state in an August 2022 East Asia Forum article that Russia’s complementarity to the US and its “no strings attached” approach to arms sales means it is likely to remain a long-term arms supplier to Southeast Asian states, despite the bloc’s attempts to diversify its sources.
Bitzinger and Boutin note that Southeast Asian arms markets such as Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam will likely continue to provide much-needed funding for Russia’s struggling defense industry, alleviating a problem predating the Ukraine war.