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China says it will use two Long March 10 carrier rockets rather than one super-heavy Long March 9 to achieve its manned moon-landing goal of 2030, a change in plan that raises new questions about China’s rocket development and broad space programs.  

Under the new blast plan, a moon surface lander and manned spacecraft will be launched separately and dock with each other during moon orbit to complete the landing. The arrangement is similar to that of China’s Tianwen 3 plan, which will launch an unmanned lander and spacecraft separately to Mars in 2030. 

The launch of the Long March 9 carrier rocket, meanwhile, will be pushed back from 2030 to 2035 as Chinese scientists follow in the footsteps of Elon Musk’s SpaceX by focusing on methane-powered engines.

“After demonstration and analysis, China has preliminarily adopted a dock-at-lunar-orbit proposal for its manned moon-landing plan,” Zhang Hailian, deputy chief engineer with the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA), said in an opening speech at an aerospace summit in Wuhan on July 12. 

He said after the spacecraft docks with the lander, two astronauts will use the lander to alight on the moon and carry out scientific tasks and collect samples. Zhang said after completing the tasks, the astronauts will use the lander’s ascender to return to the spacecraft in lunar orbit and return to Earth.

Chinese researchers are now developing the Long March 10, a new generation of manned spacecraft, lunar lander, lunar landing spacesuit and manned lunar rover. Zhang’s speech was widely reported by state media, including Xinhua, the Global Times and the People’s Liberation Army Daily, on July 12 and 13.

Technological bottleneck

When the Apollo 11 was launched by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to the moon in 1969, it used a Saturn V rocket to carry both the spacecraft and the lunar lander. 

The rocket could lift 130 tons into low Earth orbit and 50 tons to Earth-moon-transfer orbit. Its first stage used five Rocketdyne F-1 engines, each of which can produce a thrust of 6,770 kilonewtons (kN).

The Long March 10’s first stage and two boosters are powered by 21 YF-100K engines, each of which can provide a thrust of 1,250 kN. The rocket can lift 70 tons into low Earth orbit and 27 tons to Earth-moon-transfer orbit.

The reusable YF-100K is similar to the YF-100, a replica of the RF-120 that was developed by KB Pivdenne in Ukraine several decades ago. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, China bought two RF-120 and several RD-170 engines from the company. The YF-100 contributed to China’s lunar missions in 2019 and 2020.

Using the same technology, Beijing Aerospace Propulsion Institute, a unit of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp (CASIC) No 6 Research Institute, in 2011 developed the YF-130, claiming at the time that it has a thrust of 4,800 kN (500 tons). It then modified the engine into the YF-135 with a thrust of 3,600 kN.

Liu Zhirang, head of the CASIC No 6 Research Institute, said in May 2021 that the Long March 9 will use 12 YF-130 engines to send astronauts to the moon around 2030.

Long Lehao, deputy chief designer of the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program, said in June 2021 that the Long March 9 will instead use 16 YF-135 engines that can lift 150 tons into low Earth orbit and 53 tons to Earth-moon-transfer orbit.

As of now, both the YF-130 and YF-135 are still in the laboratory.

Methane-powered rockets

Long said in April 2022 that the Long March 9 rocket will use 26 methane-powered engines. In February this year, he said the number of engines in the rocket’s first stage will increase to 30 while the two engines in the second stage will also be methane-powered.

As methane burns cleaner and produces more power than kerosene, a methane-powered rocket can more easily be recycled. The fuel is used in SpaceX’s Starship’s Super Heavy rocket, which is powered by 33 Raptor engines.

“The design of the Long March 9 is now very similar to that of Starship’s rocket,” a Chinese technology writer said in an article published on May 15. “But does it mean that the development of YF-130 has ended? No, YF-130 is almost ready. All the past efforts should not be wasted.”

The writer says bundling 30 methane-powered engines together is not risk-free as they may create resonance problems. He opined that if methane engines are not suitable, the Long March 9 can use YF-130 or YF135 again.

A Fujian-based writer also avers that investments in YF-135 will not be wasted. He says if the YF-135 becomes reusable, it will have a cost advantage and can replace the YF-100K in the future.

Some commentators said YF-100 is the most reliable choice for China’s lunar mission in 2030 as China’s methane-engine technology is still immature. Media reports said in May that a methane-powered engine tested by the CASIC No 6 Research Institute in Xi’an could be used in the Long March 9. 

On July 12, China successfully launched a medium-sized rocket called Zhuque-2, which is powered by liquid oxygen and methane. The rocket, using four TQ-12 engines, can lift 6 tons into low Earth orbit. A TQ-12 engine can only produce a thrust of 670 kN while a Raptor can hit 2,256 kN.

Read: China’s first Mars rover may sleep forever

Read: What do the moon and South China Sea have in common?

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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This week, Thai leadership hopeful and Move Forward Party (MFP) leader Pita Limjaroenrat hit several obstacles in his quest for the prime ministership.

On Wednesday, Thailand’s Election Commission announced there was evidence that Pita had violated electoral law. The alleged violation involves an undeclared ownership of shares in a media company, which is prohibited for members of Parliament. 

Also read: Thailand: Pita’s loss is Thaksin’s gain

There is also an allegation that Pita and his party may have broken the law by its proposal to amend Thailand’s strict legislation against criticizing the monarchy. The EC has referred his case to the Constitutional Court and recommended be suspended as an MP.

In a statement, the electoral body said “the Election Commission has considered the issue and perceives that the status of Pita Limjaroenrat is considered to be voided, according to the Thai constitution.”

Pita has dismissed the allegations, claiming the shares were transferred and the company is not an active media organization. But the stakes are high. He faces not only disqualification from high office, but up to 10 years’ jail and a 20-year ban from politics if found guilty.

Pita’s hopes were dashed further on Thursday when the military-dominated Parliament voted down his candidacy for prime minister. The vote required a majority of the 749 seats in the combined sitting, with the aspirant only managing 324 votes. The next vote is due to be held on July 19.

This is a severe reality check for Pita, particularly after his party’s historic election victory in May, considered by some the most consequential since the 1970s. The victory was largely due to widespread support from Thailand’s youth, who are frustrated by draconian laws and military dominance since the 2014 coup.

The MFP secured 151 seats in the 500-strong Parliament after running on a reformist platform promising to tackle the military’s hold on politics, break up powerful monopolies, legalize same-sex marriage and end the lèse-majesté laws prohibiting criticism of the royal family. 

The elections were the first since the pro-democracy protests in 2020, which saw tens of thousands of Thais demonstrate on the streets on Bangkok against the military and monarchy, particularly the lèse-majesté laws.

After the election, MFP had formed a powerful eight-party coalition of like-minded, progressive parties controlling 313 seats in the new Parliament. But this was evidently not enough to take power.

Difficult choices

This is a tough lesson for Pita, a relative newcomer to Thai politics, and a bitter blow for the millions of Thais who voted for meaningful political change.

But it was aways likely the old guard of military-backed politicians would fight back. Pita and his coalition represent a new Thailand, one that is democratic and free and one that has no place for de facto military rule.

With Pita’s chances of becoming prime minister increasingly bleak, he now has a difficult choice to make.

Pita and his party could cede to pressure and drop their promises of reform. MFP already removed any mention of the lèse-majesté laws when it went into coalition with its political partners. 

But this has its own challenges. Backing down on meaningful political change would be seen as a rejection of the mandate given to MFP by millions of Thais seeking change. This could see the coalition’s support melt away. However, there is a good chance Parliament would still reject his candidacy anyway.

Or Pita could ask Thais to hit the streets in the hope of building pressure through protest. This could result in a violent backlash from the military, but it could also galvanize the support of millions of people.

This would be reminiscent of the protests of 2020 and would see Thais on the streets demanding that their future is not stolen again by the military. But it would be a high-risk approach and its outcome very uncertain.

Regardless, there appears a strong chance that the old guard will attempt to remove MFP from politics altogether. This would be a repeat of 2020, when Move Forward’s predecessor, Future Forward, was dissolved and its leaders banned from politics for a decade by the Constitutional Court. The current allegations leveled at Pita appear also to be politically motivated.

Regardless of what action Pita takes, there is a clear obligation on the current administration to respect the will of the people it claims to represent. 

The best and right course of action is for Parliament to vote for the candidate nominated by the party or parties with the most votes, and that is Pita. Anything else would be a severe dereliction of their duty and would further damage democracy in Thailand. 

After a decade of military rule, it is time Thais had their voices heard.

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At the conclusion of the NATO summit last week in Lithuania, everybody involved tried to smooth over a major rift that broke out between  Ukraine, which wanted a clear timetable for joining the alliance, and Western allies who didn’t want to specify a timeline.

Maybe after Russia’s war on Ukraine ends, US President Joe Biden said.

By the summit’s climax last Wednesday, all sides had tried to smooth over the differences with soothing words while NATO showered Ukraine with another bounty of weapons to fight off Russia.

NATO also created a group called the NATO-Ukraine Council to coordinate cooperation. In the end, though, the feel-good theatrics didn’t sell as talk of “unity” from all sides rang hollow.

To recap: Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky torpedoed a prepared script meant to show Russia that the West and Kiev were in determined lockstep.

But on the eve of the NATO summit in Vilnius, Zelensky launched sharp criticisms of NATO’s apparent decision to withhold a clear timeline for Ukraine’s membership in the alliance.

“It’s unprecedented and absurd (that a) timeframe is set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership, while at the same time vague wording about “conditions” is added even for inviting Ukraine,” he wrote.

Zelensky then performed the necessary ritual of thanking NATO and told reporters, “The results of the summit are good. The Ukrainian delegation is bringing home a significant security victory for the Ukraine, for our country, for our people, for our children.”

At first, that seemed sufficient contrition. But no. After Zelensky had left Vilnius, a gaggle of unnamed NATO officials unloaded harsh criticism against the leader.

According to an article in the Washington Post, some officials wanted to punish Zelensky for his outburst.

“The incident illustrates the frustration inside NATO with Zelensky’s pressure tactics, where even some of his strongest backers questioned this week whether he was serving Ukraine’s interests,” the paper said.

What all this means for the war effort will probably be clear in the coming months. Ukraine’s current counteroffensive is going slowly. If anything, a clear statement on future NATO membership instead of an unseemly blame game would have represented a morale boost.

The oddest thing about the episode may have been that NATO leaders were caught by surprise by Zelensky’s complaints. His dissatisfaction had been building for months. In April, he launched a heated critique of allies for failing to deliver top items on his military wish list: jet bombers and advanced anti-aircraft weapons.

Such arms are valuable in part to support ground offensives of the type Ukraine launched over a month ago.

“Unfortunately, Ukraine has not yet received enough anti-missile systems from the West. It has not yet accepted military aircraft and has not accepted what partners can offer,” Zelensky said in a televised address.

“Every Russian missile that hits our cities and every bomb that is dropped on our people, our children, only adds a black shadow to the history of those on whom the decision depends,” he said.

An announcement by Biden to supply cluster bombs to Ukraine inadvertently exemplified Ukraine’s problem of getting timely allied supplies. Cluster bombs are flocks of armaments dropped over a wide area on enemy troops that might have been useful earlier in Ukraine’s current offensive, which began last month. Ukraine had requested the cluster munitions last December.

The end of the Vilnius summit is unlikely to represent the last display of tension between Ukraine and its NATO allies.

At an open forum in Vilnius, Ukrainian activist Daria Kaleniuk asked Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, “What should I tell my son? That President Biden and NATO didn’t invite Ukraine to NATO because he’s afraid of Russia, afraid of Russia losing, afraid of Ukraine winning?”

Ukrainian fears are rooted in the country’s post-Soviet relations with the West, where governments have often been ambivalent about guaranteeing the country’s security.

During the 1990s, after the breakup of the Soviet Union of which Ukraine was a part, then-president Leonid Kuchma hesitated to give up the nuclear arsenal Ukraine had inherited.

Kuchma feared surrendering the arsenal would leave Ukraine helpless to deter future domination, if not aggression, by Russia. He wanted atomic weapons as a deterrent; NATO membership was not presented as an option.

Russian president Boris Yeltsin was unwilling to let independent Ukraine keep its arsenal of nuclear warheads. The United States, eager to promote nuclear reductions generally, preferred that all former Soviet atomic weapons be turned over to Russia. That not only included Ukraine’s cache but also arsenals held by Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Strenuous diplomacy resulted in the so-called Budapest Memorandum. It was meant to ease security concerns of the three newly-independent nuclear-armed countries – in particular Ukraine.

In the memorandum, Russia, along with the US and Great Britain, pledged “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence” of the three former Soviet Republics, “except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”

Moscow, Washington and London also pledged “to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest” Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Ukraine turned over its nuclear weapons.

Confirming Ukraine’s worse fears, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Putin, who considered the breakup of the Soviet Union a tragedy, ignored the memo Yeltsin had signed.

The Crimea takeover fueled Ukrainian desires for a new and reliable deterrent: NATO membership. NATO membership had already been provided to former Warsaw Pact Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, as well as to Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which like Ukraine were former Soviet republics.

But in 2008, NATO countries meeting in Bucharest offered Ukraine and Georgia, which was already a victim of a Russian invasion in 2008, only a vague pledge that they would eventually “become members of NATO.”

Ukrainians have publicly criticized the 2008 failure to pin down a NATO commitment as an abject lesson. Some critics have laid retrospective blame on Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor in 2008, and Nicholas Sarkozy, France’s president at the time.

Last April, Zelensky called the 2008 indecision a “miscalculation,” saying it cast a shadow over Merkel’s 16-year legacy as Germany’s leader.

“I invite Ms Merkel and Mr Sarkozy to visit Bucha and see what the policy of concessions to Russia has led to in 14 years,” referring to the site of alleged Russian atrocities in Ukraine during the current war.

Pointing fingers solely at European leaders for indecision avoids the touchy subject of US attitudes toward Ukraine’s NATO aspiration. In 2008, then-president George W Bush was ambivalent. His successor, Barack Obama, wanted to improve relations with Moscow and declined to press NATO to admit Ukraine.

American reluctance didn’t mollify Putin. His response to NATO’s vague Bucharest statement was negative.

Putin’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at the time, “We will do all we can to prevent Ukraine’s and Georgia’s accession into NATO and to avoid an inevitable serious exacerbation of our relations with both the alliance and our neighbors.”

“Russia opposes the plan to grant membership on the grounds that such a move would pose a direct threat to its security.”

Curiously, Zelensky and Putin both share deep suspicions about NATO’s vague stand on Kiev’s eventual membership. Zelensky because he thinks NATO never intends to let his country in, and Putin because he’s sure it will.

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