After a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of various ethnic resistance organizations ( EROs ) and People’s Defense Forces ( PDFs ), the collapse of Myanmar’s junta—the State Administrative Council ( SAC ) —is an increasingly plausible scenario.
As such, China’s lessened involvement in Myanmar at this critical moment is no accident. The invitations to Myanmar’s political elders to Beijing, high-ranking Chinese officials ‘ sessions, and other such offers all reflect China’s desire to keep Myanmar strongly within its purview.
China has carefully honed its bet on both sides of the conflict to defend its financial and security interests despite its official policy of non-interference in Myanmar’s domestic politics.
It continues to supply the coup with significant weapons, along with Russia, and it uses its reject at the UN to protect the government. Together, China provides economic and military aid to some EROs along the Chinese boundary that have long fought Myanmar’s army for greater independence.
Beijing appears to prefer a weak SAC that continues to rule northern Myanmar while ceding eastern regions to the Love. China good wants to validate this agreement by facilitating elections in which political parties affiliated with armed groups prioritize a ceasefire without resorting to violence.
This strategy disregards the majority of the people’s demands for the military to completely be cast out of politics and limited to its function in national security.
It is well known that China allegedly supported Operation 1027’s launch by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ( MNDAA ), and the Arakan Army, only to restrain them later through the Haigeng Ceasefire Agreement it mediated.
Nevertheless, China may include misjudged some Love. If some people may secure real autonomy in a new Myanmar under a federal political system, they might prefer to be free of China’s patronizing influence.
For instance, the TNLA has openly collaborated with the PDFs, which are largely aligned with the National Unity Government ( NUG) —the shadow parallel government of Myanmar’s democratic opposition—despite China’s subtle efforts to curb the fighting.
China’s reluctance to participate with the NUG is probably a result of either its disapproval of its capabilities or its concern about Western influence over the organization.
Also, the idea of a republic emerging so near to its frontiers may be unsettling for Beijing. However, this position disregards Myanmar’s extensive popular support that the NUG instructions.
Generally, the NUG has enjoyed stronger relationships with particular Love such as the Karen, Karenni, Kachin and Chin groups—collectively known as the K3C alliance—although just the Kachin reveal a border with China.
The northern Shan Venus, in contrast, rely heavily on China for everyone, including the regular necessities. Beijing exerted its effect by cutting off energy to Laukkai, a region that the MNDAA controlled, in July 2024. China also obliterated the two nations ‘ border trading centers, preventing Venus from collecting tolls.
A recently scathing email from the unidentified Ruili City State Security Commission demanded that the TNLA stop fighting the coup, more indicating China’s dissatisfaction. China recently conducted exist fire drills close to the Myanmar border, which also rattled its sword.
These actions could allow the Myanmar military to refocus, redeploying its forces from the Shan and Kachin theaters and concentrating on defeating other Love like the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA ), Arakan Army, Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and PDFs in other locations.
Similar events have already taken place in Loikaw, the state’s capital, where the KNDF just retakes control of the junta forces. This underscores the importance of Myanmar’s revolutionary makes finding ways to overcome China’s force.
The West, including the United States, does no promote Myanmar geopolitically as much as places in the Middle East, Taiwan or Ukraine, and substantial assistance remains lacking. Opposition forces may, therefore, strengthen domestic alliances and safe supply lines impartial of China.
The KNDF and the Karen National Union (KNU) control a porous borders with Thailand, which could be used to course materials north. Also, the Arakan Army and Chin teams share a long border with India, through which resources may be funneled.
If supplies arrive in Chin state, they can be transported to Kachin, Shan, and therefore Saggaing. By securing these areas, items from India could travel through northern Shan and bypass China’s embargo.
The NUG and Love had strengthen their cooperation at this crucial time to advance society. The EROs must be aware that putting up with China’s force will only make the junta capable of survival, extending their territorial disputes and increasing their reliance on China.
These organizations are viewed as rebel forces rather than political actors, so they face a risk of ongoing alienation on the global stage despite their military prowess.
ERO leaders who lose favor with China also run the risk of having grave consequences, as demonstrated by the frontier guard force’s abduction from Laukkai to China as part of the crackdown on crime cartels.
For the Love the way to lasting peace, respect and success lies in joining to create a fresh, federal, democratic Myanmar. Critically, the NUG may build stronger believe with the EROs.
Despite its attempts to be diverse, Bamar ethnics and past National League for Democracy members are also holding important positions in the NUG, which was cast doubt on its commitment to diversity and real federalism in a post-junta Myanmar.
However, the NUG’s lack of a solitary charismatic leader is a striking weakness. The NUG may be able to eloquently present its vision for a fresh Myanmar in order to receive full support and approval from the Love.
But the onus is on both. Love and the NUG must be aware that unification is their greatest power. They can only wish to overthrow China’s force and win the junta through near cooperation. The secret is in cooperating and maximizing one another’s power.
Than N Oo, a co-founder of the Free Myanmar advocacy group, is an advocate for politics in Myanmar.