This content was originally published by Pacific Forum, and it has since been republished. Read the original below.
In the three and a half times since the February 2021 military revolution, Myanmar has endured social, cultural, economic and military problems.
In September 2021, the opposition’s National Unity Government ( NG ) launched a defensive conflict by establishing the People’s Defense Forces ( PDFs ) and supporting ethnically armed organizations ( EAOs ) to defeat the military junta in Myanmar.
The combined efforts of PDFs and EAOs have for the past three years given the military regime significant resources-strengthening control over remote locations and engaged in guerrilla war in metropolitan areas.
Operation 1027, an anti-regime coalition led by the ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ( MNDAA ), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ), and the Arakan Army ( AA ), was launched by the anti-regime coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance ( BHA ).
The well-equipped 3BHA forces, which have close ties to China and have access to cutting-edge technology, seized large weapons from the junta and control of major territory, including major towns and financial hubs that border China, in its first three months.
Due to the conflict with opposition armed forces, where the Myanmar government has been, China’s support for the regime has waned, and its growing support for some opposition groups has become clear.
Many observers believe that the 3BHA fights to gain territory and stop online scams in the China-Myanmar border areas ( at China’s behest ), as opposed to attempting to end a military dictatorship.
However, 3BHA actions are seen as a big punch to the military government’s strength. Several defections and surrenders have now led to a significant setback for the regime, including a lack of personnel for front-line battles and a troubling decline in soldier morale.
In response, the government has implemented a enlistment law, which has led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of young people from the nation, created labor shortages in various sectors of the economy, and increased the rate of child labor.
According to reports in the media, lately captured men who had been enlisted in Pyin Oo Lwin and Lashio were almost entirely uneducated, underscoring the junta’s significant labor scarcity.
As noted by Timor-Leste President Jose Ramos-Horta,” This is the first time in the history of Myanmar when the government are certainly winning and , did not succeed. They are losing”.
Operation 1027’s following flood
Eight weeks after the first Activity 1027 campaign, which ended in a Chinese-brokered peace in January, fighting resumed in northern Shan state, with many calling this the second phase of Operation 1027.
Although the NUG had limited involvement, the 3BHA is joined by the Mandalay People’s Defense Forces ( PDF), the Bama People’s Liberation Army ( BPLA ), the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ), reputedly capturing over 80 military bases and 60 towns, including recent seizures of Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mogoke in northern Shan, and key border crossings with China.
Also, 3BHA’s subsequent attempts to capture Lashio town, a business and operational hub in northeastern Myanmar, signal that the Myanmar defense faces unprecedented challenges on several fronts.
The government has resorted to flying shooting to keep Lashio, which is the office of the Northeast Military Command, one of the regime’s 12 military areas. Within two weeks of the battle in Lashio, at least 39 residents perished. Inspired by Operation 1027’s success, another EAOs have launched synchronized problems nationwide.
The strategic Thandwe airport was taken on July 5 by the Arakan Army ( AA ), which now almost completely controls northern Rakhine state. In northern Myanmar, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) controls all towns that border China.
The military is unable to strengthen its forces because of the territory lost in northeastern Shan, which causes repeated losses in the area. The recent record of Madaya and Singu districts in northern Myanmar by the Mandalay People’s Defense Force on July 17 more shocked the defense, which led to heavy artillery attacks as the junta forces attempt to maintain power in the country’s Bamar-majority homeland.
The role of China
The 3BHA’s military successes would not have been possible without the blessing of the Chinese government, as the 3BHA relies on China for weapons, ammunition, banking and other support.
Beijing appears to have switched its long-standing support to the EAOs in order to stop Chinese nationals from engaging in illegal gambling and cybercrime in Myanmar’s border regions.
This shift also aligns with China’s geostrategic and economic goals, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor project, which will allow China to access the Indian Ocean from Yunnan’s southern province. Myanmar plays a vital part in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s US$ 1 trillion project that includes maritime, rail and road projects in Asia, Africa and Europe.
The Chinese-backed United Wa State Army ( UWSA ) intervened by dispatching more than 2, 000 of their troops to Tangyan town in northern Shan during 3BHA’s attempts to seize Lashio, a clear sign that the country is expanding its territory.
With an army of about 30 000 well-equipped soldiers and sophisticated weaponry, including heavy artillery and Chinese helicopters, the Wa army is Myanmar’s most powerful EAO.
China worries about potential revenue losses from border trade with Myanmar due to the escalating conflict. However, China’s willingness to punish the Myanmar military regime may be limited, as evidenced by recent visits from senior or ex-military leaders to China.
According to reports, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi requested that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing step down and form an interim government to pave the way for elections during former president Thein Sein’s visit to Beijing on June 29. This was done in line with Beijing’s position that dialogue is the only way to move forward since the military cannot be defeated.
Junta Deputy Prime Minister Soe Win made an official visit to Qingdao a week later after the 3BHA offensive was resumed, where they discussed border stability, the elimination of online scan operations, and the election plan. This demonstrates China’s significant influence over key players in Myanmar on both sides.
Time for proactive Western action
The security landscape has significantly changed since Operation 1027, especially considering that it is still uncertain whether the Myanmar military will completely be dismantled.
Therefore, more than ever, the resistance requires the support of the international community. There are issues with fragmentation between resistance groups, particularly between minority EAOs and Bamar-majority NUGs, as well as within the various EAOs themselves. The international community can be a significant factor in fostering dialogue between these groups.
The US and the rest of the world should profit from this and actively work with the NUG and other pro-democracy EAOs. Since Myanmar currently has an estimated 3 million displaced civilians, humanitarian aid might be in place, as well as other initiatives to lessen suffering, reduce civilian casualties, and restore democracy.
ASEAN, the US and China all desire a stable and peaceful Myanmar through inclusive dialogue, despite differing approaches. The junta should be put under more pressure by the international community, and more nations should encourage them to impose restrictions on their imports of jet fuel.
According to local monitoring group Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica, the military junta continued indiscriminate artillery strikes that left at least 359 civilians dead and 756 wounded in 819 airstrikes between January and April because of the failure to coordinate jet fuel sanctions.
Even under coordinated attacks on various political, military, and diplomatic fronts, the Myanmar military has consistently stated that it will not negotiate with resistance groups, particularly the NUG. This suggests that negotiations with the military are only going to be a result of existential military pressure.
By engaging in political dialogues with the opposition, strengthening coalition movements, encouraging interethnic solidarity, and providing non-lethal assistance, including direct humanitarian aid to war-torn areas and capacity-building initiatives in local governance and administration for post-conflict situations, the US and Western governments can strengthen their hand and advance democracy.
The inaction of the West in Myanmar as a result of pro-democracy movements ‘ efforts could cause these groups to continue to struggle to maintain their resistance and even the junta’s authoritarian rule. Democratic values will be undermined.
Aung Thura Ko Ko, aung@pacforum .org, is a resident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum and an Oxford University graduate with a Master of Public Policy.
This content was originally published by Pacific Forum, and it has since been republished. Read the original below.