Seoul threatens to overthrow Pyongyang’s management while North Korea aims to sever US extended deterrent assures for South Korea while North Korea is bidding to overthrow US forces by building ever-larger missiles.  ,
Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un was pictured standing next to a new road-mobile missile launcher chassis with at least 12 axles, which is longer than the 11-axle Transporter-Erector Launcher ( TEL ) that was used to launch the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) earlier this month, according to 38North.
38North information that the growth indicates North Korea’s continued dedication to road-mobile missile implementation. Although the limited information does not confirm its authenticity or specific use, the new chassis may be linked to a longer ICBM or a space-launch vehicle ( SLV ).
However, the cause says the car’s structure and military color job suggest it is intended for a new type of ballistic missile TEL, possibly enhancing North Korea’s missile capabilities. It points out North Korea’s ability to produce its TELs and its corporate investment in developing its missile technology as a result of the creation.
38North asserts that the new TEL’s objective and deployment are still unsure because more information and possible flight tests are required, but it may allow for more warheads, various decoys, and increased payloads to increase the rocket’s range and effectiveness.
The fresh TEL could be used as a rocket for a follow-on pattern for North Korea’s Hwasong-18 ICBM. 38North noted in December 2023 that the Hwasong-18’s solid-propellant pattern offers easier area function, reduced aid vehicle requirements and superior concealment, making it more credible and survivable.
38North information that the Hwasong-18’s possible range of up to 15, 000 km on a non-lofted path was reach anywhere in the continental US, depending on cargo pounds. While the actual amount of Hwasong-18 weapons and their manufacturing price remains unidentified, the missile is expected to strengthen, never change, North Korea’s existing ICBM army.
North Korea may be trying to defy the logic of expanded punishment that underlies the US-South Korea ally by imposing agreements on the latter, such as the reduction of its military presence in South Korea or the raising of some restrictions.  ,
South Korea’s largest ballistic missile, the Hyunmoo-5, was unveiled during its Armed Forces Day at Seoul Air Base, according to Seongnam Yonhap News Agency, not to be outdone or constrained.
Yonhap mentions that President Yoon Suk Yeol attended the event, which highlighted the missile’s strategic significance in the midst of rising tensions with North Korea.
Asia Times noted in July 2023 that the Hyunmoo-5, with an 8-ton warhead flying at ten times the speed of sound for up to 3, 000 kilometers, may arm South Korea’s upcoming Joint Strike Ships. Based on the KDDX-class destroyer hull, they are envisioned to carry up to 100 missiles, including the Hyunmoo-5.
Konrad Ruminski mentions in a brief from the Asia Research Center in November 2023 that South Korea has been developing several missile systems, including the Hyunmoo-5, to attack North Korea for decades. According to Ruminski, military personnel from North and South Korea have stressed their readiness to launch a strong counterstrike if one country is attacked.
He points out, however, that South Korea’s missile forces are unable to strike North Korean targets due to its nuclear arsenal.
Ruminski points out that the Hyunmoo-5 may be a step in changing that situation. According to reports, it can carry the largest conventional warheads that can cause earthquakes to collapse underground structures. The missile, launched from land or sea, can destroy targets across the Korean Peninsula buried up to 100 meters underground, he says.
Ruminski points out that while South Korea has made a significant step toward bridging the Hyunmoo-5 gap, North Korea still has the advantage thanks to its growing nuclear arsenal.
In August 2022, Asia Times reported that these capabilities may be essential to South Korea’s “decapitation strategy,” which involves pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes against North Korea to deter or end a conflict by executing its leaders.
The best course of action would be to directly threaten the Kim regime because North Korea is not discouraged by the possibility of a small-scale conflict and harm to crucial military and economic sites.
Further, Sungmin Cho mentions in a February 2024 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank that South Korea’s new aggressive military strategy, termed” PISU: Punish Immediately, Strongly, and Until the End”, indicates a more offensive posture, reflecting South Korea’s urgent need to counter an increasingly nuclear-capable North Korea.
Cho points out that the strategy’s automaticity and personalization of threats are intended to deter North Korea by indicating a firm will to retaliate without retaliation.
In light of the upcoming US elections, North and South Korea may be able to see how they are upstaging one another by developing ever-larger missiles in the context of the uncertainty surrounding the US-South Korea alliance. The future of the alliance is a far-reaching issue for both US presidential candidates.
Darcie Draudt-Véjares discusses the uncertainty surrounding US-South Korea relations in an article for The National Interest ( TNI ) this month, citing the upcoming change in US leadership.
Darcie Draudt-Vejares points out that historically, the US-South Korea alliance has been a focal point in presidential campaigns, with differing views on the alliance’s financial and strategic aspects.
She mentions Donald Trump’s” America First” policy, which calls for increased financial contributions from South Korea, and that he has criticized the alliance for its costs. In comparison, she says Kamala Harris emphasizes strengthening alliances in the Asia-Pacific, continuing the strategic approach from the Obama and Biden administrations.
According to Draudt-Vejares, the current election season focuses less on South Korea, with debates prioritizing other global conflicts. However, she underscores the importance of robust, institutionalized alliances that withstand domestic political changes.
She contrasts the Trump campaign’s transactional view of alliances with the Harris campaign’s multilateral approach, aiming to counter China’s influence through coalition-building.
She calls for the upcoming US administration to formulate a unified, multilateral strategy to respond to changing global threats while strengthening commitments to regional allies like South Korea.
Should South Korea perceive US non-commitment to their longstanding alliance, it may have to act unilaterally, bolstering its nuclear latency – the capability to field a working nuclear weapon under short notice to match North Korea’s brinksmanship, with the Hyunmoo-5 acting as a capable delivery system.