North Korea’s potential membership in BRICS, the bloc named for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa that is now expanding beyond that core deeper into the so-called Global South, presents considerable challenges and opportunities.
As an increasingly influential coalition representing major emerging economies, BRICS functions as a counterbalance to the Western-dominated global order with possible plans to launch its own trading currency to challenge the US dollar.
North Korea’s interest in joining BRICS signals an aspiration to emerge from international isolation, diversify and expand its economic partnerships, and enhance its geopolitical stature. At the same time, its possible inclusion could have severe repercussions for BRICS.
While North Korea’s accession could yield strategic advantages for both Pyongyang and the BRICS coalition, substantial obstacles ranging from North Korea’s nuclear program to economic and diplomatic impediments render the prospect precarious and unpredictable.
Despite its economic vulnerabilities as one of the world’s least developed nations, North Korea’s geopolitical relevance is indisputable. Its strategic location on the Korean Peninsula situates it at the core of East Asian security dynamics, with its frequent missile tests and saber-rattling against South Korea, Japan and United States directly influencing regional stability.
China and Russia, BRICS core members, regard North Korea as a buffer state that mitigates the influence of US-aligned South Korea and Japan. For them, Pyongyang’s inclusion in BRICS would enhance the expanding bloc’s footprint in East Asia, thereby extending its influence into a pivotal region.
For North Korea, joining BRICS presents the opportunity for enhanced legitimacy and potential alleviation of its current international isolation, particularly through engagement with non-Western powers.
Furthermore, membership could facilitate access to economic assistance, infrastructure development and trade partnerships via BRICS institutions including the New Development Bank.
North Korea’s bid could face significant political and diplomatic resistance from within the bloc itself. India, a pivotal BRICS member, maintains strong strategic ties with South Korea and Japan, both of which strongly oppose North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and brinksmanship.
Brazil, another BRICS founding member, has historically adopted a neutral stance but may encounter pressure from its Western allies to oppose North Korea’s inclusion.
Nuclear stumbling block
North Korea’s nuclear program represents a severe diplomatic challenge for BRICS. While Russia and China may exhibit a degree of tolerance toward Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, other BRICS members are likely to resist alignment with a state subjected to intense international scrutiny and punishment.
For decades, North Korea has faced extensive international sanctions imposed primarily by the United Nations, US and European Union in punitive response to its nuclear weapons program. These sanctions have significantly constrained North Korea’s economy, limiting its access to global finance, advanced technologies and trade opportunities.
Pyongyang’s economy is markedly centralized and dependent on a limited array of industries – predominantly the military-industrial complex – while simultaneously grappling with persistent inefficiencies in agriculture and food production. These challenges obstruct North Korea’s capacity to engage substantively in global trade and economic collaboration, with China serving as its principal lifeline.
North Korea’s economy ranks among the most isolated and underdeveloped globally, characterized by limited capacity for international trade and investment. Although China and Russia could potentially assist in integrating North Korea into regional supply chains, such efforts would necessitate substantial structural reforms in Pyongyang – reforms that the North Korean regime has historically resisted.
As such, North Korea’s internal economic imbalances, technological underdevelopment and inadequate infrastructure would present considerable challenges for its effective participation in BRICS’ economic initiatives, potentially generating greater friction than cooperation within the expanding bloc.
In addition to economic and nuclear concerns, North Korea’s human rights record is another contentious issue. The regime’s authoritarian governance, suppression of civil liberties and treatment of its citizens have garnered widespread international condemnation.
BRICS, which already faces Western-led criticism as an authoritarian club championed by autocratic China and Russia, would face heightened scrutiny and risk further compromising its global image by admitting North Korea. Pyongyang’s membership could thus undermine BRICS’s efforts to become a credible alternative to Western-led institutions like the G7.
Few strategic benefits
To be sure, North Korea’s membership in BRICS could yield significant strategic benefits.
For BRICS, the inclusion of North Korea could enhance the bloc’s geopolitical influence in East Asia, enabling a more active involvement in regional security matters. For instance, BRICS could seek to position itself as a mediator on the Korean Peninsula, providing a diplomatic forum distinct from Western-led, US-influenced initiatives.
Although North Korea’s immediate economic contributions to BRICS would be limited, the nation’s untapped natural resources, inexpensive labor and strategic geographic location represent potential opportunities for long-term investment and collaboration.
All in all, North Korea’s prospective membership in BRICS is a mix of risks and opportunities. While accession could afford North Korea economic relief, political legitimacy and a new pathway out of isolation, the nation’s nuclear program, economic underdevelopment and human rights record present considerable obstacles.
For BRICS, North Korea’s admission would pose significant risks to its global reputation and has the potential to incite internal divisions. As a course of action, BRICS should pursue cautious dialogue with North Korea, offering conditional membership that incentivizes economic reforms and a gradual diminishment of its nuclear program.
This balanced approach could enable BRICS to capitalize on North Korea’s geostrategic value while mitigating the risks associated with its controversial policies, positions and leadership.
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat. He received his master’s degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in this article are his own.