The 1975-founded Pacific Forum, a research academy for international legislation in Honolulu, was the first to publish this article. It is republished with authority.
Last year, NATO’s 75th commemoration summit was held in Washington with the heads of state gathering there. While mountain deliverables were repetitive, China had a remarkably key role in summit deliberations.
NATO’s leading priority was the Asian power, who was frequently criticized for its bombastic behavior in the East and South China Seas, its strategic collaboration with Russia, and its repeated criticism of the so-called rules-based international order.
” The People’s Republic of China’s expressed interests and coercive laws continue to challenge our passions, security and beliefs”, NATO stressed in its joint statement.
NATO’s invitation to the Indo-Pacific Four ( IP4 ) grouping of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea for a third consecutive year demonstrated the organization’s intent to increase coordination and collaboration with Asian powers on China.
The connotation was undoubtedly present, even though the administration of the United States and NATO did not specifically refer to the meetings as a counter-China work.
Europe and East Asia — one area?
Researchers and leaders in increasing numbers have made the case that Europe cannot be separated from East Asia, and vice versa. According to logic, a safety issue in the South China Sea may have a negative impact on Europe’s financial health, and a regular conflict in Europe might enable China to use its advantage while the West finds itself distracted.
There is a clear understanding that the two venues are linked, according to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on July 1.
Fumio Kishida, the prime minister of Japan, has been a staunch supporter of the connection concept, arguing that “Ukraine now may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” This is n’t altogether false. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attend to North Korea in June, his second in almost a quarter-century, has security implications for both Europe and East Asia.
In the event that either country experiences an act of aggression, Putin’s and Kim Jong Un’s fresh comprehensive strategic collaboration agreement, which improves diplomatic relations, strengthens trade ties, and offers common assistance, could only add to the Ukrainian and Korean Peninsula’s current security issues.
Russia’s supposed assistance to North Korea in satellite systems and North Korea’s supply of weapons to Russia make up a lose-lose situation for countries like Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Japan, and South Korea.
By combining tools and strengthening conversation on problems of expressed concern, the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia have attempted to mitigate these risks. Cooperation tends to revolve around diplomatic and mini-lateral compositions.
In 2023, the United Kingdom and Japan signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement that establishes rules for the UK government and the Chinese Self-Defense Forces to travel to one another’s nations for joint exercises and coaching. Japan and France are working on a similar contract.
Both as a present of handle for China and as a result of the fact that Europe’s nations have a vested interest in preserving freedom of navigation, Germany and France have deployed their naval and air troops to the Indo-Pacific. Berlin sent its first ship to the South China Sea in almost 20 years in 2023.
The United States, however, is correcting multilateral naval training with Japan and South Korea, and with Japan and the Philippines, to improve connectivity among their individual causes.
NATO has never been far from the discussion. While Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea all have long-standing ties with the intercontinental empire, those were often seen as more metaphorical than substantial. They were undoubtedly created with a particular hostile nation in thinking.
No more. In mountain communications, NATO is then making explicit references to China. The empire stated in its 2019 statement that” China’s growing impact and global policies provide both opportunities and challenges that we need to solve together as an empire.”
The language is noticeably tougher in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, highlighting China’s confrontational rhetoric, “malicious hybrid and cyber operations” and exploitation of economic leverage over smaller states.
In the present, it seems to me that NATO, which was created in the first stages of the Cold War to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union, should be repurposed to combat China or at least play a part in it. James Stavridis, the former Supreme Allied Commander, has even suggested integrating Australia, South Korea, and Japan into the alliance.
Costs and consequences
It is not a sufficient reason to move NATO out of the area because NATO’s rivals and allies are increasingly making common cause with one another. NATO has participated in missions outside the European theater, including leading a bombing campaign in Libya and leading an Afghan army training operation in Iraq.
However, the alliance would experience internal difficulties and additional security issues that NATO and its Asian partners want to address by institutionalizing its relationship with IP4 nations or by transforming it into an Indo-Pacific security guarantor.
First, the divisions at NATO: At the moment, there is no consensus on expanding NATO’s scope to include Asia, especially with the explicit goal of containing China. There are a variety of reasons why NATO members avoid it.
The opposition of French President Emmanuel Macron is motivated by concerns that integrating Asian security issues into NATO’s official duties would undermine the alliance’s long-standing commitment to deterrence in Europe.
Even though it may seem implausible, France, especially under Macron, does n’t want to burn bridges with China or take any steps to increase the possibility of a direct military conflict with China. Macron vetoed the opening of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo last year because of these concerns.
For Germany, the issue has less to do with promoting Indo-Pacific security per se and more about preserving Berlin’s €250 billion ($ 274 billion ) trade relationship with China, Germany’s largest trading partner for the last eight years.
Any attempt to break up the alliance will likely be blocked by Budapest out of self-interest because Hungary is strengthening its ties with China.
Second, it’s unclear whether NATO members have the hard power, platforms, and capability to significantly increase deterrence in Asia outside of the United States and perhaps the United Kingdom. The defense sector of Europe is underdeveloped, with the majority of production going to a continent-wide land war that wo n’t end in the near future.
France has obligations in the Pacific, but its overseas territories are thousands of miles from the First Island Chain, making them unsuitable for use in a crisis of war.
Given Berlin’s three consecutive decades of defense cuts, the most notable offerings that Germany could make are the sporadic freedom-of-navigation exercises in the region’s key choke points.
Third, China, Russia and North Korea wo n’t sit by passively in the event of a more Asia-focused NATO. To maintain a favorable balance of power in the area, all three are likely to respond.
China has long expressed concern that NATO’s urging will support US dominance in East Asia, strategically hem China, and undermine what Chinese leaders believe is the PRC’s legitimate place in international politics. In this scenario, China might want to activate its” no limits” partnership with Russia to make it a critical counterweight.
Joint Russian-China military exercises would grow and be more frequent, and any attempt to sever a gap between the two would be lost. China might even reconsider its current opposition to a formal trilateral alliance with Russia and North Korea if only to show that their actions have consequences.
None of this would be welcomed by Southeast Asian countries, which have repeatedly warned of the dangers of the region’s further militarization.
Conclusion
The United States, Canada, and other European allies should maintain the North Atlantic military force in the North Atlantic region of responsibility rather than placing Asia on the NATO agenda.
Without extra-territorial alliances that are heavily dependent on US military power, the top US, Canadian, and European priorities in Asia are maintaining an adequate balance of power with China and preventing a war that would result in significant casualties and trillions of dollars in lost global revenue.
The United States and European countries should leverage bilateral relationships with various East Asian nations like Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia, who are all modernizing their own militaries to defend their prerogatives against a militarily superior China, in order to accomplish this with the least risk.
A foreign military bloc is not necessary to explain why maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia is desirable.
Daniel R. DePetris , ( dan. [email protected] )  , is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, DC.