China has just unveiled its People’s Liberation Army-Information Support Force ( PLA-ISF), a rebranding of its previous PLA-Strategic Support Force ( PLA-SSF ) to reflect new responsibilities and capabilities and guide the military ’s technology-driven integrated combat concept, Chinese state media reports said.
In contrast to standard Army service such as the Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, the PLA’s proper arms, such as the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force and Joint Logistics Support, rely on more specific areas important to present war.
PLA-SSF, founded in 2015, was immediately tasked with developing and implementing most of the PLA’s space-based features and counter-space activities. Stressing the PLA-ISF’s broader duties, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized that the renamed PLA-ISF may be important in advancing the PLA’s development and success in modern war.
Additionally, Xi added that the PLA-ISF would become integrated into the PLA’s joint operations structure, have distinctive Chinese characteristics, and help to speed up the creation of integrated combat capabilities more efficiently.
China’s PLA-SSF may have changed its name to the PLA-ISF in response to its evolving operating strategy and corporate direction.
The PLA-SSF was established to centralize the PLA’s information support units in December 2022, according to the South China Morning Post (SCMP ). Each Army service tree had its own data help units prior to the creation of the PLA-SSF, which could have hindered more than helped operations.
As part of the 2015 reforms establishing the PLA-SSF, China ’s Central Military Commission ( CMC) took over the roles of the PLA general staff and general political departments while those departments ’ responsibilities for cyberwarfare, space, electronic warfare and psychological operations were transferred to the PLA-SSF.
The SCMP report mentions that before the PLA-SSF’s rebranding into the PLA-ISF, it had two principal departments – the Space Systems Department, which runs intelligence and communication satellites, and the Network Systems Department, which is tasked with cyber operations, electronic warfare and signals intelligence ( SIGINT ).
The renamed PLA-ISF may indicate a shift in Chinese strategic thinking, moving from “winning informationized wars” to “intelligentized warfare,” which in turn implies a larger scope for the PLA-SSF, which calls for a name change to reflect expanded obligations and capabilities.
The use of information systems in all military operations is outlined in China’s 2015 Defense Strategy, which provides the foundation for “winning informationized war.”
It states that “preparations for military struggle ” ( PMS ) are done in the context of winning “informationized local wars, ” stressing that information is not only necessary but will also play a significant role in winning upcoming conflicts.
Building on the premise of China ’s 2015 Military Strategy, the 2019 China ’s National Defense in the New Era white paper notes that technologies such as AI, quantum information, big data, cloud computing and the Internet of Things ( IoT ) mark an evolution from “informationized ” to “intelligentized ” warfare.
In a War on the Rocks post from April 2022, Koichiro Takagi mentions that the primary goal of China’s “intelligentized battle” strategy is to use AI to veto the wishes of senior government officials, military leaders, and citizens.
According to Takagi, China sees using AI for military purposes in a new way, bringing up the issue of “intelligence dominance, ” underscoring this in the context of intelligent warfare.
Maasaki Yatsuzuka identifies the principles that may have led to the marketing of the PLA-SSF into the PLA-ISF from both political and military perspectives in a January 2022 content in the Security and Strategy book.
From a social aspect, Yatsuzuka notes that the Xi management ’s implementation of intelligentized war signifies a move toward a unified decision-making process in the Army.
This process, he says, aims to uphold the Communist Party of China ’s ( CPC ) control over the PLA and secure its alignment with the party ’s goals and ideology.
He also mentions how integrating military reforms with wider-ranging party policies, like the Military-Civil Fusion (MCF ) strategy, emphasizes the need for centralized control.
Further, Yatsuzuka asserts that as warfare becomes more technologically advanced and specialized, the PLA’s emphasis on political education and control through political commissars is becoming increasingly important.
From a military standpoint, Yatsuzuka says that to move toward intelligentized warfare, the PLA must establish integrated information systems to effectively manage the diverse aspects of modern warfare, including land, air, sea, space, cyber, cognitive and electromagnetic domains.
He makes the point that making the most of AI and real-time data processing is essential for upcoming operations because it necessitates a robust data flow and analysis framework across various platforms and military units.
To enable a united and adaptable response led by centralized military leadership, Yoshizuka emphasizes the value of a consolidated strategic directive that incorporates inputs from various military and civilian sources.
The need to combine emerging technologies and capabilities with a multi-domain operational concept may also be reflected in China’s new name, PLA-SSF.
Asia Times published an article about China’s Multi-Domain Precision Warfare ( MDPW) concept in October 2023 that uses advances in AI and big data to identify shortcomings in US operational systems and launch precision strikes. It also tests and improves AI-driven capacities to align with China ’s military doctrine.
A combination of human and machine command and control systems is expected to be part of China’s intelligent warfare strategy. The focus will be on extending warfare to areas where humans are unable to operate, such as the cognitive domain, because humans will have a limited amount of control over autonomous weapons.
A technology-driven strategy to improve military interoperability and AI integration with allies and partners may make China’s Combined Joint All-Domain Command ( CJADC2 ) system more effective.
In reality, MDPW may attempt to dismantle and destroy CJADC2’s kill chain by physically attacking information nodes like those on aircraft and satellites, jamming information networks, using electronic warfare, and cyberattacks. Additionally, it may attempt to obstruct decision-making between the US and its allies.
MDPW may profit from the US kill chains ‘ fixed and centralized approach, which lack diversity in how information is shared among various components, making them vulnerable and arguably unsuitable for an extensive conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.