As the high-stakes activity of punishment and supremacy enters a risky New Cold War phase, the world’s nuclear giant are testing new long-range missiles with their muscles.  ,
In recent international intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) launches and strategic exercises, the US, Russia, and China showcased their nuclear capabilities, which show how each country is working to modernize and strengthen its capabilities in the face of rising international tensions.
On November 5, the US Air Force launched a Minuteman III ICBM from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, to examine multi-warhead features and nuclear deterrent stability. The weapon travelled 6,700 kilometers to the Reagan Test Site, and it is anticipated that the LGM-35A Sentinel will be able to move from here.
The US check follows Russia’s large-scale nuclear drilling on October 29, overseen by President Vladimir Putin, who framed the exercise—featuring Yars ICBMs, radioactive boats and Tu-95 bombers—as a model of retaliatory attacks in response to American engagement in Ukraine. Putin stressed maintaining a available, present nuclear power.
Russia’s ICBM test was preceded by China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) Rocket Force test on September 25, which launched an ICBM into the Pacific in a rare public demonstration. China’s exam was seen as a concept amid US missile defence improvements, showcasing China’s growing nuclear arsenal.
A fresh arms race is emerging as radioactive nations demonstrate their military prowess and revise their strategic opportunities. In a rapidly altering worldwide security landscape, they compete to exhibit their strength and hinder potential risks.
In response to China’s rapid nuclear proliferation, according to Asia Times ‘ article from March 2024, the US might consider replacing its missiles with several independently targetable reentry vehicles ( MIRVs ) in order to potentially violate the New START arms control agreement with Russia.
US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has highlighted the need to examine MIRV implementation to counter China’s expanding atomic army, which is projected to reach 1, 000 warheads by 2030.
The LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBMs, already equipped with a second bomb, have the capability for MIRV implementation. Potential LGM-35A Sentinel ICBMs may be configured also.
In a March 2024 content for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and various authors mention that Russia is about to complete a decades-long effort to replace its Soviet-era atomic systems with current ones.
This effort is motivated by a desire to keep US membership level, make up for weaker regular forces, and fend off rumors of US missile defense threats.
According to Kristensen and others, Russia’s development includes the implementation of advanced ICBMs like the RS-28 Sarmat, which has a wider range and greater load capacity.
They claim that Russian authorities assert that these new systems improve national security and deterrence abilities despite losses, including stalled testing and difficulties.
They point out that Russia’s decision to withdraw from the New START accordya has made it harder to confirm its nuclear arsenal’s precise position.
Russia’s nuclear arsenal development, coupled with explicit nuclear risks amid the Ukraine conflict, has heightened international concerns about Russia’s long-term corporate objectives and the potential for an arms race.
In an article for the Bulletin of Atomic Experts in October 2024, Hui Zhang points out that China’s September ICBM check demonstrates its corporate motivations to improve its nuclear deterrent capabilities.
Zhang says that the check, involving a DF-31AG missile launched from Hainan Island, marks China’s second full-trajectory ICBM check into foreign waterways since 1980.
He mentions that this action, which is being promoted as part of regular monthly training, aims to demonstrate China’s administrative and credible nuclear force in the face of recent internal struggles and rumors from outside.
In terms of capacity, he says the DF-31AG, a road-mobile weapon with a range of up to 12, 000 meters, enhances China’s ability to reach target in the western US, reinforcing its punishment tone.
He points out that China’s military capabilities are now more transparent and confident in the public launch of launch pictures.
Zhang says the test sends a clear message to the US, highlighting China’s readiness to combat any radioactive threats, particularly in the wake of possible conflicts in Taiwan.
He points out that President Xi Jinping’s evolving nuclear strategy, which emphasizes maintaining a strong second-strike capability and deterring US atomic use, highlights China’s evolving atomic strategy.
A new age of multi-front nuclear deterrent is redefining world power relationships as nuclear arsenals are expanding and relationships are tightening.
In a June 2021 content, Xi Luo examines the US, Russia, and China’s growing nuclear relationships, which points to a transition from a depressive to a triadic nuclear power system.
Luo claims that China has emerged as a major nuclear person despite having a much smaller army as the US and Russia promote nuclear modernization and strengthen their armaments with superior weapons like low-yield weapons and hypersonic missiles.
He points out these advancements coincide with the abandonment of several arms control treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty, which previously helped curb missile proliferation.
Luo mentions China’s rise challenges the US-Russia nuclear balance, making for a complex trilateral relationship. China has declined to participate in arms control negotiations despite the US’s pressure to do so because of its relatively small nuclear stockpile and preference for multilateral disarmament talks with the five permanent UN Security Council members.
In a February 2024 article for Joint Force Quarterly, Kaye Jansen points out that the US needs to modernize its strategic deterrence frameworks in response to the nuclear threat posed by China, Russia, and other potential nuclear-armed adversaries, underscoring the necessity of moving away from earlier Cold War-era nuclear deterrence frameworks.
According to Jansen, the US is facing unprecedented difficulties in maintaining effective deterrence as these quasi-peer adversaries and their partners develop their nuclear weapons and intensify cooperation.
She claims that the US nuclear arsenal and command infrastructure are being completely overhauled by the US Departments of Defense ( DOD ) and Energy ( DOE).
She points out, however, that intellectual revitalization is equally important because decades of focusing on militarily inferior adversaries have undermined the strategic thinking required to effectively deter today’s nuclear-armed rivals.
Jansen points out that the interconnected and multifaceted nature of potential conflicts requires new deterrence strategies because of the complexity of contemporary threats.
She advocates a comprehensive strategy that incorporates all major powers, stressing the importance of understanding adversaries ‘ strategic cultures to manage escalation and keep credible deterrence in the midst of fierce power competition.