North Korea is developing weapon defenses to attack the US island, which could sabotage US forces and raise concerns about a potential strategic shift in the Asian Peninsula’s power balance.
In a statement this month before the US Senate Armed Forces Committee, General Gregory Guillot, head of US Northern Command ( USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command ( NORAD), said that North Korea’s growing intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) capabilities pose a direct threat to the US mainland, with its latest solid-propellant Hwasong-19 missile likely capable of delivering a nuclear payload to targets across North America.
The new aircraft’s solid-fuel design drastically reduces release preparation time, complicating proactive recognition and interception efforts.
Guillot warned that if North Korea’s arsenal exceeds present estimates, its rapid change from missile development to sequential production was soon outweigh US ballistic missile defenses.
He even made a point about the potential for modern exchanges between North Korea and Russia, as well as potential quid-for-quo agreements that would support the latter’s highly developed strategic weapons program.
The likelihood of continuous multi-domain threats to the US land is increased by these innovations and wider strategic cooperation between US adversaries, adding even more pressure on already-existing missile security systems.
In reply, Guillot emphasized the immediate need for developing next-generation missile defenses, including the development of NGI-based domain awareness technologies and the prompt deployment of NGI-based NGIs, to combat the threat of more complex adversary missiles.
In a November 2024 article for 38 North, Vann Van Diepen says North Korea’s Hwasong-19 ICBM represents a significant advance in the country’s strategic missile capabilities, likely incorporating a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle ( MIRV ) system.
Van Diepen states that the larger solid-fuel Hwasong-19, compared to the Hwasong-18, has improved increase capability that increases payload capacity without extending range, as the earlier ICBM can now accomplish the US mainland. He notes that the Hwasong-19’s launch footage shows a probable post-boost vehicle ( PBV), essential for MIRV deployment.
He points out that a successful MIRV-equipped Hwasong-19 may increase the number of missiles per weapon, increase second-strike endurance, and put US missile security at risk. However, additional testing is required to ensure the MIRVs survive atmospheric rehabilitation.
But, Thomas Newdick argues in a The War Zone article from June 2024 that while it may be technically possible for North Korea to place several warheads on a weapon, it is more complicated to put them on many targets.
According to Newdick, it’s unclear whether North Korea has the skill to accurately place a bomb on a goal after it has been detonated from a nuclear weapon.
North Korea might have benefited greatly from the continuing conflict in Ukraine. According to Newsweek’s report from this month, North Korean nuclear missiles launched against Ukraine have increased in correctness since last year, hitting targets 50 to 100 feet away from them, up from their earlier range of 1 to 3 meters.
As North Korea transitions to published ICBM generation, it raises the possibility of overextending the US’s missile threats. After displaying 10-12 Hwasong-17 Squadrons during a nighttime rally in Pyongyang, Polititico reported in February 2023 that North Korea might have more than the US has ships.
Politico notes that if North Korea could meet four weapons on each weapon, those weapons could potentially destroy the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense ( GMD) system, which has only 44 ships. The GMD has only demonstrated 55 % success in very scripted testing and frequently required three ships to intercept a single weapon, adding to the problem of limited ships.
Cognizant of US missile defense limitations, in January 2025, US President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order to build a US” Iron Dome”, a next-generation missile defense system incorporating space-based interceptors ( SBI ) to defeat hypersonic weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks.
However, experts have disagreements regarding the US Iron Dome project’s viability and potential impact on instability or deterrence.
Ankit Panda claims in a Breaking Defense article this month that the US Iron Dome does not address the vulnerability issue and merely encourages US adversaries to develop new nuclear weapon delivery techniques, such as fractional orbital bombardment ( FOB ) systems.
In accordance with that, North Korea has developed the” Haeil” nuclear-armed underwater drone that is intended to enter enemy waters and detonate to produce a radioactive tsunami to obliterate enemy ships and ports. However, it is not clear whether North Korea’s Haeil is a real weapon or a propaganda ploy.
Additionally, Jessica West and Victoria Samson make mention for Breaking Defense in which they claim that space-based interceptors could fuel international agreements against the militarization of space.
Todd Harrison claims in a January 2025 American Enterprise Institute ( AEI ) article that while the cost of building a system of 1, 900 SBIs could reach US$ 11-27 billion, such a constellation could only intercept two incoming missiles while all other interceptors would remain out of range.
Harrison cites the absence issue where low-Earth orbit ( LEO ) satellites spend most of their time above the wrong region of the planet. Given the conflict between North Korean nuclear capabilities and US missile defenses, there are also divergent opinions on the latter’s position regarding its nuclear arsenal.
In a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Defense &, Security Analysis journal, Hwee-rhak Park and Wooyun Jo mention that North Korea has two objectives when developing its nuclear arsenal: first, to break US nuclear extended deterrence ( NED ) in the Korean Peninsula, and second, to reunify the Korean Peninsula under its regime.
Park and Jo mention that North Korea is concerned about its nuclear retaliation against the US mainland and that the US may reverse its NED position on the Korean Peninsula. They assert that the US may use tactical nuclear weapons only as long as North Korea forbids the use of nuclear weapons against South Korean military installations.
In the worst case, Park and Jo claim that North Korea might launch a number of nuclear weapons at South Korean cities to demoralize or cripple those forces before moving ground forces into the latter’s territory to compel their surrender.
They claim that North Korea can attempt to avoid US forces in South Korea while threatening a nuclear attack on them if they launch an offensive and compel the US to leave the Korean Peninsula. They point out, however, that the North Korean government would make the decision to use nuclear weapons against the US or South Korea.
Given those options, Park and Jo advise that the US and South Korea implement stronger nuclear deterrence measures, such as the permanent deployment of US nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN ) close to the Korean Peninsula, the deployment of nuclear gravity bombs and missiles in Guam, and sign a nuclear-sharing agreement to prepare US and South Korean forces for a nuclear war.