Myanmar’s army has finally returned to action after six fatal months of repeatedly losing ground with a risky high-stakes campaign that is already teetering between success and more failure.  ,  ,
In the army’s largest military operation in decades, which aims to resuscitate insurgents affiliated with the Karen National Union (KNU) and its People Defense Force ( PDF) allies, and to regain full control of Myawaddy, a highly important border trade hub in Thailand, troops have been locked for three weeks.
The military’s riches are probably at their lowest point since 1948 when the organization was named Operation Aung Zeya in honor of Alaunghpaya, the founder of Burma’s Konbaung dynasty in the 18th century.
The bid to restore the military’s State Administration Council ( SAC ) regime’s revenue and reputation will have immediate repercussions in Karen state, situated in the country’s eastern region bordering Thailand.
That includes the military’s conflicted relations with its former Border Guard Force ( BGF ) affiliates, who are now renamed the Karen National Army (KNA ) in “neutral” ethnic colors. The force has focused mostly on profiting from Saw Chit Thu’s protection of a number of casinos and professional connivance centers run by Foreign mafia groups along the Moei River border.
Beyond Karen state’s damaged politics, however, the upshot of the latest campaign will provide an essential bellwether of the SAC’s broader defense capabilities following its loss of large tracts of national borderlands and whether its survival should presently best be measured in months or maybe also years.  ,
The big push’s initial goals were to retake the western towns of Kawkareik on the Asian Highway ( AH1 ) and Kawbein on the Gyaing River, which had fallen to ethnic Mon resistance fighters in late March. Kawbein’s get dangerously exposed the Mon state capital and port town of Mawlamyine only 30 meters away.
By April 25 when junta forces advanced by area and river, Kawbein was recaptured, those objectives had been accomplished. Operation Aung Zeya now concentrates more solely on bringing troops across the Dawna range, which divides the generally destroyed Kawkareik between the Moei River valley and the Thai frontier at Myawaddy, with Kawkareik even secured.
Following backwards- and- back clashes in April and an unscrupulous reframing of “neutrality” by Chit Thu, Myawaddy is officially controlled by the warlord- for- hire’s KNA and a little Myanmar defense army garrison enjoying his protection.
All arms on board
There is a lot of uncertainty about the reputation of the warfare because neither the KNU nor Naypyidaw have made official announcements from the front lines and there are no scheinbar separate writers on the ground. But there are still important points to be made about the battle.
Second, with operational control in the hands of army commander and SAC Not 2 Vice Senior General Soe Win, it is completely clear the defense understands how many hinges on the success of a campaign to which it has committed a considerable proportion of its already overstretched resources from both the Mawlamyine- based Southeastern Regional Military Command ( RMC) area and well beyond.
The 55th redeployed from its base in southern Shan State, the 22nd based in the Karen state capital of Hpa-an and thus engaged in home-based combat, and the 44th based in Thaton in neighboring Mon state, according to reports from the ten Light Infantry Divisions ( LIDs ) that make up the army’s mobile assault force.
Up to nine battalions ( Myanmar Army-size ) battalions, or between 1, 000 and 1, 300 troops, are likely to be involved, including members of the severely underdeveloped Military Operations Command No 12, based on Kawkareik itself.
Armor from Mawlamyine has consisted of around 20 Ukrainian- built BTR- 3U armored personnel carriers ( APCs ) and some smaller Russian BRDM scout cars. The trucks-mounted multiple launch rocket systems ( MLRS ), which are North Korean, have a range of up to 40 kilometers, respectively, which provide artillery support.  ,
The Myanmar Air Force ( MAF ), meanwhile, has committed a predictably wide range of aircraft. Russian-built Yak-130 light attack jets and Mi-35 Hind gunships, the heart of its close air support ( CAS ) operations, have been upgraded by older Russian Mig-29 interceptors, and – unusually – by Sino-Pakistani built multi-purpose JF- 17 jets, which have been grounded due to technical issues since their acquisition before the 2021 coup but are now being thrown into the fight.  ,
In an additional reflection of an increasingly desperate struggle first seen in Shan state last November, the MAF has also deployed Chinese twin- engine turbo- prop Harbin Y- 12 light transports as “bombers” with aircrew apparently dropping 82mm or 120mm mortar rounds out of the aircraft’s side door by hand.
advancing slowly and slowly
Speed, or lack thereof, is the second aspect of the campaign that needs to be emphasized. Having begun with operations to secure an operational launch pad around Kawkareik town, Operation Aung Zeya has involved an advance into the Dawna Range hills along two main axes, the relatively new AH1 highway completed in 2015 and an older much rougher road that crosses the mountains to the north. It’s still unclear how far the military has traveled using a jungle track only for northern infantry.  ,
On both main road axes, the advance appears to have been grindingly slow with some reports suggesting that after two weeks of clashes, troops on the southern AH1 may only just have reached a halfway mark near the Taw Naw waterfalls.
In a situation where an offensive against guerrilla forces should be based on a decisive use of mass and speed, especially on narrow advance lines through terrain that encourages enemy harassment, it appears that several things are conspiring against the army.
One is the ongoing moral issue, which has suffered significant losses in the Shan, Rakhine, and Kachin states between late October and March. Losses suffered to date in the current operation will not have improved the situation.
It would surprise if the army had not lost at least 300 men and wounded over the course of three weeks, given the volume of forces and firepower involved. Karen and PDF casualties are hardly unavoidable but unlikely.
Beyond brittle morale, however, an almost certainly more important factor turns on the army’s yawning inexperience in conducting combined- arms warfare that requires the integration of infantry, armor, artillery and air power to achieve effective fire and movement.
Even the most technologically advanced armed forces must contend with this integration in fluid combat situations. However, as shown by commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s numerous public statements prior to the coup, Myanmar’s armed forces, or Tatmadaw, do not quite qualify as a modern war-fighting force.
For most of its history, the army has campaigned as a light infantry force conducting” clearance operations” against ethnic guerrillas and their civilian supporters. Initially relying on porters or mules to transport mortars, field artillery was occasionally used to support those operations before becoming increasingly frequent with relatively small airpower infusions starting in 2012.
Large-scale live-fire exercises conducted by the army’s training facilities outside the garrison city of Meiktila frequently involved a full complement of mechanized infantry supported by recently acquired armor, artillery, low-flying jets, and gunships, and were intended to practice contemporary joint warfare.
However, impressively choreographed drills conducted over flat terrain and without any opposition did little to highlight the state-run TV series Tatmadaw, making their use as a preparation for real-world combat in the Karen hills.
Perhaps most notable in Operation Aung Zeya’s context has been a striking and curious absence of main battle tanks ( MBTs ). Tanks can firepower and speed to spearhead a quick advance, followed by infantry in armored personnel carriers and on foot, if deployed in large numbers and in coordination with artillery and air strikes. There are no substitutes for much better-protected tanks, but the Ukrainian armored personnel carriers, which appear to be committed to leading the advance, are no substitutes for them.  ,
A third issue that army commanders must deal with is closely related to the issue of speed: the monsoon rain and low clouds’ expected arrival later this month will quickly make logistics, air support, and off-road maneuvering of combat vehicles difficult. The Dawna Range’s eastern side may not be fully accessible in the upcoming weeks, which could stall the campaign.
Offensive scenarios
By the end of May, Operation Aung Zeya will almost certainly have ended in one of three ways, each with very different implications for the future, according to experts who can predict.
The army’s first achievement is that thanks to firepower, numbers, and perseverance, it is able to storm the Dawna range and retake its former bases in Thin Gan Nyi Naung, which were taken over by the KNU and the PDFs in March, before moving on to Myawaddy, which is located ten kilometers away.  ,
The army’s advance is halted by the losses in the mountains, which also makes it fall for the rainy season to regroup around Kawkareik.
Thirdly, the KNLA and its PDF allies are successful in halting the army’s advance and preventing a retreat that causes the military to head westward in the Karen state capital of Hpa’an, 88 kilometers to the west, either in a chaotic rout or more slowly over the monsoon months.
The first scenario would imply a hugely needed morale boost and breathing space for a regime that is far from reconciled to the purported inevitability of its defeat. It would also strengthen its standing with India, China, and Thailand, which have recently experienced growing skepticism about the SAC’s staying power and have recently lost support for their diplomatic and material support.
Locally, however, a victorious advance to Myawaddy would confront the SAC with a precarious balancing act required to re- establish a sustainable modus vivendi with Karen warlord Chit Thu.
On the one hand, the army’s 5,000-strong KNA’s supportive “neutrality” will be crucial to its efforts to reestablish itself on the border and repel the KNU. On the other hand, China’s continued pressure on the SAC to shut down the criminal scam locations that have become Chit Thu’s main source of income is pressing. China’s support is still essential to its survival.
Two factors might serve to mitigate or altogether obviate this dilemma. One possibility is that the Thai government’s policy will change to rein in its own border authorities and telecom companies, which continue to be actively involved in facilitating the supply of construction materials, electricity, internet access, and prison labor to the criminal organizations that are located close to Myanmar’s border crossing the kingdom. Effectively, a Thai crackdown would help Naypyidaw avoid provoking Chit Thu itself.
The other would be the assassination of Chit Thu, an entirely plausible, even likely end for a warlord- cum- mafia boss ruling a criminal enclave whose capacity for serial betrayal has created numerous powerful enemies on virtually all sides of a complex and murky struggle.
In contrast, a retreat to Kawkareik would sever the army’s credibility, and it would mean the town and its road network would need to be protected from ongoing guerrilla harassment, putting a stop to any hope of restoring trade to and from the Thai border.
A military disaster with potentially disastrous consequences would result from the army being evicted from Kawkareik and the loss of many of the forces committed to date.
It would most immediately threaten a series of regime-held towns further west, including the towns of Hpa, Hpa, and Kawbein, which were once overrun by resistance forces, and Hlaingbwe, which were both previously under threat.
Losses on this scale are not yet inevitable but the proximity of these centers to road and rail links between Mawlamyine and Yangon certainly reflects the strategically precarious situation the SAC now confronts.
It’s impossible to predict whether the regime will eventually fall apart in the midst of mounting carnage, collapse in its core, or battle its way to 2025. However, those likely endpoints will be greatly affected by Operation Aung Zeya’s fate in the upcoming weeks.