When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his initial state visit to Mauritius in March 2015, he introduced the Nagar, or Security and Development for All in the Region, theory.
A century later, in a second visit to Mauritius, Modi made the announcement to introduce the policy known as MAHASAGAR, an improved and more detailed version of SAGAR.
MAHASAGAR demonstrates a multifaceted, complete, long-term, and more optimistic American vision for the Indo-Pacific, one that goes beyond safety concerns to include development, sharing of technology, and economic cooperation.
India strengthened its diplomatic partnership with Mauritius during Modi’s attend to the country to become an Enhanced Strategic Partnership.  ,
In order to maintain a stable future, Modi’s new perception of MAHASAGAR, which means” water” in Hindi, aims to incorporate trade-driven growth, capacity-building for sustainable growth, and a common security framework.
Key components of this initiative are anticipated to be administrative support, concessional financing, and modern assistance. However, how the MAHASAGAR coverage may be put into effect, as with SAGAR 2.0, is still up for debate.  ,
In the growing Indo-Pacific dynamics, SAGAR has been India’s strategic platform for coastal engagement over the past ten years, highlighting India’s contribution to ensuring a secure, safe, and steady regional order.
Modi’s remarks at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, including his presentation speech, more heightened India’s Indo-Pacific perspective, placing it in a broader political context. Vikram Misri, then India’s Deputy National Security Advisor ( now Foreign Secretary ), laid out five fundamental pillars of SAGAR at the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue, namely:
- Security teamwork,  
- Capacity-building;
- collaborative activity
- Green creation and,
- connection on the water
India’s relationship with local partners has been guided by these principles. As a complement to SAGAR, India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative ( IPOI ) was developed to provide a collaborative platform that is open and non-treaty-based. The IPOI encourages assistance in areas of sea ecosystem, reference management, disaster reaction, and security coordination.
Important US, Japanese, Australian, ASEAN, France, and New Zealand all have agreements with India regarding the IPOI, underscoring its equitable and joint approach to management in the Indo-Pacific.
India has effectively integrated itself into local security and economic frameworks in order to run SAGAR. Initiatives like the BIMSTEC, Colombo Security Conclave (established in 2020 with Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives ), and India’s observer status in the Indian Ocean Commission ( composed of Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mayotte, and Réunion ) underline its commitment to institutionalized maritime cooperation.
India has taken major capacity-building initiatives to improve local stability and maritime security beyond international engagements. These include improving maritime domain awareness, improving white shipping information, and promoting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief ( HADR) frameworks.  ,
Mauritius exemplifies India’s strategic role in building capacity, benefiting from significant American support in the country’s Coast Guard modernization, institutional development, and financial partnerships. India has engaged in a number of development projects in Mauritius, including the metro job, the fresh Supreme Court building, the 956 housing job, a new Medical clinic, and others.
China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region ( IOR ) necessitates a rebalanced strategy despite India’s efforts. The political conflict between India and China, which was made worse by the 2020 Galwan border conflict, has heightened strategic competition, mainly in the IOR.
India’s traditional local part has been challenged by China’s systematic expansion of its economic and military control in the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.
India’s concern about China’s economic leverage is high because its bilateral trade with China ( US$ 1.1 billion ) is nearly twice as high as India’s ($ 554 million ), which shows how strong Beijing’s economic influence is. This financial space must be bridged while maintaining India’s strategic partnerships.
The transition from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR appears to be an attempt to address this issue by intensifying participation in the Indian Ocean Region’s coastal states for development and security.
The move from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR is necessary in light of the return of a transactional US foreign policy under the Trump administration, the fast-evolving US-China conflict, and the rapidly expanding US-China Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) footprint in the IOR and the Pacific Island Region.
India is a trustworthy and trustworthy online security provider to the IOR and the wider Indo-Pacific region because of the gaps between consistent non-traditional security threats and the readiness of coastal states.
Nevertheless, India faces significant economic challenges in order to expand its interests. A review of the Ministry of External Affairs ( MEA ) annual report revealed a decline in the ministry’s budget, which undermines India’s ability to provide aid and sustain substantial support for the MEA’s Technical and Economic Cooperation ( TEC ) programs.
The Committee on External Affairs ‘ Fourth Report ( 2024-25 ) of the 18th Lok Sabha of the 18th Lok Sabha of recommends” a gradual increase of at least 20 % annually in the MEA budget over the next five years to address resource deficits and alignment with long-term goals.”
Without adequate funding, MAHASAGAR runs the risk of becoming a lofty political word without the resources to support its transformational goals. India’s decision to switch from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR reflects its reputation of the need for a more expansive, active Indo-Pacific wedding strategy.
India may address a number of pressing issues in order for this vision to come into reality, including but not limited to increasing financial commitments and strengthening partnerships with ASEAN, the US, Japan, Australia, and essential IOR countries.
To strengthen economic proposal, the policy must diversify trade and investment partnerships to counter China’s economic dominance in the area. India may be institutionalized more to maintain long-term balance by playing a strategic role in local groups like the IPOI and the Colombo Security Conclave.
In the end, how well-equipped will India be to achieve the objectives of the MAHASAGAR depend on its ability to balance monetary and political goals. In a world where the political landscape is rapidly changing, MAHASAGAR’s effective implementation could strengthen India’s position as a leading power and provider of net security in the Indo-Pacific by balancing local security, financial growth, and strategic influence.
Rahul Mishra is a senior research fellow at the Thammasat University, Thailand’s Center for Excellence in Public Policy and Good Governance, and an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He can be reached at raj, and rnbsp. followed on X at @rahulmishr_ and sent via [email protected] .
Harshit Prajapati is a graduate candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University, India’s School of International Studies ‘ Center for Indo-Pacific Studies. He can be reached at jnu.ac. harshi55_is [email protected]. followed on X at @harshitp_47 and followed in.