The Philippines has seen its fair share of dynastic rivalries.
But the deepening conflict between President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and former President Rodrigo Duterte, recently escalated by the latter’s arrest and transfer to the Netherlands for trial, is more than just a political battle—it is a blood feud with dangerous consequences for governance, security and the wider region.
Unlike mere political rivalries, blood feuds in the Philippine context involve personal vengeance, loyalty betrayals and the mobilization of private armies, political clans and illicit financial networks.
In Tagalog, dugo’t-higantihan (blood feud) refers to long-standing enmities that go beyond political differences; they are generational struggles driven by perceived betrayals, dishonor and thirst for revenge.
Filipino scholars such as Jose Abueva and Alfred McCoy have documented how such feuds, often rooted in local padrino (patron-client) systems, can destabilize entire provinces and, at times, the national government itself. McCoy famously referred to the country as an “anarchy of families.”
The Marcos-Duterte feud is no exception—it is fueled by Duterte’s view that Marcos Jr is an ungrateful leader who benefited from his support, only to discard him and his allies once in power.
But this is not just about personal grievances. The battle for supremacy between these two political titans is believed to be fragmenting power centers across the country, proliferating violence through the spread of small arms and illicit funds from POGOs (Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators) and the drug trade.
Worse, this instability is spilling over into ASEAN, posing a direct risk to Malaysia, Indonesia and the broader regional security framework.
State in jeopardy
Duterte’s political machine—rooted in Davao, Mindanao, and the powerful political clans of the south—has been actively undermining Marcos Jr’s authority. With Congress divided and local warlords sensing opportunity in the new headline-grabbing crisis, the political landscape is tilting toward uncertainty.
The Philippine military, which has historically played kingmaker during leadership crises, is also showing certain signs of division.
Duterte loyalists remain embedded in the ranks, and if the political crisis escalates, which seems likely after Duterte’s arrest and handover to the International Criminal Court, factions within the armed forces could move to protect their interests—whether through internal coups, selective defiance of orders or outright intervention in governance.
At the same time, the alliance structure in the country is breaking down. The once-formidable coalition between northern Luzon (Marcos’ stronghold) and Mindanao (Duterte’s base) is collapsing, pushing the country into deeper instability.
The Philippine National Police (PNP), notorious for its role in Duterte’s drug war, for which the former leader is awaiting trial on crimes against humanity charges in the Netherlands, remains a wildcard. If Duterte’s allies in the security forces begin operating independently, extrajudicial violence could return, fueling further unrest.
Brewing internal war
The most dangerous aspect of this political feud is the increasing circulation of small arms and illicit funds across the country.
The Philippines has long suffered from a porous black market for weapons, with firearms flowing from Mindanao’s conflict zones, private armies of political clans and corrupt military stockpiles.
As political factions begin arming themselves, the risk of localized violence—whether in Mindanao, Cebu or even Metro Manila—grows significantly.
In parallel, the rise of POGOs and laundering of drug money has created a financial underworld where illicit funds fuel political rivalries. Under Duterte, POGOs with ties to various triads flourished, spurring corruption, money laundering and organized crime. Although POGOs are now officially banned, they have been driven underground, making them even more dangerous.
Despite Marcos Jr’s recent crackdown, the industry remains deeply entrenched, with estimated billions of dollars in untraceable cash still circulating in the economy.
This dirty money is known to fund private militias, political bribes and even assassination plots, creating a combustible environment that could easily tilt toward a full-blown internal crisis.
Drugs, meanwhile, remain a major destabilizer. Duterte’s war on drugs targeted low-level dealers but failed to dismantle the high-level cartels that continue to operate largely unmolested. These networks now see the Marcos-Duterte feud as an opportunity to further embed themselves in the political landscape.
If Mindanao—already home to militant groups—becomes a hotbed of political violence, these cartels could exploit the chaos to expand operations, posing a direct threat to ASEAN’s regional security.
ASEAN ripple effect
While the Marcos-Duterte power struggle is rooted in the Philippines, its consequences could be felt across ASEAN.
The most immediate risk is to Malaysia, particularly in Sabah. Historically, instability in Mindanao has led to increased cross-border crime ranging from human trafficking to smuggling and piracy.
If the political feud escalates into armed conflict, a not-so-remote possibility, neighboring Malaysia could face a resurgence of kidnappings, Abu Sayyaf-linked terrorist activities and illegal arms flows.
Indonesia is also vulnerable. The maritime border between Indonesia and the southern Philippines has long been difficult to police, and an increase in lawlessness—fueled by political violence in the Philippines—could reignite radical jihadist networks in Sulawesi and Kalimantan.
For ASEAN as a whole, a politically unstable Philippines would weaken the region’s collective security framework. If Manila becomes consumed by internal conflict, its ability to contribute to regional counterterrorism efforts, maritime security and South China Sea diplomacy will diminish.
This will also give China greater room to maneuver, especially in disputed waters in the South China Sea.
Geopolitical timebomb
The Philippines’ strategic position in the First Island Chain makes it an irresistible prize for both the US and China.
Marcos Jr has clearly aligned himself with Washington, expanding American military access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). This directly threatens China’s ambitions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
But Duterte and his allies maintain strong ties to Beijing. During his presidency, Duterte secured Chinese investments and adopted a conciliatory stance toward China’s maritime incursions. If Duterte’s faction regains influence—whether through political maneuvering or force—China could push to regain its lost foothold.
This creates a dangerous scenario where Washington and Beijing could seek to intensify their involvement in Philippine domestic affairs. For instance, US intelligence agencies could ramp up operations to protect Marcos Jr, while China could engage in disinformation campaigns, economic coercion or even support pro-Duterte factions.
A politically fractured Philippines, with rival factions courting different great powers, risks becoming the next major battleground of US-China competition.
The Marcos-Duterte feud is more than just a political rivalry; it is an existential crisis with the potential to unravel the Philippine state. With factions known to be arming themselves, illicit money fueling instability and great powers potentially seeking to exploit the situation, the country is on a dangerous precipice.
For ASEAN, the risk is clear: a destabilized Philippines is a security nightmare, threatening Malaysia, Indonesia and the broader regional balance. For the US and China, the stakes are even higher—whichever holds sway in Manila controls a key strategic point in the Indo-Pacific.
If history is any guide, unchecked blood feuds in the Philippines do not end peacefully. Unless both Marcos and Duterte de-escalate their conflict, which seems unlikely with Duterte languishing in a foreign jail cell, the Philippines faces a real risk of implosion—one that would reverberate far beyond its shores.
Phar Kim Beng (PhD) is professor of ASEAN studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia