At the current 37th , Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur, differences between East Asian countries on the South China Sea matter were spewed across panels, speeches, and off-the-cuff remarks, even as delegates discussed local assistance opportunities and ASEAN centrality in an environment of worsening tremendous power tensions.
The South China Sea, according to Malaysia’s National Security Council director-general Raja Dato Nushirwan Zainal Abidin, accounts for 4 % of China’s bilateral relationship at best. Malaysia has de-emphasized the South China Sea matter and reiterated its willingness to negotiate with China with this statement.
In April last year, Prime Minister Anwar , Ibrahim said , he was willing to engage with China over its concerns that Petronas, a Malay power state-owned business, was developing a carbon capture task in the Kasawari oil industry, an place to which both countries lay state.
Anwar was criticized by the local opposition for supposedly validating China’s say to the place, a command that Anwar defended by insisting that he was merely open to negotiations. Whether or not it is real, Anwar insists on the necessity of negotiations with China and for Beijing to adhere to the guidelines set forth in the ASEAN Code of Conduct.
The problem is another claim countries, surely the Philippines, may not see conversations as the best way forward in countering China’s actions in the South China Sea. Manila has retreated from its earlier closer ties to China under the Duterte supervision under the command of Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
In recent months, Manila and Beijing have escalated into extremely alarming speech on both sides. According to Marcos, who specifically referred to current Chinese manoeuvres around the Second Thomas Shoal, the demise of any Filipino citizen as being caused by a “willful action” may be treated as being very close to an act of war.
Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro , added , that the South China Sea issue was “existential” for the country – a far cry from Malaysia’s attitude toward the dispute.  ,
The stark divergence between Kuala Lumpur’s and Manila’s approaches and, by extension, between Manila’s more forthcoming position and ASEAN’s non-interference stance is generating critical implications for intra-ASEAN ties and the relevance of the organization.
Manila is undoubtedly diversifying its sources of security and enlisting regional and international powers to back its claims, despite ASEAN’s demonstrated reluctance to do so.
The Philippines is enhancing its defense cooperation with the US and purchasing more weapons from them as a result of the US’s recent resumption as a major security partner for Manila following a brief pause during the Trump administration.
At the same time, Manila is , wooing , the EU as European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has pledged to strengthen maritime security cooperation with the Philippines. Discussions of defense agreements with the Netherlands and Norway punctuated this statement.  ,
In the region, Teodoro has also been hard at work,  , meeting , with the South Korean and Singaporean defense ministers on the sidelines of the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue to strengthen security ties.
Manila has demonstrated that if ASEAN, and particularly an ASEAN led by Malaysia in 2025, does not support its position, the nation will step in and look elsewhere for real support.
These gaps are also not only present-day leaders in power, but they are also not exclusive to them. As nationalism grows over claims in the South China Sea and international powers like the US and China prepare to court allies in their growing conflict, ASEAN member states ‘ disagreements over how to handle the disputes only grow.
As the region searches for new security arrangements in response to these differences, it may eventually condemn ASEAN to inaction and impotence.  ,
Olivia Tan, a senior analyst in Onyx’s Asia Practice who leads the firm’s work on China, is a Pacific Forum young leader. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. The content herein does not necessarily represent the views of Expeditors and its affiliates, divisions, subsidiaries, officers, directors, and employees.
This article was first published by Pacific Forum, and it is now republished with permission.